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The purpose of this research project is to examine the technical, political, social, 
organisational and cultural ‘practices’ of tax policy making in order to gain an in-
depth understanding of certain tax rules in the Chilean context. 
Consistent with a qualitative interpretivist approach, this study is informed by 
documents and three phases of face-to-face interviews with a range of actors 
engaged in the process of (re)making tax regulation. Through the views of a 
wide spectrum of participants, including policy makers (broadly defined), tax 
administrators, academics, tax practitioners and taxpayers, theoretical concepts 
were inductively developed. These concepts were combined with related tax 
policy literature and Bourdieusian concepts to construct a theoretical/conceptual 
framework which was later applied in interpreting the findings. 
The findings reveal how an élite group of agents forms a social space 
connected with the field of power. In this space, these agents define tax policy, 
draft legislation and budget for economic effects. This thesis illustrates how 
these agents mobilise different forms of capital from their respective fields in 
order to reach and access this social space. Transfer pricing processes 
highlight the fluidity of these spaces, allowing the access and influence of 
external forces. The research also shows that other stages are more distant 
from the field of power. 
The findings suggest the importance of tax knowledge and information in the 
development of tax regulation. Tax knowledge and information become a capital 
at stake which agents struggle to acquire. Empirical data show that the amount 
of tax knowledge and information in the space relating to the field of power is 
connected with the content and robustness of the transfer pricing rules under 
analysis. This research also suggests a high concentration of transfer pricing 
tax knowledge in very few agents across the bureaucratic, professional services 
and corporate/business fields. 
This research also shows the influence of social capital in the tax policy-making 
field. The findings show that bureaucrats and politicians consult with those 
connected with them who are subjects of trust. In the particularities of transfer 
pricing, the findings illustrate the importance of social capital in defining the 
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content of tax rules. Finally, the study also shows how domination and two 
forms of violence are present and exercised across the tax policy-making field. 
This is one of only a few studies that have examined the practice of tax policy 
making holistically, from the very early stages to the application of the rules in 
practice, broadly contributing in this respect to the tax policy strand of literature. 
In contrast to previous descriptive and partial studies, this study captures the 
views of actors responsible for making tax rules. It also contributes to theory 
development by translating Bourdieusian tools to analyse tax policy making. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview of the research 
This thesis is concerned with the ultimate influence of different forms of power 
on the content and robustness of tax legislation and its application in practice. 
This study illustrates the influence of design, drafting and deliberation stages on 
the implementation of tax legislation in practice. This chapter presents an 
overview of the content of this doctoral project. Section 1.2 introduces the 
objective of the study, the limitations of previous research on the subject and 
the nature of the research problem addressed here. Section 1.3 provides an 
overview of the research design, Section 1.4 presents the contribution of the 
research project and Section 1.5 briefly describes the structure of the thesis. 
1.2 Background to the research, research objective and questions 
A significant body of literature taking a black letter law approach (e.g. 
Freedman, 2005) has analysed features of tax regulation and its application. 
Features that have been extensively discussed in this tradition include 
complexity (e.g. Bittker, 1989; Eustice, 1989; McCaffery, 1990; Partlow, 2013; 
Paul, 1997; Pollack, 1994; Rady, 1989; Surrey & Brannon, 1968; Woodworth, 
1969), uncertainty (e.g. Lawsky, 2013; Osofsky, 2010) and, more generally, 
desirable characteristics of legislation (e.g. Thuronyi, 1996). However, reasons 
for legislation being the way it is are not embedded in the law itself, but in the 
tax policy processes that originate them. 
There is a relationship between good tax policy-making processes and better 
legislation (Ryan, 1999; Wales & Wales, 2012). Some scholars have accused 
the former of being responsible for poor, complex and unfair legislation (e.g. 
Eustice, 1989; Paul, 1997; Pollack, 1994; Rady, 1989; Surrey, 1969). These 
studies highlight the importance of good tax policy-making processes in 
improving tax legislation; however, these processes remain under-studied as 
the main object of inquiry, despite the importance of tax to society (Boden et al., 
2010; Martin et al., 2009; Steinmo, 1993; Stoianaff & Kaidonis, 2005). 
The few studies addressing this topic have been general and/or myopic. Some 
have neglected the social, cultural and organisational nature of taxation (Boden 
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et al., 2010; McKerchar, 2008) and its context dependence. For example, one 
strand of literature splits tax policy processes into a sequence of stages leading 
to a tax rule (e.g. Gould & Baker, 2002; Richardson, 1994; Sawyer, 2013b), but 
does not show how different characteristics of specific agents involved in the tax 
policy-making process and different power relations may affect the policy and 
legislative outcome. Others have examined particular stages/steps in producing 
tax regulation, such as policy development (e.g. Marriott, 2010; Philipps, 2006), 
the drivers of tax reform (e.g. Oats & Sadler, 2011), the role of individuals in tax 
law making (e.g. Christians, 2010a; Heij, 2007; Kraal, 2013; McGrath, 2002), 
the role of institutions in tax reform (e.g. Steinmo, 1989, 1993), consultation 
procedures (e.g. Burton, 2006, Sawyer, 1996; Stewart, 2007), lobbying activities 
(Fairfield, 2010; Rady, 1989; Roberts & Bobek, 2004), and parliamentary 
debates on tax rules (e.g. Hanna, 2006). This second branch of studies has 
isolated one particular component or stage, failing to trace how particular 
processes lead to specific legislation and its application in practice. 
In contrast to the above studies, this research project responds to calls in tax 
research to study how tax policies, rules and procedures play out in practice 
(Lamb, 2001; Oats, 2012b). Hence, this study seeks to enhance understanding 
of how legislation is made in practice by examining all stages leading to tax 
legislation and its application (design, legislation and implementation). In 
particular, this project studies how agents make decisions and how some inputs 
in the process affect legislation and its implementation. The technical, social 
and political nature of the processes examined here was a salient theme during 
the fieldwork. The following two quotations offer a preliminary insight into the 
uniqueness of this project in relation to prior research: 
I’ve always thought that it’s not right that the economic or technical 
logic will run the steamroller over the political logic because, when 
that happens, politics always take revenge. Likewise, I also believe 
that it is very unwise for the political logic to run the steamroller over 
the economic logic, because when you use the bulldozer, the 
economy alone rematches [to politics] later and the costs are paid. 
Then the field of action you have is in those issues where it is 
possible to combine the political logics with the economic logics. 
Well, that intersection is not fixed; it is something that moves over 
time and it is possible [to move] with good bargaining … and even 
also extend it, because if there is something that is very valued to 
someone, that for me is not so valued, then you can always ... 
exchange... (PM06). 
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Indeed, the [tax policy] discussion is very professional [technical] and 
political. One cannot say that the tax aspect is not political ... but 
technical too (TA05). 
These quotes highlight not only the technical side, but also that tax policy 
making involves social and political decisions (Boden et al., 2010; Infanti & 
Crawford, 2009; Radaelli, 1997; Roberts & Bobek, 2004), and that power 
relationships are central (Boden et al., 2010), although misrecognised, in these 
processes. 
A second uniqueness of the project is the context in which it was conducted. 
For a number of reasons, tax research in Chile is very limited. Chile is a small 
country in terms of inhabitants – the estimate for 2014 was 17.8 million (INE, 
2014) – and the proportion attaining tertiary education is one of the lowest 
among OECD countries (OECD, 2014c). The scenario is more distressing 
regarding research: the number of individuals holding doctoral degrees is also 
lower than other OECD countries (Abate, 2014). Consequently, the volume of 
academic research in the country is low. With regard to tax research, many tax 
specialists prefer to work in the private and public sectors where they can 
secure higher remuneration, leading to low research output. Most tax 
professionals who have an academic interest teach a few hours a week, 
spending most of their time in the private or public sector. In the economics 
discipline, research has addressed macro-economic aspects of tax. In the law 
discipline, tax research has taken a black letter law approach. On the other 
hand, in the public sector, the Department of Economic and Tax Studies of the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS)1 takes a predominantly positivist economic 
approach to research. Therefore, with a few exceptions (e.g. Fairfield, 2010; 
Sanchez, 2011), there has been very little tax research in practice. In this 
context, this study aims to contribute to an improved understanding of how tax 
policy processes develop in practice. 
A third uniqueness of the project is the timely study of the transfer pricing 
phenomenon. From a policy perspective, there is increasing interest in transfer 
pricing, as noted in the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project led by 
the OECD (2013a). It has been argued that transfer pricing generates 
opportunities to erode tax bases and shift profits between jurisdictions, for 




example through the allocation of ‘significant risks and hard-to-value intangibles 
to low-tax jurisdictions’ (OECD, 2013a, p.42). Accordingly, transfer pricing has 
been considered to be a key pressure area, and efforts are being made to 
improve and clarify transfer pricing rules (OECD, 2013a). In the Chilean context, 
the first transfer pricing rule was enacted in 1997 but was deemed to be 
severely flawed, being repealed and substituted in September 2012 with a new 
rule drawing heavily on the most up-to-date OECD Guidelines (2010a). The 
temporal space in which the fieldwork for this study was conducted largely 
overlaps with the enactment of this new and improved transfer pricing rule. 
From an academic perspective, the literature on transfer pricing is voluminous 
(Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). Some law studies have addressed, for example, 
technical specificities of the law (e.g. Ainsworth & Shact, 2012), the adequacy of 
underlying principles (e.g. Avi-Yonah, 2010; Avi-Yonah & Benshalom, 2011; 
Burke, 2011) and disputes (e.g. Baistrocchi & Roxan, 2012). In accounting, a 
series of studies has examined the effect of different tax rates, the 
establishment of prices and subsequent income shifting (e.g. Bartelsman & 
Beetsma, 2003; Eldenburg et al., 2003; Sansing, 1999; Sikka & Willmott, 2010; 
Smith, 2002) and audits (e.g. Chan & Chow, 1997). Others have integrated tax 
considerations with internal divisional performance and coordination (e.g. 
Baldenius et al., 2004) and management centralisation (e.g. Chan et al., 2006; 
Martini et al., 2012). Two black letter law studies have analysed Chilean 
legislation (e.g. Massone, 2011; Salcedo, 2009). On the other hand, 
interpretive/in-practice accounting studies have looked at how particular 
companies have implemented transfer pricing regulation (e.g. Cools et al., 
2008; Plesner Rossing, 2013), how uncertainty is managed through technical 
agreements between tax authorities and multinational companies (e.g. Rogers 
& Oats, 2013), and how different tax authorities implement transfer pricing rules 
(e.g. Sakurai, 2002). This study joins the academic conversation and adds to 
this policy by illustrating how transfer pricing rules are designed, drafted and 
implemented in practice. 
This academic interest is combined with the researcher’s professional 
experience. Prior to joining academia, the researcher held positions in the tax 
field as an auditor for a Big Four firm and as an external tax advisor to several 
SMEs, and also held a senior in-house post in accounting and taxation. The use 
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of loopholes and the manipulation of uncertainty raised questions about why 
laws are sometimes flawed. This research project emerges from the 
combination of policy-related, academic and practical interest. 
Research questions 
In order to fill the gap in research on the tax policy-making process in practice, 
this work posits the following overarching research question: 
How do power relations shape practices within the tax policy-making field? 
This question is broken into three sub-questions. 
Research Sub-Question One: How does the tax policy-making process relate to 
the field of power across its different stages? 
The tax policy-making process can be split into three stages: design, legislative 
and implementation (Gould & Baker, 2002). For the purposes of this study, the 
design stage is where tax policy is formulated, legislation drafted and its 
economic effects calculated. At the legislative stage a bill is discussed in 
parliament, and at the implementation stage a law is in place and is applied by 
taxpayers and tax authorities. Through mobilisation of Pierre Bourdieu’s 
concept of ‘field of power’, this question aims to illustrate how these stages are 
connected to the field of power to different degrees. At stages where élite 
members of society have more complete control and large amounts of capital at 
their disposal, it is shown how some actors relate, coalesce and exchange, 
while others aim to access control and struggle for the power at stake. 
Research Sub-Question Two: What is the role of tax knowledge and social 
capital in the tax policy-making field? 
It has been observed that the ‘expertise of bureaucrats gives them policy-
making power’ (Page, 2010, p.255), that parliamentarians lack tax knowledge 
(e.g. Gribnau, 2009), that corporate taxpayers acquire tax knowledge to comply 
with and plan tax obligations (e.g. Hasseldine et al., 2012), that tax authorities 
perform a technical activity using the law and produce tax knowledge in the 
form of administrative guidance (e.g. Gill, 2000; Hasseldine et al., 2011), and 
that tax practitioners use tax knowledge to render professional services (e.g. 
Keppler et al., 1991; Morris & Empson, 1998). This question explores the role of 
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tax knowledge throughout the Chilean tax policy-making process. It shows how 
knowledge is possessed, acquired and mobilised by bureaucrats, politicians, 
taxpayers and tax advisors through independent strategies and through 
consultation with those who are believed to have the necessary knowledge to 
dominate the field. It also explores the specificities of transfer pricing tax 
knowledge and its use across the policy-making process. 
This question also explores the Bourdieusian notion of social capital and its 
variant, political capital, in the tax policy process. The role of social connections 
has previously been explored in the transmission of global norms worldwide 
(Christians, 2010a). This study extends this literature by exploring how social 
and political capital affect tax policy design and drafting, parliamentary debate 
and the implementation of general corporate tax and transfer pricing legislation 
in Chile. 
Research Sub-Question Three: How are violence and domination manifested in 
the tax policy-making field? 
This question explores how domination is exercised through symbolic 
mechanisms (e.g. Alawattage, 2011; Carter & Spence, 2014; Cooper et al., 
2011; Farjaudon & Morales, 2013; Gracia & Oats, 2012; Stringfellow et al., 
2015) and structures (e.g. Farmer, 2004; Galtung, 1969) throughout the policy-
making field. It examines, for example, the role of agents in attributing particular 
characteristics to other individuals granting access to the tax field; how the IRS 
retains information through regulation to maintain an uncertain environment; 
and how tax advisors use language to distinguish from other entrants in the 
policy field. 
1.3 Overview of the research design 
This research project investigates the tax policy-making process in practice, 
answering the three research sub-questions explained in Section 1.2. Each 
question aims to meet particular objectives which are discussed further in 
Section 4.2. These questions, their objectives and different perspectives 
emerged from a wide-ranging and detailed review of the literature on tax policy 
making (Chapter Two), the results of a survey conducted in July 2012 (see 
Chapter Four) and the theoretical framework developed in Chapter Three. 
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A non-positivistic approach was considered appropriate to meet the research 
objective of gaining a better understanding of the social, political, organisational 
and cultural practices of tax policy making and answer the research questions 
presented in Chapter Four. Accordingly, the face-to-face/one-on-one interview 
method constituted the main research technique to obtain this type of data. 
Drawing on concepts taken from the literature and constructs from strands of 
various compatible theories, appropriate interview guides were prepared to 
match particular interviewees’ participation in the process. Participants at each 
stage of the tax policy process in Chile were interviewed in three rounds, 
totalling fifty-seven interviews/meetings. To support this technique, publicly 
available documents were also systematically searched and examined, 
including parliamentary session reports, IRS administrative guidance, media 
coverage and interviewees’ biographies, where available. 
Interview transcripts and documents were first manually coded and later 
computationally analysed using NVivo. This iterative analysis informed the 
choice of theory, and together informed the theoretical framework presented in 
Chapter Three. This framework is the result of a snapshot of the interplay 
between the tax policy-making literature and Bourdieusian theoretical constructs 
(Bourdieu, 1977, 1990, 1991; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Swartz, 2013). 
This theoretical framework constitutes the backcloth against which the findings 
are interpreted and presented in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. There is a 
social space in which very powerful agents make decisions on the final course 
of tax policy and drafting. This space is connected with Bourdieu’s field of power 
concept. Although parliament is powerful, given the political capital it draws from 
the support of parties and citizens, both parliament and agents participating at 
the implementation stage are less connected to the field of power than the 
executive branch, which accumulates higher levels of economic, 
cultural/informational and symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1998a; Cooper et al., 
2011). Tax knowledge and information are identified as a central theme in the 
production and application of tax legislation. This investigation suggests the 
concentration of a high level of transfer pricing tax knowledge in very few actors 
who are powerful throughout the tax policy-making field. Social capital is 
perceived to have an influence on the design and drafting of tax regulation, and 
its absence is likely to produce negative outcomes, as illustrated by the former 
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transfer pricing rule. On the other hand, this study also suggests that high levels 
of social capital influenced the robustness of the former transfer pricing rule. 
The empirical data suggest the exercise of structural violence through legal and 
institutional factors that allow the executive branch to dominate parliament, and 
similarly allow the committee of finance to dominate the rest of the legislative 
branch. Symbolic violence is also present throughout the process in the 
recognition of actors, such as external advisors and specialist teams within the 
bureaucratic field, as different from and more powerful than others. This 
symbolic violence is also manifested at the implementation stage through the 
use of language and withholding of information. 
1.4 Contributions 
This research contributes to tax scholarship in three respects. First, it adds to 
the literature on tax policy by examining how tax policy making operates in 
practice. In contrast to the partial/fragmented and general perspectives of the 
previous research described above, this study takes a more holistic approach to 
examine the general tax policy-making process and a particular and important 
provision in the international scenario in a dynamic setting. 
The second contribution is empirical. Although the methodological literature 
stipulates no hard and fast rule on the required number of interviews or time 
spent in the field (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; Tracy, 2010, p.841), interviewing a 
wide range of actors allows the provision of a big picture of the tax policy-
making process in practice, from diverse and rich perspectives. In addition, 
interviewing actors directly involved in tax policy development and legislative 
debate is significant, as their views are neither readily available in the public 
domain, nor to studies like this doctoral thesis. In this sense, direct explanations 
are more likely to be provided when ‘why did you do…?’-type questions are 
asked, rather than asking a third party or analysing documents (Langley, 1999). 
The third contribution is conceptual. This research project advances a 
theoretical framework for the analysis of tax policy making in practice, as 
described in Chapter Three. This theoretical framework draws on the political-
sociological work of Pierre Bourdieu (Swartz, 2006; Wacquant, 2004), whose 
concepts have been little used in tax research (e.g. Gracia & Oats, 2012; Kraal, 
2013). The framework has the power to interpret the findings presented in 
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Chapters Five, Six and Seven. It shows how structural legal, political, economic 
and social factors influence the tax policy-making process. It also shows 
interactions between various semi-autonomous fields and how some are more 
significant at some stages of the tax policy-making process than at others. The 
framework also portrays the rise of actors within fields, as well as access to and 
movement between fields, to increase their capital and reach higher levels of 
privilege and dominance. 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
The remainder of this thesis has seven chapters. Chapter Two reviews the 
literature on tax policy making, tax knowledge and social connections. Chapter 
Three presents Bourdieusian concepts and the conceptual framework 
developed for this research project. Chapter Four then defines the research 
problem with its associated research questions and objectives, explaining in 
detail the fieldwork activities conducted to execute this project. Chapters Five, 
Six and Seven answer the three research sub-questions posited. Chapter Five 
explains the general tax policy-making process for taxable income under 
democratic governments in Chile; Chapter Six presents the development and 
implementation of the first transfer pricing rule in Chile, enacted in 1997; and 
Chapter Seven presents the development and early implementation stages of 
the transfer pricing rule enacted in September 2012 that superseded the former 
rule. These three chapters draw on themes such as power, tax knowledge, 
information and social capital, developed after careful data analysis intertwined 
with the theoretical framework, offering further theoretical development on tax 
policy making. Finally, Chapter Eight draws conclusions and elaborates on the 
contributions of the study, as well as setting the agenda for further research. 
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Chapter Two: Tax Policy Making 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter One provided a general overview of the necessity for this research 
project. This chapter looks at existing research on the practice of tax policy 
making following the ‘simplified method’ approach (Aveyard, 2010, p.128), 
which consists of combining quantitative and qualitative studies with different 
worldviews and disciplines (Creswell, 2009). Section 2.2 presents the literature 
on tax policy making, Section 2.3 presents research regarding engagement with 
the environment. Section 2.4 presents the concept of transparency and Section 
2.5 introduces the concept of trust. Finally, Section 2.6 summarises the content 
of the chapter. 
2.2 Tax policy making 
In order to understand the central object of study of this thesis – the tax policy-
making process – this section examines various strands of research concerned 
with aspects of the process. In line with the findings of the thesis that practices 
differ at different stages of the policy-making process, this section considers the 
relevant literature dealing with three key stages: design, legislation and 
implementation. 
Broadly speaking, policy making is ‘an episode of political authorities acting 
within a formal or informal process to make a binding decision for a polity’ 
(Gould & Baker, 2002, p.88). This policy process ‘translates policy ideas into 
actual policies that are implemented and have positive effects’ (Birkland, 2011, 
p.25). 
The related literature has distinguished two approaches to studying policy 
processes. The first, known as the ‘stages model’, is portrayed linearly and 
includes the phases of issue emergence, agenda setting, selection of 
alternatives, enactment, implementation and evaluation (Birkland, 2011, p.26). 
A main criticism of this approach is that processes are not necessarily linear 
and may not go through all stages. 
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The second approach studies policy processes as ‘systems’. The inputs to 
these systems include elections, public opinion, communications with elected 
officials, media coverage of issues and personal experiences of decision 
makers, to which actors in the system react, producing outcomes which involve 
decisions about doing or not doing something (Birkland, 2011, p.26). Generally, 
outputs comprise laws, regulations and decisions. Both inputs and outputs are 
to a certain extent identifiable; however, the process of transforming inputs into 
outputs is treated as a black box. The ‘stages model’ is usually used to open 
that black box (Birkland, 2011, p.27). 
Researchers in this second tradition have argued that policy processes are 
embedded in larger contexts in which the environment influences and is 
influenced by policy processes. Birkland (2011) suggests that four forces, or 
environments, affect and are affected by processes: structural, social, economic 
and political. The structural environment comprises both basic formal features 
of government, such as the separation of powers, systems of state and federal 
government (federalism), and rules that delineate how governments operate, 
such as laws on open public meetings, and the Administrative Procedure Act 
and Freedom of Information Act in the United States. These laws have opened 
government practices to detailed scrutiny. However, this openness may cause 
conflict and delay (Birkland, 2011, p.28); therefore, citizens and policy makers 
must balance legislative speed and efficiency with democracy and citizens’ right 
to participate (ibid.). The social environment, refers to the ‘nature and 
composition of the population and its social structure’ (Birkland, 2011, p.28), in 
which concepts such as age, race and gender are of interest. The political 
environment affects and is affected by policy processes. Here, public opinion 
polling data on the ‘most important problem’ (MIP) gain relevance, reflecting the 
area in which greater levels of activity occur (Birkland, 2011, p.37). Finally, the 
economic environment includes variables such as economic growth, rate of 
growth, distribution of wealth, size and composition of industry sectors, inflation, 
the cost of labour and raw materials, and unemployment (Birkland, 2011, pp.42-
6). 
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2.2.1 Tax policy-making process approaches 
The literature examining tax policy making as a central object of study is scarce, 
and all such studies have applied a ‘stages model’. Two examples are the 
heuristic model and the generic tax policy process. 
The heuristic model (Gould & Baker, 2002) is a ‘stylised view’ (p.88), in which 
the process is presented as three sequential/linear stages: design, law making 
and implementation. The design stage involves the specification of policy goals, 
definition of priorities and ways of achieving the stated goals. The law making 
stage involves the drafting of legislation, debate, inclusion of amendments, 
voting and signing into law (p.89). Finally, the implementation phase is often 
described as the sole mission for tax authorities. 
The Generic Tax Policy Process (GTPP) is an administrative/customary or ‘soft 
law’ practice (Sawyer, 2013b, p.423), adopted in New Zealand in 1994 following 
recommendations made by a government-commissioned study to the tax 
administration (Inland Revenue Department). Conducted by a committee, the 
Organisational Review of the Inland Revenue aimed to evaluate and remedy 
problems with previous tax legislation and with the way in which the tax policy 
process was carried out. It is argued that the GTPP provides a ‘comprehensive 
and robust structure for the development, refinement and enactment of tax 
policy into legislation’ (Sawyer, 2013c, p. 584). The GTTP has five stages: 
strategic, tactical, operational, legislative and implementation (Richardson, 
1994). 
Others have studied adherence to the GTTP and its effectiveness in producing 
better legislation. For example, Vial (2012) argues that political expediency has 
dominated over due process. In practical terms, Sawyer (2013a) argues that the 
GTTP has been successful in developing New Zealand’s international tax 
regime. Sawyer (1996, 2013b, 2013c) has studied the tax policy-making 
process in New Zealand, drawing on this model in a descriptive and generic 
manner and without the support of empirical data or theorisation. 
These secondary research studies share two central features: generality and 
descriptiveness. Both Sawyer (2013b) and Gould and Baker (2002) present a 
simplistic view of tax policy making, focusing exclusively on structural elements 
such as the institutions involved and the activities carried out in each phase, 
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and disregarding inherent social practices. These studies pay closer attention to 
what is expected to occur in each phase, rather than explaining how agents 
make decisions regarding policy, law and its subsequent implementation, 
providing a limited understanding of how power relationships shape tax policy 
and legislation. Although the question of how to improve tax policy and law 
making to improve both tax law and governance outcomes has been posed by 
scholars (Stewart, 2006, p.1), an holistic and empirical approach to how tax 
policy stages develop in practice is noticeably absent from academic research. 
The present literature review confirms Gould and Baker’s (2002, p.88) finding 
that ‘current scholarship concentrates on one stage at the expense of the 
others, missing opportunities for additional insights’. In contrast to these partial 
views of tax policy processes, this thesis offers an integrated view of how tax 
policy is designed, drafted, debated, enacted and implemented. 
The next section summarises the key studies in the area of tax policy making. 
As previously mentioned, no published studies have covered the whole 
process; however, to identify gaps in the existing literature, the remaining 
section is organised according to Gould and Baker’s (2002) and Sawyer’s 
(2013b) phases of tax policy making. 
2.2.2 Design stage 
Economic study of tax systems has been extensive (Oats & Sadler, 2011), 
investigating the role of taxes in matters such as the redistribution of wealth 
(e.g. Alesina & Angeletos, 2003, Atkinson, 1971; Chamley, 2001; Judd, 1985; 
Kaplow & Shavell, 1994) and revenue raising (e.g. Smart, 2007), and also in 
setting mechanisms to ‘encourage savings, stimulating growth, ... penalizing 
consumption, directing investment and rewarding certain values while 
penalizing others’ (Steinmo, 1993, p.3), as well as their role in promoting, or not 
restricting, development and correcting market failures (Stiglitz, 2010). As the 
use of taxes is wide and varied, governments need to take into account factors 
such as distortions, collection costs and the effects of taxes on growth, as these 
factors may affect the ‘quality of taxation’ (European Commission, 2011). 
Political and fiscal policy economists have focused primarily on fiscal policy 
design, ignoring its underlying processes (Gould & Baker, 2002). 
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Some authors suggest that the design stage is a stage of trade-offs regarding 
issues concerning the tax administration, efficiency, equity, political acceptability 
and revenue collection (Burgess & Stern, 1993; Dagan, 2013; Ganghof, 2006; 
OECD, 2010b). It is at this stage that governments define the breadth and 
scope of tax reform, estimated revenue levels and timing (Gillis, 1989). 
Decisions regarding comprehensive or incremental tax reform are also set at 
this stage (Gillis, 1989; Jenkins, 1989). From a theoretical viewpoint, as these 
decisions concern the tax system, the ‘way that different taxes fit together 
matters, as does being clear about the role of each tax within the system’ 
(Mirrlees et al., 2011, p.45). However, this does not always happen in practice. 
Once policy makers have identified the people affected by tax policies, the 
objectives to be achieved are defined (Dagan, 2013). Dagan’s (2013) 
secondary research reveals that defining objectives is not easy, as these tend 
to conflict with each other, requiring policy makers to balance their decisions. At 
this point, policy makers decide on the tax base and tax rates (Ganghof, 2006; 
OECD, 2010b; Sanchez, 2006). 
The research described so far has adopted a positivist/objective approach 
based on quantitative data and the measurement of effects, ignoring the extent 
to which the design of tax policy is a social and political practice. Utz (1993) 
highlights that policy debates are not totally ‘objective/quantifiable’ but are 
dominated by economists’ assumptions and interests. Their views may relate, 
for instance, to the design of progressive or flat income tax systems aligned with 
left- or right-wing ideologies (Ganghof, 2006). This type of influence on tax 
policy is discussed below. 
Political considerations 
Tax policy design is not only the result of economic/public finance 
considerations such as those discussed above, but is also a political exercise 
(Bird & Zolt, 2008; Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010; Heij, 2007) linked to 
administrative and political costs (Ganghof, 2006). For example, Profeta (2007) 
finds that tax reforms were announced in Italy in order to attract uncertain voters 
(swing voters), and these reforms targeted a large number of voters in order to 
gain political support (Profeta, 2007). Alt et al. (2010) argue that political support 
may be retained non-transparently by levying taxes not entirely visible to 
26 
taxpayers. In a quantitative study using a large database containing information 
on several democracies, Gould (2001) found that policy makers are not only 
interested in the maximisation of revenues but also in increasing the possibility 
of re-election. Levi’s (1988) historical analysis of Australia’s compliance with 
Commonwealth tax rules suggests that prime ministers (rulers) will only propose 
tax reforms supported by their powerful constituents. Secondary research 
conducted by the OECD (2010b) groups a number of studies and argues that 
policy makers’ aspirations to retain voters are achieved by implementing 
incremental tax reforms in which there are no losers. However, such actions 
may, in the long run, be detrimental to tax revenues and/or the complexity of the 
tax system (Bradford, 1999). A second political element relates to policy 
makers’ vested interests. Policy makers are also citizens potentially affected by 
adopted policies, such as tax or environmental policy, and may be motivated to 
introduce policies to support initiatives less damaging to themselves (Wittman, 
1977; Besley, 2006). A third, more structural component is corruption, which 
should also be considered in tax design, especially in developing countries 
where it seems to be more prevalent (Stiglitz, 2010). 
These studies show that tax rules are not simply the result of economic 
considerations; however, how decisions are made in practice is largely absent 
from the related literature. Questions such as how an idea reaches or 
disappears from the tax policy agenda, who are the mobilisers of ideas for tax 
law change, how the space in which these decisions are made is formed, how 
actors from different institutions, such as parliament, access the space in which 
tax policy is changed, and how partisan discourses shape tax policy, are 
discussed in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. 
Human agency considerations 
Several studies have examined the role of agents as holders of ideas. Drawing 
on institutional analysis, Steinmo (1993, p.10) comments that different decision-
making systems shape the formulation of tax policy by influencing ‘who 
dominates the tax policy-making process, the strategic choices and ultimately 
the policy preferences of these same actors’. In analysing differences in tax 
policy direction in Ireland and New Zealand, Christensen (2013) argues that 
real-world policy making does not occur in a vacuum and that politicians closely 
interact with bureaucrats and other actors, bringing expertise and policy ideas to 
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the discussion. He suggests that the significant role of economists in New 
Zealand’s bureaucracy impacted on the neoliberal tax policy direction adopted 
by the country. In contrast, this openness was not found in Ireland, which 
adopted a more pragmatic approach dominated by civil servants, with little 
participation by economists. 
The role of experts is also highlighted by Philipps (1996), who suggests that the 
group involved in tax law and fiscal policy formation is relatively small and made 
up of élite experts whose language marginalises certain groups. In the same 
vein, Marriott (2010) suggests that, if these experts are well positioned, they are 
able to exert considerable influence over the tax policy-making process, and 
that policy suggestions need to be aligned with their thinking in order to be 
heard and adopted. 
Christians (2010a) examines the role of agents in translating global norms into 
national practice in tax reforms in China, Brazil and Turkey, arguing that, as a 
first condition for success, these agents need credibility, supported by academic 
credentials and élite affiliations; they also need political effectiveness to access 
the political leadership, achieved through ties with the media and political 
networks; and, as ‘agents of change’, they need financial resources to perform 
their tasks. 
Heij (2007) also examines the role and features of individuals in promoting tax 
reforms in Indonesia and Vietnam. She finds that senior officers had some 
freedom to promote tax reform but were constrained by the regimes’ rulers. 
Similarly, Kraal’s (2013) ongoing two-stage research examines the role of a 
particular politician in successful and failed tax reforms in Australia. 
These studies suggest that the number and features of individuals involved in 
designing and drafting tax legislation differ between developing and 
industrialised nations. These individuals are generally professional lobbyists, 
policy analysts, lawyers, accountants and economists (Thuronyi, 1996, p.1), of 
which there are fewer in developing countries. Consequently, tax policy 
processes become a battle in which different actors compete to impose their 
own views on which policies should be adopted and passed through the 
legislature (Thuronyi, 1996). A large number of actors with different views on 
fairness, growth or competitiveness makes trade-offs more difficult. 
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Therefore, a combination of economic, political, human-agency and 
international developments may explain why tax policy differs between 
countries. Stein et al. (2006) illustrate this well, stating that, although countries 
may face the same economic environment, ‘there is clearly no economic model 
that explains tax policy outcomes’ (p.185). In contrast, they suggest that 
different political institutions and political actors determine policy outcomes. In a 
similar vein, Avi-Yonah and Margalioth (2007) argue that it is impossible to 
design a generalised tax system, as each country has particular features. Bird 
et al. (2008) argue that tax policies that work for one country may not 
necessarily work in another. 
International tax policy developments 
In other cases, domestic tax policies converge with international tax policy. Oats 
and Sadler (2011) refer to this homogeneity in international development as a 
source of tax rule change, arguing that tax systems do not operate in isolation 
and need to be attuned to other jurisdictions. In this respect, countries tend to 
benchmark and imitate what others are doing: supranational institutions, such 
as the OECD, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union, 
have a significant impact on the diffusion of international tax policy and its 
subsequent adoption in domestic contexts (Sharman, 2012; Tanzi, 1994). For 
instance, in examining the influence of the OECD on domestic tax policies, 
Christians (2010b) argues that, as a result of transnational networks, this 
institution is recognised as ‘an expert body entitled to reference’, becoming a 
‘credible source of information’ that countries draw upon to create domestic 
norms through the mechanism of ‘emulation’ (p.27). In tax policy design, some 
OECD countries align with or try to compete with others, and use the fact that 
other countries are using a certain mechanism to justify the need for a domestic 
law change (p.28). Some pertinent examples of the influence of the OECD on 
domestic regulation for the purposes of this thesis include the model tax 
conventions on negotiation of double taxation agreements and transfer pricing 
guidelines (Sharman, 2012). 
In summary, taxation choices depend on the level of development, the need 
and desire for more public services, the capacity to levy taxes effectively, the 
availability of other sources of revenue such as natural resources and foreign 
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aid, preferences about the distribution of income, wealth and economic growth 
(Bird & Zolt, 2008, p.75). 
Despite a high level of economic understanding, these studies are highly 
descriptive, overlooking the underlying processes involved in the design phase 
(Gould & Baker, 2002). These processes are varied in nature, including social, 
political and cultural. At this stage, two studies overcome some of the limitations 
by adopting a multidisciplinary perspective, uncovering tax policy-making 
processes in practice. 
The first study is by Heij (2007), who studies factors in practice and actors who 
influenced the 1983 Indonesian income tax reform and the 1987-1994 
Vietnamese corporate income tax reform. Using qualitative data in the form of 
documents and interviews, her study aims to explain the role of international 
influences, the economic situation, crisis, state structure, interest groups and 
political responses in these reforms, adopting a fiscal sociological lens. 
Although it provides a comprehensive, general and macro overview of the 
design phase, both legislation and implementation are cursorily discussed. A full 
account of how decisions were made in parliament or by the tax authority is 
absent. 
The second study is Marriott’s (2010) research on retirement savings policy 
development in Australia and New Zealand, which examines the impact of 
individual and institutional power, as well as the influence of interest groups on 
the course of policy direction in both countries. Informed by extensive qualitative 
data and theoretically inspired by historical institutionalism, the study highlights 
the extent of consultation and access to the development of tax policy. 
However, this study does not distinguish the different forms of power at play, 
nor does it explain the subsequent phases of drafting, debate and 
implementation. 
Although these two studies are relevant to the content of this research, a 
number of questions are not fully answered. How does a policy/idea reach the 
technical and political agenda? How is the configuration of 
participants/interested parties established in practice beyond the structural 
elements or institutions of tax policy making? What are the necessary 
conditions for participation in this stage? Why and how are certain principles 
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preferred over others? This thesis aims to answer these questions in practice, in 
particular with regard to legislation on profits and transfer pricing. 
2.2.3 Legislative stage 
Once agreed, tax policy is translated into written legislation according to the rule 
of law which states that taxes ‘can be levied only if a statute lawfully enacted so 
provides’ (Vanistendael, 1996, p.1). This sub-section commences with the 
drafting sub-phase, followed by parliamentary debate. 
Drafting 
Drafting practice has been more carefully examined by the legal discipline, 
which has suggested that a clear underlying policy is likely to be successfully 
translated into legal statutes (e.g. Sortie, 2010). This idea is shared in the 
specific field of tax. Some scholars have commented that the 
simplicity/complexity and articulation of underlying tax policy influence the 
drafting of a good tax rule (e.g. Freedman, 2010; James & Wallschutzky, 1997; 
McKerchar et al., 2008a; Sawyer, 2013a). Although a link between policy and 
good law has been identified, how that link is achieved in practice is noticeably 
absent from academic research. Questions such as how the articulation of 
policy is achieved, what are the mechanisms used in practice to assess whether 
policy is properly translated into tax statues, and what are the competences 
required to do so have been little explored in practice. 
Another group of studies has examined who drafts policy. Law scholarship has 
suggested that drafts may be prepared by domestic specialists or foreign 
draftsmen, in a centralised or decentralised way (Sortie, 2010). Competences 
required by draftsmen to produce good legislation include extensive knowledge 
of the law and its adoption processes, mastery of the language, and intellectual 
depth to carry out the task properly (Karpen, 2008; Sortie, 2010). The legal 
literature suggests that knowledge is a key ingredient for drafting law 
adequately. In the field of tax, knowledge seems usually to be found 
domestically in drafters in a working group of the ministry of finance (Gordon & 
Thuronyi, 1996) or in the tax authorities that draft tax statutes in some countries 
(Stein et al., 2006). More than one agency may be responsible for drafting legal 
statutes (Sortie, 2010). These studies fail to provide a detailed account of how 
knowledge is acquired and the consequences of lack of knowledge. Questions 
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may be posited about whether the drafting group is a site of struggle and 
competition or collaboration, and about the mechanisms for coordination if more 
than one organisation is involved in the drafting, in order to gain a deeper 
understanding of the tensions to which Goode (1990) refers. 
If bureaucrats, broadly speaking, are not experts (Page, 2010), then tax 
knowledge must be sought elsewhere. Foreign drafters are sometimes 
appointed to work closely with a local drafter, providing supervision and support, 
as found by Heij (2007) in a study of the 1983 tax reform in Indonesia, given the 
low levels of education of the population. Heij (2007) provides some insights 
into how the economic environment drove tax reforms in Indonesia and 
Vietnam, making some references to the drafting process; however, how 
knowledge influenced the drafting and how the drafting procedure itself was 
conducted were not a central theme in the research. Foreign drafters/advisors 
are expected to have knowledge of comparative law and tax policy, language 
skills and drafting experience (Gordon & Thuronyi, 1996). These foreign 
draftsmen/advisors may also be supranational institutions. For example, the 
IMF provides assistance in drafting simple and clear legal statutes (IMF, 
2007b). Although it might be deduced that knowledge is a key competence for 
an external drafter, Heij (2007) suggests that these appointments may also 
serve a political purpose, demonstrating the legitimacy of the legal outcomes. 
As previously noted, these studies tend to describe the type of knowledge 
sought in these external members, whereas the social and political reasons for 
their appointment have not been examined in detail in the related literature. A 
number of questions deserve further examination, as this study does in practice. 
For instance, what are the consequences of appointing an external member 
who is also an actor in the professional services field? Is there conflict or 
domination between internal and external drafters? What mechanisms are used 
to solve disagreements in the drafting group? How do power relationships affect 
the content and robustness of tax legislation? 
Another strand of research has examined characteristics of the tax statutes 
produced. Some scholars argue that simple language is an important attribute 
of tax legislation, although opinions differ (Cooper, 2010). McBarnet and 
Whelan (1991) suggest that complex legislation arises from a desire for extra 
precision and explicitness in the rules. Other scholars are more concerned with 
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certainty and length. Freedman (2010), for example, argues that a principle-
based approach would result in shorter legislation (see also McBarnet, 2002, 
2006; but see Cooper, 2010 in relation to the Australian and UK experiences). 
In the UK, the Office of Tax Simplification (OTS) uses the length of legislation 
as an index of complexity. Sawyer (2013a) disagrees with this measure, arguing 
that it is not length that reduces simplicity but unstable underlying policy. More 
broadly, Thuronyi (1996) has listed four features that tax laws should meet: 
understandability, organisation, effectiveness and integration. These umbrella 
concepts include more specific features of research, such as brevity (e.g. 
James & Wallschutzky, 1997), reader-friendliness (Sullivan, 2001), sentence 
structures (e.g. Thuronyi, 1996), transparency (IMF, 2007a), use of diagrams 
(e.g. Woellner et al., 2007), numbering and headings (Thuronyi, 1996), 
organisation (e.g. Thuronyi, 1996; Vanistendael, 1996), effectiveness (e.g. 
Mulligan, 2008; Tan, 2011; Thuronyi, 1996), ambiguity (e.g. Thuronyi, 1996), 
drafting models (IMF, 2007b), and costs (e.g. Sandford, 1992). Vording et al. 
(2007) group some of these concepts to refer to ‘quality of tax legislation’. One 
practitioner suggests that quality of legislation refers to ‘anomalies’ and 
‘complexity’ (Sanger, 2012). Some research has suggested how to assess and 
improve the standard of the legislation. Gordon and Thuronyi (1996) suggest 
that involvement of the ministry of justice might improve the adequacy of 
legislation. Karpen (2008) proposes that the quality of legislation should be 
assessed using the ‘regulatory impact assessment’ technique (see Appendix 1). 
These features are important during the drafting decision-making process. 
Previous studies have identified desirable and undesirable features of tax 
regulation, whereas the role of knowledge and cooperation, as well as the 
mechanisms used to improve the standard of legislation, have been little 
explored in the literature. This study explores how such decisions are made in 
practice. 
Parliamentary debate 
In the context of general law, it has been suggested that the robustness of 
legislation depends on the level of education and experience of legislators and 
politicians (Karpen, 2008). In an accounting study, Hoffmann and Zulch (2014) 
suggest that, in Germany, parliamentarians have insufficient knowledge and 
expertise and are therefore considered as lay people. The situation may be 
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similar in the taxation field. Gribnau (2009, p.3) comments that members of the 
Dutch parliament generally lack expertise in taxation and are unable to deal with 
the complexities of tax law in drafting tax bills. Wales and Wales (2012) provide 
qualitative evidence showing that most politicians are not experts in ‘tax law, tax 
policy or economics. They are simply professional politicians’.2 Similarly, 
Eustice (1989, p.13) argues that ‘congressmen are not primarily technicians; 
they are generalists. They certainly do not fully understand all the technical 
implications of the provisions ... Nor do they always have the practical viewpoint 
of how the law is going to be applied’. 
Another group of studies show the effects of knowledge on access to the policy-
making process. Parliamentarians’ lack of knowledge allows interest groups to 
influence parliamentary discussion of (accounting) standards (Hoffmann & 
Zulch, 2014). Specialist knowledge on matters under discussion would allow 
parliamentarians to evaluate the information provided by technical experts or 
interest groups; however, that would not always be efficient. In this respect, 
Burns (1999, pp.174-9) argues that states and elected representatives cannot 
afford to acquire and maintain specific knowledge in all areas with which they 
deal. Specific knowledge in parliament could be acquired by reading documents 
or through instruction by others. Lobbyists use these methods to intervene in 
debates (Hofmann & Zulch, 2014). With regard to tax policy making, it is argued 
that those negatively affected by tax policies attempt to prevent their 
implementation by exerting influence and blocking enactment in parliament, or 
by persuading parliamentarians to maintain the status quo (Olofsgard, 2003). 
Accordingly, parliamentarians are able to alter the course of tax policy 
significantly during parliamentary debates (Bird, 2004; Gould, 2001; Steinmo & 
Tolbert, 1998). 
Although these studies have improved understanding of the work conducted in 
parliament and outsiders’ efforts to access parliamentary decisions, they have 
ignored the underlying process of knowledge acquisition and the types of 
decisions made in passing tax legislation when knowledge is entirely absent. To 
                                            
2
 Wales and Wales’ (2012) qualitative study analyses tax policy-making processes in various 
countries up to the production of legislation, including consultation. Although their study includes 
the legislative stage, there is no detailed analysis of how certain courses of action produce 
specific tax rules. 
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what extent do they consult experts in the field? What conditions must these 
experts meet to be considered as legitimate sources of knowledge and 
information? And how useful is that knowledge acquisition in passing 
legislation? These questions are addressed in Chapters Five, Six and Seven of 
this thesis. 
A third group of studies examines the political role of parliamentarians. Cowley’s 
(1995) study shows how the British parliament became a channel for 
manifesting ‘post hoc’ discontent with the poll tax. In this case, parliamentarians 
decided to repeal the poll tax in order to keep their seats in parliament and 
power in their political parties. In order to maintain dominance, parliamentarians 
are more likely to listen to those funding their political campaigns and those 
whose votes may help with or guarantee re-election (Olofsgard, 2003). 
Procedures for influencing tax policy and law have been also studied. For 
example, Hanna (2006) examined two ways in which US parliamentarians 
passed tax legislation: gimmicks and fakes. Gimmicks refer to actions such as 
when the legislation passed involves changes that are hidden from general view 
and may benefit certain taxpayers through the use of non-code provisions, 
alternative minimum tax rates to lower revenues, and delayed effective dates 
and transition rules to diminish revenue costs. These regulations are not part of 
the code and cannot be found in the tax act itself or in its legislative history 
(Hanna, 2006, pp.657-8). On the other hand, fakes involve changes to tax laws 
that are not hidden from general view. In fact, such changes are open and 
straightforward, but may accomplish a purpose not easily understood by 
taxpayers and tax advisors. This study adds to this literature by examining 
different factors – cultural, legal, economic and political – and how they are 
weighed up by parliamentarians in passing legislation. Although previous 
studies have shown how parliamentarians are dominated by their constituents, 
they overlook how members of parliament dominate their peers. This study 
analyses these questions by looking at general processes and transfer pricing 
policy making. 
2.2.4 Implementation 
The legislative stage produces a tax statute that is implemented in practice by 
tax authorities and taxpayers, whose relationship is sometimes mediated by tax 
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practitioners or intermediaries (OECD, 2008). This sub-section presents a range 
of studies concerned with the practices of these actors. 
Tax administration 
The implementation stage is concerned mainly with the tax administration and 
its capacities. Casanegra de Jantscher (1987, p.25) asserts that ‘tax 
administration is tax policy’. This suggests that adequate implementation of tax 
policy requires a strategy and political support (Gordon & Thuronyi, 1996, p.3; 
Bird & Zolt, 2008). Sometimes this political support is manifested through the 
recognition of a tax authority as a technical force, allowing it to perform its 
functions in tackling tax evasion independently (Sanchez, 2011). Alternatively, 
tax authorities may not be purely technical, but also political. For example, Kim 
(2008) discusses the connection between politics and tax authorities, showing 
how politicians exert influence through the appointment of personnel to high 
positions, affecting internal practices. 
Tax authorities perform a number of functions, such as drafting tax legislation, 
and issuing administrative guidance to facilitate compliance and audits. These 
are discussed in turn. Hasseldine et al. (2011) conducted a qualitative study 
with interviews to understand how changes in legislation are brought about by 
tax authorities and captured by tax advisors and taxpayers. These authors 
equate the relationship between these three actors to a market: the tax 
administration is a knowledge seller, tax advisors are brokers, and taxpayers 
are buyers. Knowledge produced by tax authorities includes the provision of 
notes, guidance, articles and publications (Gribnau, 2009 refers to this material 
as a form of soft law), which flow to users of tax information such as taxpayers. 
Hasseldine et al.’s study enhances academic understanding of the practices of 
tax authorities; however, the production of such guidance is rather ignored. 
Their analysis focuses on the technical aspects of corporate tax in the UK 
context, overlooking the role of politics in making and implementing regulation. 
How administrative guidance is issued and how power relations shape content 
are areas analysed in the present study. 
A large body of scholarship deals with attempts by tax authorities to secure 
compliance from taxpayers. Tax authorities conduct audits to enforce 
compliance (e.g. Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; Braithwaite, 2003) and adopt a 
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range of strategies to encourage compliance, including persuasive 
communications (e.g. Hasseldine et al., 2007; Hite, 1989, 1997) and the 
strategic selection/sampling of tax returns for audit (Alm et al., 1993). Many of 
these studies have deployed surveys and experimental techniques which 
assume a narrow view of rationality, thereby potentially failing to reveal the 
power relationships at play between taxpayers and authorities. 
In contrast to the more positivist/quantitative approach to the study of tax 
compliance, a growing body of critical-interpretive tax literature is addressing 
tax audits in practice. Using data from 142 interviews with revenue agents in 
four different locations in the US, Pentland and Carlile (1996) give a full account 
of how tax audits are conducted in practice. Their study highlights the emotional 
and rational/economic perspective in the domain of asymmetric information 
between inspectors and taxpayers. Other scholars have adopted ethnographic 
methods to explore audit practices. For example, Boll (2011) shows how audits 
are planned and conducted by the Danish Revenue Service (SKAT) in small 
businesses, and how the latter defend their non-compliant behaviour. In a later 
study, Boll (2014a) examines how tax inspectors in Denmark make decisions on 
what/who to audit in an inverted invoice project relating to sales of cars. 
Theoretically inspired by Foucauldian and Latourian concepts, Boll’s analysis 
focuses on how tax inspectors construct narrow images of taxpayers, 
disregarding other areas in which fraud may be more severe and never seeing 
all aspects of taxpayers’ transactions. In another ethnographic study, Boll 
(2014b) shows how tax compliance embeds a ‘socio-material assemblage’ of 
heterogeneous entities, including humans, to construct a network that leads to 
judgments of compliance or non-compliance in tax audits. These studies focus 
on audit procedures when legislation has some degree of certainty, but the 
mechanisms used by tax authorities when specific legislation is uncertain are 
absent from this strand of research. 
The effects of these audits on taxpayers have been also examined in practice. 
A seminal critical tax study conducted by Preston (1989), inspired by 
Foucauldian concepts, examined how the British tax authority influenced, 
intentionally or otherwise, the adoption and development of accounting 
practices in a record company. Focusing on individual taxpayers, Lamb (2001), 
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also inspired by Foucauldian concepts, examined tax practices and their 
accounting effects in mid-nineteenth-century Great Britain. 
Some scholars have been concerned with the role of tax inspectors. Bird 
(1999), for example, comments that recruiting and training people with 
knowledge and adopting institutional structures is slower than writing new laws. 
Tax inspectors need certainty about the law in order to enforce statutes 
(Newbery, 1987), and this is gained through training (Bird, 1999) – although, 
importantly, real practices may differ from the legal statutory system (Mansfield, 
1988). As noted, knowledge plays a pivotal role in the implementation of tax 
legislation; however, these studies adopt a generic/context-independent and 
descriptive approach, ignoring how knowledge is acquired and accessed by tax 
officials in practice, and how such knowledge acts as a power resource to 
secure compliance. 
In contrast to this abstract approach, Oats and Tuck’s (2008) critical tax study 
examines how overlap between accounting and tax profits forced the British tax 
authority (HMRC) to recruit professionals with accounting knowledge and 
experience in order to secure the compliance of large corporates. Also within 
the interpretive tradition, Tuck (2010) examines the role of technical 
competence, which gives some sense of legitimacy by making the official 
appear ‘skilled and knowledgeable’ (p.594), mixed with other capabilities of a 
strategic and marketing nature. Chapters Six and Seven examine the 
restructuring of the Chilean tax authority (IRS) in order to access technical 
knowledge and other skills to implement transfer pricing regulation. 
Regarding the use of technology by tax authorities, Newbery (1987, p.200) 
states that one of their most difficult problems is to ‘collect and process the 
information efficiently’. Information technology makes their practices more 
efficient (van den Noord & Heady, 2001). These studies differ from the critical-
interpretive approach as they are descriptive, rather than explaining the 
underlying processes and struggles confronting tax administrations in collecting 
and using tax information. As will be shown in Chapter Six, gathering 
information on taxpayers’ international transactions has become a real 
challenge for tax authorities. 
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Bird (2004) argues that, overall, it is interaction between people, material and 
information (including law and procedures) that produces revenues. This 
interaction is viewed similarly by Alm and Torgler (2011, p.645), who see tax 
authorities as having a ‘production function’; the inputs mentioned by Bird 
(2004) not only produce revenues, but also taxpayer satisfaction and equity 
considerations as outcomes. McKerchar and Evans (2009) argue that tax 
authorities need to strengthen their organisational, institutional and managerial 
structures to perform their work adequately. In this respect, for example, Eissa 
and Jack (2010) show how Kenya reformed its organisational structure, creating 
a Large Taxpayer Office (LTO) to monitor taxpayers that contribute significantly 
to revenues. Nonetheless, transferring greater responsibilities and power to this 
LTO met with some internal resistance, as other departments/units perceived 
their loss of taxpayers as detrimental to their prestige and influence. In contrast 
to these general statements about how tax authorities work and partial accounts 
of their constituent elements, this study examines the interaction in practice 
between knowledge, technology, inspectors’ personal characteristics, 
organisational structure and the law, providing a holistic view of attempts by the 
IRS to implement specific laws. 
One body of work considers the relationship between features of tax legislation 
and the way it is implemented. Hume et al. (1999) suggest that ambiguity in tax 
legislation acts as a source of dilemma, constraining enforcement capacities. In 
the Australian context, the complexity of a specific rule hindered the tax 
authority’s work, as it had to issue extensive administrative guidance in order to 
implement it (Kenny, 2010). In contrast, good regulation appears to improve the 
scenario. Simple legislation is a ‘blessing’ (Gribnau, 2009, p.4). If tax inspectors 
find it difficult to determine whether or not a taxpayer is compliant (Erard, 1997), 
tax collection costs increase (Torgler et al., 2008).3 There is evidence to 
suggest that governments that collect with low administrative costs are more 
successful (Lindert, 2003, p.936). It is believed that administrative costs are 
generally higher in developing countries (Gallagher, 2005). Functionalist 
                                            
3 These costs are generally referred to as administrative/administration costs. Turner et al. 
(1998, p.63) define administration costs as follows: ‘these are the costs to the government of 
collecting the tax. They include staff salaries and labour on-costs at all levels in the relevant tax 
collection agency; accommodation costs; information technology costs, travel, and sundry 
administration’. 
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accounts of these studies are largely abstracted from practical processes. In 
contrast, the present study shows the IRS’ struggle, in practice, to implement 
transfer pricing regulation over a number of years. 
A more recent strand of scholarship based on economic psychology is 
concerned with trust in tax authorities (Kirchler et al., 2008). Wahl et al. (2010) 
suggest that higher levels of trust could be gained through ‘fair procedures’ (e.g. 
citizens’ participation in legislation), or through friendly and service-oriented 
behaviour by tax authorities (e.g. offering help with filling in forms correctly). On 
this last point, the concept of a ‘service paradigm’ in tax administration has 
emerged, emphasising the role of the tax administration as a ‘facilitator and 
service provider to taxpayer-citizens’ (Alm & Torgler, 2011, p.646). Tax 
authorities’ provision of low-cost information to taxpayers to complete their tax 
returns positively affects tax compliance (Alm et al., 2010). A customer-
unfriendly tax authority has higher compliance costs (Eichfelder & Kegels, 
2014). In contrast to these positivist studies focusing on individuals, this 
research examines in practice how IRS-educated corporate taxpayers and their 
advisors complied with a new rule (see Chapter Seven). 
The trend for rebranding taxpayers as customers has also been examined in 
the literature. Tuck et al.’s (2011) interview-based UK study argues that this 
trend is problematic and entails a high degree of ambiguity in the definition of 
customers. Rebranding is not just about the name but also about concrete 
actions carried out by the HMRC, such as customer segmentation strategies, 
customer relationship management techniques, and measurements of 
satisfaction levels. These researchers argue that, in any case, rebranding 
taxpayers as customers alters the relationship between the state and the users 
of its services. Continuing this research, Tuck (2013), mobilising Foucauldian 
concepts, examines how the taxpayer is being ‘remade’ as a visible customer, 
despite resistance from large taxpayers who do not understand what is the 
service being delivered. HMRC has ‘embedded’ (p.127) the discourse of the 
customer, and has subsequently adopted new practices such as negotiation, 
leading to more intimate connections with large corporates. This new 
relationship has been criticised for being too ‘cosy’ (p.127). In this relationship, 
Tuck argues that the regulatee reconstructs the regulator. 
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Writing from a behavioural economics perspective, Alm and Torgler (2011) 
propose the ‘trust paradigm’, which incorporates the roles of morality, social 
norms and other factors. This new paradigm works by, for example, using mass 
media to highlight tax compliance as ethical behaviour, targeting groups to 
introduce them to the notion of compliance as the right thing to do, emphasising 
the relationship between tax payments and services provided by government, 
and re-educating individuals who think that tax evasion is right. This model 
suggests that by leveraging the trust paradigm the tax administration may 
achieve its goals and foster compliance. In the end, citizens who trust their tax 
authorities will be voluntarily compliant and refrain from evasion when the 
probability of detection is low, while evasion is likely to occur if they distrust the 
tax administration (Wahl et al., 2010, pp.400-1). 
Taking a more structural perspective, Bird (1999, p.73) lists various factors that 
have an impact on tax administration, such as institutionalisation of corruption, 
criminalisation of politics, standards of public morality, attitudes toward peers’ 
compliance, and modernisation of the economy and the legal environment as a 
whole. 
Taxpayers 
A second participant in the implementation stage is the taxpayer, either a 
corporation or an individual. This study focuses on the literature on 
corporations. In order to implement legislation, corporations capture ‘tax 
knowledge and implement informal and/or formal systems to enable routine tax 
compliance while engaging in volitional planning and avoidance activity as 
determined by various factors’ (Hasseldine et al., 2012, p.535). This suggests 
that knowledge is necessary to implement tax legislation. One mechanism used 
by companies to organise tax knowledge is organisational structure. Porter’s 
(1999) UK survey found that large companies are more likely to have an in-
house tax department, and that those with in-house departments spend most of 
their time on tax compliance activities rather than on tax planning. 
Technologies and organisational structures have changed how transactions are 
reported to tax authorities. Modern computers have made information control 
easier, while easing the burden on the tax collector (Stiglitz, 2010). Taxpayers 
use simple artefacts and procedures to comply with regulation. Boll (2014b) 
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studied how IT systems, IT reminder messages, procedures, documents, pens 
and ring-binders assisted taxpayers’ compliance in Denmark. What these 
studies have in common is that they focus on general aspects of compliance 
with legislation, rather than on a particular piece of legislation. 
Other interpretive research in management accounting has examined the 
implementation of specific tax rules in multinational companies. For example, 
Plesner Rossing (2013) conducted an interview-based study of how and to what 
extent management accounting and management control systems are 
contingent on organisational and environmental circumstances, specifically 
transfer pricing. Using a single multinational enterprise (MNE) which was 
implementing a compliance-oriented transfer pricing strategy, he shows how a 
company transformed its management control systems to be compliant with the 
external environment, paying attention to belief systems, interactive control 
systems and the role of agents in accessing and sharing information on transfer 
pricing within inter-organisational networks in order to reduce uncertainty. 
Similarly, Cools et al. (2008) studied the influence of transfer pricing tax 
compliance on the design of management control systems in an MNE based in 
the US which was implementing transparent tax-compliant transfer pricing 
policies. In particular, this company used a single set of transfer pricing 
methods and records for management control and for tax purposes. In 
implementing such a strategy, this study highlights the cohesion of all managers 
in designing a tax-compliant strategy and adhering to that plan. As shown, 
these studies have focused on management accounting practices, but not on 
the actual reporting of tax obligations to tax authorities, as the present study 
does. 
Features of the law have an impact on the way in which taxpayers relate to it. 
Uncertainty may prevent taxpayers from completing tax returns by themselves, 
making the system less fair as they resort to tax practitioners (Murphy, 2004b). 
PwC (2011) has shown a positive relationship between the perception of 
complicated/very complicated legislation and hours spent on compliance 
activities. Transfer pricing is a type of legislation that carries a high level of 
uncertainty, and one way of protecting against such uncertainty is through 
signing advance pricing agreements (APAs). Rogers and Oats (2013) examined 
the use of this mechanism in practice in the UK and the US and found that the 
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mechanism is not widely used. Another feature of some legislation is ambiguity, 
which serves as a source of power to dominate at the implementation stage. 
Suchman and Edelman (1996) argue that ambiguity may be used by regulatees 
as ‘political resources’ to serve their interests by negotiating the content of 
legislation and reconstructing the content and themselves in a reciprocal 
relationship. In a qualitative study regarding the use of power and vested 
interests, Covaleski et al. (2005) analyse how stakeholders interpreted, 
negotiated and agreed on the meaning of tax incremental financing 
programmes in the US, even though they were concrete with little uncertainty. 
In those cases where uncertainty and loopholes are more evident, taxpayers 
use these flaws in legislation to reduce tax payments (Gracia & Oats, 2012; 
Hasseldine & Morris, 2013). Fairfield (2010) suggests that large firms use this 
mechanism to reduce tax liabilities. In an international context, Sikka and 
Willmott (2010) extend these arguments, arguing that multinationals use 
transfer pricing to retain wealth. 
These studies have provided valuable knowledge on how taxpayers deploy a 
series of techniques to comply with or avoid tax obligations. However, none has 
discussed the forms in which specific legislation is applied for tax purposes in 
more than one organisation. Plesner Rossing (2013) and Cools et al. (2008) 
discuss the connection between transfer pricing and management accounting 
systems, and how the latter are affected and transformed in practice; however, 
little attention is paid to the tax compliance processes and the relationship 
established with tax authorities in doing so. How is uncertain legislation applied 
in practice? How does such uncertainty affect the relationship between 
taxpayers and tax authorities? What forms of power are present in 
implementing particular legislation? These are questions which this thesis aims 
to address. 
Tax practitioners 
Tax practitioners are a third actor visibly involved in the implementation phase, 
acting as intermediaries between tax authorities and taxpayers (OECD, 2008). 
Their role has received considerable attention in the tax compliance literature 
(Murphy, 2004a). Their intermediary position may be justified by lack of 
technical knowledge (Morris & Empton, 1998) or as a form of insurance pending 
a response from tax authorities (Hasseldine et al., 2011). 
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Tax practitioners are known for playing a dual role at the implementation stage 
of tax rules (Keppler et al., 1991). On the one hand, these intermediaries 
allegedly exploit loopholes (e.g. Sikka & Hampton, 2005; Sikka, 2010; Tan, 
2011), and on the other hand, they transfer knowledge to taxpayers (Hasseldine 
et al., 2011), enforcing compliance (Keppler et al., 1991). From a more critical 
perspective, Gracia and Oats (2012) comment that tax advisors inculcate 
existing tax practices into taxpayers. 
Several scholars have examined the ethical dimension of the work of tax 
practitioners. For example, Shafer and Simmons (2008) analyse the 
participation of tax professionals in tax avoidance schemes and suggest that the 
facilitation of strategies such as aggressive or questionable tax shelters is 
connected with ethics and professionalism. Similarly, Stuebs and Wilkinson 
(2010) argue that ethical breakdowns are the consequence of the increased 
and explicit pursuit of commercial gain at the expense of emphasis on the public 
interest. Although these views may portray an image of selfish professionals 
focusing almost exclusively on financial gains derived from the execution of the 
profession, they also worry about their reputation. In a qualitative interview-
based study conducted by Doyle et al. (2009), advisors highlighted the 
importance of reputation in providing tax advice and how they consciously avoid 
unnecessary conflicts with authorities in the UK and Ireland. 
Attempts have been made to resolve tax advisors’ misdoings through explicit 
regulation. McKerchar et al.’s (2008b) study reveals how regulation of tax 
advisors proved to be effective in lodging individual taxpayers’ returns in 
Oregon in the US. In particular, they examined the effect of tax practitioner 
regulation from three aspects: mathematical errors, and potential reporting 
discrepancies of $10 or more for interest income and audit income. Their 
conclusions suggest that imposing penalties for non-compliance directly on 
practitioners might lead to a more accurate service and a lower probability of 
supplying aggressive tax advice. 
As this sub-section has illustrated, there is some level of understanding of the 
roles performed by tax advisors, but not of the way these are performed in 
practice. This study examines the role of knowledge and its use as a currency 
of exchange for other forms of value and legitimacy. It aims to provide a more 
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nuanced understanding of how knowledge is mobilised and how consultancy 
firms dominate the implementation stage (Stringfellow et al., 2015). 
2.2.5 Post implementation review 
At the implementation stage, tax revenues may be reduced, the tax authority 
may face an increasing number of problems, compliance and administrative 
costs may increase (Bird, 1999), or the courts may be unable to impose the tax 
(Vanistendael, 1996). These aspects may indicate that legislation is not meeting 
its policy goals. Various scholars have suggested that problems with legislation 
arise from the inability of policy makers to foresee all extensions and impacts of 
legislation on business, as a result of a disorderly legislative process, or chaotic 
amendments at the last minute, leaving gaps and loopholes in the tax law 
(Logue, 2006; Vanistendael, 1996, pp.29-30; Weisbach, 1999). As a 
consequence of these deficiencies, ‘tax law is not always precise’ (James et al., 
2001, p.160). Although stability of tax rules and policy is a desirable feature of 
the tax system (House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2011, p.22), tax law 
change is sometimes inevitable to maintain the functioning of the system. 
Silvani (1992) indicates that, having detected how taxes are being under-
reported, the problem might be overcome by refining the legal provisions. 
A tax law change requires further state intervention. In the UK and Australia, 
there have been efforts to improve legislation through rewrite projects. In the 
UK, the project was first called a ‘simplification’ project, but its focus then 
changed to rewriting legislation to accomplish its goals (Rogers, 2008). The 
wording was also important in this rewrite project, in which modern language 
was accompanied by formulae, tables and method statements where 
appropriate (Salter, 2010, p.680). Others view this rewording task with caution. 
Sawyer (2013a) questions whether new words may lead to greater uncertainty 
over whether the new phrase is the same as in previous legislation. 
Other solutions to improve the standard of legislation include the enactment of 
anti-avoidance provisions. Weisbach (1999) argues that these provisions cause 
concern as they eliminate the certainty and reliability of the tax law. Weisbach 
sees these rules as relatively unfair, as they benefit the government through 
discretionary administration and through the analysis of taxpayers’ thoughts 
rather than actions. 
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However, legislative change may encounter barriers. In a descriptive study, 
Newbery (1987) states that some of these barriers, including a lack of political 
will to change the tax system, along with bureaucratic inertia such as uniform 
salary scales and security of tenure, are important factors in preventing such 
change. How and why tax rules are maintained over time has received little 
attention in tax research in practice (e.g. Marriott, 2010). This thesis aims to 
illustrate how knowledge, political barriers, personal agency and other factors 
have been catalysts for and barriers to tax law change (see Chapters Six and 
Seven). 
2.3 Engagement with the external environment 
The design and legislative stages of tax policy do not occur in a vacuum and 
are connected with the external environment (as, of course, is the 
implementation stage, given the nature of the participants, i.e. citizens), in at 
least two ways: consultation and lobbying. These are discussed in turn. 
In broad policy terms, the OECD (2002) argues that when law creation 
processes are open to public scrutiny, hidden and undesired policies are less 
likely to emerge. It suggests that consultation is able to produce better public 
policy, increase trust in governments and strengthen democracy (OECD, 2001). 
In the Australian context, Eccleston (2012) argues that a tax reform will succeed 
and will be able to resist opportunistic political attacks if it has broad-based 
engagement with stakeholders and the community. 
In law making in general, Tyler (1990) argues that if people perceive the 
process to be fair, they are more likely to comply with the statutes. The benefits 
of this engagement with the external environment have been highlighted in the 
tax compliance literature. Schnellenbach (2006, p.130) argues that, if the 
political process is perceived to be fair and transparent, tax morale, in other 
words the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes (Torgler & Murphy, 2005), should be 
more stable, regardless of whether the political outcome is desired. Similarly, 
Feld and Frey (2007) add that affluent citizens may accept income redistribution 
when the ‘political process is perceived to be fair and the policy outcomes 
legitimate’ (p.104). This engagement with citizens as partners in tax policy 
making/implementation is ‘rewarded by better tax legislation, a better informed 
polity and voluntary tax compliance’ (Burton, 2006, p.188). Others have pointed 
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to limited and ineffective consultation procedures as causes of ineffective tax 
regulation in Australia (Kenny, 2010). 
An opposite view of public engagement and transparency is held by proponents 
of elitist public policy formation (Burton, 2006). In their view, sometimes a less 
open process is preferable, maintaining reserve (OECD, 2001) in order to avoid 
influence by interest groups (e.g. Heij, 2007; Shaviro, 1990). Even the IMF’s 
Manual on Fiscal Transparency (IMF, 2007a, p.37) recommends that tax 
changes should not be pre-announced if tax avoidance is expected. However, 
little or no engagement may produce negative effects, such as dissatisfaction 
with the rules created, as reported by Stewart (2007, p.193) with regard to 
Ghana’s 1995 VAT reform, where a high level of disengagement led to the 
repeal of the tax. 
As there are elements common to the design and legislative phases, the topic is 
discussed jointly in this section. The second part discusses the literature on 
actions undertaken by interest groups where government/parliament is less 
active. 
2.3.1 Information, consultation and active participation 
The OECD (2001) argues that governments strengthen their relationship with 
citizens through information, consultation and active participation. Information 
flows from government to citizens and includes public records, official gazettes 
and government websites. In consultation procedures, the government seeks 
feedback on a certain policy and citizens provide input on policy making. In 
active participation, citizens propose ways for policy making through open 
working groups, laymen’s panels and dialogue. Experiences of this third form 
are limited and are mostly ‘experiments’ conducted at the local level (OECD, 
2001, p.36). 
2.3.2 Consultation 
Consultation is part of fiscal transparency (IMF, 2007a), on policy matters as 
well as on scrutinisation of legislative drafts (HM Treasury & HMRC, 2010). 
Consequently, consultation occurs in the design of tax policy and at the 
legislative stage of drafting and parliamentary debate. Consultation may be 
internal (with members of the same organisation) or external (with outsiders). At 
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the design stage, internal consultation may target macroeconomists, tax policy 
specialists, lawyers and administrators involved in the design and 
implementation of tax policy. It is recommended that communication and 
consultation with these actors is conducted on an ongoing basis (Gordon & 
Thuronyi, 1996). External consultation targets other government experts and 
other working groups in the ministry of finance (Gordon & Thuronyi, 1996). 
External consultation and education of parliament are recommended because 
they will generate positive responses from members of parliament in the 
preparation of a bill (Gordon & Thuronyi, 1996). 
Gordon and Thuronyi (1996) suggest that the private sector should also be 
consulted. It is argued that those consulted should be those immediately and 
directly affected by the proposals, i.e. stakeholders (OECD, 2001). Bullock et al. 
(2001, p. 47) call these individuals the ‘usual suspects’. 
Although most of the literature on tax policy making addresses consultation 
during the design stage, consultation is also conducted by parliament. 
Consultation within parliament may involve specialists in other departments and 
other parliamentarians. Parliament may consult advisors from the private sector, 
other governmental agencies and people invited to public hearings (Adams, 
2004). 
In tax policy making, whom and how much to consult is a sensitive matter of 
balance, as external groups’ interests may differ from the public interest 
(Gordon & Thuronyi, 1996). For example, accounting and law firms demand 
greater access to tax policy on corporation tax rates, environmental taxes and 
international tax rulings (as shown in PwC, 2006) whilst promoting benefits to 
clients derived from their own expert knowledge (Hasseldine et al., 2011). 
However, at the same time, engagement with a larger number of individuals 
allows the government to access new information, increase the possibility of 
greater voluntary compliance (OECD, 2001), achieve better policy proposals 
(Dunne, 2006) and contribute to producing law reasonably right first time (Law 
Society, 2010, p.4). However, consultation is not a free activity in terms of time 
and economic resources (OECD, 2001). 
Consultation may be conducted directly by a core group working on tax policy 
proposals, including the tax authority (Gordon & Thuronyi, 1996), or by setting 
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up a consultative committee or agency (Burton, 2006; Marriott, 2010). Ritually, 
this independent group gives a sense of greater independence and objectivity; 
however, this is not necessarily the case. Marriott (2010) shows that in tax 
policy formulation in New Zealand, the consultative committee privileged élites 
and the outcome was politically predetermined. 
Burton (2006) suggests that any parties engaged in the policy process should 
be provided with feedback about the impact of their inputs. If the consultation 
procedure is formal and a consultative report is issued as a result, Burton 
(2006) suggests that feedback should be included as part of this document. 
Burton (2006) goes further to suggest that individuals who make a substantial 
contribution are entitled to a direct and detailed response, as sharing this 
information also benefits the community at large. 
Sometimes broad consultation has an effect, and policy may revert towards the 
needs of those consulted (e.g. Stein et al., 2006, p.200). In contrast, Hale 
(2002) argues that ideas emerging from consultation that are out of line with 
mainstream government thinking are frequently marginalised. For example, 
Kenny (2010) illustrates that comments submitted by industry bodies on the 
content of an Australian tax law were ignored (p.203). Similarly, Adams (2004) 
finds that, in the case of public hearings, citizens’ comments are not taken into 
account as officials may already have made up their minds. On this, Philipps 
(2006, pp.151-2) comments that ‘a cynic might conclude that the [finance] 
hearings are little more than a public relations exercise designed to give the 
budget process a veneer of democratic legitimacy’. Officials/parliamentarians 
tend to want to maintain public hearings because they give the policy process a 
sense of legitimacy (Adams, 2004). 
These consultation procedures are not only conducted in producing legislation 
which may not be ‘reasonably right first time’ (Wheatcroft, 1968), but also in 
redrafting processes at the post-implementation stage (see Section 2.2.7). An 
important consideration is how much to consult. Dirkis and Bonfield’s (2005) 
report on New Zealand argues that too much consultation may cause 
disengagement. In the UK rewrite project, the irony of ‘consultation fatigue’ 
emerged, since one of the pillars of the project was engagement with citizens 
(Salter, 2010, pp.680-1). 
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This brief section has presented the ritual/procedural nature of consultation. The 
main shortcoming of this body of literature is that it is highly descriptive and 
normative, suggesting how the task should be conducted without paying 
attention to the social and political nature of these procedures. As will be shown 
in Chapters Five, Six and Seven, judgments on whom to consult depend on the 
amount of knowledge and political compatibility. Interviewees tended to call 
such judgements ‘trust’. This research aims to explain how these judgements 
made by policy makers develop in practice. 
2.3.3 Interest groups and lobbying 
Hellman et al. (2000) suggest that firms may connect with 
government/parliament in three ways: state capture, influence and 
administrative corruption. State capture is concerned with shaping the formation 
of the basic rules of the game (i.e. laws, rules, decrees and regulations) through 
illicit and non-transparent private payments to public officials. Influence refers to 
the capacity of an organisation to impact on the formation of the basic rules 
without recourse to private payments to public officials. This influence results 
from factors such as firm size, ownership ties with the state and repeated 
interactions with state officials. Finally, administrative corruption is defined as 
private payments made to public officials to alter the implementation of rules 
and policies. 
It is not only firms that try to access policy-making processes (Oats & Sadler, 
2011); therefore, a better terminology for these agents is ‘interest groups’ 
(Campbell, 1996). The level of impact of these groups depends on the structure 
of institutions (Risse-Kappen, 1996). 
For instance, the structure of the electoral system may allow greater access to 
the tax policy-making process. Roberts and Bobek (2004) studied the social and 
political powers of corporations in the formulation of tax accounting laws in the 
US. They found that companies allocated contributions to both members of 
parliamentary chambers and holders of influential positions to alter the 
provisions of a bill. Companies used their economic resources to access and 
influence the tax policy-making process and received economic benefits in 
return. Similarly, Steinmo’s (1989, p.512) institutional analysis found that 
individual members of congress became ‘independent political entrepreneurs’, 
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seeking support from interest groups concerned with particular legislative 
outcomes, and ended up acceding to pressures from these groups whilst 
drafting tax bills in the US. In the same vein, Fairfield (2010), drawing on the 
concept of instrumental power – a ‘deliberate political action to effect policy 
such as lobbying’ – found that interactions between businesses and politicians 
removed from the agenda all substantial reforms to income tax and bank 
secrecy disclosure in Chile. 
As these examples suggest, financial élites and richer taxpayers are able to 
influence and protect themselves from the vagaries of tax policy reform and the 
political system (Christians, 2010a). This is referred to as the ‘élite resistance 
hypothesis’ (Stein et al., 2006, p.187). 
Uneven access to the policy process means that some groups win and others 
lose (Hall & Taylor, 1996). This depends on internal cohesion within interest 
groups and their ability to negotiate with government. Marriott (2010, p.604) 
shows that the cohesion of unions gave them greater access, leading to the 
development of a ‘real social partnership between government and unions’. 
Steinmo (1989) found that, in Sweden, the government negotiated with interest 
groups to move tax policy forward. Nonetheless, government and interest group 
require a degree of political compatibility to agree on policy issues (Appel, 
2000). 
Burton (2006) states that the effects of interest groups on tax policy making are 
not fully disclosed, calling for greater transparency for the Australian community 
in this respect. 
2.4 Transparency 
Transparency has been mentioned as a requisite for good tax policy processes 
(Sawyer, 2013b). It is a key concept of good governance (IMF, 2007; OECD, 
2002) and is concerned with the availability of information about an actor that 
allows others to monitor that actor’s performance (Meijer, 2013). The concept of 
transparency involves three elements: an observer, an object of observation 
and a method for that observation (Oliver, 2004, p.2). Citizens (the observer) 
usually demand transparency about ‘policy intentions, formulation and 
implementation’ (the object) (OECD, 2002). 
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Kopits and Craig (1998, p.1) extend the object and observer and define fiscal 
transparency as: 
...openness toward the public at large about government structure 
and functions, fiscal policy intentions, public sector accounts, and 
projections. It involves ready access to reliable, comprehensive, 
timely, understandable, and internationally comparable information 
on government activities – whether undertaken inside or outside the 
government sector – so that the electorate and financial markets can 
accurately assess the government’s financial position and the true 
costs and benefits of government activities, including their present 
and future economic and social implications. 
Grimmelikhuijsen and Welsch (2012) and Heald (2006) distinguish three objects 
of transparency: decision-making processes, policy content, and policy 
outcomes or effects. Transparency with regard to the decision-making process 
is the degree of openness about the steps taken to make a decision and the 
reasons for that decision. Examples include open meetings and open minutes 
of parliamentary meetings, allowing citizens to know why a decision is made. 
Policy content transparency relates to information disclosed by governmental 
agencies about the policy itself, including information about the measures, their 
connection with the policy problem, the implementation path and how that policy 
affects citizens. As policies are the result of decision-making processes, policy 
content transparency arises from decision-making transparency. Finally, policy 
outcome transparency refers to information about policy effects. 
In analysing central banks, Geraats (2001) proposes five areas of transparency, 
which overlap with the previous classification: 
1. Political transparency: openness about policy objectives. 
2. Economic transparency: openness about data, models and forecasts. 
3. Procedural transparency: openness about the process of deliberation. 
4. Policy transparency: openness about policy decisions. 
5. Operational transparency: openness about the implementation of policy 
decisions. 
Transparent information should in any case be complete, coloured and usable 
(Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013). Completeness refers to the level of disclosure 
of information. The colour of information is the level at which information on 
certain issues is interpreted favourably. Finally, usability refers to the 
understandability of information. 
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Regarding tax policy making, Burton (2002, pp.10-1) suggests that 
transparency could be improved by disclosing assumptions behind estimates, 
ensuring public access to data resources, and improving data and availability. 
Although transparency is desirable, some actors may have few incentives to 
disclose information. With reference to budgetary transparency, Benito and 
Bastida (2009) argue that political incumbents have incentives to hide taxes, 
over-emphasise the benefits of spending and hide government liabilities. Being 
transparent makes politicians fiscally responsible. 
The IMF takes a broader view of transparency, including policy-making 
processes and laws. Four measures to increase transparency are given in its 
Manual on Fiscal Transparency (IMF, 2007a): clarity of roles and 
responsibilities, open budget processes, public availability of information, and 
assurances of integrity. Regarding tax issues, the Manual suggests that the 
‘collection, commitment and use of public funds should be governed by 
comprehensive budget, tax and other public finance laws, regulations and 
administrative procedures’; that special tax treatments for particular investors 
should be public; that the budget should cover all central government 
transactions; that ‘laws and regulations related to the collection of tax and non-
tax revenues and the criteria guiding administrative discretion in their 
application, should be accessible, clear and understandable’; that revenue laws 
and other documentation regarding administrative interpretation should be 
accessible by the public at large; that laws should be clear and understandable 
to limit discretion in their application; that discretionary power in the application 
of tax incentives as well as negotiation between officials and taxpayers should 
be avoided; that tax audits should be accompanied by clear and complete 
statements indicating the reasons for adjustments; that tax authorities should 
make opportunities for collusion between taxpayers and tax officials difficult and 
may even organise their workloads accordingly; that information systems should 
provide audit trails of information saved in taxpayers’ accounts and of officials 
who access that information; and that information on tax expenditures should be 
disclosed as part of budgetary documentation. 
As previously noted, some of the IMF’s recommendations are oriented to 
reducing opportunities for discretionary practices and corruption. In the tax law 
area, uncertainty in the law gives discretionary space to the tax administration 
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(Gribnau, 2009). Regarding corruption, Tanzi (2000) argues that complex laws 
allow space for inadequate interaction between tax inspectors and taxpayers in 
order to comply with the law. He adds that rules, laws and procedures that lack 
transparency leave grounds for corruption. 
In contrast with this descriptive and generic research, and strongly intertwined 
with the concept of tax knowledge and information explained above, this 
research project aims to generate a deeper understanding of how transparency 
is used as a mechanism of domination in the tax policy-making field. 
Interactions between individuals working in this field are also reinforced by trust. 
This is a concept to which many interviewees referred during the fieldwork to 
explain their part in decisions. This concept is discussed below. 
2.5 Trust 
Trust is closely related to social capital (Offe, 1999). Economists have even 
argued that trust might be the best available measure of social capital (Paldam 
& Svendsen, 2000, 2001). The importance of social capital and its decline has 
encouraged research on trust (Levi & Stoker, 2000), but definitions of trust are 
problematic, given the number of disciplines, perspectives and levels of analysis 
(Yang, 2005), as well as terminological problems. Other concepts such as 
cooperation, confidence and predictability have been ‘synonymously’ used to 
explain trust (Mayer et al., 1995, p.712). However, existing definitions of trust 
(e.g. Barber, 1983; McEvily et al., 2003; Neu, 1991a) tend to share a central 
element: ‘expectations’. Neu (1991a) comments that expectations are 
necessary, because knowing others’ actions with certainty is not always 
possible. 
The type of expectations at play are both social and constitutive (Simmel, 1964; 
Zucker, 1986). Neu (1991b, p.296) refers to social expectations as: 
practices that are taken for granted and accepted by the majority of 
society’s participants. These practices have come to be accepted as 
the correct way of behaving in certain situations and therefore 
function as ‘social rules’ that govern our day-to-day actions. 
Neu (1991b) adds that these expectations are ubiquitous and weak, so some 
individuals do not follow them. In contrast, constitutive expectations depend 
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more on specific situations which are learned by observing the desired 
behaviour in a particular context. 
In order to overcome the problems with definitions, Mayer et al. (1995, p.712) 
propose that trust is: 
the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another 
party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular 
action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or 
control that other party. 
At a conceptual level, two ways to study trust can be distinguished in the 
literature. At one extreme is the rational/economic position, and at the other a 
more social approach. Possibly one of the most theoretically developed 
examples of the rational perspective is that of ‘encapsulated interest’ (Hardin, 
2006). This means that ‘for us to trust you we must believe your motivations 
towards us are to serve our interests, broadly conceived, with respect to the 
issues at stake’ (Hardin, 2006, p.68). The trusted makes the other’s interest his 
own, or encapsulates it, based on the assumption that the relationship between 
him and the other is important and deserves to be maintained over time 
(Nannestad, 2008). In the same vein, Delhey and Newton (2005) refer to trust 
as ‘the belief that others will not deliberately or knowingly do us harm, if they 
can avoid it, and will look after our interests, if this is possible’ (p.311). On the 
other hand, and in contrast to the rational approach, the norm-driven approach 
is ‘moralistic’ (Uslaner, 2002). Here, trust is developed through processes of 
socialisation rather than acquisition, and is generally less dependent on 
personal experiences. 
Another continuum on which trust must be understood is who is trusted. At one 
extreme lies the idea that trust lies in a particular person – particularised, 
known, or on which information is held – and over a particular ‘issue or domain’ 
(Nannestad, 2008, p.414). This form is closer to encapsulated trust. At the other 
extreme of the continuum is the ‘generalised’ form of trust, which relates to 
unknown people over uncertain traits. Generalised trust is closer to Uslaner’s 
(2002) conception of trust. He argues that generalised trust is more important 
than the particularised form of trust at the societal level. Offe (1999) suggests 
four dimensions of who trusts and is trusted: 
1. Citizens trust their fellow citizens. 
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2. Citizens trust in élites. 
3. Political élites trust in other élites. 
4. Political élites trust in citizens. 
This distinction suggests that trust is multilevel, applicable to individuals, 
bureaucracies and nations (Levi & Stoker, 2000). Yang (2005) notes that 
citizens’ trust in their fellow citizens has been extensively studied in writing on 
social capital. 
Citizens’ trust in élites has been examined in the literature of trust in 
governments (Yang, 2005), referred to as political trust (see Levi & Stoker, 2000 
for a review). Trust in governments has been examined at the national level 
(e.g. Miller, 1974; Richardson et al., 2001) and at the local level (Cooper et al., 
2008). It should also be noted that trust in government has a partisan 
component; for example, Citrin (1974) notes that democrats trust democrats 
more than republicans. This second strand also encompasses trust in certain 
professions, such as accounting, examined by Neu (1991b). 
Yang’s (2005) research focuses on the fourth dimension, finding that public 
officials hold a neutral view of citizens, neither trusting nor distrusting them. In 
the tax setting, it has been argued that mutual trust between taxpayers and tax 
authorities has an impact on tax compliance (e.g. Kirchler et al., 2008). 
Another feature of trust is that it is not unconditional (Levi & Stoker, 2000). In 
this respect, Mayer et al. (1995) conclude that trust cannot be generalised from 
the performance of one task to another, or from one situation to another (see 
also Sitkin & Roth, 1993). 
A third feature is that trust has a graduated nature, as noted by Levi and Stoker 
(2000). People may trust or distrust absolutely, or to a certain degree (p.476), or 
may neither trust nor distrust, as Cooper et al. (2008) suggest. 
2.6 Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the tax policy-making literature with reference to the 
different stages of the process and has highlighted shortcomings in the existing 
literature. Section 2.2 has presented tax policy making as a linear process 
comprising three stages: design, legislative and implementation. For each 
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stage, diverse literature has been reviewed to understand its social, technical 
and political nature. As tax policy making is not purely a decision of bureaucrats 
and politicians, but also a space in which citizens have a voice, Section 2.3 has 
presented an overview of how engagement with outsiders occurs. In particular, 
a procedural view of consultation and lobbying has been presented. Section 2.4 
has presented the concept of transparency and its connection with the tax 
policy-making process. Finally, Section 2.5 has introduced the concept of trust 
in the tax policy-making process. 
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Chapter Three: Theoretical Lens 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 outlined the role of tax policy making in producing tax legislation with 
reference to various academic studies and related literature. Tax policy making 
is a site where agents compete to impose their views across all stages of the 
tax policy-making process, from design to implementation. As such, the process 
is a site of competition and power. 
Much of the research conducted so far has hinted at a connection between 
good tax policy processes and good legislation, nonetheless disregarding the 
role of power in shaping these processes and subsequent legislation. 
Consequently, this chapter focuses on a specific view of power and how it 
infuses the tax policy-making process. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 refers to the concept of 
theory and power. Section 3.3 explains the significance of theories of power to 
this particular project, and introduces the particularities of the theory of power 
selected for this research. Section 3.4 presents the conceptual model to be 
applied to the empirical findings reported in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. 
Finally, Section 3.5 summarises the key issues of this chapter. 
3.2 Theory and power 
Theory is a basic concept in social research. Silverman (1993, p.1) defines 
theory as ‘a set of explanatory concepts’, arguing that without it ‘there is nothing 
to research’.4 Theories provide a ‘backcloth’, ‘rationale’ and framework within 
which to understand and interpret research findings (Bryman, 2008, p.6). 
Through the mobilisation of theories, researchers contribute more broadly to the 
understanding of social phenomena (Oats, 2012a) by developing, transforming 
and discarding them (Silverman, 1993). 
Theories may be hierarchically organised in terms of the magnitude and types 
of phenomena they contribute to explaining. One such categorisation has been 
                                            
4
 For a debate about what a theory is and is not, see Sutton and Staw (1995), and for the 
process of building theory, see Weick (1995). 
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developed by DiMaggio (1995), who distinguishes between ‘theory as covering 
laws’, ‘theory as enlightenment’ and ‘theory as narrative’. A similar and 
overlapping hierarchical category has been developed by Llewelyn (2003), who 
classifies theory into a five-level schema, from the lowest (metaphor) to the 
highest (grand theory). A grand theory operates at a more abstract and higher 
level by attempting to explain universal, ahistorical and large dimensions of 
social life (Bryman, 2008; Oats, 2012a). 
Tax research has been criticised for being generally atheoretical (e.g. 
Wainwright & Rodgers, 2013). However, a body of well-respected 
interdisciplinary tax research (e.g. Boll, 2014a, 2014b; Campbell, 1993; Edgley, 
2010; Heij, 2007; Hikaka & Prebble, 2010; James, 2010, 2013; Lamb, 2001; 
Marriott, 2010; Mulligan, 2008; Oats & Tuck, 2008; Preston, 1989; Tuck, 2010, 
2013) draws on a variety of sociological, philosophical and political theories.5 
With regard to social and/or political theorists, Pierre Bourdieu has been less 
mobilised in accounting research (Malsch et al., 2011), with a few notable 
exceptions.6 In tax research, as a sub-specialism of accounting, very little 
published work (e.g. Gracia & Oats, 2012; Kraal, 2013) has put Bourdieusian 
concepts to work. 
The main themes uncovered in the related literature and data revolve around 
different forms of power. The theory selected for this study – Bourdieu’s theory 
of social practice – has to have a consistent element of power in order to match 
theory and data (Parker, 2012). Bourdieu’s distinctive view on power was 
considered appropriate to the object of this study.7 
In contrast to approaches closer to grounded theory, in which theory emerges 
from data analysis, this study follows a less inductive approach in relation to 
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 See Vilaça (2012) for the problems of interdisciplinary research. 
6 Some exceptions using Bourdieusian concepts include Baxter and Chua (2008), Carter and 
Spence (2014), Cooper and Joyce (2013), Farjaudon and Morales (2013), Hamilton and 
Hogartaigh (2009), Neu (2006), Neu et al. (2013), Oakes et al. (1998), Shenkin and Coulson, 
2007, Stringfellow, 2010 and Stringfellow et al. (2015). 
7 Other theories were analysed in detail to evaluate their appropriateness to the object of this 
study. These included new institutional sociology, historical institutionalism and Lukes’ 
dimensions of power. Classical democratic theory, interest group theory, globalisation theory, 
the public policy model, the agenda-setting approach and fiscal sociology were reviewed in less 
depth (see Heij, 2007 for a review). All were deemed insufficient to answer the research 
questions. Bourdieu’s theory integrates agency and structure and distinguishes different forms 
of power which seem pertinent to the data. 
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theory. Chua and Mahama (2012) recommend that theory should infuse the 
entire research process, rather than being applied only after data collection, 
which would result in an ‘uncomfortable marriage’ (p.81) between theory and 
data. This suggestion is considered throughout, infusing all stages of the 
research process with Bourdieu’s theory. The next sub-section explains the 
appropriateness of a theory of power. 
3.3 A Bourdieusian theory of power 
Power is ubiquitous in all social life (Swartz, 2013), and ‘all social interaction 
involves the use of power, as a necessary implication of the logical connection 
between human action and transformative capacity’ (Giddens, 1981, pp.28-9). 
For Bourdieu, power is the core ingredient in the organisation of social life and 
in all types of human relations, including cultural and economic (Swartz, 2006). 
The exercise of power also entails domination, which is a distinctive feature of 
Bourdieu’s understanding of power (Swartz, 2013).8 Bourdieu sees the social 
world as a stratified space ‘where individuals, groups, institutions form 
inegalitarian structures of hierarchy and domination’ (Swartz, 2013, p.80). 
Regarding power and domination, Bourdieu (1991, p.167) further argues that 
power is perpetuated by institutions with: 
structure and structuring instruments of communication and 
knowledge that ‘symbolic systems’ fulfil their political function, as 
instruments which help to ensure that one class dominates another 
… by bringing their own distinctive power to bear on the relations of 
power which underlie them and thus by contributing ... to the 
‘domestication of the dominated’. 
Bourdieu developed tools to study three different but interconnected types of 
power: 
1. ‘power vested in particular resources (capitals)’ 
2. ‘power concentrated in specific spheres of struggle over forms of capital 
(fields of power)’ 
3. ‘power as practical, taken-for-granted acceptance of existing social 
hierarchies (symbolic power and violence)’ (Swartz, 2013, p.45). 
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 Foucault (1977) also analyses domination. 
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The theoretical aspirations of this study are two-fold. First, Bourdieu’s 
conceptualisation of different forms of power and domination feature 
prominently in the whole process of tax policy making. Equally importantly, 
agents in charge of designing and developing tax legislation are part of an élite 
group that holds significant amounts and diverse forms of power, calling for a 
deeper examination and theorisation of how these forms of power are mobilised 
in the process of tax policy making. Second, this study aims to make a 
theoretical contribution by extending the use of Bourdieusian concepts in the tax 
policy literature. This theoretical contribution is in line with Parker’s (2012) 
argument that qualitative studies offer ‘new theoretical frameworks’ (p.68) to 
inform tax policy and ‘practice’ (Chua & Mahama, 2012, p.81, with reference to 
Ferraro et al., 2005). 
3.3.1 Bourdieu’s Theory of Social Practice 
Bourdieu (1930-2002) was a preeminent sociologist of the late twentieth century 
who contributed, inter alia, to social theory, sociology of art, culture and the 
media, sociology of education, research methodology and epistemology of 
social sciences (Rawolle & Lingard, 2013). Less prominent is the contribution 
he made to political sociology and the philosophy of democratic politics 
(Wacquant, 2004). Political sociologists and political scientists have generally 
neglected this area of contribution (Swartz, 2006), even though Bourdieu’s work 
examined the actual accounts and practices of agents, the state and central 
agencies (Everett, 2002). In this respect, Bourdieu makes no distinction 
‘between the sociological approach to the study of the social world and the 
study of political power’ (Swartz, 2006, p.87). 
Philosophically speaking, Bourdieu’s sociology acknowledges the duality of the 
social world, i.e. objectivism and subjectivism, referring to this as an artificial 
division of social science which is ‘the most fundamental, and the most ruinous’ 
(Bourdieu, 1990, p.25). This view of the world is simultaneously ‘subjective and 
objective, internal and external, symbolic and material, individual and collective, 
free and constrained’ (Swartz, 2010, p.9). It is in practice, i.e. in the actions of 
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people in society (Rey, 2007), that this duality is manifested.9 Gracia and Oats 
(2012, p.306) argue that practices emerge from ‘the relational interaction of 
subjective experiences and the objective social structures that frame those 
experiences’. 
Bourdieu’s framework is a unification of three theories – of social structure (the 
field), of power relations (capital) and of the individual (the habitus) – which 
together constitute Bourdieu’s triad (Malsch et al., 2011, p.198). Other 
sociological approaches have focused on how people behave based on the 
meaning that things and social interactions have for them (e.g. symbolic 
interactionism); however, Bourdieu’s concepts also deal with social structure 
and macro-sociological issues, recognising interrelationships between systems 
and actors (Lunnay et al., 2011). Swartz (2010, p.3) clarifies that these 
concepts are not components of a grand theory, as other authors put it; indeed, 
Bourdieu himself rejected the idea of treating these concepts as ‘“theoretical” 
instruments ... in themselves and for themselves, rather than to put them in 
motion and make them work’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p.228). 
These three ‘tools for research’ (Swartz, 2010, p.4) are relational and inter- 
dependent; therefore, they should be mobilised together to achieve a better 
understanding of events (Cooper & Joyce, 2013; Malsch et al., 2011; Swartz, 
2008, 2010; Thomson, 2012). There is a reciprocal or ‘dialectical’ relationship 
between field and habitus (Ihlen, 2007, p.270), whereby habitus affects field and 
vice versa (Rey, 2007). Capital is also related to field (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 
1992). It is in the intersection of field, capital and habitus that practices emerge 
(Swartz, 2008). These concepts are discussed below. 
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 In line with Wagenaar (2004, pp.643-4), this thesis does not understand work in the 
behaviourist sense, which views work as a sequence of ‘related activities’ such as ‘pick up the 
phone, open a file on the computer, fill out a form’, etc. In fact, these actions are ‘just the 
surface manifestation of the whole ensemble of physical and mental skills’. Thus, the ‘practical 
judgments, the everyday, taken-for-granted routines and practices, the explicit knowledge that is 
brought to bear on concrete situations, the moving about in the legal-moral environment of large 
administrative bureaucracies, the mastering of difficult human-emotional situations, the 
negotiating of discretionary space, and the interactive give and take with colleagues that, taken 
together, make up every day’ tax policy-making as a practice. 
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3.3.2 Field 
Bourdieu used three analogies for his broad conception of the field (le champ): 
a field on which a game such as football is played (le terrain); a field as in 
science fiction; and a force field as in physics. However, his understanding was 
not reduced to any one of them (Thomson, 2012, p.66).10 The field is a network 
or configuration of social relations – structured systems of social positions in 
which there are struggles over resources (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Madsen 
& Dezalay, 2002; Rey, 2007). These configurations may be portrayed as 
markets or games, in which actors have stakes and also ‘trump cards’ 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p.98). In this space of social relations, actors 
occupy positions of ‘dominance, sub-ordinance or equivalence (homology)’ 
(Ihlen, 2007, p.270) where they try to ‘usurp, exclude and establish monopoly 
over the mechanisms of the field’s reproduction and the type of power effective 
in it’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p.106). 
Bourdieu (1998b, pp.40-1) captures these ideas well by defining field as: 
[A] structured social space, a field of forces, a force field. It contains 
people who dominate and people who are dominated. Constant, 
permanent relationships of inequality operate inside this space, 
which at the same time becomes a space in which various actors 
struggle for the transformation or preservation of the field. All the 
individuals in this universe bring to the competition all the (relative) 
power at their disposal. It is this power that defines their position in 
the field and, as a result, their strategies. 
Society is constituted by semi-autonomous fields with autonomous and 
heteronomous elements (Andon et al., 2014) with their own hierarchy of agents 
(Bourdieu, 1977). Each field is ‘shaped differently’ depending on the ‘game 
played’ on it and each has its ‘own rules, histories, star players, legends and 
lore’ (Thomson, 2012, p.67). These individual fields are sites of contestation in 
which agents occupy dominant or dominated positions (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 
1992). 
Fields are delimited; ‘what happens on/in the field is consequently boundaried’ 
(Thomson, 2012, p.67). Field boundaries may be temporal, spatial, goal-related, 
technical, or related to the players involved (Gracia & Oats, 2012; Mutch, 2006). 
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 Similarly, Martin (2004) identifies three dimensions to Bourdieu’s view of field. 
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However, these boundaries are difficult to identify. The limits of the field are ‘at 
the point where the effects of the field cease’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, 
p.100). 
Social fields may be economic, juridical, political, bureaucratic, educational, in 
the field of arts, etc. The juridical, or legal, field is organised around internal 
protocols and assumptions, characteristic behaviours and self-sustained values 
(Bourdieu, 1987b, p.806), while the bureaucratic field is the ‘set of impersonal 
public institutions officially devoted to serving the citizenry and laying claim to 
authoritative nomination and classification’ (Wacquant, 2004, p.8). 
The political field is a space of ‘conflict over the definition and implementation of 
public policies that are struggled over by political professionals who are 
increasingly linked to the state’ (Swartz, 2013, p.69). This field is structured 
around ‘competition for control of the state apparatus’ (Swartz, 2013, p.37), 
where the ‘power of representation or manifestation’ is exercised (Wacquant, 
2004, p.6). The political field ‘contributes to making what existed in a practical 
state, tacitly or implicitly, exist fully, that is, in the objectified state, in a form 
directly visible to all, public, published, official and thus authorized’ (Bourdieu, 
1991, cited in Wacquant, 2004, p.6). Like any other field, the political field 
exhibits a ‘bipolar opposition’. At one extreme are those that ‘defend the status 
quo, the incumbents, the conservatives, the orthodox’; at the other, ‘the 
challengers, the progressives, the protagonists of change, the heterodox’ 
(Swartz, 2013, p.71). In the political field the political parties also interact 
(Lagroye, 2002, cited in Swartz, 2013, p.69). 
3.3.3 Field of power 
In comparison with other Bourdieusian concepts, the field of power has received 
less attention (Maclean et al., 2015). The field of power is an ‘arena of struggle 
among the different forms of power (or capitals) for the power to be recognized 
as the most legitimate’ (Swartz, 2013, p.36). Bourdieu (1996, p.264) refers to 
the field of power as: 
struggles among the holders of different forms of power, a gaming 
space in which those agents and institutions possessing enough 
specific capital (economic or cultural capital in particular) to be able 
to occupy the dominant positions within their respective fields 
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confront each other using strategies aimed at preserving or 
transforming these relations of power. 
Emergence of the field of power is part of a differentiation process in society 
giving rise to semi-autonomous social fields, including legal, bureaucratic, 
political, economic, university/academic and artistic (Bourdieu, 1996; Cohen, 
2011), each governed by its own laws as mentioned above (Wacquant, 2004). 
There are exchange relationships between these fields, making them ‘inter- 
dependent’ (Thomson, 2012, p.69). In the field of power there are two dominant 
principles: domination, and legitimation of the dominant form of capital 
(Wacquant, 1993, p.25). 
Bourdieu argues that there are two opposing poles of capital in the field of 
power: economic and cultural (Wacquant, 1993, p.23). The economic field, with 
economic capital, represents the ‘dominant pole’, while the artistic field, with 
cultural capital, represents the ‘dominated’ position (Swartz, 2013, p.63). At one 
extreme, there are agents ‘very rich in economic capital but poor in cultural 
capital’; and at the other, agents ‘very well endowed in cultural capital and 
poorly in economic capital’, (Wacquant, 1993, p.23). In the middle of these 
opposing poles, there are agents who possess both forms of capital 
simultaneously, such as the professions and upper-level state bureaucrats. 
Swartz (2013) reflects that the administrative and university fields occupy 
intermediary positions, the former being closer to the economic field and the 
latter to the artistic field. The juridical field appears to be less autonomous and 
more closely related to the political field (Bourdieu, 1987b). 
The field of power is inhabited by powerful agents who possess ‘to a very high 
degree’ one of a number of capitals (Wacquant, 1993, p.21), occupying ‘more 
than one social field at a time’ (Thomson, 2012, p.68). Maclean et al. (2015) 
refer to these agents as multi-positional ‘hyper-agents’, the most powerful of 
whom occupy positions in various arenas, such as public bodies, business 
associations, top cultural and sports associations and charities. Dominant 
agents are also referred to as the ‘ruling class’ or ‘élite’, as illustrated by 
Bourdieu himself (Wacquant, 1993, p.19). The concept of élites has been widely 
studied in politics and business (Mills, 1956). Pareto (1935, pp.1422-23) defines 
élites as follows: 
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Let us assume that in every branch of human activity each individual 
is given an index which stands as a sign of his capacity ... So let us 
make a class of the people who have the highest indices in their 
branch of activity, and to that class give the name of ‘élite’. 
Those belonging to the élite group enjoy a position of ‘pre-eminence’ over other 
members (Nadel, 1956, p.415), as a result of having attributes that other 
recognise as superior (Nadel, 1956). These agents are able to exert ‘influence 
or power’ (Nadel, 1956, p.417). 
These dominant agents/classes are distinguished from others by the volume of 
capital accumulated, and are also differentiated internally based on the type of 
capital accumulated – ‘culturally originated versus economic forms of capital’ 
(Swartz, 2013, p.36). There is also a ‘macro-level arena of struggle’ in the field 
of power (Swartz, 2008, p.50), in which significant volumes of economic, social 
and symbolic capitals are at play and are liable to be acquired by dominant 
actors (Harvey & Maclean, 2008). Dominant actors try to impose their form of 
capital as the most legitimate for the whole society (Swartz, 2013); they set ‘the 
value of their initial capital and eventually convert part of this capital, thereby 
diversifying their portfolio of capitals in occupying dominant positions in other 
social fields’ (Cohen, 2011, p.335). 
These dominant agents are then able to control important facets of society, 
such as agenda setting and policy debates (Rhodes, 2007), and exercise 
discretion in promoting the ‘ruling ideas’ of the day, producing a ‘theodicy of 
their own privilege’ (Bourdieu, 1996, p.266, cited in Maclean et al., 2010, p.332). 
These agents not only struggle, but also coalesce with others in order to 
achieve their goals, such as gaining the approval of favourable legislation or 
conceiving alternative possibilities (Maclean et al., 2015). 
There is a conceptual overlap between the field of power and the state (Swartz, 
2013). However, power is concentrated not in the state but in the field of power 
and diverse fields (Swartz, 2013). The state is an arena of struggle over a 
particular type of capital, ‘statist capital’, which emerges from the concentration 
of a broad array of capitals, including physical, economic, informational (or 
cultural) and symbolic. Statist capital is ‘a special type of capital ... a 
metacapital’ (Swartz, 2013, p.131). The state is a ‘set of partially overlapping 
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bureaucratic fields’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p.113) whose culture is ‘public 
service’ (Bourdieu, 1996, p.379). Bourdieu defines the state as an: 
ensemble of administrative or bureaucratic fields (they often take the 
empirical form of commissions, bureaus, and boards) within which 
agents and categories of agents, governmental and 
nongovernmental, struggle over the peculiar form of authority 
consisting of the power to rule via legislation, regulations, 
administrative measures (subsidies, authorizations, restrictions, etc.) 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p.111). 
However, the state lies ‘within the broader arena of the field of power’, in which 
there are struggles for power over statist capital (Swartz, 2013, p.135). 
3.3.4 Capital 
Struggles in the field arise over resources or capital. Here, success depends on 
the ability to define, access and acquire the form of capital valued within the 
field which, in the end, determines the position occupied by the agent in that 
field (Bourdieu, 1986; Everett, 2002). The structure of the field is: 
given by the distribution of the various forms of capital, that is, by the 
distribution of the properties which are active within the universe 
under study – those properties capable of conferring strength, power 
and consequently profit on their holder (Bourdieu, 1987a, p.4). 
According to their capitals, agents are distributed in: 
the overall social space, in the first dimension according to the global 
volume of capital they possess, in the second dimension according to 
the composition of their capital, that is, according to the relative 
weight in their overall capital of the various forms of capital, 
especially economic and cultural, and in the third dimension 
according to the evolution in time of the volume and composition of 
their capital, that is, according to their trajectory in social space 
(Bourdieu, 1987a, p.4). 
Bourdieu conceptualises four general species of capital: economic, cultural, 
social and symbolic (Bourdieu, 1977). These will be discussed in turn. 
Economic capital is material, including monetary and material wealth, 
commodities and physical resources (Everett, 2002), and ‘underpins other 
forms of capital’ (Gracia & Oats, 2012, p.306). Bourdieu refers to economic 
capital as the ‘dominant principle of hierarchy’ (Swartz, 2013, p.58) and argues 
that, for example, companies control a larger part of the market when their 
capital is more significant (Bourdieu, 2008). 
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Cultural capital refers to the demonstration of ‘competence in some socially 
valued area of practice’ (Sallaz & Zavisca, 2007, p.23). It includes knowledge, 
skills, taste, lifestyle and qualifications (Bourdieu, 1991), as well as knowledge 
of how the political process works, how to lobby and how the media works 
(Ihlen, 2007). The acquisition of cultural capital is not a ‘passive process of 
accumulation’ (Haines et al., 2009, p.68); there are struggles for capital and 
status in order to ascend within the field (Bourdieu, 1986), including 
organisations (Maclean et al., 2010). 
Cultural capital may be manifested in various ways, such as embodied, 
objectified and institutionalised cultural capital (Everett, 2002, pp.62-3). 
Embodied cultural capital is a product of external wealth transformed into an 
integral part of a person, such as muscular physiques, suntans, language skills, 
bodily comportment and personal familiarity with works of art (ibid.). This is 
incorporated through a process of ‘embodiment, incorporation, which ... costs 
time, time which must be invested personally by the investor’ (Bourdieu, 2006, 
p.107). Objectified cultural capital refers to cultural goods, such as pictures, 
books, dictionaries and writings, and institutionalised cultural capital refers to 
academic qualifications (Everett, 2002). Cultural capital is more durable and 
less ‘susceptible to attrition’ than economic capital (Everett, 2002, p.63). 
Cultural and economic capital are ‘very strongly correlated’ (Bourdieu, 1987a, 
p.4). 
Social capital represents the sum of resources, be they actual or virtual, ‘that 
accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of 
more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and 
recognition’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p.119). Social capital is extremely 
important in accessing the field of power, acting as a ‘bridge building’ factor 
connecting agents with distant realms (Burt, 1992, 2000; Maclean et al., 2010, 
p.342). 
A variant of social capital is political capital, which is related to the social 
networks of political parties (Everett, 2002). Political capital has the capacity to 
generate profits and privileges by ‘operating a “patrimonialization” of collective 
resources’ through political parties (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p.119) to 
mobilise ‘social support’ (Swartz, 2013, p.37). Political capital is delegated 
through its objectification in specific ‘permanent institutions’ and its 
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‘materialization in political machines’ (Swartz, 2013, p.65). Bourdieu (1991) 
distinguishes two types of political capital: personal and delegated. Personal 
political capital is connected with the person, his ‘fame and popularity based on 
the fact of being known and recognized in person’, and for having a good 
‘reputation’ (Bourdieu, 1991, p.194). This suggests that political capital is 
simultaneously interpreted as a form of symbolic capital (Swartz, 2013). 
Personal political capital is also categorised based on two origins: ‘knowledge 
or experience accumulated through public service’ or from a ‘heroic or 
prophetic’ stance (Bourdieu, 1991, pp.184-94). In turn, delegated political 
capital refers to the ‘authority granted by a political organization’ (Swartz, 2013, 
p.66). This type of political capital comes from delegation. It depends more on 
organisational position than on the individual as such. 
The last form of capital is symbolic capital, which is found in prestige, renown, 
reputation and personal authority. This form of capital emerges from other forms 
of capital which are converted into symbolic form and then deemed to be 
legitimate (Bourdieu, 1977). 
In contrast to economic and cultural fields, organised around economic and 
cultural capital respectively, symbolic capital does not have its own field, 
operating as a ‘metacapital’ (Swartz, 2013, p.111). 
Capitals do not exist in isolation but are relational to the field (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992; Swartz, 2013). Bourdieu (1990, p.123) suggests that in the 
economic field ‘wealth can function as capital only in relationship with a 
specifically economic field, presupposing a set of economic institutions and a 
body of specialized agents with specific interests and modes of thought’. 
Agents may deploy different strategies in order to improve their position in the 
field, for example: 
discrediting the form of capital upon which the force of their 
opponents rests (e.g. economic capital) and to valorize the species of 
capital they preferentially possess (e.g. juridical capital). A good 
number of struggles within the field of power are of this type, notably 
those aimed at seizing power over the state, that is, over the 
economic and political resources that enable the state to wield a 
power over all games and over the rules that regulate them 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, pp.99-100). 
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3.3.5 Habitus 
This is the third concept developed by Bourdieu (1991) to theorise the 
relationship between structure and the individual. Agents generally do not act in 
an instrumental way (Shenkin & Coulson, 2007), obeying the ‘express, explicit 
norm or rational calculation’ (Bourdieu, 1990, p.11). Rather, they obey a 
different set of rules: ‘they obey a certain “feel for the game’’’ (Bourdieu, 1990, 
p.11). Habitus is defined as: 
...systems of durable,11 transposable dispositions, structured 
structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, 
as principles which generate and organize practices and 
representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes 
without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express 
mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them. 
Objectively ‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ without being in any way the 
product of obedience to rules, they can be collectively orchestrated 
without being the product of the organizing action of a conductor 
(Bourdieu, 1990; p.53). 
Actors produce ‘sensible and regular thoughts and practices’, but without the 
intention to behave meaningfully and without being conscious of obeying 
(explicit) rules (Bourdieu, 1990, p.69). In other words, habitus is the source of a 
series of moves ‘which are objectively organized as strategies without being the 
product of a genuine strategic intention – which would presuppose at least that 
they are perceived as one strategy among other possible strategies’ (Bourdieu, 
1977, p.73). For Bourdieu, practice is ‘not based on an explicit rule or law. This 
means that the modes of behaviour created by the habitus do not have the fine 
regularity of the modes of behaviour deduced from a legislative principle: the 
habitus goes hand in hand with vagueness and indeterminacy’ (Bourdieu, 1990, 
p.77). Habitus is durable through a process of inculcation, because one cannot 
‘unlearn’ one’s dispositions; but it is not static since it is open to adaptation 
(Hamilton & Hogartaigh, 2009) or ‘innovation’ (Shenkin & Coulson, 2007, 
p.304).12 Although habitus is usually understood to be part of human beings, the 
                                            
11
 Durable does not mean immutable (Sallaz & Zavisca, 2007). 
12
 Bourdieu also analyses change through his concept of hysteresis. Bourdieu (1977, p.83) 
writes that ‘The hysteresis of habitus, which is inherent in the social conditions of the 
reproduction of the structures in habitus, is doubtless one of the foundations of the structural lag 
between opportunities and the dispositions to grasp them which is the cause of missed 
opportunities and, in particular, of the frequently observed incapacity to think historical crises in 
categories of perception and thought other than those of the past’. For a summary of the 
application of the concept, see Hardy (2012). 
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concept is also applicable to groups of individuals such as organisations and 
institutions (Goddard, 2004). Participants enter the field with a certain amount 
and forms of capital, but also with habitus (Cooper & Joyce, 2013). 
3.3.6 Doxa 
Bourdieu sees most social practice as unconscious (Cooper & Joyce, 2013) due 
to the existence of the ‘paradox of doxa’. Doxa is a term coined to refer to the 
passivity of individuals in accepting daily life as it comes. As noted by Bourdieu 
(2001, p.1): 
the established order, with its relations of domination, its rights and 
prerogatives, privileges and injustices, ultimately perpetuates itself so 
easily, that the most intolerable conditions of existence can so often 
be perceived as acceptable and even natural. 
Field doxa ‘takes the form of a misrecognized shared allegiance to the rules of 
the game on the part of agents’ (Deer, 2012, p.117). Where doxa, or common 
sense (Rey, 2007, p.66), produces an unfair allocation of capital and a 
legitimisation of that production, the concept of symbolic violence appears. 
3.3.7 Symbolic power, symbolic violence and symbolic capital 
This is the third contribution of Bourdieu to the study of power. In this analysis, 
Bourdieu uses the concepts of symbolic power, violence and capital, sometimes 
distinctly and sometimes synonymously given the overlap between them 
(Swartz, 2013). Bourdieu (2000, p.172, cited in Swartz, 2013, p.81) states that 
domination ‘always has a symbolic dimension’. 
Swartz (2013, p.83) argues that symbolic power is the ‘capacity to impose 
symbolic meanings and forms as legitimate’. It is ‘an imposed power – a cultural 
form of domination ... in modern societies symbolic power tends to be 
monopolized by state institutions’. Symbolic power represents an internalised or 
incorporated form of power which undergoes a process of ‘naturalization’ 
(Swartz, 2013, p.83). This type of power entails the power of naming and 
classification, differentiating social reality. Language is important in this process 
(Swartz, 2013). Schubert (2012, p.179) refers to language as a device of ‘power 
and domination’. Symbolic power is about ‘producing social classifications 
among groups and rendering them legitimate’ (Swartz, 2013, p.87). 
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Symbolic power requires recognised authority, which is captured by the concept 
of symbolic capital discussed above. Symbolic power shapes the habitus, and 
through the latter is embodied, generating a ‘practical sense’ for ‘organizing 
perceptions of and actions in the social world’ (Swartz, 2013, p.89). 
Symbolic violence is intended to capture the effect of symbolic power (Swartz, 
2013). Symbolic violence is ‘misrecognized obedience in that symbolic power is 
accepted as legitimate rather than as an arbitrary imposition’ (Swartz, 2013, 
p.83). Rey (2007, p.39) argues that symbolic violence is a mechanism by which 
distinctions between individuals and groups take place and ‘forms of domination 
predicated thereupon are reproduced in society’. Bourdieu stresses that 
structures of domination are the product of an ‘incessant (and therefore 
historical) labour of reproduction’ called ‘symbolic work’ (Swartz, 2013, p.94). In 
contrast, Schubert (2012, p.180) argues that dominant actors need to invest 
‘little energy to maintain their dominance. Members of the dominant classes 
need only go about their normal daily lives, adhering to the rules of the system 
that provides them their positions of privilege’. 
Bourdieu & Wacquant (1992, p.167) add that it is ‘the violence which is 
exercised upon a social agent with his or her complicity’. There is also an 
element of passivity in the existence of symbolic violence, as those structures 
and processes that dominate individuals seem to them to be ‘natural, self- 
evident and legitimate’ (Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008, p.31). With reference to 
symbolic violence, Bourdieu (1990, p.127) states: 
Gentle, invisible violence, unrecognized as such, chosen as much as 
undergone, that of trust, obligation, personal loyalty, hospitality, gifts, 
debts, piety, in a word, of all the virtues honoured by the ethic of 
honour, presents itself as the most economical mode of domination 
because it best corresponds to the economy of the system. 
Although the concept of violence usually denotes physical aggression, Gracia 
and Oats (2012, p.307) reason that it includes non-physical manifestations of 
violence, such as ‘being denied access to resources, rights or opportunities or 
being treated as inferior’. Force does not have to be physical or complete to be 
effective (Oakes et al., 1998). Indeed, Bourdieu (1977, p.196) argues that 
symbolic violence is the ‘gentle, hidden form which violence takes when overt 
violence is impossible’. These acts of symbolic violence or domination are 
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normalised by participants in the field as intrinsic facets of the field (Gracia & 
Oats, 2012). 
Actors misrecognise the existence of symbolic violence, which acts for 
dominant and dominated agents (Swartz, 2013, p.95). However it is more 
‘insidious for the dominated’, because when misrecognised it makes the 
dominated group part of their own domination (ibid.). The dominated understand 
domination as ‘normal, inevitable or natural and thereby misrecognize the true 
nature of their social inequalities by accepting rather than resisting them’ 
(Swartz, 2013, p.38). 
Symbolic violence is ‘corporeal and cognitive and finds expression in all forms 
of body language’ (Swartz, 2013, p.92). Structures of hierarchy and domination 
endure, and reproduce inter-generationally without resistance. 
The next section explains the conceptual framework that has been developed 
drawing on these Bourdieusian concepts and that assisted in the data 
interpretation and analysis presented in subsequent chapters. 
3.4 Conceptual model 
The following conceptual model aims to portray a ‘simplified representation of 
the real world’ (Bill & Hardgrave, 1973, p.28), in this case a simplified 
representation of the tax policy-making process in practice. This model is 
presented in visual and narrative forms (Baran & Davis, 1995; Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). 
Following Bourdieu’s own approach to research, rejecting theoreticism and 
methodologism (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), the constructs presented here 
emerged from close interaction between theory and data. 
Drawing on the writings presented in this section, the tax policy-making process 
is conceptualised as a ‘field’ in which agents compete with each other for the 
types of capital valued within it. Although this specific field has a certain level of 
autonomy, it is influenced by external factors (fields), be they legal, political, 
economic or social, which ‘together comprise the wider social field in which we 
all interact’ (Oats & Gracia, 2012, p.115). These outside influences include, for 
example, supranational institutions, political constitutions, law making, 
parliament-specific regulation, funding of political campaigns, the economic 
73 
situation and citizens’ demands. Some of these objective 
mechanisms/institutions may cause structural violence. 
Structural violence is a term coined by Galtung (1969) and Latin American 
liberation theologians to describe ‘sinful’ social structures with deeply ingrained 
social inequality (Farmer, 2004). This violence is systematically exercised by 
those belonging to a certain social order and is connected with oppression 
(Farmer, 2004). Structural violence operates whenever individuals are harmed, 
maimed or killed by unjust social, political, legal, religious or economic 
institutions, systems or structures (Farmer, 1997; Farmer et al., 2006; Köhler & 
Alcock, 1976). Structural violence prevents individuals from reaching their full 
potential and tends to be overlooked and invisible (Farmer et al., 2006). 
The tax policy-making field emerges at the intersection of various individual and 
semi-autonomous fields, inter alia the bureaucratic, economic, juridical, political, 
business-corporate, professional services and academic fields.13 Each of these 
fields has its own ‘rules, norms and culture’ (Bourdieu, 1998a, p.65). Given 
these ‘cross-disciplinary relationships’, the boundaries of the tax field are 
usually more complex than those in other fields (Gracia & Oats, 2012, p.308). 
As this model represents just a portion of reality (Shoemaker et al., 2004), only 
relationships between the tax policy-making field and other fields will be 
acknowledged as they go beyond this research.14 Figure 3.1 illustrates the 
formation of the tax policy-making field. 
‘Participators’ (Bourdieu, 1998a, p.65) in the tax policy-making field come from 
diverse fields. The bureaucratic field comprises presidents/prime ministers, 
cabinet ministries, the treasury, tax authorities and related entities, both 
domestic and international. The economic field is made up economists in the 
public and private sector. The juridical field consists of the legal apparatus, 
including lawyers and judges. The political field is made up of parliamentarians 
and political parties. The business-corporate field comprises individuals and 
                                            
13
 Modern societies are characterised by having a larger number of fields compared with the 
pre-modern world (Sallaz & Zavisca, 2007). 
14
 The creation and implementation of tax rules have an impact on other fields, such as the 
juridical, educational and economic fields. For example, court decisions in the implementation of 
tax rules affect the juridical field. Similarly, tax regulation affects the economic field in terms of 
investment and cost of regulation, and tax rules and their implementation impact on the 
educational field, specifically in the content delivered in academic programmes. 
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companies, regardless of their legal form, and their trade representatives. The 
professional services field is made up of professional advisors in different 
disciplines. Finally, the academic field comprises educational institutions, 
academics and students. As previously noted, agents may belong to more than 
one field at the same time. For example, the president/prime minister 
(bureaucratic field) may simultaneously be a lawyer (juridical field), an affiliate to 
a political party (political field), a part-time academic (academic field) and a 
taxpayer (business field). 
Within each field, there are movements depending on the amount and 
composition of capitals. The more accumulated capital valued within the specific 
field, the more powerful the agent or institution becomes.  
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As Figure 3.1 shows, higher amounts of capital allow agents to access spaces 
to make decisions at the top level of the design stage. 
In the tax policy-making field, the state relates to other fields at different levels. 
The design stage of tax policy making (Gould & Baker, 2002) may be 
conceptualised as a site of power. Here, the most powerful agents in various 
fields relate and make the most important tax decisions that rule society. Figure 
3.1 shows that at this level senior-level bureaucrats interact, filter and struggle 
over cultural capital, represented by the content of legislation, with a minority of 
‘hyper-agents’ from the economic, juridical, professional services, business-
corporate, academic and political fields. In this struggle, policy and tax 
legislation are defined but not necessarily agreed. Only the views of powerful 
agents are captured in written legislation. In this sense, what is not included in 
tax legislation is also part of legislation. Regarding the role of the political field, 
at the design stage it is overtly manifested in a timid way, as represented in 
Figure 3.1. However, its influence in changing the course of tax policy is 
considerable; in some cases its power is greater than that graphically presented 
in this model. 
The legislative stage operates as a site of power, but with far lower intensity 
than the design stage. Although powerful in principle as a result of the political 
capital (Swartz, 2013) held by parliament, which can approve or reject tax rules, 
in some countries it cannot initiate tax reforms (e.g. Chile). Parliaments engage 
with society at large through public hearings and consultation procedures; 
however, political constitutions may allow any type of agent to access 
parliamentary discussion in passing tax legislation, regardless of the volume or 
type of capital they bring or whether they are part of an ‘élite’. It is parliament 
that exchanges forms of capital, such as the right to be listened to and enter this 
dimension, and trust and information/knowledge; and it has the ability to filter 
opinions and deliberate accordingly. At this stage, parliament interacts with 
bureaucrats in order to gain a deeper understanding of the content of tax rules. 
In this interaction, members of political and bureaucratic fields may either 
coalesce or be in opposition. 
At these two stages, the predominant role is played by the state (government), 
comprising executive and legislative branches. In general terms, the role of the 
state is significant as ‘Governments appear to be in a powerful position to shape 
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the field’ (MacMillan, 2013, p.14). Fligstein (1991, p.314) argues that by setting 
‘the rules of the game for any given organizational field’, governments ‘can, 
therefore alter the environment more profoundly and systematically than other 
organizations’. The boundaries of the state/government tend to be blurred in the 
tax policy-making process due to interactions with outsiders; governments 
should therefore no be longer be perceived as ‘a set of buildings with staff in a 
capital – but a way of doing things, a way of interacting, of disciplining, of 
behaving ... it is the expression of a complex web of relationships, assumptions, 
subjective choices, beliefs and expert knowledge, etc.’ (Boden, 2012, p.127). 
These complex interactions determine what can be done at the tax 
implementation stage and endow agents with certain capitals, and hence 
positions, in the field. 
At the implementation stage of tax policy making, fewer fields interact than in 
the two previous steps. For example, the political and academic fields are no 
longer visible, as the capitals (power) that agents draw from these fields is 
irrelevant, showing that capitals exist in relation to a particular field as discussed 
above. This stage may be interpreted as the natural and initial environment of 
agents such as taxpayers (corporate-business field), tax officials in charge of 
the implementation of tax rules (bureaucratic field), professional services 
firms/individuals (professional services field) and the court as the ultimate 
authoritative voice of the content of tax legislation (juridical field). This stage is 
inhabited by dominant and dominated agents. Dominant agents are those able 
to mobilise their mix of capitals specifically at the implementation stage, but are 
also able to influence the content of tax rules at previous stages by mobilising 
capitals and by occupying positions in more than one field simultaneously. For 
example, designers and drafters of tax rules (bureaucratic field) and politicians 
(political field) may be affected by the tax rules as taxpayers (corporate-
business field) and be policy motivated (Besley, 2006). 
These movements and interactions show the dynamism of the tax policy-
making field broadly understood. Some agents from individual fields mobilise to 
ascend in their respective field and access the field of power to set tax rules; 
and when that capital is no longer relevant, they draw no further power from it, 
returning to their specific individual fields to dominate within them and those that 
relate to them. These movements and loss of relevance are illustrated in Figure 
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3.1 by appearing or not appearing at each of the design, legislative and 
implementation specific stages. An important consideration is that the 
boundaries of each specific field are sometimes unclear. The economic field 
may comprise, for instance, the corporate-business, professional services and 
academic fields. This conceptual model is used in Chapters Five, Six and 
Seven to interpret the findings. 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter has introduced the concept of theory and its specific relevance to 
this study (Section 3.2). Power appears as a recurring theme in related critical 
literature and in data collected for this project; therefore, to transcend 
description and reach higher levels of explanation, a theory of power was 
selected to fit the data and theory. 
Bourdieu’s concepts of power and domination have been introduced (Section 
3.3) and his three major contributions to the concept of power have been 
thematically organised and discussed. A review of Bourdieu’s writings and other 
commentators on his work has been presented to introduce the concepts of 
field, capital and habitus with their ramifications of doxa and symbolic violence. 
In Section 3.4, these concepts have been mobilised to construct a unique model 
of tax policy making, drawing on Bourdieu’s work and concepts found in the tax 
policy literature. This model is deployed in Chapters Five, Six and Seven to 
analyse and discuss the empirical data. 
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Chapter Four: Methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the research question and three research sub-questions 
accompanied by their attendant objectives, the methodological choices, and the 
fieldwork procedures and limitations. Section 4.2 presents the overarching 
research question with its related research sub-questions that will be answered 
in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. Section 4.3 describes the philosophical 
assumptions guiding this research project. Section 4.4 presents the fieldwork 
activities, including the choice of specific tax policy-making processes and 
research methods. Section 4.5 describes the data analysis process. Section 4.6 
explains the writing style and coherence of this thesis. Section 4.7 presents its 
strengths and limitations, and Section 4.8 summarises the content of the 
chapter. 
4.2 Research question, sub-questions and objectives 
This study examines tax policy-making processes in practice in the Chilean 
context, positing one overarching research question with three sub-questions 
addressed in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. These research questions are the 
result of literature and data analyses and theoretical reflection. 
The overarching research question is: 
How do power relations shape practices within the tax policy-making field? 
The three associated research sub-questions and their attendant objectives are: 
Research Sub-Question One: How does the tax policy-making process relate to 
the field of power across its different stages? 
Objectives: 
 To identify the individual autonomous fields that participate in the process of 
tax policy making for income/corporate tax and transfer pricing legislation. 
 To identify the key agents and their respective positions of domination in the 
field for corporate tax and transfer pricing legislation. 
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 To gain a better understanding of how actors move in their individual fields 
and how such moves influence the configuration of the field of power. 
 To gain a better understanding of how actors abandon the field of power and 
lose dominance across the stages of tax policy making. 
 To gain an insight into how tax policy, drafting and budgeting are carried out. 
 To gain an insight into how the parliamentary debate develops in practice 
and how the space of debate is constructed. 
Research Sub-Question Two: What is the role of tax knowledge and social 
capital in the tax policy-making field? 
Objectives: 
 To identify the different types of tax knowledge and social capital at play in 
the tax policy-making field, specifically at the stages of design and law 
making. 
 To gain an insight into how tax knowledge allows agents to ascend in the 
field and how social capital confers access to agents located in different 
realms. 
 To illuminate how possession of these forms of capital makes some agents 
more powerful and dominant in the tax policy-making field. 
 To gain a better understanding of how mobilisation of tax knowledge and 
social capital may influence the content and robustness of tax legislation. 
 To improve understanding of how social capital works as a driver for 
consultation procedures across the stages of tax policy making in general 
contexts and in transfer pricing legislation. 
 To gain an insight into how social capital relates to lobbying in the 
development of and debates on tax policy. 
 To conceptually relate transparency to different amounts of cultural capital 
and its use as a political weapon in the tax policy-making process. 
Research Sub-Question Three: How are violence and domination manifested in 
the tax policy-making field? 
Objectives: 
 To explore domination between and within policy-making process stages. 
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 To identify the role of symbolic violence across the tax policy-making 
process. 
 To identify the role of structural violence across the tax policy-making 
process.  
4.3 Philosophical approach 
This project adopts a qualitative interpretive approach (Ahrens & Chapman, 
2006; Crotty, 1998; Grbich, 2007; McKerchar, 2010; Silverman, 1993) to answer 
the posited research questions, aiming to open the ‘black box’ of organisational 
processes and answer the ‘who’, ‘how’ and ‘why’ of human action over time and 
in context (Doz, 2011, p.583). 
In an interpretivist approach, the researcher favours the view that ‘we actually 
cannot know anything about such a real world. Everything we say and 
experience is through the medium of our constructs and ideas. Even the very 
idea of reality itself is a human construct’ (Gibbs, 2007, p.7).15 This perspective 
assumes that ‘social reality is emergent, subjectively created, and objectified 
through human interaction’ (Chua, 1986, p.615) and is helpful for interpreting 
human action and culture (Benton & Craib, 2010). 
It is the researcher’s belief that knowledge created by this type of approach is 
valuable but is different from explanation (6 & Bellamy, 2012, p.239). 
4.4 Fieldwork activities 
This section summarises the data collection and analysis techniques deployed 
to answer the research questions. 
4.4.1 Objects of study 
The first step in conducting this research was to select what to study. Hägg and 
Hedlund (1979) recommend making these choices transparent. The inputs to 
this investigation included three qualitative, informal, semi-structured 
exploratory interviews with experienced academics and professionals in the 
                                            
15
 Interpretivism is the most commonly used term in research paradigms. Although this 
distinction would suggest a clearly defined boundary, Lather (2006) argues that there are 
movements within and across paradigms, making such boundaries more fluid. In referring to the 
so-called objectivity of quantitative approaches, Lather argues that ‘objectivity debates are 
never, finally, settled and ... reflexive understanding about how politics, desire and belief 
structure scientific method (Harding, 1998) is needed across the paradigms’ (p. 49). 
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field; an academic report prepared by legal academics entitled ‘Manifiesto 
Académico por la Reforma Tributaria’ (a review of the changed provisions of the 
2012 tax reform) published in 2012;16 the researcher’s own theoretical and 
practical experience of dealing with the particular legislation; and the results of 
an electronic survey (Blaxter et al., 2010; Haslam & McGarty, 2003).17 Despite 
the problems acknowledged in the survey literature (e.g. Buckingham & 
Saunders, 2004; Gillham, 2007), it was considered to be a good method for 
capturing the views and perceptions of users of income/corporation tax 
legislation in Chile. This technique was used with the aim of analysing tax 
policy-making processes of interest to a large number of users of tax legislation 
and then making a practical impact. 
The survey procedure undertaken was as follows. An email survey supported 
by Qualtrics was sent during June and July 2012 to determine which tax 
provisions within the income tax code prior to September 2012 were perceived 
to be the ‘most problematic’ for its users. The target population included adult 
students with practical experience of taxation in private and public 
organisations, including the tax authority. This population was reached through 
a database of adult students enrolled on tax-related further education 
programmes and on the Master’s in Taxation (N=990) at the University of Chile, 
along with affiliates to the two main tax-related professional bodies – the 
International Fiscal Association (IFA) and the Instituto Chileno de Derecho 
Tributario (IChDT). While the student group was targeted directly by the 
researcher, affiliates of the professional bodies were emailed directly by the 
secretaries of these bodies. 
In order to increase the response rate, the questionnaire targeting students 
included personal greetings (Heerwegh, 2005), and two reminders were sent 
after the first email. The emails sent by the secretaries were not personalised 
and included an anonymous link. 
The questionnaire (on file with the researcher) was divided into three sections. 
Section A gathered demographic information, Section B referred to their 
                                            
16
 Available at http://www.ichdt.cl/userfiles/MANIFIESTO.pdf [accessed September 2012]. 
17
 The use of a quantitative survey should not be understood as contributing to a mixed 
methods rather than a qualitative study, as the results of the survey informed cases but were 
not used to answer the research questions. 
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subjective/objective tax knowledge, and Section C listed 18 provisions within 
the income tax code to be ranked according to their perceptions of difficulty. 
Subsequently, the provision selected as the ‘most problematic’ was evaluated in 
terms of understandability, integration, effectiveness and organisation 
(Thuronyi, 1996). 
A total of 220 valid responses was received. The effective response rate 
obtained from the 990 emails sent was nearly 22 per cent, which is relatively 
high compared with the 12 per cent reported in the email survey literature. The 
results of the poll showed that the two most problematic provisions at that time 
were the tax profit fund (TPF), with 65 responses, and the transfer pricing rules, 
with 24 responses. In September 2012, the government in power enacted a tax 
bill which repealed the former transfer pricing rule and introduced a new one 
based on OECD guidelines; however, the TPF rules were not substantially or 
directly changed. For these reasons, analysis of the original and revised 
transfer pricing rules constitutes two-thirds of the empirical content of this 
research, allowing a historical and dynamic approach. 
In order to gain a panoramic view of tax policy-making processes in practice, 
the researcher decided to examine income/corporate tax legislation broadly 
conceived (analysed in Chapter Five) and the two transfer pricing rule-making 
processes (Chapters Six and Seven). Once a decision had been made on what 
to study, the fieldwork procedures continued with the choice of research 
methods. 
4.4.2 Research methods 
The type of data gathered for this qualitative research is almost exclusively 
words (Hageman, 2008; Bryman, 2008) sourced from documents and 
interviews (Creswell, 2009; Eisenhardt, 1989; Gibbs, 2007; Yin, 2014). 
Documents 
The main documents examined included official reports, administrative records 
and newspaper articles (Bloor & Wood, 2006, p.58). For the transfer pricing 
cases, parliamentary documents of the legislative debate, administrative 
guidance issued by the IRS, newspapers containing biographies of particular 
agents and key commentaries at particular stages of the process were selected. 
This selection was justified by the fact that these documents produced large 
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quantities of data, unchanged by the presence of the investigator while 
constituting a rich source of primary data (Berg, 2007; Noaks & Wincup, 2004; 
Payne & Payne, 2004). These documents together were valuable in tracing the 
chronology of the process (Pettigrew, 1997) and then understanding and 
attributing meaning to social activities (Altheide, 1996) displayed within the tax 
field. The key documents examined are summarised in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Primary documents 
 
Histories of the law and finance committee documents were carefully examined 
in order to identify policy makers involved specifically in transfer pricing rule-
making processes. Where deemed appropriate, the researcher contacted some 
actors for further interviews. 
Interviews 
Interviews were a critical source of data in this qualitative study (Bédard & 
Gendron, 2004). This technique allows a researcher to unravel complex 
interactions and influences that would otherwise remain obscure (Marriott, 
2010), especially in the study of organisations and processes (Patton, 1990). In 
reading the documents mentioned above, the researcher noted the existence of 
undocumented phases or opinions which were in people’s heads (Langley, 
1999) but not in the papers, and one way of accessing that information was to 
conduct interviews. Through the ‘speech, gestures and actions of competent 
participants’ (Hassard, 1991, p.286), the core of their practices may be 
understood. 
Interview participants were purposefully selected (Creswell, 2009; Patton, 1987) 
based on the researcher’s perception of them as ‘good’ participants (Meadows 
& Morse, 2001, p.194), given their experience in the tax policy-making field. The 
researcher identified the various fields at play in tax policy making, described in 
Rule Document Source Period Number of words
Former transfer pricing 5 Reports Committee of Finance Chamber of Deputies Jul- Aug- 1996 21,225
Former transfer pricing History of law No. 19.506 National Congress Library Jul-97 255,415
Former transfer pricing History of law No. 19.840 National Congress Library Nov-02 118,120
Former transfer pricing Administrative guidance Internal Revenue Services 1998-2002 8,743
New transfer pricing Presidential message No. 058-360 National Congress Library Apr-12 29,125
New transfer pricing 12 Reports Committee of Finance Chamber of Deputies Apr- Aug-2012 95,981
New transfer pricing History of law No. 20.630 National Congress Library Sep-12 383,014
New transfer pricing Administrative guidance Internal Revenue Services Oct 2012- Sep 2013 38,486
Total 950,109
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Chapter Three, and then identified the predominant actors in each. Their 
importance in the field was initially determined by examination of the documents 
above and their position in their respective fields/organisations. The initial plan 
was to interview at least five agents in each group, i.e. five individuals in charge 
of designing tax policy and estimating its economic effects, five agents in 
parliament, five in the tax authority, five working for professional services firms 
and five taxpayers. 
Although there is no specific predetermined number of interviews to conduct 
(Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009) nor a ‘magic amount of time in the field’ (Tracy, 
2010, p.841), for two reasons the researcher applied the maximum variation 
technique (Meadows & Morse, 2001), contacting and obtaining the views of as 
many people as possible for each stage – design, legislative and 
implementation – of the tax policy-making process. The first reason relates to 
credibility. Tracy (2010, p.844) argues that credibility may be assured by 
‘multivocality’, which consists of including varied and divergent voices in the 
study. The researcher’s position is that a larger number of diverse participants 
allows stronger claims and perspectives to be drawn upon. The second reason 
for targeting a large number of participants is that it was foreseen that not all of 
those invited would respond positively, as in fact happened. 
Most of the interviews resulted from the researcher’s mobilisation of different 
forms of capital, mainly cultural, social and symbolic (Bourdieu, 1977, 1990). 
The researcher ‘knocked on the door’ of very high-profile bureaucrats and 
politicians, who agreed to be interviewed possibly owing to the amount of the 
researcher’s cultural capital converted into symbolic capital in the form of 
academic qualifications, occupying an academic position at a prestigious 
institution in Chile, being a doctoral student in the United Kingdom, having 
previously held a position as practitioner for Big Four firms and the industry, and 
also for the importance of the project itself. Other interviews were the result of 
previous forms of capital plus the researcher’s social capital (Bourdieu, 1977, 
1990), i.e. social connections. These connections were established whilst he 
held positions as a tax auditor for a Big Four firm, as a Master’s in Taxation 
student and as academic coordinator of tax programmes at the University of 
Chile. In this way, access to less public agents in the bureaucratic and 
professional services fields was granted. 
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Once in the field, a ‘snowballing’ effect occurred: interviewees identified others 
with unique experiences in the field to be sampled and interviewed (Meadows & 
Morse, 2001, p.194). These more private actors were later contacted and 
invited to participate in the study. 
With these techniques and strategies in place, around 70 people were initially 
contacted by email, with a letter attached introducing the researcher and the 
purpose of the study. The hot debate in tax reform at that time (2012) resulted 
in a very high number of participants among those contacted. At that time, there 
was great pressure from citizens to increase revenues and fund a substantial 
educational reform. As tax reforms are the result of the views of the most 
powerful actors, it appears that some of the winners in the political field were 
willing to take part in the study to justify their decisions. Equally, less powerful 
losers in the political encounter seemed to have an interest in highlighting their 
dominated position, as it will be illustrated in the empirical chapters. This stance 
is consistent with Alvesson’s (2011) view that: 
Interviewees may have other interests than assisting science by 
simply providing information. They may be politically aware and 
politically motivated actors. Many people will have a political interest 
in how socially significant issues are represented. This does not 
necessarily mean that they will cheat or lie. Honesty and political 
awareness do not necessarily conflict (p.29). 
Unlike the few participants in the political field, the researcher took a romantic 
view of most interviewees (Alvesson, 2003) as subjects at the service of 
science, being ‘honest, unselfish subject(s), eager or at least willing to share  ... 
[their] experience’ (Alvesson, 2011, p.29). This assumption was demonstrated 
at the analysis stage, when actors in the bureaucratic and professional service 
fields, for instance, acknowledged their victories and defeats in technical 
aspects of the design, deliberation and implementation of tax rules. In other 
words, these agents appeared not to be acting as Alvesson (2011, p.29) 
suggests, as they did not ‘tell the (partial) truth as they know it but in favourable 
ways for them’ or ‘disclose truths disfavourable either to them or their group’, 
but in contrast were very critical of their own acts. For example, some agents 
reflected on their limited understanding of tax legislation, the lack of adequate 
staff and technological resources to implement tax legislation, and how these 
factors influenced their practices. The agents’ postures may have been the 
result of seeing the researcher as independent and not politically biased, but 
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rather as a ‘person who needs help in order to produce a dissertation’ 
(Alvesson, 2011, p.81). 
Overall, 59 interviews/meetings were held in three periods: 21 September to 31 
December 2012, 17 December 2013 to 7 January 2014, and 21 March 2014. 
Two interviews were discarded for research purposes because one was entirely 
concerned with a particular tax provision out of the scope of this research, and 
in another the interviewee gathered information about the project for 30 minutes 
and then booked another appointment which never occurred due to his 
unavailability. The final anonymised list of participants in this study is presented 
in Table 4.2. 
This table shows a larger number of tax officials and policy makers; however, 
the researcher deemed there to be a balance for the following reasons. Firstly, 
the tax administration is organisationally structured into departments for general 
aspects of income tax, but also into specialist departments such as transfer 
pricing. Furthermore, taxpayers represent companies carrying out economic 
activities both in Chile and overseas, and these companies are liable to basic 
forms of income/corporate tax but also have to comply with transfer pricing 
legislation. Accordingly, the researcher deemed that the views of different 
actors were captured and balanced. Secondly, both high-profile bureaucrats 
and parliamentarians are presented in the analysis as policy makers, not just 
functionally but also to increase levels of anonymity. 
Once the participants had been identified, the process continued by defining 
subjects to be addressed during the interviews. These questions were drafted in 
line with the purposes of this research, drawing broadly on the tax policy-
making process regarding their perceptions of the process as well as ‘valid 
actual information’ (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009, p.150). The emphasis was on 
technical knowledge, advisors’ roles, consultation activities, perceptions of 
transparency, trust, organisational aspects, compliance costs, perceptions of 
the robustness of legislation, and political aspects. Several sets of questions 
were drafted for each group to which the participant belonged. In this way, sets 
of specific questions were drafted for policy makers, tax administrators, tax 
advisors, taxpayers and academics. 
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Table 4.2: Interviews and participants
 
Interviews Participant Internal code Role Date 
1 1 AC01 Academic 09/10/2012
2 2 AC02 Academic 22/10/2012
3 3 CA01 Professional Institute of Accounting 23/11/2012
4 4 ET01 Tax practitioner 03/10/2012
5 5 ET02 Tax practitioner 05/10/2012
6 6 ET03 Tax practitioner 11/10/2012
7 7 ET04 Tax practitioner 31/10/2012
8 8 ET05 Tax practitioner 27/11/2012
9 9 FT01 Tax administrator 02/10/2012
10 10 FT02 Tax administrator 29/10/2012
11 11 FT03 Tax administrator 10/12/2012
12 12 PL01 Professional Institute of Taxation 06/12/2012
13 13 PM01 Policy maker 21/09/2012
14 14 PM02 Policy maker 01/10/2012
15 15 PM03 Policy maker 04/10/2012
16 16 PM04 Policy maker 11/10/2012
17 17 PM05 Policy maker 18/10/2012
18 18 PM06 Policy maker 26/10/2012
19 PM06 Policy maker 28/11/2012
20 19 PM07 Policy maker 05/11/2012
21 20 PM08 Policy maker 06/11/2012
22 21 PM09 Policy maker 20/11/2012
23 22 PM10 Policy maker 04/12/2012
24 23 PM11 Policy maker 07/12/2012
25 24 PM12 Policy maker 10/12/2012
26 25 PM13 Policy maker 20/12/2012
27 PM13 Policy maker 26/12/2012
26 PM13-1 Policy maker 27/12/2012
28 27 PM14 Policy maker 26/12/2012
29 28 PM15 Policy maker 31/12/2012
30 29 PM16 Policy maker 17/01/2013
31 30 TA01 Tax administrator 01/10/2012
32 31 TA02 Tax administrator 02/10/2012
33 TA02 Tax administrator 09/01/2014
34 32 TA03 Tax administrator 13/11/2012
35 33 TA04 Tax administrator 26/10/2012
34 TA04-1 Tax administrator 27/10/2012
36 TA04 Tax administrator 14/11/2012
37 35 TA05 Tax administrator 29/10/2012
38 36 TA06 Tax administrator 30/10/2012
39 37 TPPT01 Taxpayer 23/10/2012
40 TPPT01 Taxpayer 09/01/2014
41 38 TPPT02 Taxpayer 29/10/2012
42 39 TPPT03 Taxpayer 04/12/2012
43 40 TPPT04 Taxpayer 04/12/2012
44 TPPT04 Taxpayer 08/01/2014
45 41 TPPT05 Taxpayer 18/12/2012
46 42 TPTA02 Tax administrator 15/11/2012
47 43 TPTA03 Tax administrator 15/11/2012
48 TPTA03 Tax administrator 20/12/2013
49 44 TPTA04 Tax administrator 23/11/2012
50 45 TPTA05 Tax administrator 10/01/2014
51 46 TPTE01 Tax practitioner 08/11/2012
52 47 TPTE02 Tax practitioner 09/11/2012
53 TPTE02 Tax practitioner 06/01/2014
54 48 TPTE03 Tax practitioner 12/11/2012
55 TPTE03 Tax practitioner 17/03/2014
56 49 TPTE04 Tax practitioner 13/11/2012
57 50 TPTE05 Tax practitioner 13/11/2012
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Within these groups, further distinctions were made with respect to their 
particular expertise, for example transfer pricing, where appropriate. Questions 
were also drafted with certain theoretical considerations in mind (Parker, 2012, 
p.58), including new institutional sociology, historical institutionalism and 
Bourdieu’s theory of social practice; otherwise, ‘specific (theoretical) 
interpretations’ may not have been possible (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009, p.107). 
Despite the benefits of circulating the questions in advance, such as gaining 
greater attention (Gillham, 2007) or credibility (Horton et al., 2004), a freer 
approach, similar to that of Tuck (2007), was taken in order to avoid the 
‘defended subjects’ problem (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000, cited in Blaxter et al., 
2010, p.195). Hollway and Jefferson (2000) refer to defended subjects as 
individuals who protect vulnerable aspects of themselves by investing in 
particular discourses. Nonetheless, only one interviewee asked for the 
questions in advance, and these were emailed prior to the appointment. 
All interviews were semi-structured and conducted in Spanish. Fifty-five were 
recorded using two electronic devices, one responded by email, and one was 
not recorded at the request of the participant, so detailed notes of the 
responses were taken (Creswell, 2009). In most cases, field notes were also 
made about impressions of the interview setting (Gibbs, 2007), what had been 
learned and how that particular interview differed from others (Eisenhardt, 
1989). These notes allowed the researcher greater flexibility in crafting 
questions in situ during the interviews about areas to which the actors might 
contribute further (Horton et al., 2004). 
Although most questions targeted contemporary practices, the former transfer 
pricing case, discussed in Chapter Six, involved the use of ‘retrospective 
interviews’ (Denis et al., 1996, p.675) for some participants involved in the 
design and parliamentary debate. In these cases, the researcher provided 
detailed contextual information in order to situate the participant in the past and 
explore his inner world (Alvesson, 2003). For example, the researcher orally 
reproduced direct quotes taken from the History of the Law, No.19.506 (see 
Section 4.4.2.1 above) to locate the participant in the context and explore the 
meaning that s/he attributed to those social practices. 
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Recorded interviews were subsequently transcribed verbatim by the researcher 
and, in a very few cases, parts were professionally transcribed to contribute to 
this thesis. The transcription professional signed a confidentiality agreement 
containing a clause requiring deletion of the electronic files and destruction of all 
physical evidence relating to the transcription. These transcribed interviews 
assigned a personal code to each interviewee to guarantee anonymity, as 
shown in Table 4.2. Between interviews, the transcripts were examined in order 
to fill any gaps in further appointments. In cases where transcription time was 
constrained, the audio files were listened to and detailed notes taken prior to a 
new appointment, in order to refresh the researcher’s mind, to confirm previous 
evidence, fill the gaps and trace the tax policy-making process. In other words, 
data ‘saturation’ was ‘deliberately sought’ (Meadows & Morse, 2001, p.193). 
After the interviews had been concluded, only one interviewee (PL01) asked for 
a transcript (Blaxter et al., 2010); however, no comments were received in 
response. 
4.5 Data analysis 
The data analysis for this research was conducted interactively and cyclically 
rather than linearly (Miles & Huberman, 1994). There was a joint and 
overlapping process of data collection, coding and analysis, as suggested by 
the related literature (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Figure 4.1 
illustrates the iterative type of analysis conducted in this investigation (Creswell, 
2009). 






















Documentary analysis was conducted, adopting both rational and interpretivist 
approaches similar to those applied by Kraal and Kasipillai (2014) in their 
historical analysis of the Dutch East India Company’s tax farming practices in 
Malacca. The researcher first took a rational approach to analysing the Histories 
of the Law and other parliamentary documents to trace the different 
stages/chronology and the agents involved in the two tax transfer pricing policy-
making processes. Adopting a similar approach, analysis of the black letter law 
was undertaken to capture the content of the administrative guidance issued by 
the IRS. At this stage, the researcher was heedful of relationships between 
these documents and other connected documents, i.e. ‘intertextuality’. Failure to 
follow such an approach may have led to misinterpretation of the documents 
(Atkinson & Coffey, 2004). 
The second stage involved the researcher’s immersion in the corpus of data, 
i.e. the documents and interview transcripts (Braun & Clarke, 2006) by reading 
them theoretically. Theoretical reading consists of reading, reflecting 
theoretically and taking notes on the interpretations (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009, 
p.236). This immersion provided the researcher with a general grasp of the 
content and significance of the data. This inductive approach, grounded in the 
data (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009), allowed the identification of concepts such as 
tax knowledge, coordination, ideology, transparency, trust, consultation and 
forms of implementation. 
Once this general understanding had been achieved, more structured methods 
of interpretive data analysis were followed (6 & Bellamy, 2012).18 At this third 
stage, the corpus of data was analysed based on meaning, which involves 
‘coding, condensation and interpretation’ (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). A code is 
‘a research generated construct that symbolizes and thus attributes interpreted 
meaning to each individual datum for later purposes of pattern detection, 
categorization, theory building and other analytic processes’ (Saldaña, 2013, 
p.4). 
                                            
18
 This study is concerned with the subjective form of interpretation which is ‘the researcher’s 
account of how the people being studied think and feel about a condition, an event, a problem 
or whatever’ (6 & Bellamy, 2012, p.230). 
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Here, a manual open coding process was conducted, in which chunks of text 
were coded (Miles & Huberman, 1994) and notes were written on the hard 
copies to make further sense of the data. This first cycle of coding (Saldaña, 
2013) included acts, activities, meanings, perceptions, strategies and 
relationships. These codes were entered in an Excel file as ‘dictionary codes’, 
with definitions based on first impressions of the data (Miles & Huberman, 
1994). 
Recognising the benefits of computer-based analysis, such as the efficient 
management of large quantities of data (Blaxter et al., 2010; Grbich, 2007), 
QSR NVivo 10 was used to electronically replicate the manual codes of the 
interview transcripts. The parliamentary documents were manually analysed. 
To achieve higher levels of differentiation of subtleties, the initial codes were 
regrouped and redefined in the form of parents and children (Gibbs, 2007) and 
the dictionary code was updated accordingly. At this point, the interview 
transcripts were grouped and codified for each stage of the tax policy-making 
process. Consequently, there were three codes with children under the phases 
of design, legislative and implementation. Some examples of codes at this point 
included the audit process, budgeting, consultation, coordination, drafting, 
information, organisational structure, ideology, scrutiny, technical specificities of 
the law, transparency, trust, compliance cost, and forms of implementation. 
The analysis progressed to the identification of patterns of meaning, and these 
patterns were connected at a more conceptual level. These connected 
conceptual levels are graphically shown in the conceptual framework, and 
constituted the core of subsequent analyses. These patterns included 
information/knowledge, trust and power. 
The final phase of analysis mentioned by Miles and Huberman (1994) –
‘memoing’ – was deployed to take notes of ideas and theoretical connections 
between patterns and with Bourdieu’s theoretical artillery. Owing to time 
constraints, the researcher made notes in the margins of documents, whilst in 
other cases these notes were stored in NVivo through the ‘Annotation’ option. 
Once this analysis process had been concluded, descriptive versions of 
Chapters Five, Six and Seven were drafted. Rein and Schon (1977) suggest 
telling a story of events in the first place, and then mapping out the elements of 
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the events and their interrelationships. Following this advice, these first drafts 
were subsequently recoded to reach higher levels of distinction and 
abstractness where required. In some cases, these changes led to changes to 
the theoretical framework presented in this chapter. In this respect, there was a 
move from Bourdieu’s triad (field, capital and habitus) to include concepts more 
closely linked to Bourdieu’s political sociology, with the concepts of the field of 
power and domination. 
At this stage, other techniques were used to explore and describe cases (Miles 
& Huberman, 1994, pp.90-142). Specifically, a ‘thematic conceptual matrix’ was 
used (Miles & Huberman, 1994, pp.131-3), supported by an Excel file. The latter 
included columns of codes and sub-codes, such as cultural capital, 
transparency, social capital, political capital and power, for each stage of the tax 
policy-making process detailed in the literature review and the conceptual 
framework. Once this second type of analysis had been completed, the three 
empirical chapters were redrafted. 
It was later decided to conduct a cross-case study of the transfer pricing cases, 
in order to ‘enhance (theoretical) generalizability’ (Miles & Huberman, 1994, 
p.173) and transcend radical particularism (Firestone & Herriott, 1983), 
increasing understanding and explanation (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
An important point to highlight is that the researcher’s interpretations are the 
result of his own theoretical/epistemological assumptions and were restricted by 
connections between theory, data and research questions (Ahrens & Chapman, 
2006). Indeed, the context was structured by several actors in different arenas, 
such as political, economic, social and material; therefore, favoured 
explanations might not find their place in this coherent context (Campbell, 
1988). Nonetheless, interpretations were largely influenced by the researcher’s 
background. Tax legislation is usually drafted and presented with several sub-
categories of types of income, exemptions and penalties for each case of non-
compliance. The forms of coding and analysis used largely reflect these 
structures inculcated in the researcher, which were brought to the research 
unconsciously. 
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4.6 Writing up and research coherence 
Ethical considerations were considered in reporting the findings. One such 
consideration refers to anonymity, which was assured by using internal codes 
for each participant and by changing some personal pronouns but not altering 
the essence of the transcripts. 
Secondly, to defend against criticisms of researcher bias in qualitative research, 
sources of data are quoted verbatim in order to support the claims made 
throughout the project (Hageman, 2008). Literal quotes are also used to provide 
further explanation (Grbich, 2007). These strategies are evident in Chapters 
Five, Six and Seven. 
To conclude this section, it is important to refer to what good qualitative 
research is in relation to ‘meaningful coherence’. One element of this coherence 
is the use of ‘methods and representation practices that partner well with 
espoused theories and paradigms’ (Tracy, 2010, p.848). Throughout this study, 
coherence was achieved by using qualitative data sources such as interviews 
and documents, analysing them based on meanings, and using compatible 
theories. Bourdieu’s language is anti-positivist in nature (Swartz, 2010, p.2), 
which may imply more than one philosophical paradigm within the social 
sciences. Thus, whereas some researchers adopt a critical realist stance in 
conducting Bourdieusian research (e.g. Lunnay et al., 2011), others adopt a 
social constructionist/interpretivist approach to understanding social 
phenomena (e.g. Gracia & Oats, 2012; Kraal, 2013). This work contributes to 
the interpretivist literature; therefore, all methodological elements presented in 
this project are coherently connected. 
4.7 Strengths and limitations 
This study has both strengths and limitations. A major strength is the techniques 
used to select the transfer pricing rules as the focus of study. Unlike some 
researchers’ opportunistic approach to accessing particular organisations or 
events, transfer pricing was selected after gathering views from diverse, 
experienced and random participants. This is likely to make the findings 
presented in this research of greater interest to policy makers. 
A second strength is that several members of élites directly involved in tax 
policy making took part in this study, which is rare for a doctoral dissertation. In 
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some cases, specific agents responsible for making crucial decisions were 
interviewed, increasing the quality of explanations as to how and why certain 
views and courses of action were preferred over others. This fact ensured a 
good fit with the conceptual framework presented in Chapter Three regarding 
configuration of the field of power and stages in the tax policy-making process. 
A third strength is the timing of this study. As noted above, the tax reform was 
debated a couple of weeks before the fieldwork commenced. The longitudinal 
feature of one part of the study also allowed the researcher to capture views 
from taxpayers and tax practitioners shortly after the rule had gone through its 
first phase of implementation. This convergence in time benefited the study by 
bringing first-hand, and perhaps unfiltered, views of a type not previously 
generated in the Chilean context at all stages of tax policy making. 
The study also has limitations. The first relates to the main research technique – 
interviews. Interviews make it difficult to generalise findings to a wider 
population (Hasseldine et al., 2011). They provide indirect filtered information 
through the views of interviewees, and the researcher’s presence may bias 
responses (Creswell, 2009). There is also the above-mentioned risk of 
‘defended subjects’, especially in the political field. A point strongly linked with 
the use of interviews is that the findings produced in this dissertation are very 
particular to the Chilean legal structure, institutions, agents and culture, and 
may not be generalisable to the history of all tax policy making in the country, or 
in other jurisdictions. 
Timing also negatively affected the study of the former transfer pricing 
legislation. Given that several years had passed between the design and 
debate of the former (1996-1997) and amended (2002) legislation, some views 
may have been over-processed and filtered in these retrospective interviews. 
For this reason, the researcher asked for audio recordings of the relevant 
meetings of parliament, but unfortunately these debates are available only to 
parliamentarians. 
A third limitation is connected with the type of analysis deployed. It is 
recognised that intensive coding may destroy the meaning of data (Eisenhardt, 
1989, p.534), and that the richness and flow of arguments may be damaged by 
taking such an approach. To overcome these problems, the researcher 
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examined the original transcripts in order to capture the essence of each 
interview, but some issues may still have been overlooked in this type of 
analysis. 
The final limitation relates to the nature of assertions made throughout this 
research. As noted above, the researcher brought his own beliefs and 
subjectivity to the project (McKerchar, 2010), which infused and shaped 
interpretations. Such interpretations may not produce true knowledge (Oats, 
2012a). Furthermore, what were found to be influences in producing this type of 
legislation may simply be reasons rather than causes (6 & Bellamy, 2012, 
p.240). 
4.8 Summary 
This chapter has described and explained the key aspects of the approach 
adopted in this study. The chapter commenced by stating the research 
questions, followed by an introduction to the interpretive tradition used 
throughout. The selection of what to study has been explained in detail to justify 
these decisions. The chapter has explained the research methods used to 
answer the research questions, describing the documents and interviews that 
informed this research, along with their suitability for these purposes. A detailed 
account of how the documents and interviews were analysed has been 
provided, as well as addressing how the researcher’s position may have 
influenced the interpretations made in the study. The chapter has also 
described the writing up process, the coherence of the study and its strengths 
and limitations. 
The next three chapters present and interpret the findings, supported by the 
theoretical framework presented in Chapter Three, illuminating the 
understanding of the practice of tax policy making. 
  
97 
Chapter Five: General Tax Policy-Making Process 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a general overview of the context of this study and 
introduces the tax policy-making process relating to income tax for corporations 
in Chile in practice. Section 5.2 sets the scene for the tax policy-making process 
in Chile, commencing with some insights into Chilean culture, followed by a 
detailed account of the participants and practices in the process. Sections 5.3 to 
5.6 present the findings in relation to the tax policy-making process, following a 
combination of Gould and Baker’s (2002) heuristic model and the GTPP used in 
New Zealand, as discussed in Chapter Two. Finally, Section 5.7 summarises 
the chapter. 
5.2 Background to Chile: Culture and tax policy-making framework 
Chilean culture is hard to define as a result of contradictions and clashes of 
values (Subercaseaux, 1997). However, four main characteristics have been 
identified: paternalistic authoritarianism, legalism, fatalism and ‘compadrazgo’ 
(Gomez & Rodriguez, 2006). The level of authoritarianism in Chile is considered 
to be soft and hidden beneath paternalism, whereby a superior protects a 
subordinate (Godoy et al., 1986). This type of relationship is a legacy of 
Spanish colonisation, in which the landlord provided property and other goods 
to the vassal in return for loyalty. Over time, this relationship evolved: 
dominant political elites early established paternalistic relationships 
of protection and loyalty as appropriate dynamics of social interaction 
with subordinate classes, which resulted in what is recognised today 
as a benefactor and protective state (Gomez & Rodriguez, 2006, 
p.46). 
The notion of authoritarianism involves domination, whereby an individual can 
dictate to others what to do (Baars & Scheepers, 1993). Authoritarianism 
operates in the public and private fields in Chile (Gomez & Rodriguez, 2006) 
and is based on the assumption that Chilean people lack agency to exercise 
liberty, making others take leading roles (Di Girólamo & Gutierrez., 1984). 
In this context of authoritarianism, people find available spaces of power and 
exploit them, constructing their own space in which the opinions of others are 
marginalised. Those who become subordinated accept it and reproduce the 
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structure with those under them (Gomez & Rodriguez, 2006). This situation is 
also replicated in the political sphere, where ‘many political agreements are 
reached without major debate or consideration of the opinions of all affected 
parties and usually imply the neglect of opposing ideas and arguments’ (Gomez 
& Rodriguez, 2006, p.47). This authoritarianism attributes considerable 
importance to certain professions and occupations, for example medical doctors 
(ibid.). Other professions dominant in Chile include lawyers and engineers, who 
are considered to be more traditional. Even economics and business 
administration form part of engineering degrees rather than being offered as 
degrees in their own right. Accounting degrees are considered to be beneath 
law and engineering degrees with business, and attempts have been made by 
some tertiary institutions to create programmes that have an accounting 
component but are nested within an engineering degree. 
Legalism – behaviour framed by existing laws and rules – plays an important 
role in Chilean society (Fernández & Bello, 2004). In the context of a ‘discourse 
that stresses that law is justice and reason whilst politics is passion and interest, 
behaviour compliant with the law is understood to be rational, appropriate and 
politically correct’ (Gomez & Rodriguez, 2006, p.51). Gomez and Rodriguez 
(2006) argue that law is powerful, operating with punishment and rewards to 
control and intimidate individuals and groups. In opposition to this strict 
legalism, those that deceive others and the system have some recognition, 
seeing it as a virtue (Edwards, 1983). 
The third component of Chilean culture is fatalism, understood as the idea that 
events in life are caused by exclusively external forces. This is internalised and 
transformed into pessimism about the future and frustration and impotence 
regarding society (Gomez & Rodriguez, 2006). Nonetheless, there is also a 
sense of optimism. According to Gomez Diaz (1997), Chilean fatalism fluctuates 
between optimism and pessimism. 
The final component relates to compadrazgo and the need to belong to social 
networks. As a result of the class structure inherited from the Spanish Kingdom, 
Chileans aim to belong to different groups. Compadrazgo is ‘a social institution 
that allows reinforcing links with relatives and friends through reciprocity’ 
(Gomez & Rodriguez, 2006, p.56). These networks allow people to connect with 
others within and outside organisations in the private and public sectors 
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(Gomez & Rodriguez, 2006). In the public sector, this compadrazgo operates 
when higher authorities reserve a place for their followers and ‘appoint the most 
loyal members of their compadrazgo network to positions of monitoring and 
control’ (Gomez & Rodriguez, 2006, p.58). A potential result of compadrazgo is 
corruption between political groups and the private sector (Gomez & Rodriguez, 
2006). A relevant theme in this component is trust. In an OECD (2011) survey, 
Chilean respondents to the question ‘Generally speaking, would you say that 
most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with 
people?’ reported the lowest level of trust (13%) amongst OECD countries. This 
concept plays an important role in the tax policy-making process, as will be 
shown throughout the empirical chapters. 
National culture constitutes the backdrop to tax developments and should not 
be understood separately (Nerré, 2008). The term ‘tax culture’ has been coined 
to represent the ‘entirety of all relevant formal and informal institutions 
connected with the national tax system and its practical execution, which are 
historically embedded within the country’s culture, including the dependencies 
and ties caused by their ongoing interaction’ (Nerré, 2008, p.155). This study is 
developed under these assumptions, as this and subsequent chapters illustrate. 
The next section presents the agents and functions involved in the tax policy-
making process in Chile. 
5.2.1 The Chilean tax policy-making framework 
For the purposes of this thesis, the Chilean tax policy-making process is 
structured in three sequential stages following Gould and Baker’s (2002) 
heuristic model. The design stage involves the statement of policy, drafting and 
budgeting for any economic effects. Although drafting is usually part of the 
legislative phase, for the purposes of this thesis it is presented as part of the 
design phase as it is carried out in the executive branch. In this stage, the 
principal agents are the president of the republic, who is head of state and 
government and democratically elected for a period of four years.19 In contrast 
to the general law-making process, the political constitution confers on the 
president the exclusive initiative to ‘impose, abolish, reduce or remit taxes of 
any kind or nature, to establish or modify existing exemptions and to determine 
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 Article 25, Political Constitution of the Republic of Chile. 
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their shape, proportionality or progression’ (Article 65, Political Constitution of 
the Republic of Chile). The president is also able to control the pace of the 
discussion in the Chilean Congress, at any point during its discussion, through 
‘urgencies’.20 Bills categorised as having simple urgency must be discussed and 
voted in the respective chamber of Congress within thirty days, whereas, if the 
bill is labelled as having extreme urgency, the period will be fifteen days, and if 
it is labelled as requiring immediate discussion, this period is reduced to six 
days.21 As a consequence of these powers, the president has ultimate 
responsibility for tax law changes. 
The ministry of finance is one of 23 ministries through which government is 
exercised.22 Hierarchically, the highest authority is the minister of finance, 
followed by the deputy minister/undersecretary; both are posts privy to the 
exclusive confidence of the president.23 Tax policy is one of the ministry of 
finance’s work areas,24 involving ‘design, implementation and continuous 
improvement of the nation’s tax policies, in the drafting of laws and other areas 
of the national tax system that are essential tools of fiscal policy’.25 It also 
participates in the ‘coordination and execution of tax policies with Chile’s 
Internal Revenue Service and Customs Service’, as well as representing the 
finance ministry before the fiscal affairs committee and the OECD.26 
Four entities linked to the ministry of finance are important for this research, 
given their participation in the tax policy process: the tax authority (Servicio de 
Impuestos Internos – IRS), the customs service (Servicio Nacional de 
Aduanas), the budget office (Dirección de Presupuestos – DIPRES), and the 
treasury (Tesoreria General de la Republica). Their roles in tax policy making 
are discussed in turn. 
The IRS controls and provides services oriented to the correct application of 
internal taxes efficiently, equitably and transparently in order to minimise 
evasion and to provide ‘excellent services to taxpayers to maximise and 
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 Article 74, Political Constitution of the Republic of Chile. 
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 Article 27, Ley Organica Constitucional del Congreso de Chile. 
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 Article 1, Decreto con Fuerza de Ley No. 7912, published 5 December 1927. 
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facilitate voluntary tax compliance, executed by competent civil servants 
committed to the Institution’s results’.27 IRS’ duties are set out in the Tax Code 
and in the Organic Law of the IRS.28 The IRS is composed of the national office, 
Large Taxpayers Directorate29 and regional offices.30 The highest authority in 
the IRS is the national director, or simply director, who is appointed by the 
president and is in his exclusive confidence.31 The director’s powers and 
responsibilities include: the administrative interpretation of tax rules by giving 
instructions and rules to control taxes; responding to queries from IRS staff 
regarding tax implementation; delegating certain tax matters to subordinates 
acting on his behalf; and issuing administrative resolutions oriented to making 
effective the administrative responsibility of tax administration civil servants.32 A 
key responsibility of the director, connected with drafting legislation, is: 
to advise and report to the Minister of Finance, when the latter 
requests it, in matters of competence of the Service (IRS) and in the 
adoption of measures which are deemed as necessary for the best 
implementation and enforcement of the tax laws, and to propose the 
legal and regulatory reforms that are desirable.33 
The customs service’s responsibilities are ‘to monitor and control the 
movements of goods across coasts, borders and airports of the Republic, to 
intervene in international traffic for the purposes of tax collection on imports, 
exports and other issues determined by law, and to generate statistics on this 
traffic across borders, without prejudice to the other functions assigned to it by 
law’.34 DIPRES is required, inter alia, ‘to estimate public sector inputs (income) 
and their projected performance and to optimise the capacity to mobilise 
resources for the achievement of the objectives of governmental action’.35 In tax 




 Decreto Ley No. 830, ‘Tax Code’; Decreto con Fuerza de Ley No. 7, 30 September 1980. 
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policy making, this estimate is contained in the financial report. Finally, the 
treasury is responsible for collecting taxes and other fiscal revenues, including 
interest and penalties for late payments, by judicial, extrajudicial and 
administrative means.36 
In this way, the president, the minister of finance, the director of the IRS, the 
director of customs and the director of the budget office agree on tax policy, 
draft tax legislation and estimate its economic effects. Once these tasks have 
been completed, the tax bill and the financial report are submitted to parliament 
to continue with the legislative stage. 
The Chilean National Congress participates in law formulation, represents 
constituents and controls government’s actions. It is bicameral, with the 
Chamber of Deputies and the Senate acting together in tax law formulation.37 
The Congress operates with a system of committees, requiring both chambers 
to have a committee of finance.38 The committees of finance of each chamber 
provide information on the impact of proposals on the state’s budgetary and 
financial matters and its institutions and enterprises.39 Tax bills can only be 
originated by the Chamber of Deputies, which means that the discussion 
process is as follows.40 In the first place, the bill with a financial report is 
received by the committee of finance of the Chamber of Deputies, where it is 
discussed and voted on. Discussion takes place in two stages: ‘general 
discussion’, where the core idea of the project is discussed and the ‘idea of 
regulating’ is voted on; and detailed discussion, article by article. During the 
detailed discussion, it is possible for the executive branch to introduce 
‘amendments’ to the bill by virtue of constitutional powers granted to the 




 The Chamber of Deputies is made up of 120 members democratically elected and renewed 
every four years (Article 47, Political Constitution of the Republic of Chile); the Senate is made 
up of 38 senators elected every eight years (Article 49, Political Constitution of the Republic of 
Chile); Article 46, Constitution of the Republic of Chile. 
38
 Article 17, Organic Constitutional Law of the National Congress No. 18.918. 
39
 The committee of finance of the Chamber of Deputies has 13 members (Article 213, 
Regulation of the Chamber of Deputies of Chile), and that of the Senate has five members 
(Article 29, Regulation of the Senate of Chile). 
40
 Article 65, Political Constitution of the Republic of Chile. 
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president.41 Voting results are decided by an absolute majority of participating 
deputies.42 
Second, the bill, financial report and a report prepared by the committee of 
finance are submitted to the Chamber of Deputies to continue its debate and 
voting. A deputy, chosen as informant, will orally present information about the 
discussion to the Chamber of Deputies, and then the discussion stage takes 
place. Within each chamber, there may be ‘general’ and ‘particular’ discussion, 
similar to the discussion in the committee of finance. Voting results are 
calculated by an absolute majority of the members present.43 Thirdly, the bill is 
submitted to the committee of finance of the Senate for its discussion and 
vote.44 Voting operates under the same conditions as that of the Chamber of 
Deputies. Finally, the tax bill and financial report are revised by the Senate. If 
there are disagreements between the two chambers as to the outcome, a mixed 
committee is created to resolve them. 
In general terms, the public cannot attend sessions of the committees of 
finance;45 however, in order to make decisions, the committees may request the 
attendance of relevant staff and authorities able to assist in their discussions 
and may seek advice from specialists in their respective fields, as well as 
requesting reports or hearing appropriate institutions and individuals.46 
Both chambers, including all types of committee, operate under the principle of 
transparency, which consists of allowing and promoting knowledge and publicity 
of the acts and resolutions adopted by deputies and senators in the execution of 
their activities in the chambers and committees, and the foundations and 
procedures they use.47 Similarly, sessions held by the chambers, their 
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documents and records, minutes of their debates, attendance, information 
about invitees and voting are publicly available.48 
Once the project has been approved by both chambers, the bill is submitted to 
the president of the republic, who decrees its approval and promulgates it as a 
law.49 Once published in the official journal, the law comes into force and goes 
through the implementation stage. 
On the one hand, the IRS, customs service and the treasury must implement 
the law in force. On the other hand, taxpayers, whether or not assisted by tax 
advisors, must also enact practices to comply with the law. In the application of 
the law, problems may arise in terms of collection and/or collection procedures. 
In such cases, the process may commence again. The next section explains in 
general terms the practices concerned with tax on corporations. 
5.3 General tax policy-making process 
This section presents the tax policy-making process for income tax for 
corporations following the structural process delineated by Gould and Baker 
(2002): design, legislative and implementation. Given the particularities of the 
Chilean process, in which the drafting is conducted within the executive branch, 
this task is presented as part of the design phase, as mentioned above. 
5.3.1 Design 
In this stage, the bureaucratic and political fields converge to define tax policy, 
draft legislation and budget for its effects on the economy. The natural 
participants in this stage include the president of the republic, the ministry of 
finance, other ministries, the IRS and DIPRES. These participants hold the most 
senior positions in the bureaucratic field. However, they may also draw power 
from other spaces, such as the political field. For instance, the presidents during 
the period covered by this research (1990-2012) were members of political 
parties and were supported by political coalitions.50 Some ministers had also 
                                            
48
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 Patricio Aylwin Azócar (1990-1994, Christian Democrat); Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-
2000, Christian Democrat); Ricardo Lagos Escobar (2000-2006, Socialist); Michelle Bachelet 
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been appointed based on their links with political parties. In this respect, 
respondent PM05 commented on the ministers’ influence over political parties, 
arguing that it was strong because ‘ministers came from [political] parties’. 
Regarding IRS national directors, social capital and political sympathy were 
commented on by PM06 and PM15 during the fieldwork as factors influencing 
their appointment. These are the actors that agree on tax policies, as TA05 
commented: 
First ... how much revenue is expected for a country regarding its 
strategy of development and the logic of the tax system? I think these 
are the central ideas. Do we want to favour direct or indirect taxes? 
... I would say that these are the central questions, and the president, 
minister of finance and, to some extent, the national director of the 
IRS have to have this clear. This is the core thing for me. 
The small number of participants and the types of decision made here might be 
interpreted as a site of struggle linked to the most important decisions of the 
field of power. It is notable that this small and closed space blurred the 
separation between design and drafting of tax legislation, as confirmed in a 
second interview in January 2014 (TA02). TA05 also commented on how tax 
legislation was made in this small powerful group: 
Now, normally tax laws are prepared between the minister of finance, 
the [national] director of the IRS, the advisors to the minister of 
finance and the advisors and the team of the director of the IRS. 
This quotation excludes the participation of the president of the country; 
however, there is evidence of presidential involvement in recent years. With 
regard to the 2012 tax reform, a couple of participants (PM12, TA02) 
commented that the president participated in making decisions on tax policy 
and law, as PM13 said: 
[Proposals] emerged in the ministry of finance, these were discussed 
with the IRS but in the end it was the president who made the 
decision ... and the final version [of the proposals] was analysed by 
the president and it was he who made the decisions on what to 
include and exclude ... the ministry of finance provides information to 
the president in order to make the decision. Moreover, the president 
perfectly understands what each provision is about; he doesn’t make 
ill-informed decisions. 
                                                                                                                                
Jeria (2006-2010, Socialist) and Sebastián Piñera Echenique (2010-2014, National 
Renovation). 
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The role played by these different actors varied depending on the type of policy 
adopted. During the fieldwork, it was noted that economic conditions and 
requests from the tax administration had been the two major drivers of tax law 
change (Oats & Sadler, 2011). In the first group, it was noted that tax policy had 
been pivotal to increased revenue collection. The purposes of this type of 
reform included the need to fund a particular political programme, to respond to 
citizens’ demands once governments were in office, and to provide resources 
for contingencies such as natural disasters (TA02). TA05 argued that this type 
of policy originated in the president of the republic and was the result of a 
‘political consensus, from a political need’, corroborating the close link between 
tax and politics (Infanti & Crawford, 2009). Political consensus was necessary to 
move forward in the legislative process, and then agreement between the 
president and political parties was pivotal (TA05). In carrying out these 
economic reforms, authorities had been cautious and had refrained from 
increasing tax rates substantially, which might have caused citizens’ 
dissatisfaction. PM06 commented that, in the period 1990-2010, tax reforms 
sought not to cause ‘taxpayers’ anger’ through a steady tax rate increase 
because the ‘costs of acceptance of this type of reform’ were too high. These 
comments might be interpreted to mean that policy makers were aware of 
taxpayers’ behaviour, and conscious that decisions were constrained by the 
potential for taxpayers’ disapproval. This is consistent with the tax compliance 
literature, which has linked high rates of tax with unfairness, and has suggested 
that perceptions of unfairness have a negative impact on ‘tax morale’ (Torgler, 
2005; Lago-Peñas & Lago-Peñas, 2010). As an alternative to avoid these 
problems, TA05 commented, for instance, that higher tax collection was 
planned through a reduction in tax evasion rates by conferring extra powers and 
resources on tax authorities. 
In contrast, a technical rather than political approach had been taken to 
increasing competitiveness. Here, the ministry of finance had played a major 
role, for instance by lowering tariffs (TA05). Other ministries had entered this 
powerful space when tax policy had been used as an instrument to change 
economic behaviour. Change had been achieved through the preferential 
treatment of certain areas, taxpayers or transactions by using tax expenditures. 
Some activities targeted by these policies included mining, housing, capital 
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markets, labour markets, culture and public works, as reported by TA02 and 
TA05. 
The second broad category of activity related to the amendment of flawed 
legislation. Such proposals were led by the national director of the IRS and the 
ministry of finance and their advisors, who constantly received information on 
the performance of the system. In this area, the IRS proposed: 
improvements, changes, to broaden the tax base, greater powers to 
audit, greater access to tax information ... there, I would say, it is the 
IRS that is surveying the problems. It has to conduct audits and sees 
how tiresome the tax system is... [the IRS] proposes changes to 
simplify [the system]... (TA05). 
Whenever such flaws had become widespread, miscellaneous bills to prevent 
tax planning had been proposed (PM06). These corrective bills had also faced 
taxpayer resistance, as a perception of the current ‘way of taking advantage of 
the system’ as a right (PM06) was internalised by some members of society. 
Whatever the driver of tax law changes, the basic framework in which tax rules 
operated must be maintained. TA05 referred to this coherence as the ‘tax 
system’s logic’, which relates to expected revenue collection and the relative 
importance of each type of tax and reliefs, as well as other structural features of 
the tax system, such as integration between corporate and personal tax, in the 
collection of revenue. In his opinion, this ‘logic’ had helped the development of 
the country and, therefore, had been constant over the years. Once tax policy 
had been agreed within this structural logic, it was translated into written 
legislation. 
5.3.2 Drafting 
It was also in this closed and small powerful space that tax policy was 
translated into legislation by agents rich in cultural capital in the form of tax 
knowledge and information, as discussed in Chapter Three. Accordingly, this 
form of cultural capital was an important input in making tax legislation, as 
suggested by TA05: 
There is where laws are made, [tax laws] are specialised, are done 
there with the technical men from the ministry of finance and IRS, 
because they understand taxes and their consequences and [the 
ministry of] finance analyses the micro- and macro-economic 
aspects… (TA05) 
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This quotation suggests that tax knowledge and economic information were 
relevant to the creation of tax legislation. Given the specific roles of each 
institution within the bureaucratic field discussed earlier in this chapter, it is 
notable that coordination between the IRS and the ministry of finance was a 
feature in the design stage. Prior to 2006, economists in the ministry of finance 
were in charge of tax policy, the output of which informed the drafting phase, 
mainly because taxation is an economic phenomenon (PM15). In this way, the 
IRS gained autonomy over how to put tax policy into the written law, choosing 
from a set of available options, including adjustments to the tax base, changes 
to tax rates, and the introduction of credits or deductions (TA02). This autonomy 
was not unproblematic because the IRS ended up shaping tax policy, with 
biases towards increasing tax compliance and levels of control. Whenever a 
memo was received from the ministry of finance, the IRS commented on the 
‘need for information, the number of people, IT’ needed and the way the tax 
audit departments were structured, and difficulties lay in whether the drafting 
accurately represented the stated policy (TA02). This closeness reinforced the 
idea of a blurred separation between policy and drafting commented on above. 
In 2006, the IRS’ monopoly over tax knowledge disappeared with the creation of 
a new post of ‘tax policy coordinator’ in the ministry of finance. This post was 
initially occupied by a tax lawyer with institutionalised cultural capital (Everett, 
2002) through a law qualification from the oldest law school in the country and a 
master’s degree from the US. This agent had also acquired practical experience 
in law firms and a Big Four firm, and drew on significant power as the post 
concentrated on several aspects of tax policy and other areas. With a new 
government in 2010, this agent returned to the professional services field to 
work in a law firm that he had been co-founded in 2004 (Obregón, 2010). It was 
believed that the level of specialisation of this post increased with the arrival of 
the new government in 2010 because there was more than one individual 
involved in tax policy making, as remarked on by PM13. Between 2010 and 
2011, the lead role was played by a tax lawyer with high institutionalised cultural 
capital, with a law degree from a very prestigious university and an LLM in 
taxation from the US. This agent also moved from the professional services field 
to the bureaucratic field, with fifteen years of experience in a Big Four and a law 
firm. From 2011, another tax lawyer graduated from a prestigious university in 
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the country, with an LLM from the US, with eleven years of experience in a law 
firm and with experience in academic field as a lecturer occupied this position.51 
Despite the specialisation in the bureaucratic field derived from this expert tax 
knowledge, other informants were critical of its effects on tax law making. 
PM15, for example, critically argued that economists had been, to some extent, 
displaced in the design of tax policy. It was also observed that these agents 
were not purely technical experts but also had some political – not necessarily 
partisan – interest in shaping tax law. These lawyers were believed to have 
brought their own technical agenda of closing loopholes, and then to have been 
able to influence tax policy design; however, it was believed that they had 
overlooked the deeper effects of those legal changes on the coherence of the 
tax system. 
Since 2006, and as a natural consequence of gaining experience, the tax policy 
coordinator had gained the ‘autonomy’ to prepare the first drafts of law (TA02). 
Although this new actor entered the tax policy-making field formally through the 
creation of this post, this should not be interpreted as a loss of the IRS’ power in 
its drafting role. For example, in the 2012 reform, ‘notes’ were written by the 
ministry of finance to the IRS instructing it on what should be drafted, but 
preliminary drafts had also been prepared by the tax policy coordinator’s team 
(PM12).52 Whenever the tax policy coordinator’s team had prepared a draft, and 
acknowledging that there was no mechanism to evaluate the robustness of tax 
proposals, the team relied on ‘technical support from the IRS’, assessing its 
quality by looking at ‘whether the [drafting] is going to work or not and if there is 
a contradiction with a [rule] that already exists’ (PM13). As the IRS was the 
principal holder of tax knowledge, this assessment may have contributed to 
maintaining the integrity of the tax system (Thuronyi, 1996). 
This cooperative relationship in the bureaucratic field had developed over years, 
and might have been based on the IRS’ symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1977, 
1990), recognising that drafting was ‘essentially a technical’ activity and that its 
opinions impact on policy based on this assumption (TA02).53 In terms of 




 Most income tax rules were drafted by the IRS (PM12). 
53
 For example, opinions regarding the negative impact of new rules on audit processes or the 
extent to which new rules increase tax complexity were taken seriously in this process (TA02). 
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hierarchical structure, the IRS’ senior positions reviewed and reported to the 
highest authorities in the ministry of finance on the IRS’ position (TA02). 
Historically, the group of draftsmen within the IRS comprised lawyers with a 
particular type of tax knowledge and was stable over a long time, allowing 
members to develop expertise in drafting tax law. It was also small, made up of 
three or four drafters. More recently, other types of tax knowledge had been 
brought to and shared in this small group. Professionals with a ‘numeric’ 
understanding of tax operations acted as advisors/reviewers, enriching the 
quality of tax bills in order to ‘detect errors to make extra adjustments’ (TA02). 
Draftsmen from the tax policy coordinator’s unit also brought their knowledge 
and experience, rising to between six and eight individuals overall. 
Regarding drafting procedures, drafters had some freedom as there was no 
formal procedure or handbook to follow. However, drafting practices were less 
disruptive when imitating older/wider legal tax text models. More broadly, 
drafters also followed the style of other more structural codes, such as the Civil 
Code, the Tax Code and the Organic Law of the IRS. This imitation may be 
interpreted as a way of gaining greater legitimacy for the current legislative 
outcome based on fundamental texts already in operation. 
Although unstructured in nature, the drafters respected two main principles in 
writing legislation: legality and simplicity. Legality was respected by clearly 
stating the subject, tax rate, base and other features of the tax. Simplicity was 
the result of a trade-off between detailed and simple legislation, referring to the 
system as a whole and to the wording of legislation. It was argued that anti-
avoidance, anti-evasion and tax relief provisions reduced the system’s simplicity 
(TA02). Wording was a secondary aspect under consideration during drafting, 
as the purpose was to keep administrative and compliance costs low, 
regardless of who the drafters were. It was commented that simplicity was 
pursued by using existing ‘words/definitions’ in the legal corpus, since new 
terminology would increase complexity (PM13). This is consistent with the 
conflictual relationship between simplicity and certainty (Partlow, 2013). In this 
way, the integration of new legislation with existing legal texts would be 
achieved (Thuronyi, 1996). 
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The implementation of tax legislation was also influenced by consideration of 
the administrative costs regarding the appropriateness of staff numbers, staff 
specialisation levels, the financial resources to be invested in those human 
resources, the adequacy of current technology and evaluation of extra 
technological resources, evaluation of what type of information required control, 
assessment of the sufficiency of available information, examination of the need 
for extra information and of information matches, the impact of the rule on 
double taxation agreements, and the assessment of administrative procedures 
intended to reduce administrative costs, such as electronic invoices (TA02). 
This is in line with the ‘reform-minded legislators’ (Gould & Baker, 2002) 
mentioned in Chapter Two, and also with the notion that administrative capacity 
influences tax reform (Sakurai, 2002). On the other hand, compliance costs 
were reduced by allowing the taxpayer to comply with regulation without 
resorting to expert advice (TA02). Simplicity of language was the aim of the 
drafters who articulated the texts when initiating a tax bill; however, it was 
acknowledged that this was not always achieved as it was a difficult task 
(TA02). Conversely, other agents perceived that simplicity of wording was not a 
test of the robustness of tax legislation per se because it allowed room for 
‘abuse’ through manoeuvre (PM12; Sanger, 2012). This finding is consistent 
with James and Wallschutzky’s (1997) view that simplification of complex 
matters may lead to ‘babble’. Another aspect that drafters took into account 
related to the way in which the courts interpreted legislation by creating 
hypothetical scenarios of how a court/jurisprudence worked in practice (TA02). 
This suggests that drafting tax regulation not only required in-depth technical 
tax knowledge, but also legal knowledge and knowledge/information on how tax 
authorities and taxpayers implemented tax legislation in practice. 
A remarkable point in this phase was the supremacy of the IRS in drafting 
regulation. This form of symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1977), sustained through tax 
knowledge, allowed the IRS to distinguish what to include in the text from what 
to leave out, and to supervise the drafting by the tax policy unit. 
Tax knowledge and information was not only brought into this phase by drafters’ 
direct involvement in tax affairs, but also through consultation with others that 
had this experience. There is evidence that the IRS conducted internal 
consultation within the bureaucratic field. For example, interviewees revealed 
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that consultations took place between the drafters and other IRS departments 
regarding the capacity to implement the tax rule under construction. For those 
newer and more ‘innovative topics which involve a great deal of processing 
information or [where] there is no information’, audit departments, for example, 
proposed ways by which those requirements could be included in the written 
rule (PM12). 
Although the benefits of consultation are acknowledged in the existing literature 
discussed in Chapter Two, some agents disagreed about its effectiveness. 
TA02, for instance, argued that loopholes could not be resolved by listening to 
more people and, if they did, staff and time constraints prevented such action: 
What happens later is that in the application of the law there are 
situations that were not foreseen [by drafting teams], or how one rule 
combines with another rule and that [combination] generates creative 
interpretations for sure ... [this] risk may be reduced, if there is a risk, 
[by consultation] but always teams are limited in staff numbers, [they] 
were few ... there is little space to listen to all the people that one 
may like to and also there is little time. 
As this quote suggests, consultation was limited by the size of the team and 
time, especially when those targeted did not belong to the bureaucratic field. 
This was the Chilean experience during the drafting phase. TA02 stated that 
there was no consultation with external supranational institutions, such as the 
World Bank, the IMF or the Inter American Center of Tax Administrations 
(CIAT), although the OECD had some informal involvement. Such unstructured 
consultation depended largely on the leadership of the team, as commented on 
during the interviews. 
Once a rule had been written, it was reviewed/scrutinised to assess its 
robustness and make amendments if appropriate. To do this, drafters required 
knowledge on the tax avoidance opportunities used by taxpayers and their 
advisors. There is evidence that, in the 2012 tax reform, drafters from the IRS 
and tax policy coordination unit shared knowledge based on their respective 
experience in the bureaucratic and professional services fields. This 
collaboration was used, for example, to improve the standard of anti-avoidance 
regulation, as the following quote shows: 
What do we do now to avoid [taxpayers] infringing the rule? What if?’ 
What these two groups did was use a whiteboard with several 
scenarios [and asked] well what can [taxpayers] do now? 
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[Taxpayers] can do this other thing; then the rule has to be wider, a 
little bit more generic, not as precise, otherwise [taxpayers] 
circumvent this part (PM12). 
Involving a larger number of participants in testing legislation was positively 
perceived in the field. TA02 commented that ‘it is a very good policy having 
more eyes looking at one drafting. It has been useful to detect errors [and] 
make additional adjustments’. Bringing experience from the bureaucratic and 
professional services field into this assessment was highlighted during 
interviews. In the 2012 tax reform, former private-sector professionals were 
familiar with the possible ‘manoeuvres’ available to reduce tax liabilities, while 
the IRS was aware of taxpayers’ actual practices. These types of knowledge 
were supplemented to secure tax compliance but, in contrast to Oats and Tuck 
(2008), who evaluated tax compliance at the implementation stage, these now 
bureaucrats mobilised knowledge in the drafting phase by acting as if they were 
in opposite and adversarial trenches. The following quotation illustrates how this 
activity had been conducted in recent years: 
Hey, we, as taxpayers/tax advisors, can do this thing here… well, 
yeah, but we, as tax administrators, can do this other thing here. One 
draftsman punched (and the other responded). This was the dialogue 
(PM12). 
This ‘dialogue’ increased the ‘procedural quality of laws’ (Karpen, 2008, p.157), 
as PM12 agreed. In contrast to this collaboration, the negative effects of not 
bringing this knowledge into the process were commented on. In a second 
stage of the 2012 tax reform, the ministry of finance led the process without the 
IRS, resulting in a reduction in the robustness of the law regarding integration 
and organisation (Thuronyi, 1996), as ‘several problems [arose] because that 
left a lack of coordination in the law in terms of references, enforcement dates, 
etc.’ (PM12). This shows how collaborative policy making had a positive 
influence on the standard of tax legislation. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that higher levels within the bureaucratic and 
political fields carried out these activities. The IRS national director made 
comments on the bill as a form of ‘quality assessment/control’ (PM12). During 
the 2012 tax reform, even the president ‘tested’ the drafting and made 
suggestions about how things should be done (PM12). In this case, the 
president’s knowledge was recognised as pivotal in conducting this 
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assessment. This president had ‘institutionalised’ cultural capital, as discussed 
above, in the form of a first degree and a doctorate in economics, and practical 
experience as a member of the Senate’s committee of finance (PM05). In the 
Senate, he had built a good reputation for being knowledgeable and 
hardworking, as noted by one interviewee. During the fieldwork, these 
‘transposable dispositions’ (Bourdieu, 1990, p.53) were referred to as personal 
features and a work style of being ‘on top’ of fiscal decisions (TA02). 
Despite all this knowledge and expertise mobilised to enact robust legislation, it 
was acknowledged that possible and unforeseen implementation avenues 
emerged in practice. The law had its own lifecycle after enactment, as TA02 
said: 
The rule has an open texture, i.e. the text allows interpretations that 
the drafters were unable to foresee at the drafting stage and then the 
interpretation rules contained in the constitution and in [other] law[s] 
are very important. And therefore, what drafters wanted to do [with 
the rule] will not be what taxpayers or the courts interpret because 
legislation has its own life (TA02). 
Some of the practices used by taxpayers and tax authorities to implement the 
law are discussed later in Section 5.6. Once a rule had been completed, the 
Chilean law-making framework stated that its impact must be budgeted. This 
phase is discussed below. 
5.3.3 Budgeting 
Within the powerful group involved in the design, DIPRES provided support to 
the IRS in preparing economic estimates, playing an ‘advisor’ role (PM08). 
These estimates were powerful (Graetz, 1985) because if economic figures 
contravened tax policy a bill might be withdrawn or thrown out (TA02). These 
estimates were not only technical in nature, but also had a political use for 
attacking or defending positions in the tax policy-making field. For example, 
regarding the 2012 tax reform it was mentioned that if the numbers had been 
proved wrong, adversaries would have used that against the executive, arguing 
that it was ‘lying to the population’ (PM13). 
The report preparation process required coordination between DIPRES and the 
IRS, as the latter held internal information about various taxes. In 2012, for 
example, the IRS’ Department of Studies prepared information that served as 
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an input to the bill’s financial report. This information came from income tax and 
VAT returns and, for bank secrecy reasons, was subsequently 
transformed/grouped before its submission to the ministry of finance or DIPRES 
(PM09). Tax secrecy legislation prevented the IRS from being totally 
transparent in sharing this information with the two institutions. In Geraats’ 
(2001, p.48) terms, this may be interpreted as a lack of ‘procedural 
transparency’. This constraint gave the IRS department the purely ‘technical’ 
role of ‘calculation’, as numbers were deemed to increase objectivity (PM09). In 
performing this task, the Department of Studies tried to act rapidly and with 
(economic) transparency, providing the economic information required (PM09). 
DIPRES evaluated the adequacy and validity of the figures until it had ‘certainty 
about what is being published … is good and it has reasonable [underlying] 
assumptions’ (PM14) to prepare the financial report. Time was a barrier to 
extensive review and analysis, requiring DIPRES to ‘trust in the specialisation of 
work’ (PM14) of the IRS’ experts in constructing the input. PM14, reflecting on 
the 2012 reform, said: 
DIPRES accepts that there is tax secrecy with information that [the 
IRS] cannot pass onto [DIPRES] and [the latter] trusts that the IRS is 
doing its work in the best way possible and that they are the experts 
in the subject. [DIPRES] wouldn’t question that functioning. 
This quote shows that the IRS was recognised as the main holder of tax 
knowledge and information in the preparation of these estimates, suggesting 
that ‘trust manifests where knowledge ends’ (Luhmann, 1979, cited in Neu, 
1991a, p.296). Despite this internal secrecy, there was considerable openness, 
or economic transparency (Geraats, 2001), with the public at large who 
requested information during the 2012 tax reform, as commented on during the 
interviews. 
It may be argued that these actors and the functions they performed at the 
closed and small design stage was connected with the field of power, given the 
amounts of capital at stake. The minister of finance, the IRS national director 
and the DIPRES director were identified as the most powerful agents at this 
stage because they ‘hold the responsibility and management’ of tax policy 
(TA05). Generally, this was a closed space with little interaction with the 
external environment (Mulligan, 2008), as noted by a member of the 
professional institute of accountants (CA01) and a member of the professional 
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institute of tax law (PL01). Nonetheless, there is evidence of interaction with 
other fields through consultation. 
5.3.4 Consultation 
There were a number of salient features of the consultation procedure. First, it 
was acknowledged that was very selective. As will be shown in Chapter Six, 
limited consultation with external members occurred in the policy-making 
process in the mid- to late ’90s. TA05, who was in office until the early 2000s, 
commented that, given the importance of tax matters, the number of those 
targeted was very small, using ‘one or two external advisors’. This resonates 
with the ‘usual suspects’ (Bullock et al., 2001) mentioned in Chapter Two. 
Second, consultation in Chilean legislation was very informal and not 
institutionalised. During the 2012 tax reform, the ministry of finance held 
‘informal meetings’, as PM13 commented. Third, those consulted were mostly 
lawyers. PM14 commented that external lawyers advised the ministry of finance 
during the 2012 tax reform. 
Two conditions for having a voice at the design stage were identified during the 
fieldwork: tax knowledge and political compatibility. In the first place, those 
consulted were recognised as having high amounts of tax knowledge, being 
referred to as ‘experts in the market’ (PM13). These advisors had ascended in 
their respective fields (e.g. professional services), as shown in the theoretical 
framework in Chapter Three, and were recognised as trusted sources of tax 
knowledge. PM13 added that, during the 2012 tax reform: 
There was technical trust. In fact, the people contacted [in the 
ministry of finance] did not necessarily share [their] political stance 
and were very open to help. 
There were conflicting views on the benefits of direct external consultation with 
knowledgeable individuals in the professional services field. PM12, for instance, 
saw it as a valuable way of gathering knowledge, information and experience 
from those in practice. In contrast, ET04 saw it as ‘utopic’ to believe that the 
external advisor would pour knowledge into the tax policy process. ET04 did not 
think that the advisor would tell the legislator ‘look, these are all the situations 
that give room for tax savings ... take note of them and eliminate them from the 
legal order’. ET04’s perspective was aligned with a rational perspective, stating 
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that the advisor had no incentives to take such a course of action, as shown in 
the following quotation: 
In a free debate, in a free society, everyone is after his own interests 
which are all absolutely legitimate. Then it is utopic to say ‘look, I am 
going to consult with the PwC tax partner and he will tell me all the 
fibs’, or to say ‘this guy is evil, he won’t tell me all the fibs [tricks in 
the tax system]’ – it is not his function. His function is to advise the 
taxpayer, possibly regarding tax savings using tax relief rules 
forgotten but totally in force … because he is called to provide a tax 
saving, so why would he tell you to eliminate all those aspects for 
which he has earned money all the year? Because it is not his 
function, he is not called to do himself a professional hara-kiri … 
even in other cultures, the advisors’ role is not to reveal the fibs to 
the [tax] administrator. 
This view is in accordance with the idea that actors ‘with high cultural capital 
can command extremely high wages’ (Cooper & Johnston, 2012, p.612); 
therefore, they were unlikely to provide advice that would ultimately damage 
their economic capital, as that would place them in a less powerful position. In 
ET04’s view, it would be naïve to expect that from advisors and from self-critical 
tax inspectors’ analysis of their practices. Rather than relying on their will to tell 
the truth about problems in the tax system, ET04 believed that knowledge 
should come from the academic field through ‘scientific analysis’. ET04 added 
that academia was a space in which a paid individual could comment 
independently without ‘capture’, whereas other actors, including practitioners 
and tax administrators, were always biased.54 This view might be interpreted as 
suggesting that extensive tax knowledge was not a unique condition for being 
involved in the tax policy-making field, but an alignment of values, interests or 
ideology, broadly speaking, was also required. TA05 commented on the 
technical and political aspects of the appointment of these tax advisors: 
But [the IRS and the ministry of finance] always looked for the most 
qualified people in the market. I mean, if one asks who the best tax 
experts are, the best advisors, maybe eight names appear, and from 
those eight, there were two that were ‘related’ to the political 
coalition. Then one looked for those related to the political coalition. 
                                            
54
 In ET04’s view, practitioners’ economic dependence on clients limited their possibilities to 
express opinions. In consultancy firms, other tax partners looked at the opinions of others, and 
these were ultimately aligned, given the hierarchical systems of these service firms. 
118 
This suggests that there must have been some closeness with those consulted, 
reflecting the concept of social capital in the Bourdieusian sense (see Chapter 
Three for a detailed explanation). On social capital, PM14 commented that: 
Basically, you know, the people that have more renown are known by 
everyone who is dedicated to [tax matters] and also there was some 
trust based on the previous lives of each one of us that for different 
reasons ... we knew them, which gave us the possibility to reach out 
to them. 
Similarly, TA05 added: 
It is usual to consult with ... people that work in the private sector that 
are trusted by the IRS national director, [and/or] the minister [of 
finance], who have a look and make comments but in a very informal 
manner ... but they are two or three persons because these themes 
are a secret, they cannot filter out before [submission to] the 
parliament... I remember that [it] used to work with a pair of private 
sector advisors who worked in taxes who had the [IRS] national 
director’s trust or the [finance] minister’s trust and they asked them 
for their opinion, but it was not formal and it was very reserved. 
Other interviewees refereed to this social capital as political trust. For example, 
TA05 added: 
[The executive] always looked for someone in whom it had political 
trust55 in order to share opinions, because if someone (for example) 
is very much on the right wing and has the view that taxes should be 
lowered for everyone, he will hardly collaborate with a government 
that wants to raise taxes for certain activities, enterprises or people. 
Then there are two reasons why one looks for someone politically 
related in order to have a view about where the country wants to go, 
and then trust that that information will not end up in third parties’ 
hands, because it is sensitive to arrive in a company and say ‘look, I 
know this tax will be changed so do this now before it is levied’. 
This reveals a connection with transparency. The executive was not obliged to 
publish its tax bills prior to parliamentary debate. Doing so might result in 
taxpayers/advisors taking advantage of flawed current legislation, increasing 
their economic capital (Bourdieu, 1990). This highlights that a lack of policy and 
procedural transparency (Geraats, 2001) might have been desirable at this 
stage. It also shows the connection between knowledge and information, 
including transparency, and social capital in the tax policy-making process. This 
section has shown that knowledge, part of cultural capital, is a condition for 
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 Interviewees referred to political trust as ‘political compatibility’. 
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ascending in the respective field, and that social capital grants accession to the 
distant and close tax policy-making field, as discussed in Chapter Three. 
Despite all these efforts to increase the quality of tax regulation (Vording et al., 
2007), sometimes there were consequences unforeseen by those in charge of 
drafting provisions (PM15) but which were detected at later stages by 
economists who then, at the post-implementation stage, stated that the policy 
goals had not been totally met (TA). 
Besides this active quest for knowledge and/or legitimacy of tax regulation, 
strategies were used by outsiders to access the design phase. These included 
hearing/lobbying activities and notes/letters sent to policy makers. 
5.3.5 Hearings and lobbying activities 
Attempts to access the tax policy-making process were not new. Shortly after 
democracy had been restored, many professionals had been interested in 
participating in the development of economic programmes, including tax 
policies. During this early period, the ministry of finance created committees for 
different matters, composed of officers and volunteers. The number of 
volunteers for the committee of taxation greatly exceeded those for other 
committees. PM06 estimated that around ‘two hundred’ individuals attempted to 
intervene, whose vested interests in participation became transparent shortly 
thereafter. The great majority of these volunteers were trying to ‘get more 
information rather than providing information’ (PM06). This view aligns with that 
of ET04 above, who mentioned that experts did not have real incentives to 
share tax knowledge as they would use it later for their own benefit, highlighting 
the dual role played by tax advisors mentioned in Chapter Two. 
Parties directly affected by tax law changes might also raise their voices during 
tax policy-making processes, especially when bills were closing loopholes. 
When changes were being made to the presumptive income regime, the 
taxpayers affected had taken for granted that gaining from the tax system was a 
vested interest, and when the change was going to occur, they defended 
themselves in the same way as ‘labour unions defend their workers’ (PM06).56 
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 The outcome of this type of intervention in the presumptive income regime is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
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These taxpayers understood this regime as a ‘right’, and change was 
interpreted as a discriminatory practice arguing that they greatly contributed to 
the economy and society (PM06). This is consistent with PM01’s view that 
interest groups that protected tax reliefs unaligned with the tax system were 
very powerful. 
In the 2012 tax reform, other actors also attempted, unsuccessfully, to be part of 
the tax design stage. One tax inspector association prepared a tax reform 
proposal which was later submitted to the ministry of finance; however, its voice 
was not heard. According to TA04, after a few months the association received 
a note stating that it would be contacted in due course, but this did not occur. 
This silence was interpreted by the association as a sign of unfairness in access 
to the tax policy-making process. In this respect, the same interviewee 
commented: 
This is the social dialogue with the ministry of finance, i.e. there are 
ears to listen to entrepreneurs, to the big entrepreneurs, there are 
ears to listen to independent organisations ... but there are no ears to 
listen to the tax inspectors who work directly in daily tax audits and 
know where the system flaws are ... and know how to solve them. 
Unlike this formal channel, the association’s proposal was welcomed by other 
entities that were not part of this powerful space. In the association’s view, not 
listening to them had an ideological component linked to a conception of the 
state and its role in society. In this respect, TA04 further commented: 
The government has an ideological view on what the state is, on its 
role in subsidising entities and the role companies play in economic 
development. We [the government and they] hold different views. We 
may share some stuff ... as tax inspectors may not have a political 
view ... because what we do is very technical, but even within 
technicalities, even people that (ideologically) support the 
government ... say that, for instance, income tax should not be a 
credit [against personal taxation]. This is said by many people from 
both [political] sides because it is not an ideological view but a 
technical conception.57 
Although formally the association’s proposal was read and may have been 
analysed within the ministry of finance, or even at higher levels in the IRS, it had 
no effect on change in tax policy. This suggests that granting minimal, or even 
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 According to their technical conception, companies should pay taxes and not use it as a tax 
credit (TA04-1). 
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full, access to policy development did not guarantee effective intervention. 
Government, through its cabinet and associated institutions, set and 
implemented policies which were unlikely to change without good reason 
(Adams, 2004). In this sense, institutions belonging to the executive branch 
remained strong and were not ‘permeable’ to forms of intervention or lobbying. 
In TA05’s experience: 
Certainly, there was lobbying, but there was great unity in the 
government, i.e. lobbying entered through parliamentarians ... and 
[interested parties] asked to be received and sometimes the 
[executive] received them but as part of the [tax policy-making] 
process, but that does not mean that things were going to change ... 
[the executive] received people but many times it did not hear them 
... the government, in which I was, had an idea about where to go 
and kept on course, they talked [with interest groups] and received 
some interesting points, but keeping on course ... one thing is 
receiving them [interest groups] and another is listening to them. 
This should not be understood as the executive branch being stubborn. It 
listened to people and followed their opinions when it perceived that those 
opinions were reasonable and included aspects or consequences that had not 
been foreseen. In the same interviewee’s view: 
The important thing for authorities is not dialogue with interest 
groups, but it is dialoguing but keeping the course ... and if one 
learns after the meetings [with interest groups], one changes 
[opinion] but not because they buy us, nor for the power they hold ... I 
always felt a lot of power in the president and in the minister of 
finance. I was never told ‘be careful with these people because they 
are politically powerful’, never... never. 
Likewise, during the 2012 reform, think tanks politically aligned with the 
government (executive) had no greater influence due to their connections, and 
their opinions were simply one additional view within the larger set of available 
opinions. PM13 argued that ‘there are aspects that [the executive] takes and 
others not ... this is an impartial and technical treatment [of opinions]’. An 
overarching principle in democratic tax policy-making processes was 
highlighted by a policymaker, who stated that ‘society has a voice, but society 
cannot be the legislator, although it has great influence’ (PM06). As has been 
shown, the executive had a monopoly in dialogues with interest groups (PM01) 
and was then able to filter what was appropriate and what was not. These 
practices are consistent with Hale’s (2002) perception that opinions outside 
mainstream policy are marginalised. 
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5.3.6 Notes/letters 
This was a more subtle form of intervention noted during the fieldwork. During 
the 2012 tax reform, several comments, in the form of letters, were sent to the 
ministry of finance, and other comments were published in newspapers, 
highlighting or criticising aspects of bills under discussion in parliament. This 
shows that the policy-making process was not linear (Sawyer, 2013b), as actors 
might try to exert influence at any stage in the process. In 2012, it was 
acknowledged that there were no inappropriate appearances or direct 
influences by large taxpayers (PM13). 
5.3.7 Pre-legislative stage 
Before the bill was submitted to parliament, the three main institutions of the 
executive branch, i.e. the ministry of finance, the IRS and the budget office, 
made final decisions about its content. If any institution’s team provided 
stronger technical arguments, the rest trusted this and agreed to follow that path 
of action (TA05). 
In this final step in the design stage, two executive branch practices were 
uncovered during the interviews. Firstly, the executive designated an officer to 
convince/persuade parliamentarians to approve the bill as suggested. This 
nomination was based on trust, understood as an expectation that the officer 
would get the bill approved smoothly. His nomination was based on a balance 
between political and technical competence. In some cases, people’s habitus 
was perceived to be inadequate and too ‘rigid’ to achieve the goals, as 
mentioned by PM15 with regard to the 2012 reform, which led to the executive 
replacing the officer concerned. In other cases, it was perceived that an 
experienced technical officer could appropriately negotiate with parliament, as 
mentioned by TA05. 
The second practice was that of education of or communication with 
parliamentarians on the content of a bill, as mentioned by Gordon and Thuronyi 
(1996). In carrying out this activity, parliamentarians had the ‘core ideas’ 
explained to them, without entering into the full technical details of the bill, as 
mentioned by TA05. 
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5.4 Legislative 
Although formal debate in the National Congress followed a sequence, as 
illustrated in Section 5.2.1, the ways in which deputies and senators made 
decisions were similar. For this reason, a combined overview is presented of 
how these actors made decisions on legislation. 
In this phase, the executive branch and parliamentarians were the two main 
actors that made decisions on tax policy making and vied for control over the 
content of legislation (Mutch, 2006). However, the structure of the process and 
the allocation of capitals between these two participants created an imbalance 
between the two in the field. Firstly, as mentioned earlier in the chapter, the 
exclusive prerogative of the president of the republic to initiate a tax law change 
was perceived as an asymmetry of power, as acknowledged by PM10. In 
practical terms, PM01 argued that this asymmetry became objectified during 
analysis of the bill: parliamentarians were prevented from introducing an 
amendment to the bill which, in turn, had to be negotiated with the executive. 
Secondly, time pressures, called ‘urgencies’, to complete the parliamentary 
debate within a defined period of time restricted the temporal boundary of the 
field (Gracia & Oats, 2012; Mutch, 2006). With these impositions, 
parliamentarians were prevented from obtaining a detailed view of the content 
of legislation (PM10). Thirdly, the miscellaneous content of the bill also acted 
against a balanced debate in Congress, as mentioned by PM05. These 
structural elements may be interpreted as causes of structural violence, as 
explained in Chapter Three. 
Besides these imbalances, there was an unequal distribution of resources 
between the executive and parliament. Tax knowledge was scarce in parliament 
compared with the executive. PM16 mentioned that ‘whilst each minister comes 
to the parliament with ten different advisors and specialists in several subjects’, 
Congress had few specialists from a limited number of disciplines to whom to 
resort. In this regard, PM04 added: 
The great architect ... in tax matters especially, is the executive. As 
you understand, the executive has technical teams, has unmatched 
technical apparatus compared with that of the parliament. 
In this scenario, parliamentarians made decisions on tax legislation. 
Examination of tax bills was in two broad areas: economic/political and 
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technical. In the first area, a joint economic and political assessment of bills took 
place. For example, PM16 referred to revenue collection as a factor by which to 
determine the merits of a tax bill, while the ‘political/ideological’ component was 
notorious in discussions of the tax burden (PM03). Other participants in this 
study presented these two aspects as inseparable. PM01 commented that 
parliamentarians tried to ‘understand what is proposed ... understand the impact 
it has on the tax structure and on the burden’ as well as the consequences for 
growth and income distribution and whether it worsened the distribution of the 
burden. Economic and political/ideological components must match in order for 
a bill to be approved, as mentioned by PM03. This suggests that the analysis 
was influenced by dispositions internalised in the habitus, as explained in 
Chapter Three. 
The second component was the technical analysis of legislation, which became 
tangled during tax debates. TA02, for instance, in commenting on the 
procedures of the 2012 tax reform, mentioned that debates on policy, revenue 
impact and distribution obscured technical discussion.58 In carrying out technical 
examination of legislation, the possession of tax knowledge was pivotal. 
Regardless of the political affiliation of interviewees, there was a consensus that 
the possession of tax knowledge in parliament was low (PM01, PM02, PM04, 
PM07). This lack of knowledge led members of parliament to enact their 
practices more by ‘feelings’ (PM01) than by technical certainty. In this respect, 
PM01 added that there was: 
darkness in the [legal technicalities of] tax procedures, which 
sometimes are the most important part [of the debate] ... [parliament] 
is immersed in an immense, immense darkness in the tax 
procedures. 
Although some members of parliament held high amounts of symbolic capital in 
the form of reputation (Bourdieu, 1990), having held high positions in the 
executive in the past, parliamentarians ‘are not tax specialists’ (PM07). In the 
same vein, PM10 added that parliament did not have the ‘specificity and 
technical competences adequately to address tax issues’. Technical discussion 
‘for those who are not specialist is not easy at all’ (PM01), especially on tax 
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 A very debatable component of the 2012 tax reform was a tax credit for education. 
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practice and the ‘associated effects’ of legislation (PM02). The absence of tax 
knowledge arose from a lack of professional practice, as argued by PM02: 
What happens is that the tax discipline has major complexities. I 
think that if you haven’t worked in the area, you don’t have to 
understand what an excessive withdrawal is, you don’t have to 
understand what goodwill is … these are concepts … and you have 
to study them. And moreover, the law has to be studied and it is not 
easy because it is [disorganised] … tax concepts, the tax code, the 
income tax code are not legislation easy to digest for people who do 
not know the issue. 
This also suggests that the existing complexity of the tax system had an impact 
on the enactment of new legislation. Despite this lack of or limited tax 
knowledge, other actors in the field argued that parliamentarians were not 
expected to be tax experts. In ET04’s words, a parliamentarian was in Congress 
to: 
represent the popular will and then they do not have to be specialists 
... it is not the task of the legislator to know about everything, his role 
is to represent political opinions, political trends… and to generate 
the political opinion according to the state’s long-term goals, of the 
democracy… 
In addition to this general lack of tax knowledge, there were asymmetries within 
Congress, ranging from parliamentarians who did not understand ‘anything at 
all’, to others with a ‘general legal view’, and others taking a political and 
technical perspective (PM01). Analysis of the interviews shows that 
asymmetries were alleviated in some cases and deepened in others. Learning 
was one way to reduce this cultural gap in tax. Some parliamentarians had 
learned over time by reading and had gained greater expertise in certain 
aspects of income tax and even VAT, as mentioned by PM01. This was 
influenced by parliamentarians’ habitus, as suggested by PM04, who argued 
that some individuals were ‘more studious and diligent’ than others. In other 
cases, the executive indirectly deepened tax knowledge asymmetries by 
providing access to the ministry of finance’s advisors by its coalition 
parliamentarians, as mentioned by PM02. This practice was oriented to aligning 
political partners with the content of a bill and succeeding at the legislative 
stage. Consequently, the executive became more powerful in getting the bill 
approved at the expense of deepening cultural capital asymmetries in tax. This 
partnership resonates with Neu (2006) and Gracia and Oats (2012) regarding 
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the formation of social groups, although in this case an informal one. These 
findings together are consistent with Hoffmann and Zulch’s (2014) argument 
that knowledge is not static and can be transmitted in several ways. 
Three consequences of this limited tax knowledge were identified from the 
interviews. First, parliamentarians with low levels of tax knowledge had fewer 
tools to contribute to the debate and ended up resorting to political/ideological 
arguments instead (PM02). Second, scrutiny of legislation was inappropriate for 
assessing whether a policy was as stated in the drafting stage, and whether 
loopholes were available. For example, referring to a particular provision in the 
income tax code, PM01 mentioned that parliamentarians never thought that that 
mechanism would be used by tax lawyers to avoid taxation. This resonates with 
Hall and Taylor’s (1996, p.942) analysis of historical institutionalism in which 
‘the unintended consequences and inefficiencies generated by existing 
institutions’ are of interest. Third, it caused inefficiencies at the legislative stage. 
PM07, referring to the 2012 tax reform, argued that this limited understanding 
made communication between parliamentarians and the executive slower, and 
sometimes technicalities were not fully understood by the former. PM07 added 
that the absence of knowledge led parliament to trust very strongly in the 
judgements of the IRS and the budget office. 
Since tax knowledge was a key disadvantage for parliamentarians, there was a 
struggle for this form of capital in the tax policy-making field. When it was 
unavailable, it was sought in other fields through consultation and invitation. 
5.4.1 Consultation 
Consultation had become common practice in parliament (PM03), particularly in 
the committees of finance (PM05). This need had intensified with the time 
pressures that parliamentarians faced, making the role of tax advisors essential 
(PM10). Similarly, PM16 acknowledged that parliamentarians did not have 
‘enough time to study every project in detail’. These findings resonate with 
Burns (1999, p.179), who argues that ‘elected representatives find it impossible 
... to acquire the minimal technical knowledge entailed in the variety of problem 
areas’ with which they are involved. Accordingly, tax experts provided the ‘best 
technical solution’ (ET04) to help parliamentarians develop a technical opinion 
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and then make informed decisions (PM04). Informed decisions, in turn, helped 
parliamentarians to counterbalance the power of the executive (TA05, PM10). 
Consultation depended on factors such as whom to resort to, and both 
monetary and time resources (OECD, 2001). Regarding whom to consult, it was 
mentioned that parliamentarians looked for a person ‘willing to tell the truth and 
to not induce parliamentarians in one sense or another’ (PM01). As this quote 
suggests, there was a trust component in the appointment of consultants. The 
reasons for appointment will be examined later in this chapter. 
Parliamentarians possessed economic capital, and some exchanged it for tax 
knowledge. For instance, paid professionals from several disciplines, including 
economics, law and accounting, supported parliamentarians during the 2012 tax 
reform (PM02), while others received free tax advice, as acknowledged by 
PM03 and PM05.59 However, it was perceived that free tax consultation might 
not attract advisors who had studied the rules in detail. ET01 argued that 
advisors might have other commitments and might prefer to earn fees 
elsewhere, rather than attending free of charge. Those consulted might belong 
to either the private or the (former) public sector (PM03). 
Time was another determinant of how much to consult. Evidently, extra time 
allowed parliamentarians to consult or listen to a wider spectrum of people, as 
reported by PM02. More than one opinion might be used to validate technical 
opinions. For example, PM02 tried to ask more than one person, looking for a 
second or even a third opinion because a parliamentarian ‘may receive an 
opinion that may seem reasonable to him one day’, but then that stance might 
change when other information was received. 
Tax experts might provide their advice openly, in which case the history of each 
law acknowledged their names, as in the cases covered in Chapters Six and 
Seven, or privately. Private advice might take the form of personal advice, 
where links with the institution/firm for which the advisor worked were not made 
transparent. In the case of the 2012 tax reform, this type of non-transparent 
advice occurred, where the accounting/law firm did not want to appear to be 
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 In this case, there must have been other forms of reward for tax advisors which are beyond 
the scope of this chapter. 
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supporting any position in political terms and the advice took a personal form 
(ET05). 
Procedurally, advisors carried out research and also used their networks, or 
social capital (Bourdieu, 1990), in order to provide advice (PM05). This advice 
might take a distant or close form. The first was by submitting a report to a 
parliamentarian (PM05), while the latter was a more close and collaborative 
approach. In referring to this second type of procedure during the 2012 tax 
reform, PM10 mentioned that parliamentarians checked the content of the bill 
‘sentence by sentence’. 
Advisors’ professional capital (Kurunmäki, 1999) had a significant impact on the 
content of tax legislation. For instance, in the 2012 tax reform, it permitted the 
identification of problems overlooked by the executive branch, as reported by 
PM03. Similarly, PM10 mentioned that their advice allowed parliamentarians to 
conclude that the rule was exceeding the policy in some way. PM10 argued that 
the executive was: 
trying to shoot a butterfly with a cannon. Before specific problems 
were detected that could have had a narrower or specific solution, 
the fundamentals of the Chilean tax system were being changed and 
that seemed a mistake, and therefore the executive was told that. 
The case commented on by PM10 was later changed by the executive and 
withdrawn from the tax bill. This shows that some parliamentarians were able to 
access the design phase under some circumstances. 
5.4.2 Invitation 
The second type of involvement identified during the fieldwork was consultation 
by invitation. This practice of the committees of finance consisted of inviting 
people deemed appropriate to the tax debate, and also in response to 
suggestions of particular members of the committees of finance (PM10). This is 
consistent with the concept of ‘usual suspects’ (Bullock et al., 2001, p.47) 
mentioned in Chapter Two. 
Similarly to direct consultation, consultation by invitation posed time constraints. 
Historically, the availability of more time allowed members of the committees of 
finance to invite a larger spectrum of people, including economists and 
academics (PM16). Extra time also allowed some people to participate more 
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than once in the technical debate in order to delve into technicalities in the rules 
(PM01). 
Examples of institutions invited over the years included accounting and tax 
associations. These institutions usually set up committees to analyse the 
technical content of legislation, as reported by CA01 and PL01. Despite this 
preparation, short-notice invitations prevented them from providing more 
detailed technical opinions (PL01). The impossibility of providing extensive 
technical input gave some agents the impression of false public engagement. 
PL01 used the metaphor ‘pledge of allegiance’ whenever the objective of 
sharing tax knowledge was not met. Nonetheless, PL01 recognised the positive 
role of public engagement in tax policy making if conducted appropriately, 
commenting that having a ‘transparent process, the clarity and trust in the 
manner in which tax rules are made’ would contribute to greater voluntary 
compliance (PL01). This is consistent with Feld and Frey’s (2007) finding that 
tax compliance can be boosted by fair and legitimate political processes, as 
mentioned in Section 2.3. 
The impact of consultation by invitation was not perceived to be very strong by 
CA01, who mentioned that opinions became an input when they matched 
parliamentarians’ beliefs. This resonates with Marriott (2010), who argues that 
those aligned with policy direction and who influence policy are privileged by 
legislation. 
Similarly to the conditions influencing the appointment of advisors in the design 
phase, tax knowledge and political compatibility influenced such decisions in 
parliament. Tax knowledge was mentioned by several interviewees (PM01, 
PM03, PM05, PM10 and PM16) as the primary reason for advisors’ 
appointments, and took three different forms. First, these actors held some type 
of qualification, i.e. an institutionalised form of cultural capital (Everett, 2002). 
For instance, PM05 resorted to individuals with a PhD degree which denoted 
that these advisors had reached a top position, at least in the academic field. 
Having academic experience was a second dimension of this form of cultural 
capital in tax. In this respect, PM10 mentioned that people with ‘professional 
excellence and academic experience’ were sought after. Thirdly, professional 
experience in the field was highly valued by interviewees. PM03 resorted to 
lawyers from the private sector and former IRS officials. Similarly, ET05 
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commented that senior staff in accounting and law firms had participated, 
providing some types of advice to parliamentarians. 
The second main reason for the appointment of advisors was political affinity. 
Although it was not mandatory to belong to the same political party to advise a 
parliamentarian, these outsiders had to ‘hold a common view regarding the 
themes’ on which they advised, as PM16 commented. A similar perspective 
was taken by PM03, who commented that, besides technical competence, 
political views were important: 
Of course, and also they are people of your political affinity. I do not 
want a person with a doctorate in econometrics, but I need a person 
that I also believe in and that sees life – I don’t mean the same, but 
with similar colours to me. 
Either direct advice or invitations from think tanks politically closer to 
parliamentarians were acknowledged in the field as inputs to the debate (PM02, 
PM03 and PM10). Although a distinction was made between technical and 
political factors, these two concepts operated inseparably in practice. In 
referring to the disadvantages of having a permanent, dedicated tax staff within 
Congress, PM04 commented that ‘technical themes have an ideological 
background ... and that staff is contaminated by a [political] colour… and then, if 
I am not of that colour, [their advice] is not helpful at all and I don’t trust anything 
they may tell me’. These two components together were converted into 
symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1990), which influenced their habitus and the way in 
which these actors operated and influenced the tax debate. 
5.4.3 Hearings, notes/letters and reports 
Interest groups tried to provide tax knowledge/information to gain access to the 
tax policy-making field, influencing the debate by seeking attendance at 
hearings and submitting notes/letters and reports to parliamentarians. 
In hearings, interest groups requested invitations (PM10) to finance committee 
sessions. This was allowed under the regulatory framework of law making, 
which allowed any group to participate by presenting its ideas (PM01) and 
influencing the debate (PM16) for its own vested interests (PM07). 
Hearings had an effect on tax decision making. PM01 argued that interest 
groups’ perceptions were ‘powerful in the parliament ... especially technical 
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opinions which are sometimes covered by ideological postures’. Some groups 
were less biased than others. PM07 mentioned that senior staff from 
accounting/law firms were less biased as they did not depend on a particular 
client. In contrast, some tax lawyers were viewed with mistrust by other 
parliamentarians. In particular, PM01 commented that: 
Different interest groups come to the Congress, look at things from 
their own perspective, how tax rules affect them and how they do not. 
The most powerful/dangerous interest groups that come are tax 
lawyers, whose business is tax planning and therefore they are 
always trying to keep loopholes that allow them to sell to enterprises 
... and try to ensure that the rules that harm them do not change 
since they have sold that as a service. 
In order to counterbalance the knowledge of these lawyers, parliamentarians 
required greater expertise in tax. However, this was not the case. PM01 
commented that: 
the problem is that [parliament] discovers that, because 
parliamentarians don’t always discover the trick. The government has 
more capacity to discover [the tricks] than parliamentarians because 
they have larger advisory teams. 
This resonates with Hoffmann and Zulch’s (2014, p.710) statement that ‘in 
public systems that involve a parliament as the decision-making body, the 
standard setter per se has less expertise (for example, tax knowledge) than the 
interest groups’. Time was again a factor in how many hearings were held. 
Obviously, more time allowed more people to be heard during the 2012 tax 
reform (PM16), including a presidential candidate, associations and students, 
as mentioned by PM02. 
Another source of influence/knowledge for parliamentarians was notes/letters 
published in newspapers or directly submitted to parliamentarians. PM02 
mentioned that ‘during a period there were many letters from tax lawyers 
published in [name of newspaper] that every day were finding imperfections and 
loopholes, issues that could have a [negative] impact’ on the tax system. PM01 
reported that some parliamentarians had received comments on a tax provision 
in the 2012 tax reform, highlighting its rights and wrongs. 
Think tanks also informed parliamentary debate through the research they 
conducted. It had become common practice for parliamentarians from both 
political sides to rely on these reports (PM03). Although think tanks had a 
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political ideology, their reports were read by members of the committees of 
finance, regardless of their ideology (PM04). These reports reached 
parliamentarians through their political parties (PM05). Political parties were not 
neutral to tax policy debates, giving instructions on what to decide. This point is 
discussed below. 
5.4.4 Instructions from political parties 
Political parties gave instructions to their parliamentarians, influencing the 
decision process. This aspect is relevant, as the funding of political campaigns 
was not entirely transparent in the Chilean context. This aspect forms part of the 
legal factors presented in the conceptual framework in Chapter Three. 
The fieldwork revealed three ways in which parties were indoctrinated and then 
that information was transmitted to their parliamentarians. First, high-profile 
members of the executive branch informed political parties and their members 
on the committees of finance about which decision to make. In this respect, 
PM05 commented that: 
Members of committees of finance met ministers of finance, deputy 
ministers and other people to conduct a detailed study of each bill. In 
this case, the influence of ministers on political parties, as ministers 
come from political parties, was greater than that of parliamentarians 
... there were the members of the committees of finance of the 
Chamber of Deputies and Senate, and it was there where the 
technical analysis by the ministries and specialists was conducted ... 
in that way the members of the committees arrived [at the meetings] 
with a prejudice. 
Second, companies and business associations lobbied think tanks connected 
with with political parties in order to put pressure on them as well as the 
government to get bills approved in a certain way (PM05). A third way was for 
companies to fund political parties directly. PM01 commented that the existing 
political system was structured so that large economic groups funded both the 
right- and centre-left-wing parties. This funding entailed ‘commitments’ to the 
funders, which were met by approving rules in the most convenient way to 
those funders (TA04-1). This aligns with Roberts and Bobek’s (2004) finding 
that companies allocate contributions to fund parliamentarians in order to 
receive a legislative favour in return. 
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In this way, political parties were captured and instructions flowed to 
parliamentarians. The system in which candidates for a certain campaign were 
elected was a method used to pressure parliamentarians to follow such 
instructions. PM05 commented that parliamentarians were told ‘“look, I will not 
include you in the [electoral] list [as a candidate] because this is a dual system 
and I decide who the candidate is” ... in this way, parliamentarians are not 
interested in what citizens think’. Parliamentarians drew power from the political 
field, as presented in Chapter Three, and their decisions were influenced by 
partisan instructions. These instructions had an impact on the habitus of 
parliamentarians who were also interested in staying in office (Besley, 2006). 
5.4.5 Decision-making process 
Tax knowledge and political instructions served as inputs into the decision 
making process, but were weighted in different ways by parliamentarians. For 
example, some parliamentarians relied heavily on the technical reports given to 
them by their political parties; others relied on joint research conducted with 
their advisors and were not ‘influenced’ (PM05) by partisan instructions; others 
attached significant importance to work conducted by the National Congress 
Library, as commented by PM03; and others applied what they had learned 
from presentations made by outsiders in parliament (PM10). However, it was 
the parliamentarian himself who weighed and made the final tax decision. On 
this point, PM02 commented: 
Parliamentarians made the balance in the end. I mean ... there are 
many things parliamentarians took from the discussion and others 
weren’t taken. That’s the parliament’s work. ...evidently 
parliamentarians’ advisors are closer, they tell the parliamentarian 
about the impact of what is being said (possibly by those listened to) 
and the consequences of certain comments made, but from that 
perspective ... the final decision is made by parliamentarians based 
on the weight they give to the arguments they have had over the 
table. This happens not only on tax ...parliamentarians have advisory 
[support], and the community is also interested in participating, in 
opining on the positive or negative effects of the tax bills. They have 
the chance to do it and it was done for [the 2012 tax reform] in 
depth… 
The decisions made were not necessarily procedurally transparent (Geraats, 
2001). In some cases, negotiation occurred outside parliament in order to 
understand the content of legislation and move forward, as mentioned by PM02. 
Similarly, ET04 commented that the ‘debate is held outside the congress. The 
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technical discussion is held in the IRS, ministry of finance, in the corridors and 
with the interest groups’. Despite this practice, parliamentarians tried to gain 
more legitimacy, or symbolic capital, in making their decisions. For the 2012 tax 
reform, sessions held within the committees of finance were broadcast by 
television, which was understood as sign of [procedural] transparency, as 
commented by PM02 and PM10. Nonetheless, it was also acknowledged that 
some individuals ‘make discourses for the television fuelled by more ideology 
than technical analysis’ (PM02). This aspect may be linked to elections. PM04, 
in referring to elections, mentioned that ‘every parliamentarian’s decision is on 
the media and able to be channelled ...whilst the more aseptic the decision is, 
the less it is going to influence me, the more ethically right it is’. 
Although procedural transparency was desirable, some policy makers took an 
opposite view. For example, PM04 opposed the publication of parliamentary 
reports because ‘discretion makes the debate more genuine’ and some aspects 
were not well received outside parliament. Without making any distinction in 
terms of transparency, TA02 commented that processes were made 
transparent by inviting people and publishing session reports, giving ‘legitimacy 
to the processes’. However, as shown, for example in the instructions from 
political parties, transparency took a ritual rather than a genuine form. 
Although the decision-making process was complex because of the number of 
inputs and there seemed to be ‘careful examination’ of tax bills, as mentioned 
by PM04, this was insufficient to make robust regulation or ‘perfect’ legislation 
(PM04). 
Once decisions had been made in the committees of finance, these were 
communicated to their respective general chambers, either the Chamber of 
Deputies or the Senate. The next sub-section examines how this 
communication flowed and influenced other parliamentarians. 
Communications from the committees of finance to the Chamber of 
Deputies and Senate 
It was acknowledged that the substantial debate on tax bills was held in the 
committees of finance (PM01) and that decisions made by them were very 
unlikely to change in the Chamber of Deputies and Senate (PM08). The 
reasons for this were two-fold: technical and political. 
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Consistent with previous findings, there was a perception that tax knowledge 
was held by very few members of parliament (PM05). In this scenario, other 
parliamentarians tended to trust the work carried out by the parliamentarians in 
the committees of finance. In this regard, in a conversation with a non-member 
of committee of finance, PM04was told that: 
If [name of parliamentarian] says that [the bill] is OK, it means that 
the bill had passed and was carefully examined by other 
parliamentarians… That’s technical trust ... that other person knew 
that I had examined the bill. He had the trust that I had certain 
knowledge and that if I hadn’t highlighted anything as wrong, he 
thought that the bill was irreproachable. 
Besides this trust in the technical competence of parliamentarians, the IRS’ 
stance was also highly respected. TA05 commented that there was ‘trust’ in the 
technical work done by the IRS. This trust may also be interpreted as a factor in 
moving forward the debate in the Chamber of Deputies and Senate. 
The second element was political affinity. There was consensus in the 
interviews that parliamentarians from the committees of finance led the rest in 
order to decide on tax bills, rooted in political affinity. PM05 commented on this: 
Let’s assume that I am communist and I belong to the committee of 
finance and there is another communist in the committee of 
agriculture. I trust that he will give me a right report on agriculture 
based on the political party’s criteria. 
PM04 referred to this concept as political trust, adding that ‘the parliamentarian 
of a particular political colour leads … [that is] political trust’.60 
Although these quotes suggest that this always occurred, PM03 argued that 
members of the committees of finance had some power, but that would not 
necessarily influence the decision in the whole Chamber of Deputies or Senate: 
In relation to political trends inside the parliament, many times what 
[parliamentarians] from a certain political colour from the committee 
of finance think, the rest of parliamentarians, I am not saying that 
they trust, but tend to listen to what [x], [name of parliamentarian] or 
[name of parliamentarian] do inside the committee of finance. Then, 
the opinion of the members of the committee of finance has a weight 
for their political partners, but it is not determining at all. Here each 
one is the owner of his own decisions ... but there is a certain 
influence in that sense. 
                                            
60
 PM04 referred to political compatibility, as mentioned before. 
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The preceding sub-sections have shown how parliamentarians made decisions 
at the legislative stage. However, as acknowledged earlier in this chapter, 
another actor exerting influence on the content and pace of legislation was the 
executive branch. Through several mechanisms granted by the constitution, 
explained above and now revisited, the executive vied for control. 
5.5 Practices of executive branch 
Besides negotiation and reaching consensus with parliamentarians, other 
practices of the executive branch revolved around the use of several forms of 
(non-)transparency to control and get tax bills – the object of transparency 
(Oliver, 2004) – approved in parliament. Those found in the fieldwork are 
discussed here. 
Within the law-making framework, and as mentioned earlier in this chapter, the 
executive was permitted to introduce time pressure and thus control the pace of 
discussions in the parliament. This may be interpreted as controlling through 
‘playing’ with the temporal boundary of the field (Gracia & Oats, 2012; Mutch, 
2006). It was noted that, when bills were examined very quickly, it was not 
possible to conduct a detailed analysis of the content of tax rules (PM05). In this 
case, parliamentarians were prevented from improving their position in the field 
by increasing the stock of tax knowledge to defend their postures over shorter 
periods of time. 
A second mechanism was the use of miscellaneous bills, which were connected 
with the intention to hide a tax change. For instance, PM05 said that an income 
tax aspect was changed in a VAT bill with only minor comments, such as ‘article 
X is modified and the colon and the following sentence is repealed’. PM05 
rejected this approach and argued that full information should be provided in 
this respect. 
A third mechanism was lack of openness about policy objectives, i.e. political 
(non-)transparency (Geraats, 2001). In this respect, PM01 said that the 
executive studied a large topic and went to parliament with a fraction of that and 
tried to ‘prevent parliamentarians from realising that the problem is [bigger] and 
tries to block any [discussion]’. In PM01’s view, parliament’s limited tax 
knowledge made it difficult to understand the problem and analyse its 
ramifications more broadly. This practice was reinforced by the 
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political/constitutional power conferred on the executive to not disclose any 
contents of a tax bill before its submission to parliament. PM03 said that the 
executive did not have ‘any obligation’ to make the bill transparent at an earlier 
stage. 
A fourth mechanism was obscuring of the content of economic estimates, which 
was economic (non-)transparency (Geraats, 2001). PM04 commented that 
DIPRES did not provide great detail on the bill in order to avoid questions being 
raised in the parliament. DIPRES’ reports were described as ‘inscrutable’ and 
‘managerial’, and in this way further discussion was blocked. This resonates 
with Lukes’ second dimension of power in which non-decision making (blocking 
of discussion) may be considered as a form of decision making (2005). A 
stronger view was held by PM01, who argued that figures were manipulated to 
serve the objectives set by the executive. PM01 commented that: 
always this is hidden and normally the ministry of finance distorts the 
revenue or manipulates the objective it has ... sometimes to the 
theoretical maximum, other times to the theoretical minimum 
depending on the objective intended to be achieved ... [A]s the 
parliament does not have the tools to make the estimations, [it] has 
to trust in what the executive delivers. 
A fifth form commented on during the fieldwork was a combination of political, 
economic and policy (non-)transparency (Geraats, 2001), specifically during the 
2012 tax reform. These practices may be interpreted as a selective form of non-
transparency because parliamentarians belonging to the coalition government 
were provided with ‘content, information ... to align them with the bill’ through 
access to advice from the ministry of finance, auditors and lawyers, amongst 
others (PM02), in order to play the executive’s game (PM01). Accordingly, 
parliamentarians who received such inputs perceived the process to be 
transparent, as noted by PM10. In contrast, opposition parliamentarians did not 
receive such support (PM02) and, accordingly, perceived the process to be 
non-transparent, with the executive focused on their non-understanding and 
with little ability to intervene. Moreover, if the opposition had objected to the 
content of the tax bill, they would have been called ‘obstructionists’ (PM01). 
Prior to submission to the executive, there was no formal procedure to evaluate 
the effects of the law to be enacted (PM03, PM04), which became known after 
implementation. The design and legislative stages produced tax rules with 
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specific features and flaws. The next sub-section presents the findings in 
relation to how those tax rules were implemented in practice. 
5.6 Implementation 
At the implementation stage, fewer fields were involved, including the 
bureaucratic (IRS), professional services (tax advisors), corporate/business 
(taxpayers) and academic fields, as shown in Chapter Three. These actors 
interacted and vied for control over the ‘actual’ content of tax legislation. This 
sub-section will show how these actors enacted practices in order to position 
themselves as more powerful in the tax policy-making field. 
5.6.1 Implementation by the IRS 
As noted above, the IRS was a dominant agent in tax policy making because it 
participated in designing and drafting tax rules and then implemented them. 
Three implementation practices were identified from the interviews: official 
administrative guidance, training and audits. These are discussed in turn. 
Official administrative guidance 
The IRS had a specialist department in charge of issuing administrative 
guidance, known as ‘circulars’, and questions from taxpayers, called ‘notes’ 
(oficio, in Spanish). Whereas circulars were compulsory for tax inspectors only 
and not for taxpayers (TA01), notes had to be followed by the taxpayer who 
requested them. 
The object of circulars was to provide an interpretation of the content of 
legislation. This had its root in the fact that the IRS knew the ‘spirit’ of legislation 
and then ‘in some way, has some right to interpret’ (TA01). This guidance must 
never exceed the legal framework, and going further was understood as a 
mistake (TA01). This indicates the dominant position of the IRS in the field. On 
the one hand it produced legislation and, if flawed, had the right to interpret it. 
However, when a law was inadequate, the usefulness of circulars was doubtful. 
In this respect, FT02 acknowledged that circulars never analysed complex 
aspects of legislation. This may be interpreted as a sign of symbolic violence: 
the retention of information thus maintained a climate of uncertainty (Gracia & 
Oats, 2012). 
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In issuing circulars, there is evidence of internal and external consultation to 
improve the standard of the instrument. Internal consultation was conducted in 
order to avoid any ‘counter-productive’ effect on other legislation in force 
(TA01). External informal consultation with the association of accountants, law 
bar and others had been conducted with respect to certain legislation. Despite 
this external input, it was the IRS who made decisions on which opinions to take 
(TA05). This external consultation allowed the IRS to increase its knowledge of 
taxpayers’ practices and related costs. 
A connection between better tax policy processes and better legislation 
appeared during the interviews. TA01 argued that, if better debate were carried 
out in Congress, fewer circulars would be necessary to supplement the law: 
I think that if there are good discussions in the Congress during the 
production of legal texts, I think there would be less administrative 
guidance issued by the IRS; because today there is no knowledge of 
the aim of the rules, but if there were good discussions, on the 
scope, etc., I think that everybody would better off, better informed 
about the scopes and object [of legislation]. 
The second administrative rule was the note (oficio), which was a response 
from the IRS to questions formulated by taxpayers on particular issues. In the 
opinion of TA01, the volume of these responses was conversely related to the 
robustness of legislation, as the following quotation suggests: 
If the IRS is always responding on the same issue, it means that the 
rule is not clear ... that it was ambiguous, that what it wanted to do 
was not achieved, and that makes the procedures more complex. 
These quotes together illustrate the connection between good tax policy-making 
processes and better standards of tax legislation. 
Training and audits 
The IRS developed training programmes for its tax inspectors in order to 
increase their tax knowledge to implement the rules. The topics covered in 
these training sessions were where the law and the content of various circulars 
were delivered (TA01). 
Like other jurisdictions, the IRS segmented taxpayers by size (TA01), which 
allowed a better focus for audits. The formal procedure to be followed in tax 
audits was already regulated in the tax code, which detailed the sequence of 
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procedures and documentation to be completed and requested. Informally, the 
IRS had adopted the practice of reading newspapers to identify risks and 
potentially launch a tax audit (FT02). 
Besides contributing to tax compliance, audits also contributed to establishing 
further controls and to improving the tax system when the rules were not 
working appropriately in practice (FT01). This type of assessment in terms of 
efficiency and efficacy was regularly made, which explains the number of 
changes to tax rules once enacted. TA02 mentioned that amendments and 
closure of loopholes followed the detection of new avoidance and evasion 
schemes. When such problems were identified, the tax policy-making process 
began again, as noted above. This evaluation highlights that legislation was not 
perfect and was ultimately tested once in operation. 
5.6.2 Implementation by taxpayers 
Taxpayers also implemented tax legislation, and in doing so enacted various 
practices at the organisational level, resorting to advisors on certain tax issues 
and using loopholes for tax planning, and in their relationship with the tax 
authority. These practices are discussed in turn. 
Organisational features 
The companies interviewed had small tax functions, as will be shown in 
Chapters Six and Seven. Those at higher levels in companies did not 
understand taxes (TPPT04) and tax knowledge was highly concentrated in few 
individuals within the expert department, as mentioned by TPPT03. Even further 
levels of specialisation might occur within companies. For example, TPPT05 
commented on having people in charge of sub-units of tax compliance and tax 
planning. Likewise, TPPT01 mentioned that one area was in charge of tax 
compliance and payments, and other areas were more concerned with 
consultancy and planning. 
Tax knowledge was an important condition for implementing tax legislation and 
was a form of capital at stake in the field. Some companies reported recruiting 
people with high tax knowledge in terms of experience and qualifications, 
whereas those already in office had taken postgraduate courses, as mentioned 
by TPPT05. 
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Besides knowledge, there was evidence of higher levels of automation in order 
to keep tax accounts in order. In this respect, for instance, TPPT05 mentioned 
attempts to improve efficiency through software. This company now had 
software to compute income tax, tax equity, deferred income taxes and effective 
tax rates, and to file affidavits. These practices and resources might reduce the 
number of errors in practice, avoiding fines and further work. 
Tax advisors 
The companies interviewed reported having resorted to tax advisors for different 
purposes (TPPT01, TPPT02, TPPT03, TPPT04, TPPT05). In some cases, 
companies sought more than one professional opinion to mitigate risks and to 
prepare for tax audits. TPPT01 mentioned having resorted to a succession of 
up to four Big Four firms for opinions, especially in more complex areas such as 
international taxation where knowledge seemed to be more scarce. The use of 
advisors was recognised as a risk management mechanism (Mulligan, 2008, 
p.262). This highlights the predominant role of the Big Four firms analysed 
elsewhere (Sikka & Willmott, 2009; Stringfellow et al., 2015). 
Risks and tax planning 
In the fieldwork, it was noted that taxpayers managed their tax risks using non-
compulsory administrative guidance. One way of doing this was by using 
circulars issued by the IRS. TPPT01 acknowledged that since this guidance 
was public it could not be ‘ignored’. At a broader level, a tax administrator 
commented on the wide use of circulars by taxpayers (FT01). This suggests an 
adverse attitude of taxpayers to risk. 
Another mechanism used by taxpayers was to request a particular ruling, i.e. 
notes (oficios), which appeared similar to the ‘advance ruling’ mechanism 
identified by Mulligan (2008, p.261). This clarification issued by the IRS was 
usually used to confirm certain criteria and for tax planning, as reported by 
TA01. 
Organisational coordination and validation seems to have been important in tax 
planning. TPPT01 mentioned having a legal department in Chile with 
headquarters in Europe. The latter was very much aware of risks, including non-
technical reputational risk (Mulligan, 2008, p.247). In this respect, TPPT01 
added that: 
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The tax aspect is much connected with reputational risk and 
sometime the thing is that the issue is not illegal but you are being 
used by clients to undertake, .for instance, inheritance tax planning ... 
which are topics that could be seen as politically wrong ... that the 
[name of company] is doing this ... then there is an issue over the 
legal risk, but it is a reputational risk. 
In this respect, this interviewee added that the company took a conservative 
stance and refrained from undertaking certain transactions that might generate 
a tax contingency, despite the interest of the commercial area, in order to 
protect their reputation: 
Because the reputational risk is not very tangible, not very 
quantifiable ... it is a thing that we tell these [commercial] people … ‘if 
a tax inspector asks you for this product, you cannot tell them what 
you are telling to us ... and it is not that it is illegal but it looks bad, it 
looks bad’. Regarding pensions, the commercial executives tried to 
put a product in the media, massively, but the tax area said not at all. 
(The commercial area said), ‘But why? This is in the law.’ ‘Yes, it is in 
the law but what the law intends is not this. What the law is trying to 
do is to encourage workers to invest in their pensions ... and that’s it.’ 
As this quote shows, reputation was protected by taking a conservative stance 
in interpreting the law according to its spirit to avoid problems, as the 
interviewee commented. This reputational risk overlaps with the concept of 
‘symbolic capital’ (Bourdieu, 1977, 1990). In this case, the headquarters was 
not willing to shoulder the burden of legal costs to defend an aggressive tax 
plan. For this company, citizens’ perceptions were highly valued, and being 
recognised as a company involved in aggressive tax planning was deemed not 
to be a good strategy to follow. 
Perceptions of the IRS 
There was some level of consensus on the high quality of the national tax 
authority, as will be shown in Chapters Six and Seven. With regard to the more 
general aspect of taxation, this positive perception remained. This is consistent 
with the view of the IRS’ performance as one of the best in Latin America 
(Fairfield, 2010; Harberger, 1989). For example, TPPT01 perceived that the IRS 
was getting better prepared all the time, and that it was investing in training. 
Higher levels of specialisation and tax knowledge had helped to change the role 
of tax inspectors, as TPPT05 suggested: 
You go to the IRS and you think you are at Harvard – only 
professionals aged 20-25 with masters’ from everywhere… [The IRS 
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has] high quality professionals and moreover they are account 
executives now; they are no longer tax inspectors, they are tax 
accounts executives. Then the IRS has very well qualified people 
behind the audit processes. Now you go there and you have to 
demonstrate with facts and documentation that you are right. 
This changing role of tax inspectors resonates with Tuck’s (2010) finding that 
tax inspectors not only deal with detailed technical knowledge but are also part 
of an organisation with strategic and marketing aspirations, as mentioned in 
Chapter Two. In this scenario of a powerful IRS rich in tax knowledge, 
taxpayers defended themselves with higher amounts of tax knowledge 
(TPPT05), trying to project an image that they were not doing ‘inadequate 
things’ (TPPT01). This is consistent with Pentland and Carlile’s (1996) finding 
that taxpayers try to project an image of themselves as good taxpayers. In this 
way, they defended their symbolic capital, understood as reputation as 
explained earlier in this chapter. 
The final sub-section presents the findings in relation to the role of tax 
practitioners regarding the implementation of tax regulation. 
5.6.3 Implementation by advisors 
Intermediaries played a key role in the implementation of tax legislation. These 
actors supported and advised taxpayers on compliance with the norms in force, 
and at the same time provided tax planning services. The practices they 
enacted began with the interpretation of the content of tax legislation, and thus 
this sub-section begins with perceptions of features of income tax legislation. 
Thereafter, the way in which loopholes were used in tax planning is presented, 
concluding with the relationship with the tax authority and the way practices 
were disseminated in the field. 
Income tax law features 
Although, ambiguity, complexity and compliance costs were intertwined 
concepts, as shown in Chapter Two, the findings relating to each are presented 




Some tax practitioners acknowledged that corporate income tax legislation in 
Chile had problems and that those problems resulted from a deficient tax policy-
making process. ET01 commented that the absence of a long-term plan had 
produced legislation that had attempted to solve specific problems; however, in 
consequence the law overall was ‘bad’ and its objectives were unclear. In turn, 
this policy-making style had produced ‘legislative hyper-inflation’. ET03 
commented that tax rules emerged from Congress in a ‘worse’ state. The level 
of technical debate held in Congress was perceived to be ‘nil’ (ET04), which, 
combined with the low level of tax knowledge and expertise of the 
parliamentarians, had generated the current situation (ET02). 
The preceding paragraph should not be understood as tax practitioners’ 
pessimistic and general perceptions of income tax law. Although ET04 
perceived that income tax legislation was flawed in terms of age, referring to it 
as ‘not modern’, and that it ‘has flaws of language and concepts’, this 
respondent’s general view was that the legislation ‘works well’ from a technical 
perspective. This good functioning conformed with the features, or habitus in 
Bourdieusian terms, of taxpayers and tax inspectors who made the law work, 
such as tax morale (Torgler, 2003) and trying to make things right, as shown 
above. 
Extensive administrative guidance was not well received in practice; instead, 
better processes were required, as ET01 commented: 
I would like there to be less circulars, less notes [oficios] and for the 
law to be clearer. For me, that’s the ideal. That is not necessary 
because at this moment the IRS is working on all the circulars ... then 
I would like the law to be so clear that the interpretation of the IRS is 
minimal ... because in the end, which is one beholden to? ... To the 
law … and the IRS should be beholden to the law, and what is 
happening is that as the [national] director may interpret the law, [the 
IRS] starts to think that the circulars and notes are above the law, i.e. 
when one tells a tax inspector ‘the law says this’, the inspector says 
‘yes, but Circular 48 says this and the note says this’ ... and then one 
thinks, ‘hey, but the head [of the IRS] enacted the circular and if this 
person [tax inspector] does not apply it, he is fired ... then, I insist this 
has the origin that the law is poorly done, [it is] obscure, that 
adequate wording is not used. Why? Because, at the same time, 
there is no time to study ... because, this [tax rule] comes from a 
political media thing. Then it is a sequence of things that produces 
bad law, and that allows the IRS to interpret in the way it wants, and 
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then that means that when it is used, we will go to court and then I 
will make money. 
A similar view was held by ET03, who argued that circulars did not clarify the 
flaws in enacted legislation and generated ‘grey areas’. These grey areas of the 
law opened room for tax planning. On this, ET01 added: 
I think that tax planning is influenced, amongst other reasons, by bad 
law, by bad law made by the legislator ... On the one hand, that 
allows the IRS to interpret the law in a sense that is convenient for it 
and, at the same time, the taxpayers on the other hand. 
Complexity 
Complexity was a second feature commented on during the fieldwork. ET01, 
ET02 and ET03 agreed that the income tax law was complex. ET01 referred to 
the number of different tax treatments within the income tax code as a source of 
this complexity. In referring to tax incentives, donations and credits, ET01 used 
a metaphor, arguing that the use of these instruments sometimes ‘has a fraud-
like odour’. 
A second component of complexity was linked with the wording deployed in 
legislation. ET01 commented that it seemed that ‘tax laws are made for a small 
universe of people that are involved in the topic and for the rest is a pain’. ET03 
commented that it was difficult for those who were not devoted to the tax area 
and lacked practice. 
A third component of complexity related to the organisation of legislation 
(Thuronyi, 1996) discussed in Chapter Two. ET01 mentioned that integration 
with other legislation was very complex, while ET02 added that income tax law 
was disorganised and that ‘you read one article [provision] and have to read 
others as well to understand the former’. Ambiguity and complexity combined 
had an impact on compliance costs. 
Compliance costs 
These features had to some extent empowered tax practitioners, as they were 
holders of rich tax knowledge with mastery of tax legislation, or professional 
capital (Kurunmäki, 1999; Gracia & Oats, 2012). This was also linked with 
symbolic capital, as the following quotation suggests: 
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Then in the end one becomes a god. If one knows a little … that sells 
... for advisors, [this] is really good because you present an image to 
taxpayers and the taxpayer reads the law and does not understand 
anything ... the fees are very important for tax advisors (ET01). 
Since tax knowledge was relevant in determining the actual content of 
legislation, tax practitioners were rewarded with fees, the purest form of 
economic capital (Bourdieu, 1990), which was also evaluated by ET02: 
[These features of the law are] negative, negative, totally negative. 
Well, negative for any person’s eyes. If I am more individualistic, this 
is more interesting for me; it is more work for me and for all 
specialists, because in the end you have more work, [taxpayers] 
need you more. A greater need is generated than if [the law] was 
easier. But seeing this as a layperson, it is very complex, because in 
the end you frequently have to resort to an advisor. 
These features also raised the compliance costs relating to normal activities. 
The high reliance of the Chilean tax system on affidavits (PM15) had increased 
the ‘administrative burden of tax compliance’ (ET02). High compliance costs in 
the implementation field may be interpreted as an ‘unintended consequence’ 
(Marriott, 2010; Peters, 2005) of legislators, whose discourse contradicted the 
effects of tax rules in practice. Particular features of the law on tax planning are 
discussed next. 
Tax planning 
There was consensus among the interviewees that tax planning was a licit 
concept (ET01, ET02, ET03, ET04). In preparing tax plans, advisors exhibited 
high levels of conservatism. This aligns with the idea that Chilean taxpayers 
were in general very compliant (ET01). ET03 mentioned that taxpayers looked 
for tranquility and safety in their tax plans by appointing the best tax advisor to 
provide it. This suggests that advisors honoured the tax risk management 
mechanism of appointing advisors put into practice by taxpayers (Mulligan, 
2008). The particular practices through which this conservatism was achieved, 
according to the interviewees, were: 
 Using circulars issued by the IRS. ET02 acknowledged that circulars were a 
source of information. ET03 referred to this guidance as a source of risk 
‘mitigation tool, a tool of safety’. 
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 Informing taxpayers of all issues for them to decide which path to take 
(ET01). This is consistent with Hoffman’s (1961) analysis that a tax 
practitioner must evaluate all contingencies and then inform the taxpayer. 
 Applying the ‘smell test’ of tax planning (Mulligan, 2008). This is linked with 
dealing with both the letter and spirit of the law (McBarnet, 2002). In this 
sense, tax advisors tended to discard any tax plan that might be perceived 
as illegitimate. ET01 preferred to refrain from tax plans that ‘smell like a tax 
crime’ and, although favouring the taxpayer in the case of ambiguity, 
preferred to work in the middle, between the letter and spirit of the law. 
From the analysis of these interviews, it may be suggested that these practices 
were oriented to protecting practitioners’ reputations, or symbolic capital 
(Bourdieu, 1990), which, if damaged, might have a negative impact on their 
economic capital (Bourdieu, 1990). In this sense, ET01 mentioned that, as 
practitioners, any tax service offered should not damage the profession. 
Similarly, referring to an advisory firm, ET02 commented that the firm took care 
of its reputation and informed taxpayers of all potential tax planning 
contingencies. The reputation of the profession was taken seriously even by law 
associations, which would never encourage the widespread use of ‘very 
reckless tax plans’ (ET01). 
Relationship with the tax authority 
There was a level of consensus among tax intermediaries on the standard of 
the IRS. The interviews revealed a perception that the level of tax cultural 
capital had increased over time within the IRS (ET01, ET02). This higher level 
of competence translated in practice into unwinding the core of tax issues 
(ET02), but also made it harder ‘to fight against the IRS’ in defending taxpayers 
(ET01). This suggests that the IRS had become a more powerful actor in the 
field through tax cultural capital and, in response, tax advisors had to be equally 
or better prepared in determining the amount of tax liabilities. 
Institutionalisation of practices 
Once learned, practices were institutionalised and replicated in the field, as will 
be shown in Chapters Six and Seven. In general tax terms, it was 
acknowledged that tax knowledge in completing tax tasks flowed from more 
experienced toward more junior professionals through professional practice 
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within accounting and law firms. This was commented on by ET03 in explaining 
the operations of business restructuring with a junior accountant, who had 
gained knowledge through interaction with the senior staff. It was also 
acknowledged that there was imitation, or ‘copying’, of the practices of 
experienced staff by new entrants to the tax profession (ET03). 
5.6.4 Post implementation review 
DIPRES’ work went beyond the preparation of the financial reports in the design 
of tax rules to include the formal evaluation of current legislation. Although there 
was no ‘official mechanism to assess the quality of regulation’ (PM13), 
measures relating to the success of revenue collection estimates over time 
were used once the rules were in operation (PM03, PM04). These evaluations 
might lead to a tax change, which would make the tax policy-making process 
commence again. 
5.7 Summary 
This chapter has conceptualised the relationship between the design phase and 
the field of power. It has also identified two important components in the 
creation of tax legislation in the executive and legislative branches: tax 
knowledge and social capital. In particular, it has illustrated how tax knowledge 
was held and acquired from different sources, including tax advisors. Regarding 
the latter, this chapter has illustrated how social capital acted as a connector 
between different fields. It has also illuminated how the possession of different 
forms of power led to domination. In particular, it has illustrated the concepts of 




Chapter Six: The Former Transfer Pricing Rule 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings relating to the three research sub-questions 
presented in Chapter Four. Section 6.2 provides a general overview of transfer 
pricing to enable understanding of the findings presented in this and Chapter 
Seven. Section 6.3 presents the findings in relation to the design stage. Section 
6.4 describes the process that took place in parliament and the enactment of 
this rule. Section 6.5 illustrates the failed first implementation and amendment. 
Section 6.6 presents the findings in relation to the post implementation phase. 
Section 6.7 presents the initiatives for the new rule, and Section 6.8 
summarises the chapter. 
6.2 Background to transfer pricing 
The creation of multinational enterprise groups was a response to cross-border 
decentralisation in the nineteenth century (Picciotto, 1992). MNEs are parts of 
groups of associated companies operating in two or more countries (OECD, 
2010a). The phenomenon of transfer pricing occurs when goods are sold and 
services rendered between related parties (Groot & Selto, 2013; Hanlon & 
Heitzman, 2010). These parties may be located in the same or different tax 
jurisdictions. Transfer pricing allows companies to reduce their amount of 
payable taxes and is nowadays a tool for international tax planning (Adams & 
Coombes, 2007; Baistrocchi & Roxan, 2012). 
In terms of regulation, transfer pricing is based on the arm’s length principle 
which has been widely promoted by the OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administration (1979, 1995, 1996, 1997, 
1999, 2010). The arm’s length principle states that when two divisions or 
business units within an MNE have an internal transfer of goods, services or 
intangibles, the price charged should be that set if the transaction had been 
between independent parties. This principle seeks to regulate market behaviour 
(Plesner Rossing, 2013) using comparable prices. However, a comparable 
value may not exist, in which case the OECD Guidelines establish different 
methods for its computation and comparison (see Appendix 2). 
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Countries have followed and adapted the arm’s length principle in various ways 
in their domestic legislation. The achievement of uniformity may be 
unsuccessful, given the extent of and ways in which the principle has been 
adopted in domestic legislation, introducing uncertainty into international 
transactions (Avi-Yonah et al., 2009). This uncertainty may be reduced through 
advance pricing agreements (APA) between the relevant tax authorities and 
multinationals in order to fix the prices for a number of years (see Appendix 2). 
The next section presents the 1997 Chilean experience in adopting the OECD 
Guidelines. 
6.3 Design stage 
This section presents the tax policy-making process for the 1997 transfer pricing 
rule following the structural process delineated by Gould and Baker (2002): 
design, legislative and implementation. As in Chapter Five, the drafting stage is 
included in the design stage. 
In transfer pricing policy design, the bureaucratic, political and professional 
services fields converged. The president and the minister of finance in the 
period were members of a centre-left-wing political party (Christian Democrat 
Party), whereas the deputy minister of finance was a member of the Socialist 
Party. Evidence suggests that the deputy minister’s composition of capital 
(Bourdieu, 1990) allowed him to occupy a powerful, leading position in order to 
generate institutional and legal change in this period. First, the deputy minister 
held a high amount of ‘institutionalised [tax] cultural capital’ (Everett, 2002, 
pp.62-3) derived from training as an economist and doctoral studies in taxation 
in the US. Second, he had social capital through being a member of an 
influential think tank, described as his ‘intellectual crab’ (PM06), which during 
the years of democratic recovery generated economic and public policy 
proposals as well as contributing to the development of researchers who 
occupied senior political positions between 1990 and 2010.61 Through these 
connections, the deputy minister provided advice to ministers and was 
recognised for his interests in international taxation (TPTE05), enabling him to 
access the tax policy-making field. As illustrated in Chapter Three, knowledge 




and experience allowed the deputy minister to ascend within the 
professional/economic field, and social capital then allowed him to access the 
space in which tax policy was designed. These forms of capital were converted 
into symbolic capital, leading the minister of finance to delegate to the deputy 
minister, as the following quote suggests: 
Politics is like a financial statement of a company. You have a 
political equity; but it is tight and you spend it on the fights you have, 
and in all things, but you also have to accumulate it, because, if you 
spend it all, eventually you will end up with no support to do 
anything… In general, tax and regulatory matters are very exhausting 
... and I say that the consequence of that is that [ministers of finance] 
delegate a lot on these aspects. Then, [the Deputy Minister of 
Finance and close team] received a lot of trust from the minister of 
finance in order to not bother him all the time ... The minister and 
deputy minister ended up being a very strong duo (PM06). 
Once in this leading position, the deputy minister was known for being an 
enthusiastic individual who had conducted institutional/legal changes that ‘have 
a lot to do with him’ (TPTE05). PM08 suggested that, at this point in time, the 
development of tax policy was more connected with the person than with the 
organisation: 
nobody doubts that if there was a tax matter it would be led by [the 
deputy minister], who would be ... in charge of everything from the 
undersecretary. If the deputy minister had been in the budget office, 
[tax policy development] would have been conducted from the 
budget office. It has more to do with the person... [The deputy 
minister] had a human capital that nobody could question and it was 
him who formulated [tax] policy. 
This is in line with Gordon and Thuronyi’s (1998) proposal that the personality of 
specific individuals contributes to tax policy formulation when the groups are 
small (see also Christians, 2010a; Marriott, 2010). 
Later, the deputy minister set up a small tax committee within the ministry of 
finance, occupying the post of coordinator. This committee also comprised two 
members of the bureaucratic field, specifically from the IRS. With regard to 
international tax matters, another member of the IRS joined, based on 
accumulated knowledge in theory and practice, ascending in the bureaucratic 
field, at least in terms of power. The following quotation notes the importance of 
this individual, especially in moving along the transfer pricing agenda: 
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[This person] had significant importance ... studied in England, is a 
Swedish lawyer, had worked for [a former Big Four name] and had 
an understanding of associated entities, transfer pricing … and then 
began to raise issues in this context … and the need to set a transfer 
pricing rule (PM15). 
Apart from this IRS official, transfer pricing knowledge was limited throughout 
the executive branch. In response, two members of the professional services 
field were invited to participate in setting the tax policy agenda. From the 
interviews, it may be inferred that the absence of detailed tax knowledge 
influenced their appointment. There were two reasons for the limited 
‘theoretical’ and practical tax knowledge (PM15). First, until around 1992, the 
year in which the IRS accepted the use of other models, there was an idea that 
the Andean Pact framework of negotiation was the sole option for negotiating 
double tax agreements (PM15). Second, Chile was not a well-established 
participant in the international sphere. PM11 commented on the limited 
‘inclusion of Chile, neither of the ministry of finance nor IRS authorities in the 
global sphere. ... For example, Chile was not an OECD member, neither was it 
an observer; it didn’t attend the OECD meetings.’ This situation encouraged 
strong reliance on external advisors (PM11). 
These two advisors were rich in tax knowledge. Both held a law degree from a 
prestigious Chilean university and master’s degrees from US universities, and 
had held positions in Big Four firms. The junior advisor had also worked for a 
law firm. In addition to this experience, they had been tax lecturers at Chilean 
institutions for a number of years. It may be inferred that these individuals had 
reached senior positions in the professional services field and were also agents 
in the academic field. Their academic experience was well received in the 
executive branch, as PM06 commented: 
In the case of lawyers’ selection, the committee … worked more with 
those lawyers that also had an academic life through being university 
lecturers, who in spite of being lawyers for large lawyers’ offices, had 
a slightly different approach. For these tax lawyers, finding a loophole 
or flaw is like solving a Sudoku. It’s a wit problem, an intellectual 
challenge. Therefore, their reward is in finding [the legal flaws] rather 
than in doing business; it was to improve the law. Even [they] had 
some lawyers that were referees in a way that when there was any 
doubt about the law, [they] asked them and they started to think 
[about the rule] and suddenly they had a sparkle in their eyes and 
one realises that they had found the flaw and they remained being 
very collaborative, which doesn’t happen with those [lawyers] 
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working exclusively in the private sector ... who don’t have this public 
interest thing… 
This quote reflects that the cooperative stance of these lawyers was aligned 
with the policymakers’ ideas, and the belief that they would not retain 
information for private/business purposes was internalised at this higher level. It 
was commented during the fieldwork that these advisors had a sense of public 
vocation. Bourdieu (1990, p.126) argues that generous men exercise 
domination and violence by ‘giving’: 
A man possesses in order to give. But he also possesses by giving. 
A gift that is not returned can become a debt, a lasting obligation; 
and the only recognized power – recognition, personal loyalty or 
prestige – is the one that is obtained by giving. In such a universe, 
there are only two ways of getting and keeping a lasting hold over 
someone: debts and gifts, the overtly economic obligations imposed 
by the usurer, or the moral obligations and emotional attachments 
created and maintained by the generous gift, in short, overt violence 
and symbolic violence, censored, euphemized, that is, 
misrecognizable, recognized violence. The ‘way of giving’, the 
manner, the forms, are what separate a gift from straight exchange, 
moral obligation from economic obligation. To ‘observe the 
formalities’ is to make the way of behaving and the external forms of 
the action a practical denial of the content of the action and of the 
potential violence it can conceal. 
These ‘favours’ may have been a source of symbolic capital to be converted 
into something else in future, but the ways in which these favours were paid 
back are beyond the scope of this research. Resorting to specialists when 
knowledge is not internally available has been found elsewhere (e.g. Gracia & 
Oats, 2012; Morris & Empson, 1998). In addition to their recognised tax 
knowledge, these professionals were holders of social capital at two levels. At a 
micro level, these two advisors knew each other from the academic and 
professional services fields through rendering services to the state on a tax 
task. These relationships established a social bond, allowing the more junior 
advisor to enter the tax policy-making field (PM15). At a macro level, there is 
evidence of social connections (social capital) between the junior lawyer and 
the deputy minister of finance through the think tank with which the latter was 
closely linked. As shown in Chapter Five, technical competence and political 
compatibility were conditions for entering the tax field. The combination of both 
increased the deputy minister’s trust in this junior advisor. In fact, the deputy 
minister ‘trusted very much and with good reason because [this junior external 
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advisor] is a very competent person and also because he was in the deputy 
minister’s political trust’ (PM15). It was known that the junior advisor was close 
to a left-wing political party and then to the Socialist party. These connections 
empowered the junior member to gain significance in the tax policy design and 
drafting stages. Although only an intermediary (OECD, 2008), this external 
lawyer altered the tax knowledge market, simultaneously playing the roles of 
knowledge intermediary and knowledge seller as part of the drafting team 
(Hasseldine et al., 2011). Having a position in more than one field may be 
interpreted as being a ‘hyper-agent’, as mentioned in Chapter Three. 
In this way, this powerful social space close to the field of power was formed 
and tax policy agreed. Transfer pricing policy responded to the surrounding 
economic environment (Birkland, 2011; Oats & Sadler, 2011) of the mid-1990s, 
characterised by an excess of funding in the domestic market. The executive 
branch of the time believed that an efficient economic policy for allocating these 
domestic resources was through promoting foreign investment. In practical 
terms, the executive branch used tax policies to influence economic behaviour 
(Birkland, 2011) by signing double taxation agreements (DTAs), which included 
a transfer pricing clause consistent with the OECD model. This is consistent 
with the instrumentalist approach to law, in which legislation is deemed to be a 
tool for introducing changes to economic and social levels (Griffiths, 1979). This 
international standard achieved what was explained in the theoretical 
framework of Chapter Three regarding the legal, political, economic and social 
factors affecting the field. With the inclusion of Article 9 in the OECD’s DTA 
convention, and as Chile started to sign DTAs, a transfer pricing rule became 
‘essential’ (TPTE02). In this sense, the Chilean tax system initiated a phase of 
isomorphism more closely to resemble those of other jurisdictions (Christians, 
2010b; Oats & Sadler, 2011). Once agreement had been reached on the need 
for a transfer pricing rule, the next step was to define how it would operate and 
to draft it. 
6.3.1 Drafting 
It was intended that the rule would capture the international practice contained 
in the OECD Transfer Pricing guidelines. This action would serve as a signal for 
other countries so that ‘at least it would appear that the international standard of 
the Chilean legislation was improving a little bit’ (PM15), or as an impression 
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that ‘Chile was playing under the OECD rules, with global rules, but not knowing 
what it was about, and therefore international standards, that maybe were not 
well understood, were adopted and tried to be fitted into the income tax code 
without being certain about what was being done’ (PM15). This finding is 
consistent with the adoption of OECD guidelines by jurisdictions that recognised 
this institution as an expert body (Christians, 2010b) and also with the symbolic 
use of legislation. The symbolic legislation approach argues that, through laws, 
‘abstract ideals are manipulated to disguise the impossibility of realising them in 
practice’ (Cotterrell 1986, p.108, cited in Heij, 2007, p.37). Heij (2007) suggests 
that the symbolic use of legislation is important in taxation where laws appear to 
be promoting a particular idea, although in practice they do not work. Heij 
(2007), with reference to Campbell (1996), states that the desire to belong to a 
particular community may be a driving force in the adoption of certain tax 
decisions (p.37). 
In practice, however, some tax experts argued that the OECD principles were 
not successfully captured in the domestic legislation, which underwent a 
‘Chileanisation’ process (TA06, TPTE02, TPTE05). The technical specificities of 
the rule will be discussed in Section 6.3.2. 
The drafting working team was made up of two individuals and, as suggested 
by Gordon and Thuronyi (1996), was a sub-set of the committee set up by the 
deputy minister of finance and was familiar with the ‘laws and practices of the 
country’ (p.9). One drafter was part of the IRS (bureaucratic field), with 
extensive experience in drafting tax legislation within the legal technical 
department, and therefore was a holder of high tax knowledge, in line with 
Thuronyi’s (1996) suggestion. The second drafter was the junior lawyer with 
experience in consultancy firms whose appointment was explained in Section 
6.3. Within this micro-level field, drafting decisions were made between these 
two members and subsequently approved by the coordinator, i.e. the deputy 
minister of finance. The latter not only administratively approved the work, but 
also questioned some agreements reached within the team based on his 
intelligence and experience, as commented during the fieldwork. Although it is 
often deemed desirable to concentrate the phases of ‘policy development, 
technical analysis and statutory drafting’ in a single agency, as Arnold (1990, 
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p.382) suggests, here they were separate and communicated through 
coordination. 
Tax knowledge was a constraint within the IRS. At this time ‘there was not the 
expertise within the IRS’ on these international tax matters (PM11). The 
appointment of a tax expert indicates that people working with this rule lacked 
specialist knowledge on the rule, which prevented the team from drafting a rule 
that could be applied (TPTE05). In general terms, PM15 stated that: 
The simple and basic nature of the rule is due to the ignorance of 
those who participated in this issue… [The IRS drafter] had no 
specific knowledge on the rule and [it] was created very quickly. 
This view was shared by a tax expert, who added that the working group tried to 
draft a rule that was simple because they had little knowledge of what they were 
doing (TPTE05). 
In order to fill the tax knowledge gap, the IRS drafter embarked on a process of 
self-study of comparative tax systems, particularly in Hispanic heritage 
countries such as Spain, Mexico and Peru, whose experience was used as an 
input into the tax policy-making process. This input was valued in the process, 
as much could be learned from foreign experience to avoid potential problems 
(Gordon & Thuronyi, 1996). During this drafting stage, self-instruction was the 
main route used within the IRS to improve its position in the tax field. 
Consultation with foreign tax administrations was not used as a way of 
accessing additional tax knowledge, an explanation for which may lie in the 
limited integration of Chile in the international sphere, as mentioned above. 
Similarly, consultation by the IRS with the private sector was also absent from 
the process. Therefore, tax experts and the business community were ‘caught 
unaware’ (TPTE05) of the existence of the project until it was disclosed during 
the legislative stage in parliament. TPTE05 commented on this lack of 
consultation: 
At that time there was no custom of discussion of tax bills nor their 
socialisation [making them public through discussion] in order for 
anyone to opine on it before its approval. In fact, the government of 
the time submitted its proposal to be discussed in parliament; then, 
when I personally knew about it, it was when it was in parliament and 
it shocked me because I knew of the topic, I had worked on that in 
the US ... [T]here was no consultation ... because [name of Big 4] is a 
specialist company and there were people [who had knowledge of 
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this] but we were not many either, so if [the government] had asked, I 
would have heard about it even through rumours of other people that 
had been consulted, but I had no knowledge. I would say that we 
were surprised in the sense that we were not warned that it would be 
a proposal. 
Absence of consultation related to policy process transparency (IMF, 2007a), as 
the following quote suggests: 
[the process was] internal, non-transparent. The truth is that the mark 
in twenty years of the [centre-left-wing coalition government], tax 
proposals were always discussed behind closed doors and were 
never socialised. Very specific consultation procedures were made to 
certain specialists… (TPTE05) 
Although non-consultation was recognised during the interviews as a factor that 
jeopardised the quality of this tax rule (PM15; Burton, 2006), it was not 
deliberate on the part of the IRS. Time constraints arising from the normal tasks 
of the unit, which was not only dedicated to the drafting of tax bills, forced it to 
perform the tasks usually by ‘half’ (PM15). An important effect of time 
constraints was that, for instance, the proposal had to be amended the day after 
it had been sent to parliament. This amendment was done through an indication 
that was grammatically incorrect (cobren a instead of cobren entre in Spanish), 
making the bill incoherent. 
This time constraint on consultation was also caused by structural violence 
exercised through ‘urgencies’, as discussed in Chapter Five. This is consistent 
with the time within which the transfer pricing article was included in the tax bill. 
As will be shown in the legislative stage, the transfer pricing rule was included 
for parliamentary discussion once the proposal was already in parliament, 
signalling that the drafting team may have experienced pressure by senior 
authorities within the executive to complete the task, preventing external 
consultation. These findings are consistent with the benefits and disadvantages 
of having a small drafting team. Although having a small group may lead to 
‘relatively coherent law’ (Gordon & Thuronyi, 1996, p.1), it may also cause face 
problems such as the absence of adequate consultation (Gordon & Thuronyi, 
1996), as related during the interviews. 
In contrast to the IRS’ absence of consultation, it was believed that the external 
advisor may have consulted his accounting/legal firm, generating an imbalance 
of power within the drafting team. Tax knowledge accessed through 
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connections with international professional services firms would have placed the 
junior advisor in a more powerful position than his counterpart. The inclusion of 
the professional services field in the process was viewed with caution by 
policymakers, given the dual role played by tax advisors: 
They do have expertise but they don’t disseminate it totally. I mean, 
they play for both teams. They provide advice, that of course opens 
[the tax administration’s] eyes and makes the system less naïve, but 
on the other hand, they don’t reveal all their secrets because this is 
their business. Indeed, they talked with managers or partners of their 
firms in Mexico or the US, but the tax administration didn’t. The tax 
administration didn’t receive any feedback from people with real 
experience in the application of this type of rule (PM15). 
Tax advisors had a dual role as enforcers of certain tax legislation and as 
exploiters of uncertain legislation (Klepper et al., 1991), as explained in Chapter 
Two. This dualism was objectified in professional practice when accounting or 
law firms weighed up their vulnerability to losing clients, whose risks and 
preferences were taken into account when the advice was provided (Milliron, 
1988). 
The next sub-section provides an account of how limited tax knowledge, limited 
or no consultation and transparency, time constraints, and social capital 
influenced the content and robustness of the rule. 
6.3.2 Technical specificities of the rule 
Arm’s length principle and uniformity 
The rule was meant to adhere to OECD guidelines. The proposed legislation for 
discussion in parliament was made up of four paragraphs totalling 346 words. 
The first paragraph did not provide an explicit definition of transfer pricing, but 
simply stated that the IRS would be able to challenge the prices charged by a 
branch or subsidiary to its headquarters, or to another headquarters branch or 
related firm, when prices ‘do not conform to the values that are charged for 
similar transactions between independent firms’. 
Burden of proof and documentation 
At a higher level in the ministry of finance, it was thought that this rule would 
operate for the most ‘extreme cases of simulation’ (PM06). In the case of 
simulations in the Chilean context, the burden of proof was placed on the IRS. 
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At that point in time, the IRS was simultaneously a party and the judge of first 
instance in a tax dispute; therefore, granting extra powers which would increase 
the possibility of IRS ‘discretion’ would have been more difficult to pass in 
parliament. Structural/institutional constraints thus influenced the allocation of 
the burden of proof and what the IRS was allowed to do. Chapter Three showed 
that legal factors influence the tax policy-making field. This decision was 
captured in the first paragraph of the bill, which stated that the IRS would 
‘challenge’ (Article 38, Income Tax Law) any MNC transactions that did not 
follow the arm’s length principle for tax purposes. 
Strongly linked with the burden of proof were requests for documentation 
(OECD, 1995). The fact that the IRS did not ask for specific transfer pricing 
documentation, such as a transfer pricing study or specific affidavits, was 
influenced by two factors: economic and political. The economic factor related 
to efficiency, in particular administrative/compliance costs. The Chilean tax 
system relied heavily on the submission of affidavits to the tax authority, which 
had a cost for taxpayers. In this scenario, the executive had to decide between 
‘assuming the burden [of proof], which is evaluating whether the price set 
between related parties is alright’ or ‘that [taxpayers] demonstrate [their prices] 
through documentation’ (PM15). It was decided not to make the taxpayer bear 
the burden of an extra compliance cost required to ‘confirm the veracity [and] 
accuracy used to estimate and set the prices’ (PM15). 
The political factor related to trust. It was believed that the junior advisor’s 
intention was that a transfer pricing study should be undertaken by large 
consultancy firms; however, the final decision was not to give extra work to this 
type of firm. As noted, the external lawyer’s intention was interpreted with 
distrust as a form of over-representation of professional services firms in the tax 
policy-making field. This form of representation may even have been 
unconscious and internalised in the advisor’s habitus, which had also been 
shaped by belonging to the professional services field. This is because ‘habitus 
is transposable, in that people carry their dispositions with them as they enter 
new settings’ (Sallaz & Zavisca, 2007, p.25). This over-representation may have 
been an attempt to favour ‘commercialism’ over more general concerns about 
the ‘public interest’ (Shafer & Simmons, 2008, p.696). Although, the IRS was a 
subordinate organisation, given its lack of knowledge on transfer pricing, it was 
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able to neutralise the advantages of the more knowledgeable tax advisor 
(Emirbayer & Williams, 2005). The ‘dangerous power’ granted to this ‘homo 
novus’ (Bourdieu, 2004, p.24) was reduced by the IRS, which positioned itself 
as a guardian of the public interest (Swartz, 2013). 
Although the transfer pricing guidelines issued by the OECD in 1995 stated that 
cooperation between taxpayers and tax authorities should operate in relation to 
documentation ‘in order to avoid excessive documentation requirements while 
at the same time providing for adequate information to apply the arm’s length 
principle reliably’, it may be inferred that compliance costs, along with trust in 
the role of the advisor, were more powerful than the official guidelines on which 
the Chilean legislation drew, leading to a high level of ‘Chileanisation’ (TA06) of 
the tax rule (see OECD, 1995, Para. 5.28-5.29). It is evident that any sort of 
documentation in the form of affidavits or transfer pricing studies would have 
increased compliance costs, a matter of permanent interest to taxpayers 
(McKerchar, 2008, p.401), making the process more complex. This aligns with 
the idea that advisors have vested interests in maintaining the complexity of the 
tax system (Hasseldine et al., 2012, p.535, citing McKerchar et al., 2008a). 
Nonetheless, despite the privileged access that accounting and law firms had in 
the tax policy- and law-making process, their interests would have been 
‘privileged at the expense of others’ (Marriott, 2010, p.610). The executive and 
the tax administration redistributed, or simply reduced, the high level of capital 
granted to the advisor in the field. An alternative interpretation is that a centre-
left coalition of political parties (called ‘Concertacion’) was in power at that time. 
The deputy minister, in whom high trust had been placed, was a member of the 
Socialist Party, and therefore regulation conferring more ‘economic capital’ 
(Bourdieu, 1990) on large (consultancy) companies would have appeared 
ideologically contradictory, misaligning practices with expected habitus. 
These components together were objectified in written legislation, which did not 
include any type of documentation request, either as an affidavit or a transfer 
pricing study. 
Comparability 
The second paragraph of the bill (Article 38) referred to comparability. In 
particular, it stated that: 
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If the agency does not perform such type of transactions with 
independent companies, the Regional Direction [IRS] may challenge 
the prices, considering the values of goods and services in the 
international market. In order to do this, the Regional Direction shall 
request reports from the Customs Service, from the Central Bank of 
Chile or from the agencies holding the information requested. 
The IRS lacked the necessary ‘tools’, both ‘technical and legal’ (TA01), over the 
entire period during which the rule was in force. Therefore, a mechanism that 
contributed to better enforcement was to share information from taxpayers with 
different agencies. These drafters’ practices may be interpreted as ‘reform 
minded’ (Gould & Baker, 2002, p.90), acknowledging the information 
deficiencies of the IRS and looking to external sources to implement legislation 
accordingly. 
Methods 
This rule was criticised for its lack of clarity about the methods the tax authority 
would use to set prices within MNCs. In the case of the Chilean legislation, 
there was uncertainty about which methods were allowed. As previously 
mentioned, the rule underwent a process of ‘Chileanisation’, which was 
reflected in the methods chosen. In particular, there was no clear reference to 
the ‘traditional transaction methods’ or ‘transactional profit methods’ contained 
in the OECD guidelines (1995, Chapters II and III). 
For example, the comparable uncontrolled price (CUP) was not readily 
identifiable (see Appendix 2 for fundamental concepts of transfer pricing). In 
contrast, the Chileanisation process was reflected in the undefined concept of 
‘reasonable profitability’ (rentabilidad razonable in Spanish). The use of legal 
wording would have provided more precision (Thuronyi, 1996). Other 
identifiable methods in the provision were cost plus and resale (see Appendix 
2). 
The reason for the simplicity of the rule was the limited tax knowledge of those 
who participated in the design and drafting. It was commented that the IRS 
drafter had no specific knowledge of transfer pricing, which was solved by 
reading literature on transfer pricing methods, as noted above. In addition to the 
limited specialist tax knowledge during the design and drafting stages, the IRS 
did not have specialist tax inspectors to carry out and enforce transfer pricing 
audits. Foreseeing this important limitation, the drafters included methods they 
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would be able to administer with the human resources available at that time, 
and drafted the legislation accordingly. Again, their habitus and subsequent 
practices align with Gould and Baker’s (2002) ‘reform-minded’ concept. In this 
respect, PM15 commented that the IRS: 
…did not have the staff … to introduce more complex methods, 
where you need to have commercial engineers, economists … there 
weren’t either human or financial resources. Then, the vision was to 
do something that would be administrable … in conversations with 
the sub-department of audit, it was concluded that they wouldn’t be 
able to administer it. 
This shows that ‘tax administrative issues might become an obstacle to the 
implementation of tax reforms if change would entail additional costs to the tax 
administration and taxpayers’ (OECD, 2010b, p.57). Nor was current tax 
knowledge going to improve in the near future, due to a myopic strategy of not 
providing extra funds to the IRS to ‘train people nor to send them abroad’ to get 
that training (PM15). In this area, professionals were scarce and expensive 
(PM15). 
This drafting approach is in line with previous research by the World Bank, 
which states that changes in tax policy need to be compatible with the 
administrative capacity to implement them (Bird, 1991), since ‘policy without 
administrative change is nothing’ (Bird, 1991, p.39). Similarly to the findings of 
Chapter Five, closeness between tax policy design and drafting biased the 
drafters toward control techniques rather than anything else. 
Relationships 
The former rule was very simple regarding relationships, referring to direct or 
indirect participation in direction, control or capital. However, this presumption 
had to be changed in 2002, as will be shown later in this chapter. 
Advance Pricing Agreements (APA) 
The rule did not contain an APA clause to reduce uncertainty. However, 
taxpayers requested administrative regulation on this topic, which was not 
provided. 
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6.3.3 Scrutiny: Quality assessment 
The drafting team did not have any formal procedure to assess the adequacy of 
the tax rule prior to its enactment; therefore, evaluation occurred during the 
implementation stage. It was during tax audits that the standard of the rule was 
tested, as mentioned by PM15: 
[Implementation was the] first check that in reality the rule was not 
very practicable, that it was easy for taxpayers to defend themselves 
or that it was a blank rule, and then, from the legal viewpoint in the 
court, it would be easy for taxpayers to defend themselves. 
Evaluation of the legislative outcome by the bureaucratic field was that it was 
not good; however, there was a self-satisfied argument that it was a ‘starting 
point’, as PM06 put it: 
many times, in these institutional modernisation processes, it is not 
always possible to get something adequate in the first try, but nothing 
is worse than anything. 
Regarding the technicalities of the rule, comments referred to it as a 
‘discretionary rule’ which was a ‘repugnant feature … because certainty is what 
is required in legal codes’ (PM15; see Chapter Two). 
6.3.4 Budgeting 
DIPRES acted as an advisor to the minister of finance, and estimates were 
calculated with joint data from both institutions (PM08). The transfer pricing rule 
was considered as an administrative mechanism of control which would have 
no revenue impact (History of Law, No.19.506, p.42). 
6.4 Legislative stage 
The executive branch exercised structural violence (see Chapters Three and 
Five) by including a miscellaneous bill in parliament.62 The transfer pricing 
provision was included through an ‘amendment’. As previously noted, the 
discussion began in the committee of finance. There is evidence that the ten 
parliamentarian members of the committee of finance had little tax knowledge 
on transfer pricing, except those with knowledge of the mining industry. A 
policymaker commented on this limited knowledge at that time: 
                                            
62 
The bill treated changes to the Income Tax Code, VAT Code, Tax Code, Law No.18.320 and 
others. The time urgency was ‘simple’ (History of Law, No.19.506, p.20). 
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I don’t know, I think that there are not many people that have 
knowledge [about transfer pricing] … nobody knew very much about 
this [in parliament] (PM01). 
The documents reveal superficial examination of the rule in just two sessions of 
the committee, which may be explained by the limited transfer pricing tax 
knowledge. For example, Deputy A superficially stated ‘that the mechanism 
proposed is adequate in general terms’ (Session 20a, 1996, p.11); however, 
there is no evidence of detailed scrutiny of the provision. 
In order to participate in the law-making process, additional tax knowledge on 
the topic could have been obtained through interaction between the 
bureaucratic/political field and other fields, as noted in Chapter Three, at the 
legislative stage. There is empirical evidence of this convergence through 
‘special invitations’ (History of Law, No.19.506, p.30) to a representative of a 
business association (business/corporate field) and one association of IRS 
inspectors (bureaucratic field). However, this interaction seems to have been 
fruitless as the documents examined reveal no evidence of discussion of the 
rule. The silence of the association of IRS inspectors (History of the Law, 
No.19.506, p.40) may reflect the absence of detailed technical transfer pricing 
tax knowledge, which is consistent with the widespread limited understanding of 
these topics within the IRS discussed in Section 6.3. 
Limited discussion may also be explained by the limited time available to 
discuss the rule. An extra ‘amendment’ to the draft rule was introduced in the 
last session of the committee of finance, which included two additional valuation 
methods (cost plus and resale).63 These amendments were unanimously 
approved, i.e. there was no resistance to the content of the law. As these 
amendments were part of the legal framework described in Chapter Three, this 
may be interpreted as another sign of structural violence supported by the law 
by giving little time for discussion in parliament. This form of violence was 
recognised by policymakers. PM01 commented that the executive branch ‘put 
this [rule] beneath the surface to avoid disclosure’, and that ‘way of passing 
laws’ was attributed to the minister of finance, who was described as ‘very nice’ 
but not very transparent. There was a perception that the committee of finance 
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 The amendment also changed the words ‘charges to’ to ‘charges between’ (Session 21a, 
1996, p.18). 
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was diligent in performing its work; therefore, this structural violence may have 
contributed to the absence of further analysis or search for extra knowledge. On 
this PM06 commented: 
[In that period] there were laws whose impact was huge, but I would 
say that the committees of finance within the Chamber of Deputies 
and the Senate have always been of good quality. These are neither 
political celebrities nor anything like that. These are the ones who 
work more, they are pretty serious, they work well [and] they are 
profound … especially at that time. 
Another factor noted in the analysis that may have had an influence on the 
limited debate was the sense of legitimacy given by the OECD guidelines.64 
Christians (2010b) notes that the powerful stance of the OECD is recognised as 
an authority in tax matters. It was noted in the debate that the transfer pricing 
rule would confer new administrative powers on the IRS in order to challenge 
prices and expenses relating to international double taxation, and that these 
powers were ‘generally accepted in the international field’ (History of Law, 
No.19.506, p.46). 
As noted, the committee of finance was dominated by structures imposed by 
the law and the executive, unanimously approving the rule with little resistance 
(ibid.). Consequently, the executive branch positioned itself as the main actor in 
this initial discussion. 
In the Chamber of Deputies, the executive introduced extra time constraints 
(History of Law, No.19.506, p.82), once again controlling the temporal boundary 
of the tax policy-making field (Gracia & Oats, 2012; Mutch, 2006). A member of 
the committee of finance remarked on the complexities of international tax 
aspects of the bill, with which Chile had no experience (History of Law, 
No.19.506, p.87). 
In the Chamber of Deputies there was evidence of domination and resistance 
regarding the discussion of a set of tax rules in which transfer pricing was 
included. On one side, members of the committee of finance tried to block the 
discussion of the set of rules, using the committee’s symbolic capital. Deputy A 
(centre-right wing, National Renovation) said: 
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 A further factor was mentioned by TPTE01, who argued that passing this poor law was a 
method used to protect multinational companies. 
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Mr President, the discussion can be clarified easily, because the 
committee of finance had no problems regarding Articles 1 [which 
included transfer pricing] and 2, but the debate should incorporate 
some rules from Article 3 that amends the Tax Code, as they were 
not approved unanimously. I think that the discussion should start 
from Article 3 onwards. The provisions on double taxation are very 
complex, difficult to explain in the Chamber, but in the long debate 
held at the committee [of finance] there was unanimous agreement 
on all of them. Therefore, the discrepancy of opinions arises from 
Article 3 (History of Law, No.19.506, p.89). 
This may be interpreted as a type of self-recognition that the committee of 
finance was the most qualified agent to discuss tax bills and that others would 
not be able to understand them. The power of the committee of finance and the 
reward for being part of it was reinforced by PM01: 
The committee of finance has certain power. There is always a 
certain... it generates anger because its members make more 
decisions … but it has a certain power. For some [parliamentarians] it 
is very important to be there for this reason. 
This attempt at domination was also structural because the rules of the Chilean 
Chamber of Deputies allowed the tax debate to be skipped if the rules had been 
approved by its committee of finance. As mentioned earlier, these rules shaped 
the tax policy-making field, as the conceptual framework illustrates. 
This form of non-transparent policy making was resisted by a deputy who was a 
non-member of the committee of finance (centre-right wing, National 
Renovation), challenging the way in which policy was normally conducted. This 
deputy questioned parliamentarians’ work if debate were not conducted, 
arguing that ‘before voting we should discuss the project … [I]f we are not to 
discuss the issue, why are we here? In that case, we hear the informant deputy 
and then vote, but if that is to be the criterion, let’s apply it to all projects’ 
(History of Law, No.19.506, p.89). 
From this point in the debate, a struggle for a form of political capital occurred, 
represented by having a voice in the tax law-making process. The president of 
the Chamber (Socialist Party) argued that structural components 
(‘miscellaneous bill’ and ‘extreme urgency’) made detailed discussion of the bill 
difficult (History of Law, No.19.506, pp.89-90). The dissenting deputy opposed 
non-discussion, adding: 
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but in a project of this nature and size, we, the 120 Deputies, have 
the right to give our opinion. However, those who are not members of 
the committee of finance, we are unable to discuss or study it, 
because we received it today. As projects are put on the table a few 
hours before the session, we don’t have the opportunity to study 
each in depth. The government must understand that to make use of 
urgencies, it is necessary to analyse the complexity of each project, 
so that all parliamentarians can participate in its discussion. I think it 
is up to the Chamber to try to find a solution to this (History of Law, 
No.19.506, p.90). 
In principle, the dissenting deputy convinced the president of the Chamber to 
have a voice in discussion of the article, in which transfer pricing was included 
(ibid.). 
However, domination attempts continued from other members of the committee 
of finance, who opposed this space for participation through the creation of 
(social) ‘groupings’ (Gracia & Oats, 2012; Neu, 2006). Deputy A suggested 
approving the articles relating to double taxation because they ‘are positive and 
were unanimously approved in the committee [of finance] after a long debate’ 
(History of Law, No.19.506, p.91). Later, Deputy B (centre left, Christian 
Democrat) reinforced Deputy A’s arguments, adding that ‘in the committee [of 
finance, this article was] notably improved, which benefits taxpayers by 
overcoming the double taxation problem’ (ibid.). Finally, Deputy C (right wing) 
was stronger, suggesting approval of the article, given the unanimity reached in 
the committee of finance and ‘in order to move forward’ (ibid.) in the discussion. 
Finally, the Chamber of Deputies unanimously approved the article containing 
the transfer pricing provision (ibid.). This sealed the destiny of the transfer 
pricing rule, with no discussion in the Chamber of Deputies. 
There is evidence to suggest that this struggle over the discussion of legislation 
was less related to a partisan struggle since the dissenting parliamentarians 
(Deputies A and C) were members of a right-wing party. There is no evidence to 
support the extent to which business power was influential in defending the 
committee of finance, as Fairfield (2010) concludes for tax reforms in Chile. In 
contrast, the quotations analysed suggest that there was rather a defence of 
symbolic capital and the work conducted in the committee of finance. Had these 
members of the committee of finance allowed room for more participatory 
scrutiny, it would have become evident that the discussion on transfer pricing 
held within the committee had been limited and ‘not long’, as Deputy A informed 
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the Chamber. Through concepts linked with efficiency, this site of power was 
defended. For example, Deputy C suggested approving the articles without 
further debate, with the intention of continuing with the rest, leading to a saving 
of resources. 
These practices jeopardised the ‘procedural’ (Geraats, 2001) or ‘decision 
making’ transparency (Grimmelikhuijsen & Welsch, 2012) of the process, 
revealing a form of non-decision-making power (no scrutiny and debate) which 
was nonetheless still a form of decision making (Lukes, 2005, pp.22-5). This 
action blocked the legislative agenda, leaving no room for anything but trust. 
Since it is not always possible to be certain about others’ actions (Neu, 1991a), 
trust comes into operation. This aspect resonates with Luhmann’s (1979) 
argument discussed in Chapter Five. Non-members of the committee of finance 
did not have any exit route other than trusting the decisions made by that 
committee. The absence of discussion on the transfer pricing rule not only 
prevented the rest of the Chamber of Deputies from acquiring tax knowledge on 
the subject, but also reduced the quality of the rule (Karpen, 2008; Vording et 
al., 2007). Far more people would have been able to scrutinise the content of 
the legislation if room for debate had been opened up. 
Due to a special arrangement, the process in the Senate was not linear but 
simultaneous. The associated committee of finance and the Senate held 
parallel sessions due to extra ‘time constraints’ (History of Law, No.19.506, 
p.233). The committee of finance of the Senate was composed of five senators 
whose stock of tax knowledge in general was considered to be good and 
sufficient. Nonetheless, extra knowledge was acquired from paid/non-paid 
advisors with similar political perspectives, and through reports prepared by 
political parties and think tanks from diverse political spectrums. Committee 
senators considered these reports (PM05), regardless of their embeddedness, 
‘because [tax] matters are not an ideological issue but a technical issue’ 
(PM04). There was also knowledge sharing between senators of the same 
political stance who supplemented, for example, legal and economic 
knowledge. These three forms ‘inculcated and socialised … [each other] into 
existing field doxa exerting influence over the development of their … habitus’ 
(Gracia & Oats, 2012, p.313; Xu & Xu, 2008). A higher level of tax knowledge 
allowed the senators to make ‘informed rather than come to feel decisions’ 
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(PM04). Referring to the type of debate held within the committee as ‘serious’ 
and lasting for hours, PM04 commented that ‘in general, the internal work within 
the committee [of finance] is rich, with arguments and with technical 
background’.65 From a political perspective, informed decisions allowed 
senators to represent the interests of their voters and legitimise their political 
work in forms of symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1990). This is consistent with 
Cooper and Joyce’s (2013, p.126) interpretation that symbolic capital is gained 
through doing ‘their work in a way which is consistent’ with the interests of those 
represented (e.g. the electorate). This interaction between the professional 
services, academic, political and bureaucratic fields allowed a high level of tax 
knowledge and political support to ascend to the tax policy-making field, as 
shown in Chapter Three. 
In contrast to the limited power held by the Chamber of Deputies at all levels, 
being prey to the executive’s domination, evidence suggests that the Senate 
was able to access the social space connected with the field of power inhabited 
by the élite and influence the ‘content’ of the transfer pricing rule. One member 
(Senator A) and one non-member (Senator B) of the committee of finance 
proposed four amendments to the rule under discussion. Three related to how 
the IRS would challenge cross-border transactions. In the senators’ view, the 
IRS should challenge transactions ‘with good reason’ (fundadamente in 
Spanish), which should be contained in the amended version of the rule (History 
of Law, No.19.506, p.261). The fourth amendment related to a number of 
domestic institutional providers of information to construct comparable prices 
and enforce legislation. These senators tried to restrict the institutions to just the 
Central Bank and Customs, eliminating the text ‘or to the institutions that may 
hold the required information’, as stated Section 6.3.2. The access granted to 
these senators to change the law may be explained by the existence of 
personal and delegated political capital (Bourdieu, 1991), as explained in 
Chapter Three. Senator A was ‘known and recognised’, had a ‘name’ and 
‘renown’ (Bourdieu, 1991, p.194) and symbolic capital in the form of reputation 
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 Unfortunately, the parliamentary documents examined were not sufficiently transparent to 
disclose all the ‘examination carried out’ (PM04) in many cases, including the debate about the 
transfer pricing rule. The cursory nature of the reports in that sense may have resulted in 
inappropriate evaluation of parliamentarians’ work in terms of accountability. 
170 
(Swartz, 2013). This personal political capital is explained by Bourdieu (1991, 
p.194): 
the possession of a certain number of specific qualifications which 
are the condition of the acquisition and conservation of a ‘good 
reputation’, is often the product of reconversion of the capital of fame 
accumulated in other domains: in particular, in professions which … 
ensure that you have some free time and which presuppose a certain 
cultural capital. 
In the fieldwork, Senator A was described as a very active person holding a 
great amount of knowledge (PM04) derived from his doctoral studies in 
economics and ‘possibly’ from his connections with tax advisors (PM05). This 
knowledge, along with political intentions, translated into the proposal for 
amendments.66 Analyses of transfer pricing were difficult for senators because it 
was not a common theme. PM04 referred to transfer pricing as a ‘matter of 
difficult handling; [transfer pricing is] not [a topic] of daily handling’. The 
possession of knowledge placed Senator A in a more advantaged position than 
the other members of the committee of finance. This finding highlights the role 
of powerful individuals in the tax field, as discussed elsewhere (e.g. Kraal, 2013; 
Marriott, 2010). In an intra-organisational analysis of MNCs, Mulligan (2008, 
p.311) attributes the power that agents hold to sources such as the ‘title held’ 
(the more prestigious the better), and the ‘raw tax knowledge and expertise 
gained through qualifications and experience’, i.e. the tax ‘knowledge experts’. 
This personal political capital was supplemented by delegated political capital, 
which is derived from delegation ‘as the representative of an organization (a 
party or trade union)’ (Bourdieu, 1991, p.194) and requires ‘investiture’ 
(Bourdieu, 1991, p.195). This capital was dependent on and given by the 
committee of finance (Swartz, 2013). The amendment relating to the IRS’ power 
to challenge transactions was unanimously approved by the five members of 
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 It is impossible to identify with certainty how this idea emerged. These two visible senators 
were members of right-wing political parties embracing a neoliberal ideology and had social 
networks with diverse companies. In this general respect and referring to reasons for tax law 
non-change in history, PM03 said that ‘the Chilean right wing is aligned to the Chilean business 
world ... in perfect harmony’. In this specific case, their habitus may be explained by reference 
to the policy motivation concept detailed in the literature review section (Wittman, 1977). 
Broadly, their interest may have been guided by purely ideological reasons, defending those 
represented (Cooper & Joyce, 2013), but also, since these senators were themselves 
potentially affected by this provision as entrepreneurs, becoming policy motivated. However, 
there is no evidence to make claims for these two reasons. 
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the committee of finance, while the information exchange clause was rejected 
(History of Law, No.19.506, p.289).67 
Evidence suggests that the Senate resisted the domination exercised by the 
executive branch through the latter’s structural violence mechanisms. Based on 
analysis of the History of Law, both the miscellaneous nature of and the time 
constraints on the bill generated heated complaints during its debate in the 
Senate. For example, Senator C stated that the miscellaneous nature of the 
complex bill made it difficult to understand, given the little time allowed for 
discussion (History of Law, No.19.506, pp.224-5). Similarly, Senator D stated 
that a miscellaneous bill was very difficult to analyse in the general discussion 
(History of Law, No.19.506, p.228). In similar terms, Senator D, a member of 
the committee of finance, referred to the inclusion of a set of international 
taxation rules. Senator D discouraged the mix of ideas (domestic and 
international) in a single bill because this form of law making was ‘dangerous’ 
and never produced ‘good legislation’ (History of Law, No.19.506, p.248). 
Referring to haste, Senator D referred to asymmetry in the time allowed for 
detailed scrutiny between the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, expressing 
regret: 
that a legal initiative that has been one year in the Chamber of 
Deputies enters the Senate with extreme urgency, preventing us 
from a diligent analysis that this type of matter requires. There should 
be a longer period of time to formulate indications, because they 
must be properly studied (History of Law, No.19.506, p.228). 
Senator E referred to this asymmetry as a ‘lack of respect towards the senate’ 
(History of Law, No.19.506, p.259). According to Senator F, these time 
constraints on introducing ‘amendments’ harmed good legislative outcomes, i.e. 
legislation that ‘lasts forever’ (History of Law, No.19.506, p.250). The following 
quotation by Senator G summarises the diversity of matters analysed and the 
negative effects of time constraints on the ‘quality of tax law’ (Vording et al., 
2007): 
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 There is no evidence to explain the results of this vote. A potential reason for these habituses 
was that consensus on the role the IRS should play in the economy or instructions came as 
mandates from their respective parties, derived from technical agreement or business power to 
lobby. It was not possible to uncover these reasons during the fieldwork. 
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Regarding a proposal labelled as of extreme urgency, the time we 
have is short. And if we think about [the bill], which is one whose 
several articles imply modifications of complex legal bodies, we 
realise that three or four days is very little time. Ultimately, if there is 
no other outlet, we must stick to it, but I think this undermines the 
quality of the law that is intended to be enacted (History of Law, 
No.19.506, p.225). 
With this political power, in the form of freedom to control what was discussed 
and the pace of scrutiny, the executive branch placed itself in a more powerful 
position than Congress in the law-making field. The latter held less capital in 
terms of economic resources, being prevented, for instance, from consulting tax 
experts on the content of legislation and its effects, and from exerting political 
control over the matters for and pace of discussion. Although there is no 
evidence to support the exercise of symbolic violence by the executive in the 
form of withholding relevant information (Gracia & Oats, 2012), Congress had 
far less time to participate actively in the law-making process. Through these 
mechanisms, the executive branch acted like a monopolistic agent in tax law 
making. In this particular tax law-making process, it was able to alter the 
economic, legal and social fields more profoundly. This resonates with 
Fligstein’s (1991) argument (see Section 3.4). 
There is also evidence of domination attempts by the Senate’s committee of 
finance (at the top) against the Senate as a whole (at the bottom). Similarly to 
the discussion in the Chamber of Deputies, the whole senate was advised that, 
according to the Senate’s regulation (Article 133), proposals unanimously 
approved by the committee of finance, such as the amended transfer pricing 
rule, should be voted directly without discussion unless opposed by a senator 
(History of Law, No.19.506, p.392). 
In the discussion in Senate, Senator H, an acting member of the committee of 
finance, resisted and asked for an open discussion of those matters 
unanimously approved by the committee of finance, including the transfer 
pricing rule, due to the short time for analysis prior to voting (History of Law, 
No.19.506, p.392). Later, the same senator successfully blocked the discussion, 
making it non-procedurally transparent to the rest of the senators (Geraats, 
2001). In particular, Senator H said: ‘I just want to state that the suggestion from 
the committee [of finance] is approved’ (History of Law, No.19.506, p.407). The 
whole Senate agreed and no discussion was held in the Senate regarding the 
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transfer pricing rule. This resonates with Lukes’ (2005) second dimension of 
power, explained above. 
During interviews with policymakers of the time, trust was identified as one 
reason for approving the bill without discussion in the Senate. It was believed 
that other senators trusted that Senator H had analysed (scrutinised) the rule, 
had acquired tax knowledge, had a politically unbiased view of the rule and was 
not a friend of the minister of finance (social capital). In contrast, it was believed 
that Senator H ‘had studied the issue and [the rest of the senators] could be 
confident in voting’ (PM04). From these statements, it may be inferred that the 
other Senators who were non-members of the committee of finance weighed 
the technical and political nature of the debate. Trust, a form of social capital 
discussed in the literature, led to acceptance of what the committee of finance 
said. PM04 stated that ‘parliamentarians from a particular political colour guide 
the rest’ (PM04). In this sense, members of the committee of finance legitimised 
their position in the field by using other forms of capital, such as cultural and 
social, including trust (Bourdieu, 1977). This is consistent with the discussion in 
Chapter Five. 
In addition to these social practices, some research has argued that trust has 
an economic efficiency component that reduces information processing 
(McEvily et al., 2003). On this, PM04 stated: 
No, no, but regarding a rule, an article, a thing that may raise doubts 
… a discussion may last two hours and they [senators] may reach 
nowhere. Then, this issue was discussed in the committee, [the other 
senators] can be sure, because the committee reviewed it and it was 
good... Normally [in the committee] there were dissenting views but 
they reached the same conclusions and therefore, [it was] thought 
[that the rule] was fine. 
These findings should be considered in the context in which the bill was 
debated. The indication formally approved by the committee of finance and 
tacitly approved in the Senate on challenging ‘with good reason’ was interpreted 
as an attempt to avoid the discretionary practices of the IRS (PM15). This 
comment was contrasted with the discussion of other provisions in the same 
parliamentary debate. The bill proposed that tax inspectors should be able to 
conduct tax audits anywhere in Chile. As a precursor to the transfer pricing 
changes, Senator A questioned the tax administration’s powers in general 
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terms. At this time, the IRS was judge of first instance and took part in tax 
disputes. On this point, Senator A argued that conferring extra powers on the 
IRS in this imbalanced scenario was not right, concluding that in Chile 
‘taxpayers are citizens, not the Internal Revenue Service’s subjects’ (History of 
Law, No.19.506, p.484). 
Senator I, also a member of the committee of finance but from the government 
coalition, responded that there was a sort of ‘phobia against the Internal 
Revenue Services’ (History of Law, No.19.506, p.487). In general, senator I 
indicated that granting powers that would make the IRS’ work easier ‘face 
impassable resistance’ in parliament, despite the large number of citizens that 
benefited from the public policies funded from taxes (ibid.). Senator B 
responded to this idea of resistance, stating that those representing the (right-
wing) political sector had not tried to ‘cut short’ the IRS’ powers contained in the 
bill under discussion, but to ‘avoid the Internal Revenue Services´ growth for 
any reasons’ because it was already big (History of Law, No.19.506, p.496). In 
Senator B’s view, maybe the IRS had to be modernised in another way and, if 
tax evasion continued, this could be analysed and measures sought to stop it. 
Senator B’s arguments were based on the economic revenues that the country 
had collected so far (History of Law, No.19.506, p.497). 
In this respect, it may be interpreted that the proposed amendments to the 
transfer pricing rule were more political than technical, guided by the habitus of 
the right-wing participants (Bourdieu, 1990). Here the parliamentary debate 
concluded and the transfer pricing rule was promulgated and published in the 
official gazette in July 1997. 
6.5 Failed implementation 
As the conceptual framework shows, fewer fields participated at the 
implementation stage: the bureaucratic field (IRS and DIPRES), the corporate-
business field and the professional services field. 
6.5.1 Implementation by the IRS 
Chapter Five illustrated the significant power held by the IRS, which first drafted 
legislation and then issued administrative guidance and conducted audits to 
implement legislation. The implementation of the former transfer pricing rule 
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was gradual, bearing different hallmarks over time. For this reason, the findings 
are discussed in periods. 
First period, 1997-2002 
The strategy of implementation for this period (Bird & Zolt, 2008) involved 
issuing administrative guidance, setting organisational strategies and 
undertaking audits. 
Official guidance 
In January 1998 the IRS published an administrative guidance document 
(Circular No.3) giving instructions relating to the changes introduced by the 
transfer pricing rule. From analysis of the document, three purposes/strategies 
are inferred: 
 Clarification of issues in the formal rule in order to complement it. The 
administrative guidance provided a definition of transfer pricing for Chilean 
purposes. The drafters had failed to include this definition. 
 Remaining silent on key issues not contained in the rule. Although the 
guidance made reference to the methods of valuation, it remained silent on 
what ‘reasonable profit’ was, maintaining the uncertainty. Similarly, the IRS’ 
procedures for challenging prices ‘with good reason’ were not stated. For 
example, the IRS remained silent about interquartile ranges and adjustment 
points. However, it provided a limited explanation of what challenging ‘with 
good reason’ entailed: ‘with records that according to reasoning, analysis 
and logical concordance allow another value to be set for the transfer’. 
These practices show how the IRS aimed to dominate the field with symbolic 
forms. As a respected authority, its silence and failure to clarify issues may 
be interpreted as symbolic violence (Gracia & Oats, 2012). This incomplete 
guidance helped the IRS to dominate by sustaining ‘a climate of uncertainty’ 
(Gracia & Oats, 2012, p.316). 
 Extension of the scope of the formal rule. Through this guidance, the IRS 
attempted to resolve unregulated aspects of the official provision. The 
circular established new relationships with related parties that had not been 
explicitly contained in the rule, extending its scope. For example, this circular 
made reference to the Public Limited Company Law (Law No.18.046) and 
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the Stock Markets Law (Law No.18.045) to regulate ‘agreements for joint 
action’, which had not been included in the rule. In this way, it used its 
authority to interpret the law, trying to alter the legal hierarchy of rules and 
matching the level of administrative guidance to that of a law enacted 
following the constitutional procedure, explained in the preceding sub-
section. The limited experience of the IRS in understanding business 
practices prevented it from producing law reasonably right first time (Law 
Society, 2010, p.4), as this practice illustrates. 
These findings are consistent with the perception of a poor official provision. 
Retrospectively, PM05 referred to this provision as ‘incomplete’ and insufficient 
to address the transfer pricing phenomenon. This legal ineffectiveness 
translated into an incapacity to implement policy adequately (Thuronyi, 1996). 
Organisational structure 
As noted in Section 6.3.1, the ministry of finance was myopic in failing to 
provide extra funds to train inspectors abroad (TPTE05) or recruit people with 
tax knowledge and experience (PM15), which forced the drafters to exclude 
methods of valuation unlikely to be implemented successfully. 
The IRS’ strategy for applying the law was organisational, through the creation, 
shortly after the rule’s enactment, of a department in Santiago (the capital) 
staffed with people inexperienced in transfer pricing. Although ambitious in size, 
the group was made up of around 50 professionals from different academic 
backgrounds, but with a lack of specific tax knowledge in transfer pricing and 
also inexperienced in the area of audits (TPTE05). 
The operational level was not the only constraint in the implementation. The 
leader, an engineer, did not possess specialist knowledge on tax matters 
(TPTE05). In order to fill the tax knowledge gap of the newcomers, and since 
the IRS was unable to train people because of a general lack of experience, the 
solution was outsourced training. Professionals from a large accounting firm, 
with high amounts of tax knowledge and social capital, connected with 
specialists in the US, the UK and the Netherlands who provided training for a 
few days only, ‘not weeks or months’ (TPTE05). This shows that the 
professionals accessed new knowledge through social capital. 
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Audit procedures 
The first period of implementation was difficult owing to the limited tax 
knowledge and experience in the IRS and also due to leadership issues 
(TPTA04, TPTE05). Inadequate leadership and guidance in aspects such as 
‘how the process [audits] should be done [and] how to implement the rule’ 
(TPTE05) translated into ineffective audit procedures. TPTA04 commented on 
the inefficacy of audits during this period: 
The extinct international audits department was created due to the 
1997 rule ... groups were formed but transfer pricing was not 
addressed, nor was it possible to address until the year 2000. The 
issue of requesting information from other public institutions seemed 
obvious to me, but hasn’t been done ... then, the group was set up to 
apply the rule, and in practice it addressed normal aspects of audits 
[such as] expenses, depreciation, but it didn’t address transfer pricing 
from the sole occupation perspective. It may have been a leadership 
issue more than a lack of resources, but 13 years have passed so it 
is difficult to have a good trace of what happened. 
As this quote shows, the former group was unable to apply the rule to basic 
aspects contained in the act in order to construct comparable prices, such as 
requests for information from related public entities. Although learning in 
practice should have occurred in the daily execution of the work, the quote 
highlights that adequate audit practices were not achieved, preventing the IRS 
from becoming a powerful actor at the implementation stage. In this respect, its 
domination extended mainly to issuing administrative guidance, not to applying 
the rule in practice. This shows a gap in the IRS, where enacted laws differed 
from their actual implementation (Mansfield, 1988; Tanzi, 1987). 
These aspects together led to failure in the implementation, so the norm was 
effectively ‘deceased’ (TPTE05) for a couple of years until the year 2000, when 
attempts were made to conduct audits in ‘a very experimental way’ (TA06). Until 
2002, annual audit rates were low, totalling around ‘four or five’ (TPTA04). 
Unfortunately, many audit attempts were unsuccessful and ended with no 
results. TPTE05 claimed to know about a company audited around 2000, in 
which the IRS ‘collected information, tried to find an issue, but ended up with 
nothing’. 
In conclusion, this period of implementation was not exemplary and has been 
described as a ‘failed experiment’ (TPTE05). The findings on the performance 
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during this period are consistent with previous research that has suggested that 
tackling transfer pricing in developing countries is difficult given ‘the lack of 
institutional framework and the inadequacy of expertise and resources’ (Chan & 
Chow, 1997, p.112). 
2002 Amendment 
In response to the problems identified with the former rule, the executive branch 
proposed an amendment in 2002. The documents suggest that the IRS and the 
ministry of finance designed the policy and did the drafting. Two reasons 
motivated change to this ‘insufficient rule’ (History of Law, No.19.840, p.7). First, 
tax avoidance had been detected during audits regarding relationships between 
related parties in cross-border transactions. In order to tackle this problem, the 
IRS proposed to ‘extend the relationship presumption’ (TPTE02) contained in 
the former rule, because existing schemes allowed taxpayers to avoid tax 
(History of Law, No.19.840, p.223). At this point, taxpayers had become the 
more powerful actors in the field, interpreting law to their economic benefit using 
these loopholes. Abreu (1996) refers to this as avoidance power, by which 
taxpayers, usually under professional advice, reduce their tax liability. On the 
other hand, the IRS’ powers were limited in enforcing the rule. 
A second reason for the tax law change concerned administrative costs. Given 
that no documentation was requested from taxpayers in the first place, audits 
imposed a high administrative cost on the IRS. In order to reduce these costs, 
the IRS proposed to reduce its administrative costs by making a request for an 
affidavit to report all of an MNC’s participations and transactions, including 
information on related entities located overseas or in Chile. 
There are no economic estimates for this rule (History of Law, No.19.840). The 
bill entered parliament with ‘extreme urgency’. 
Legislative stage 
In the committee of finance of the Chamber of Deputies, the documents do not 
suggest the participation of other fields besides the IRS and the ministry of 
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finance (History of Law, No.19.840, p.23).68 The deputies of the committee 
approved the legislative change. 
In the Chamber of Deputies, the documents suggest limited technical scrutiny 
and debate, and a high level of political and partisan discourse. For example, 
Deputy D, from the centre-left-wing governing coalition, called the right wing to 
approve the bills, saying that: 
all that [the government] is trying to do is to regulate in accordance 
with international standards. It is what a serious and responsible 
country with its finances is trying to do. No to secrets, no to upper-
echelon agreements, no to seven entrepreneurs that meet with a 
minister, with a president or with whoever! ... I would prefer some of 
these investors to leave, because they don’t leave anything in the 
country. There are many that come to us to use us. Let them go; we 
do not need them! (History of Law, No.19.840, p.75). 
This quote suggests that international regulation was held to be legitimate 
because others were using it. A centre-right-wing deputy, E, proposed to vote 
against the rules that contained the transfer pricing provision because they were 
not good (History of Law, No.19.840, p.78). The rule was approved by the 
Chamber of Deputies. 
In the committee of finance of the Senate, the documents show no participation 
other than the bureaucratic field (History of Law, No.19.840, p.97). Similarly, the 
documents do not reveal the nature of the debate, if any, other than that it was 
approved (History of Law, No.19.840, p.105). 
There is evidence of discussion in the Senate. Centre-right-wing senators 
opposed the amendment to the transfer pricing rule. For example, Senator J, a 
member of the committee of finance, said that changing the relationships aspect 
was inadequate: 
Currently, it is increasingly frequent to see strategic alliances to 
access new technologies, distribution channels, major capital 
sources, and to exploit the know-how. In turn, there are investments 
that allow diversification of portfolio risks to which a company is 
exposed regarding its flows. It is also largely the case that exclusivity 
contracts are signed to avoid opportunistic behaviour; that is, that 
either party wants to take advantage of the investment. Therefore, 
the measures of this point distort transfers and negotiations between 
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however, these documents are not publicly available. 
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companies, which lead them to make sub-optimal decisions, 
diminishing the potential capacity of Chile (History of Law, 
No.19.840, p.121). 
Referring to the whole proposal, Senator K, a member of the committee of 
finance and from a right-wing party, said that it needed further analysis and 
asked for a second discussion (History of Law, No.19.840, p.128). Once again, 
time constraints prevented detailed scrutiny of the tax regulation, which right-
wing Senator L, resisted, saying that there was not enough time to discuss the 
bill adequately. Senator L continued, arguing that the idea of ‘relationships’ was 
not contained in the central idea of the project and that the rule would alter the 
current treatment of operations in international commerce (History of Law, 
No.19.840, pp.154-5). This may be interpreted in the light of partisan links 
between businesses and right-wing parties made up of economic élites 
(Fairfield, 2010). ‘Grouping’ was also connected with the regulation in terms of 
political campaigns in which companies might fund politicians (Gracia & Oats, 
2012; Neu, 2006). 
Similarly to the former rule, the evidence suggests that the Senate was able to 
access the social space connected with the field of power inhabited by the élite 
to influence the ‘content’ of the transfer pricing amendment. Senators K and L 
had political capital (Bourdieu, 1991), enabling them firstly to propose the 
elimination of the two paragraphs relating to transfer pricing. Secondly, they 
proposed a revised version of the relationships paragraph, from which they 
proposed to delete the presumptive relationship of ‘transactions in the absence 
of a genuine business reason’ (History of Law, No.19.840, p.163). The third 
indication was proposed by the executive which, rather than requesting an 
affidavit with information on transactions, proposed that documentation must be 
kept until the IRS requested it (History of Law, No.19.840, pp.163-4). Following 
a process of negotiation between the executive and the Senate, the former 
withdrew its suggestion and introduced a consolidated suggestion, drawing 
together the proposal made by the two senators and its own suggestion about 
keeping documentation (History of Law, No.19.840, p.174). In terms of political 
affiliation, members of the right-wing political parties rejected the bill, whilst the 
coalition government approved the article. 
Despite the problems encountered by the IRS during audits regarding its 
methods, it was told not to change anything else: 
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In general, in Chile it is very difficult to change the tax law. Then, for 
example … when the rules were modified adding the two paragraphs 
about the presumptions of the relationship rules and the obligation to 
keep documentation, there was an explicit instruction that nothing 
else could be modified. Then, the reasons for no change were more 
political than technical, because if they were modifying the rule, it 
was a good opportunity to do the rule again, but it was not. Normally, 
what is stated is that if this rule ‘x’ may cause a lot of ‘noise’, and 
therefore people may be affected, it will not be modified because 
they may be more important from the tax policy point of view 
(TPTA04). 
These instructions align with Fairfield’s (2010, p.45) argument that large firms 
prefer to lower their tax burden through tax avoidance. The centre-left-wing 
government avoided conflicts with business (Fairfield, 2010, p.52), and 
therefore avoided tax traumas. 
In the second discussion, Senator K referred to the powers granted to the 
Customs Service and the IRS, but did not mention the rule itself. Senator K 
labelled the relationship section ‘senseless’ (History of Law, No.19.840, p.222). 
The deputy minister of finance clarified this issue and said that the senator was 
referring to other powers granted to Customs. This may suggest an imprecise 
and undetailed knowledge of transfer pricing. Later, government Senator M, 
explained the scheme of transfer pricing and questioned the opposition 
senators’ behaviour (History of Law, No.19.840, p.225): 
Mr President [of the Senate], the systematic interventions of the 
Opposition [senators] have come to my attention. All of them are 
aimed at not consenting to norms that allow the IRS do their job well. 
And this is the core issue: that companies pay [tax] as appropriate; 
that the Internal Revenue Service has the necessary tools to fulfil its 
mission. 
This attempt to defend businesses may be interpreted in line with the findings of 
Fairfield (2010, p.53), as the right-wing and business leaders were the same 
individuals. 
Another opposition senator, N, argued that the transfer pricing rule was 
functioning and that what was under discussion was an extension of the IRS’s 
power to challenge prices (History of Law, No.19.840, p.226). In his words, it 
was intended that the IRS would replace the market. This also suggests that 
knowledge was obscured by partisan discourses, as Chapter Five illustrated. 
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Restricting the scope of relationships was well received by right-wing deputies. 
Deputy E supported the new proposal approved in the Senate, arguing that it 
was better because the relationship called ‘transactions in the absence of a 
genuine business reason’ had been deleted from the bill. Deputy F also 
questioned the comprehensive powers being granted to the IRS. Nevertheless, 
the rule became law. 
6.6 Post implementation 
This section explains the post-implementation practices of the IRS, taxpayers 
and tax advisors. 
6.6.1 IRS post implementation 
Audit performance, organisational structure and non-documentation 
effects 
2002-2009 
Since the burden of proof was on the IRS and there was no mandatory 
documentation in form of an affidavit or transfer pricing study, audits had been 
very time-consuming and costly since 2002. This explains why the number of 
cases audited was very low. An informant reported that around four and five 
cases were investigated at that time, while a taxpayer’s payment derived from 
an adjustment was not received until 2004 (TPTA04). Lack of documentation 
was the main cause of poor audit performance that the IRS had to combat 
(Newbery, 1987). Although it is likely that no audits were conducted in the 
period 2005-2007, in 2005 the IRS started to request information on 
transactions between related parties based on its general powers, but not as a 
power granted by the transfer pricing rule. In that year, 200 entities were 
required to complete a form with information on their transactions, but the 
reporting was of ‘awful quality’ (TPTE01). However, the information received 
allowed a database to be built (TPTA04) which would help the conduct of future 
audits. 
Audit performance remained poor, which drove further organisational changes. 
After the ‘non-audit period’, in 2007 a new transfer pricing group was created in 
the sub-department of audit, reporting to the national direction. During its 
existence, this group gained experience/tax knowledge on transfer pricing 
audits (TA06). In contrast to the former group created with the enactment of the 
183 
rule, which decreased in staff numbers over the years, this group was staffed 
with only seven professionals, with engineering and economics qualifications 
and a ‘modelling’ orientation. Legal advice was provided by lawyers from 
(an)other department(s). Despite this new attempt, the number of audits 
remained low. 
From the interviews, it is possible to identify three aspects which impacted on 
this poor performance: the organisational dependence of the group, the staff’s 
type of knowledge, and the rule itself. Whilst the first two were relatively easy for 
the IRS to change, the problems relating to the rule extended over the whole 
period in which the provision was in force. For this reason, the effects of the rule 
will be discussed later in this sub-section, as they transcend the sub-periods 
under analysis. 
First, this team gained experience through almost two years of work which 
concluded in 2009, when the group was relocated in a regional department – 
the Large Taxpayers Directorate (see Eissa & Jack, 2010). This organisational 
change was made because the audits were conducted by regional departments, 
not by the national direction, making this reporting structure ‘administratively’ 
complex (TA06). 
Second, as noted above, the type of knowledge and training that these 
inspectors had was deemed inadequate for conducting audits. In particular, this 
economic/market/mathematical view translated into trying to estimate prices 
(TPTE01), which were the easiest to refute (TPTA02). An interviewee portrayed 
this approach quite well: 
So, what’s the problem with engineers? Generally ... for engineers 
the estimates are not friendly for them; then, if you don’t come with a 
one million dollar difference and a logarithmic model, a thing that 
seems very complex to them, they don’t like it... I think that’s why a 
lawyer was needed that really understood [transfer pricing] in the 
context that this is not a mathematical issue, but a legal issue ... the 
issue is to create legal cases with technical arguments (TPTE01). 




This newly relocated and transformed group was also small, made up of six 
individuals who had conducted audits across the country since its formation. In 
contrast to the strong ‘mathematical’ background of the dismantled group, the 
new team was more diverse in terms of academic background, holding 
business administration, accounting, public administration and law degrees.69 
Six individuals made up the group: four tax inspectors, one lawyer and the head 
of group (TPTA05). 
Although the core team was small, a feature that may explain the low audit 
rates (TPTA04), there was additional support from other areas such as the IT 
department, legal department and economists from the IRS national direction 
(TPTA04). Internal levels of specialisation and forms of knowledge exchange 
became evident during the interviews: there was one specialist in database 
analysis, the inspectors conducted the operational audits, the lawyer supported 
the legal analysis of cases, and everything was coordinated and supervised by 
the head of the group (TPTA05). 
This team had increased its knowledge since its creation. Formal and informal 
methods of training were identified from the interviews. Formal training included 
transfer pricing sessions organised by the OECD, activities relating to technical 
collaboration between tax administrations, and online courses (TPTA04). In 
addition to this specific technical knowledge, to supplement this team’s work, 
members had attended other courses deemed to be necessary, such as on 
IFRS (TPTA05). Knowledge in the team had also increased through practice. 
For example, the lawyer in the group worked for the OECD and his interaction 
with other members increased the knowledge of the team through social capital. 
Other knowledge had been gained through fieldwork. Referring specifically to 
mining industry audits, tax inspectors had learned how the London Metal 
Exchange works (TPTA05). Finally, procedural legal knowledge had been 
acquired in practice through relations with the court.70 Much of this learning had 
been through ‘trial and error’, as referred to by one interviewee. In the past, the 
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‘commercial engineering’. 
70
 There were no court decisions at the time this fieldwork was conducted, although an 
interviewee recognised that these outcomes would be an important input in developing 
additional knowledge when addressing cases. 
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team never requested contracts in Spanish between related parties as their 
members had a good command of the English language; however, judges 
requested contracts in Spanish, which had encouraged the team also to request 
them in Spanish (TPTA05). 
Despite greater amounts of tax knowledge, taxpayers perceived that this was 
concentrated in Santiago only (TPPT04). This may be explained by the fact that 
other regional departments had never conducted an operative transfer pricing 
study (TPTA02). 
Until August 2011, the team had been in charge of the whole audit process, 
from the early stages of risk analysis, the selection of taxpayers and holding 
meetings with taxpayers, to the actual conduct of audits (TPTA05); however, 
the creation of a new department in the sub-department of audit in the national 
direction led to higher levels of specialisation and coordination within the IRS, 
as the next section will show. 
August 2011 onwards 
This new department, referred as to ‘the brain’, specialised in designing audit 
plans for distribution to the Large Taxpayers Department and other regional 
departments to conduct audits (TPTA02). Similarly to the team in the Large 
Taxpayers Directorate, this group was also small, made up of six individuals 
plus the head, who also led another department. Although these members held 
similar formal qualifications, such as business administration and economics, 
their expertise was diverse. This diversity was what the senior members of the 
group were specifically seeking during the recruitment process. Specialists able 
to ‘think and identify economic sectors, understand how different industries and 
actors work and where these multinational groups are’ (TPTA02) was the main 
selection criterion. 
Besides this formal component of education, experience in the field was also 
sought. In contrast to former groups, this team had experienced individuals in 
the technicalities of transfer pricing. The new team was no longer made up of 
the ‘professional that had read a little’ (TPTE03) on transfer pricing; there were 
even members that had worked for Big Four firms (professional services field), 
had trained abroad and had gained international experience in practice. This 
practical component was highly valued. TPTA02 noted the difference between 
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knowing the content of guidelines, ‘reciting the description of the method’, and 
having worked with ‘papers and knowing what companies are doing’. With this 
experience, the group would be able to ‘read between the lines’ of the poor-
quality information usually provided by taxpayers. In the opinion of TPTA02, this 
poor quality of reporting may have influenced the poor performance of the 
former groups. 
The tax knowledge of the appointed members translated into knowing how to 
use IRS’ internal and external data and about finance and valuation, capital 
markets, econometrics, statistics and economics. These skills went beyond the 
standard tax inspector profile, as Tuck (2010) suggests. 
The group undertook forms of internal training. At the end of 2012, for example, 
an economist in the group with practical experience trained the team on 
procedural issues of audits, such as what to search for and where to go 
(TPTA03). Further training would be provided in the future to supplement all 
these core skills. 
In performing their work, these professionals took the role of the media as an 
input seriously. One interviewee reported that ‘two people in the group arrive 
earlier, check all the press in the morning and send a summary to everyone on 
anything potentially interesting for the group’ (TPTA02). 
Collaboration between the two existing groups was also noted during the 
interviews. In 2011-2012, this new team took on incomplete cases to close 
them, with an associated payment (TPTA02). 
This group had gained symbolic capital in its short existence. The market 
perceived the strengths of this group, which was expected to collect much more 
resources as a performance indicator based on their competitive salaries 
(TPTE03). The next section explains the effects of legislation on audit practices. 
6.6.2 Features of the rule and their effects on audit procedures 
The IRS had to deal with four particular aspects of the rule: the burden of 
proof/non-documentation requests, uncertainty in the methods, adjustment 
points and agreement procedures. These aspects are discussed below, along 
with the practices deployed by the tax authority to enforce this rule. 
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Burden of proof/non-documentation requests 
The burden of proof and absence of specific documentation requirements made 
information on taxpayers’ transactions the first capital at stake in the field. 
Although the IRS was increasing its tax knowledge over time, with better 
prepared staff, technology to set comparable prices and the legal power to 
request information, the taxpayer held the information on transfer pricing and 
had the power not to disclose it through an affidavit. This made the struggle for 
this form of capital very costly for the IRS. In this respect, the IRS resorted to 
information available from different sources, such as the press/media, and other 
information on the taxpayer and the industry (TA06). With regard to information 
requested by the administration based on its general powers, the IRS showed 
its dissatisfaction with the quality of information provided in other affidavits or 
forms informing the design of audit plans. An interviewee said that the IRS was 
‘disappointed about the information provided by taxpayers in affidavits. [They] 
submit anything, fill information in the wrong boxes, numbers that are useless or 
that can’t be real’ (TPTA02). Although a useful source of this information 
through the Central Bank and Customs was explicitly included in the rule, the 
former was not particularly keen to share/prepare information for these 
purposes (TA06). 
Once some information had been gathered, the analyses started to identify 
which companies’ performance was below the industry mean, and these cases 
were particularly selected (TPTA04) and the investigation taken further. With 
this information, tax inspectors started to prepare evidence, in a similar form to 
transfer pricing studies, which would be used to show taxpayers that they were 
not adequately following the arm’s length principle. These tasks were 
particularly costly in terms of ‘accuracy’, given the volume of information 
involved (TPTA05). In contrast to the taxpayer, the tax inspector needed to 
understand the business, which was time-consuming, involving meetings with 
taxpayers across the process in order to understand the operational process of 
the transactions (TPTA05). In the case of transactions with related entities, 
there was no information available and the tax inspector started to wonder 
uncertainly, for example, whether tax losses might have been caused by a 
transfer pricing issue. In this scenario, sometimes the IRS simply risked 
initiating the analysis with the limited information available, making the audit 
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more time-consuming (TPTA05). These problems, derived from non-specific 
documentation requirements, meant that many audits failed to ‘reach fruition’ 
(PM11). Thus, auditors started an examination, spent many hours with high 
expectations of the outcome, but if it did not succeed, that time was ‘lost’ 
(TA06). Here, ‘there was a lot of preamble [to the tax audits] for nothing’ 
(TPTE01). 
Nonetheless, it was recognised that this costly process brought some benefits 
for future practices. Substantial tax knowledge was gained through this process 
as a result of having the burden of proof (TA06, TPTA05). This resonates with 
Bergman’s (2003) argument that stable tax policy, such as transfer pricing, 
contributed to the development of an efficient tax administration in Chile able to 
detect non-compliance, and enhanced tax compliance in the long term. TPTA04 
described this process well: 
There is an aspect that I consider relevant here… the issue of the 
burden of proof. When the IRS has the burden of proof on his back, 
that forces the IRS to study everything from scratch. Then, when they 
go to talk with inspectors in other countries that do not have the 
burden of proof, the differences of opinion and experience are 
enormous. I do not doubt that the guys who are in this group know 
much more than the inspectors from those countries because these 
inspectors grew up in the jungle and had to survive in the jungle. 
In this struggle for cultural capital, taxpayers were not particularly cooperative, 
as explained during the interviews. Usually, taxpayers provided basic financial 
statements, but contracts, directorate meetings and budget reports were 
unavailable to the tax authority (TPTA04). Holding this information may be 
interpreted as a form of symbolic violence, in equivalent terms to those 
explained by Gracia and Oats (2012). 
Uncertainty of methods 
Uncertainty was an issue regarding the methods of valuation. This uncertainty 
made the IRS read between the lines and observe the OECD Guidelines in the 
rule, although these methods were not explicit in the legislation (PM11). 
TPTA05 said that the IRS’ operational group argued that the ‘net profit is in the 
reasonable profit [concept contained in the rule] … so I say, over time [the tax 
inspectors] learned to read between the lines’. In TPTA05’s opinion, in 
implementing the rule tax inspectors had to go beyond literal interpretation, 
otherwise they could not have applied the law. The IRS argued that the 
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‘reasonable profit concept’ was very broad and that the CUP, profit method or 
any other method would be included, but that was very legally uncertain (TA06). 
This was a major difficulty during audits. When told to use a certain method, the 
first thing taxpayers did was to read the rule and see whether it was specified. If 
the method was not contained in the law, the taxpayer replied ‘it does not say 
here that you can or cannot do this’ (TPTA05). Although not specifically referred 
to as such, the CUP method was used during audits (TA06, TPTE01). 
In dealing with uncertainty in the methods, the IRS mobilised its increased tax 
cultural capital; however, this strategy was not always successful, as taxpayers 
also defended their capital at stake, as the quotations have evidenced. 
Adjustment point 
In terms of adjustment, the rule made no reference to price ranges or secret 
comparable prices, although the IRS used both (TPTE01, TPTE03). In terms of 
price ranges, the IRS tended to imitate the practices of other jurisdictions, as 
noted by TPTE01: ‘The IRS always used the interquartile range for analysis … 
because others use it’. This is consistent with Carruthers’ (1995) argument that 
‘there is reassurance if not actual safety in numbers, and in the absence of a 
compelling reason to strike out on their own, organizations do what others are 
doing' (p.317). Through imitation, and with the assumption that that was the 
practice, the IRS would transform its capital into symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 
1990), or legitimacy (Scott, 2001), establishing the doxa. 
Regarding the point of adjustment, it was argued that the IRS’s practices should 
not be discretionary and should be perceived to be neutral and objective: 
[the IRS] has not been discretionary up to now. [Adjustments] have 
been always to the median and I think that the IRS should keep that 
approach for now until an instruction is issued … because taxpayers 
may ask: why did you place me in the first [quartile] and not in the 
third?’ Or ‘why didn’t you place me in the middle point between the 
median and the quartile?’ I think that for everything, in general, the 
IRS should show a neutral, objective stance ... that does not favour 
anyone nor is detrimental to another or anything like that … [the 
criterion] should be the median (TPTA02). 
In the absence of a clear legal rule that the IRS could use to guide its practices, 
which were already ‘legitimate’ in other jurisdictions, it proceeded cautiously in 
order to protect its symbolic capital in the field. Otherwise, taxpayers could have 
190 
taken their case to court and, if an adverse decision had been made, besides 
the loss of economic capital in play, the IRS could have lost symbolic capital in 
the future. The IRS’ habitus may explain why the number of cases brought to 
court was minimal during the existence of this rule. 
Procedure for reaching agreement 
Another aspect to note is that the rule did not include the possibility of reaching 
an agreement between the IRS and taxpayers. Again, the IRS did not follow any 
formal procedure and, if both parties accepted the adjustment, the payment was 
made (TPTA05). In this respect, reputation was important for taxpayers: 
For example, if a company trades in the stock market in the US ... it 
is not nice having a dispute in Chile; then, in the end, taxpayers said 
‘take these two million dollars’ and everyone was happy … the IRS 
played in that area and the law was not applied (TPTE02). 
As noted in this quotation, taxpayers were afraid of losing symbolic capital 
which would be followed by a loss of economic capital. In this process, the IRS 
identified the forms of capital at stake and taxpayers protected their position in 
the field through these less transparent agreement practices. 
These problems in implementing the transfer pricing rule created a common 
view of its degree of robustness. One interviewee referred to the rule as 
providing ‘very little’ (TPTA05) and another as ‘too little insightful’ (PM12). 
Administrative costs 
According to TPTA05, this type of audit took place on-site, and as such it took 
time. For example, it was mentioned that tax inspectors had to travel to different 
regions in the country to attend meetings and get to know the operational 
process. 
6.6.3 Taxpayers’ implementation 
This sub-section presents the findings on taxpayers’ implementation practices. 
Organisational structure 
In general, the companies interviewed had small tax units in which tax work was 
conducted. This does not mean that they had a specialist, organisationally 
independent tax department; they were usually dependent on the accounting 
departments. The four interviewees reported that their groups comprised two 
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people (TPPT02), two people (TPPT03), four people (TPPT04) and seven 
people (TPPT01) respectively.71 None of these companies had an in-house tax 
professional working exclusively on transfer pricing activities. This finding is 
consistent with the opinions of other tax experts interviewed, who stated that 
there were no people dedicated to this subject within organisations in general 
(TPTE01). In similar terms, another interviewee claimed that ‘in Chile, there are 
not ... at least, I have not seen [them] and I could guarantee that there are no 
transfer pricing in-house (professionals)’ (TPTE03). The situation would have 
been different for larger companies with exclusive transfer pricing units 
(TPTA02, TPTE02). Given absent or little tax knowledge, the role of tax 
advisors was increasingly important for taxpayers (OECD, 2008). 
Role of external advisors 
The absence of intra-organisational tax knowledge led to high levels of reliance 
on external advisors when information was requested by and reported to the 
IRS. Regarding information reporting, a dichotomy between tax advisor/good 
reporting and in-house/‘not so good’ reporting was empirically noted (TPTA03). 
These intermediaries’ positions were also related to the voluntary preparation of 
transfer pricing studies. There was a perception that mid-size companies, which 
tended not to have specialist transfer pricing units, generally relied entirely on 
auditors for the preparation of these studies (TPTE02), and that very large 
companies with in-house transfer pricing units prepared these studies internally, 
where the advisors’ role was to validate and justify the figures with analyses 
carried out by their advisors (TPTA02). A very large company, which did not 
have a transfer pricing unit/specialist, reported that its advisors took all the 
‘burden of the work … in terms of [legal] interpretation as well as in defending 
the figures’. 
The level of reliance on tax advisors was different when facing a tax audit. Tax 
advisors were becoming visibly more important during these processes. In this 
case, an interviewee said that it was a common practice that ‘everything was 
left in [external] auditors’ hands and [companies] were not involved in the 
process’ (TPTA05). 
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From the interviews it is possible to infer that this reliance did not change, 
mainly because of the high compliance costs of human resources and 
databases/information. On this second component, a tax expert (TPTE03) 
commented that, although companies might be interested in creating transfer 
pricing units, database costs were so high – US$20.000 per year – that 
ultimately companies decided to outsource, saving resources and also getting 
the advisors’ ‘benediction’ by transferring the responsibilities to them. This 
heavy reliance created a need for and further dependence on tax advisors, who 
ended up dominating at this stage, given their expert tax knowledge. 
Forms of implementation: Active and passive 
From the data analysis, two forms through which taxpayers implemented the 
rule emerged. Whenever the taxpayer revised and adjusted the prices set in 
cross-border transactions for tax purposes in anticipation of a tax audit, an 
active implementation was being undertaken. Conversely, if the taxpayer did not 
revise or adjust the prices set in cross-border transactions for tax purposes and 
acted in response to a first move by the Chilean IRS, it was interpreted that a 
passive implementation had taken place. This differentiation operated at two 
levels, individual and group. 
The active form was not prevalent in the companies interviewed when analysed 
individually in Chile, a finding that was consistent with the general perceptions 
of other interviewees that in general companies did not do anything active 
(TPTE01, TPTE02). Although the experience of each company was different in 
its approach to the core shared practice, the passive form of implementation 
derived from low audit rates and the absence of mandatory documentation 
requests. Regarding audits, the four interviewees (TPPT01, TPPT02, TPPT03, 
TPPT04) said that they had never been audited specifically for transfer 
pricing.72 
Since the rule did not oblige taxpayers to submit any sort of documentation in 
the form of a transfer pricing study or affidavit, very few companies had 
voluntarily undertaken transfer pricing studies. However, the percentage of 
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companies doing so was perceived to be very low, possibly around ‘ten per 
cent’ (TPTA03). 
Two interviewees stated that their companies in Chile had undertaken transfer 
pricing studies. A Chilean headquarters said it had voluntarily prepared its first 
transfer pricing study with a Big Four firm in 2009, i.e. twelve years after the 
enactment of the rule. Similarly, a second company, with European 
headquarters, also reported having had a transfer pricing study done by another 
Big Four firm (TPPT02). 
Despite these attempts, in some cases no change followed these reports. The 
Chilean headquarters reported that tax practice on transfer pricing did not 
change as a consequence of the report (TPPT04). Its ‘philosophy’ was to 
centralise operations, making no profits on transactions with related entities. In 
contrast, its related entities abroad had transfer pricing consciousness in their 
‘DNA’. This finding highlights the passive form of implementation that this 
company undertook, seeing itself as a sole entity. If analysed globally, however, 
this group could be classified as active based on the number of entities abroad, 
but also as passive if considering the predominant role played by the 
headquarters. 
Differences in decision-making power were noted during the fieldwork. In 
particular, in all cases the headquarters determined the decision of the whole 
group, conferring little or no power on their subsidiaries. In general, foreign 
headquarters tended to confer little autonomy on their Chilean entities, which 
tended to apply the foreign policy. In such cases, Chilean entities used a 
‘master-file’ prepared abroad to support their transfer pricing policy (TPTE02). 
The weak power of these Chilean entities was well described by TPPT01, who 
reported that its decision on the method – cost plus margin – was ‘one hundred 
per cent imposed’ by its headquarters in Europe. 
This limited autonomy described by TPPT01 may have been related to the 
presence of stricter regulation abroad, to which headquarters had to adhere. 
Accordingly, headquarters planned globally, making Chilean entities follow their 
plan. TPPT02 said that the definition of the method to be used for 
commercialisation was defined by its headquarters, which had to comply with 
very strict regulation in Europe. The instructions coming from foreign 
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headquarters were not only about the method of valuation but also about the 
prices with which the Chilean entity had to operate. Foreign headquarters told 
their Chilean entities to ‘stay between this value and this value’ (TPPT01, 
TPTA05, TPTA03). A very extreme case of low autonomy was reported by 
TPPT03, who said about its main imports of goods that: 
prices are set abroad … and charged through invoices, but I do not 
know the price-setting procedures because they change yearly and 
that changes the margin configuration but I do not know the criterion 
and that is why I am asking for information [from the European 
headquarters] … [I know] nothing about the [transfer pricing] method 
used. 
This situation reflects the relatively little power the Chilean entity had as a result 
of having no information – understood as an absence of ‘economic 
transparency’ (Geraats, 2001) – on how the prices were set in comparison with 
the headquarters. Having no information to provide to the IRS in an audit, the 
Chilean entity was placed in a ‘very difficult position’. These Chilean entities had 
mainly obeyed foreign orders, as reported by TPPT01 and TPPT02. As noted, 
interviewees referred to the ‘strict’ control that other jurisdictions exercised on 
their headquarters, which excluded them from having a voice in the price-setting 
process. 
Transfer pricing was designed by foreign headquarters and Chilean entities 
accepted these instructions. This form of obedience was interpreted as a ‘very 
advanced’ form of implementation by one taxpayer (TPPT01). In this respect, 
TPTE03 highlighted the power of foreign headquarters to impose their wishes 
on Chilean entities, given the lack of documentary requirements in the Chilean 
legislation: 
Also, for a long time, Chile was seen as the ‘ugly duckling’ … 
(Foreign headquarters said) ‘[in] Chile … transfer pricing does not 
matter, send the charges to them’. I heard several times that 
[companies said] ‘we are not reaching the [required] profitability in 
[name of country], send Chile an invoice and it doesn’t matter 
whether Chile reaches its market profitability’. 
In contrast, Chilean entities did not often plan transfer pricing as ‘it is a very 
advanced [issue] for Chile’ (TPTE01). 
For Chilean entities with foreign headquarters, the transfer pricing rule was 
never an issue to worry about or a focus for the company (TPPT01); the rule 
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was labelled ‘toy-like’ (TPPT02). The underlying causes of this approach, on the 
part of the IRS, were the burden of proof and the sense of having no control. As 
shown above, the authority had to prove that taxpayers’ transactions were not 
following the arm’s length principle and had to ‘do the work of gathering proof, 
justifiably, and say that what [companies] were doing wasn’t right … then all that 
justification was bothersome and costly to implement’ (TPPT01). These reasons 
made the IRS reluctant to take action (TPPT01). There was a perception that 
audits were not carried out extensively and, if done, few industries were subject 
to examination. For example, TPPT02 said that ‘sometimes, the IRS attacked 
pharmaceuticals, mining companies … because money was really there’. 
The effect of the rule on companies was that they expected an audit to comply 
with the rule under the Chilean terms. This was the approach adopted by all 
companies analysed individually/domestically. TPPT02’s company was 
compliant and then they ‘were quiet, waiting for the IRS to come’. However, 
TPPT02 acknowledged that in the past the company had had some transfer 
pricing issues quantified in a transfer pricing study commissioned from a Big 
Four firm. Although the report suggested a potential adjustment to their prices 
and the Chilean entity informed its headquarters abroad, they were waiting for 
the IRS to turn up and, if that happened, they would try to ensure that ‘the 
adjustment was the smallest possible’. 
As has been shown, all companies reacted in a passive way, waiting for a first 
move by the IRS to make a change to their transfer pricing practices if they 
were detected as being non-compliant. However, viewed as a global group, the 
companies were compliant with stricter foreign regulation, adopting an active 
role in complying with the arm’s length principle, but for global processes. This 
undefined posture applied to Chilean headquarters which, if analysed locally, 
were not complying with the principle either locally or globally according to the 
power held by the Chilean headquarters; whereas, if classified according to the 
number of entities involved, the group tended to adopt an active approach to 
implementation of the rule. Table 6.1 summarises these comments: 
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Table 6.1: Forms of implementation 
 
People working within accounting departments were more aware of the 
technicalities of the rule in Chile (TPTE01) than higher managerial levels. In 
fact, ‘there was a conviction that Chile did not have a transfer pricing rule or that 
it was never going to be applied. So they could have taken all the profits away 
and nobody would have done anything. That was the belief’ (TPTE02). In this 
respect, TPTE01 commented that Chilean entities told their foreign 
headquarters that they were making profits but the IRS ‘does not bother them 
about that, everything is fine then ... don’t worry’. TPTE05 went further, saying 
that, given the IRS’ lack of activity, ‘people lost fear ... and thought that the 
issue [transfer pricing rule] had disappeared’. The following anecdote given by 
TPTE01 from the early 2000s summarises the perception of the absence of a 
transfer pricing rule: 
I remember one of them in particular in which the CEO arrived late 
[to a technical seminar on transfer pricing]. I had done all the 
presentation of Article 38, everyone was silent and he arrived and 
said: ‘ah, this is transfer pricing, and when is it going to be applied in 
Chile?’ And indeed, I was explaining that the rule had been in force 
for a couple of years … and he replied ‘and why has nobody told me 
about it? ... Well, tell us more about it. 
This passivity caused an inadequate level of knowledge of the transfer pricing 
issue (TPPT04) over the period in which the rule was in the income tax code up 
to 2012. This limited knowledge translated into a misconception of the role of 
transfer pricing, which was viewed as ‘more an issue of financial planning’ 
(TPTA03) and not just a tax issue. This misconception extended to the type of 
professional service provided by external advisors preparing transfer pricing 
studies. TPTE03 responded to clients’ request to set a price with ‘this is an 
estimation’. 
However, more recent experience showed a greater level of concern about the 





TPPT04 Passive Passive/ Active
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topic and did not know how it was useful to them, what type of documentation 
they had to submit or what the legal requirement was (TPTA02). In the years 
2010-2011, the scenario had improved in this respect, as large companies knew 
about transfer pricing, not in detail but cursorily about market prices, and that in 
some way the authority might audit them (TPTA02). The moment when ‘paying 
attention’ to transfer pricing rule occurred was when facing a tax audit and it 
was then that advisors were sought (TPTE01), reinforcing the passive approach 
to implementation of the rule. There was greater knowledge or awareness of the 
issue and greater expectations regarding its application. The media and ‘noisy’ 
international scandals about large companies’ adjustments and payments 
(TPTA02) may have increased this interest. Nonetheless, other entities 
remained ignorant. 
As there had not yet been any court decisions in Chile, there was little 
knowledge that the IRS could give to taxpayers about the application of the rule 
(TPTA02). 
Ambiguity of the rule 
Along with the burden of proof on the IRS and the absence of documentation 
requests, a particular feature of the law had contributed to the taxpayers’ 
passive form of implementation – ambiguity. Although the rule underwent a 
‘Chileanisation’ of the methods contained in the act, as explained in the design 
stage, the rule referred to methods of adjustment for use by the tax 
administration but not by taxpayers. Ambiguity acted against taxpayers when 
defending their compliance with the rule. TPTE01 commented on this: 
On the other hand, the current [at that time] law says that if the IRS 
detects that you are not compliant, the IRS, as it has the burden of 
proof, will be able to use these methods to make the adjustment, but 
in any point it reads that you [as taxpayer] can use these methods to 
support [your transactions] … in the end if I want to know if I am 
doing well, I apply the same methods … and go to the IRS and tell 
them, ‘look, here are my ranges, prepared in the same way [that you 
do] and I am within’. That’s a way of saying, ‘yes, I am good’. As 
currently there are two methods, nobody knows how to tell the IRS 
‘look, I am doing fine’. That’s basically the problem with the methods. 
Ambiguity of the rule could have been reduced through the use of circulars 
issued by the administration; however, in TPPT02’s opinion, this administrative 
guidance left ‘things the same’, providing no additional useful information about 
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the application of the law or how to prepare for a tax audit. From TPPT04’s 
perspective, the law was ambiguous and, given that circulars supplemented the 
rule, in this case ‘circulars were not going to make a miracle’.  
Compliance costs 
Non-documentation requests led to low compliance costs, as noted by TPPT01. 
In this sense, the objective stated during the design stage was met in practice. 
The introduction of the 2002 amendment, which required documentation to be 
made available to the IRS if requested, was not mentioned as a cost in the 
interviews with taxpayers. Only a tax expert referred to this element (TPTE02). 
The most frequently mentioned source of compliance costs was the voluntarily 
prepared transfer pricing study. The price of these reports was high and 
depended on the volume of transactions, although some companies voluntarily 
incurred these costs, as shown above (TPPT02, TPPT04). 
6.6.4 Tax practitioners’ implementation 
Tax advisors acted as experts, and their implementation practices are 
discussed in this section. 
Organisational structure 
In the early years after its enactment, professionals with knowledge and 
experience of transfer pricing were scarce and those who had knowledge had 
worked in other countries (TPTE05). Consequently, consultancy firms started to 
adopt a set of strategies to increase the level of expertise. For instance, a Big 
Four firm adopted a route not replicated by other firms, consisting of funding 
studies abroad and undertaking secondments abroad (TPTE05).73 
Another route followed by consultancy firms to bring knowledge from abroad 
was to bring holders of that knowledge to Chile. Focusing on the region, some 
accounting firms brought people from Argentina, a country with considerable 
experience of transfer pricing (TPTE05). For example, around 2004, a Big Four 
firm brought in a lawyer from its branch in Argentina. This lawyer, who had 
gained formal training and later professional experience in Europe, had 
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managed to provide training on the subject in his home country for other people 
working in Chile in order to create a transfer pricing group (TPPT04). However, 
services in this area ‘had very little flight [success]’ (ET03), possibly due to the 
passivity of the rule caused by the lack of specific documentary requirements 
and low audit rates, as explained in connection with the tax administration. 
Given the importance the topic was gaining over time as a result of media 
reports, documentation requests from the IRS, companies’ own interests, and 
limited development of the transfer pricing market in Chile (TPTA03), 
consultancy firms continued with the practice of recruiting professionals from 
other Latin American countries such as Colombia, Ecuador and Mexico, as 
noted during the interviews (TPPT04; media comments), leading to a growth in 
the number of transfer pricing specialists working in these specific audit 
teams.74 
Firms had continued to grow in the area. One firm, for instance, had created a 
specialist transfer pricing group between 2009 and 2010 (ET05). The trend for 
‘importing knowledge’ had also remained. People felt motivated to migrate to 
Chile due to the perception that Chile had a transfer pricing rule as it was an 
OECD member (TPTE04). 
Although the teams were small in number, as reported by TPTE04, until 2012 
they were sufficient to provide adequate professional services (TPTA03). Firms 
also provided internal training to their personnel (TPTA03). 
In terms of qualifications, it was noted during the interviews that teams were 
made up of economists, lawyers and accountants with a good command of 
English language and accounting knowledge, as well as databases, highlighting 
the importance of technology in administrative practices (e.g. Bird, 2004). 
Services provided 
The coding process allowed two types of service to be distinguished in terms of 
a first move by the IRS: response or anticipation. During the interviews two 
services were mentioned with regard to a response to a first move by the IRS. 
Given the generally late information requests made by the IRS, as noted for 
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instance by TPTE03, the first service consisted in the completion and 
submission of information to the IRS. The second service was representation 
during a tax audit. 
In anticipation of a first move by the IRS, three services were evidenced during 
the interviews. The first was the preparation of a transfer pricing study through 
which taxpayers had their intercompany prices validated using the arm’s length 
principle as a benchmark (TPTE04).75 These studies were originated either 
domestically or by foreign headquarters (TPTE03). Preparation of these 
documents was a specialist and time-consuming process. Specialist services 
were provided by expensive resources devoted to their preparation in terms of 
databases and experienced professionals. On the other hand, the process was 
time-consuming because interviews were conducted with the parties involved in 
cross-border transactions, along with the revision of contracts. Consequently, 
the price of this service was higher than for audits or compliance (TPTE03). 
The second service was that of tax planning, which always entailed moving 
prices within the range (TPTE05). Getting to know the range implied knowing 
the prices that aligned with medians, analysing assets and risks which might 
lead to reorganisation. 
The third type of service, although less common, was called ‘transfer pricing 
diagnosis’, which was equivalent to an IRS tax audit (TPTE01). This service 
was provided in anticipation of an IRS tax audit with the aim of ‘alerting’ the 
company to potential risks in cross-border transactions and suggesting 
corrective measures. 
These services had become very good income sources for accounting firms 
(ET03) and, although all advisors tried to maximise the economic capital from 
their services, they preferred to take a conservative stance. TPTE01, for 
example, tried to ‘minimise controversies’. Another advisor preferred not to use 
the word ‘conservative’ but ‘according to the rule’ (TPTE03). 
In trying to apply the rule, some tax practitioners commented on its features and 
those of the administrative guidance. A major problem with which advisors dealt 
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was methods which were not clearly stated either in the legislation or in the 
administrative guidance (TPTE02). Problems also arose with the use of 
interquartile ranges and adjustment points. A third problem concerned the 
presumptive relationships included in the 2002 amendment. TPTE05 
commented that the section on relationships was broadened too much, 
including concepts that ‘nobody understood’. On these problems, TPTE02 went 
further, arguing that the problem of legislation lay in the process: ‘the rule is 
bad, it was dreadfully conceived … giving [wide] space for interpretations’. 
Institutionalisation of practices 
From the interviews, it was possible to identify two ways in which tax practices 
were disseminated and internalised in the industry. The first set of activities 
related to seminars, through which experienced professionals affiliated to 
professional associations, such as the Chilean Institute of Tax Law and 
International Fiscal Association (IFA), ‘illustrated to members’ (PL01) certain 
aspects of interest. These seminars were not oriented toward giving instructions 
on what to do, but provided ‘funded professional opinions’ on the matter (PL01). 
Another way in which practices were adopted and later taken for granted was 
through the professional service itself. Consultancy firms (accounting and law) 
offered their services and thereby gained experience in the client’s industry. 
Discourses such as ‘look, I have experience in this’ were used by professional 
firms to attract clients, which finally contracted their services, trusting these 
advisors based on their technical experience. Internally, these firms replicated 
what client X was doing in the context of client Y in transfer pricing, but never 
disclosed information to clients. This experience was what the client was 
seeking and paying for (TPTE03). In the end, these practices made the advisors 
powerful agents in the field (Stringfellow et al., 2015). 
6.7 Post implementation stage II: The new rule initiative 
As was shown in the implementation stage, the rule had several problems that 
prevented the IRS from implementing it properly. It was ‘absolutely incomplete’ 
(TPTE01) in terms of the methods and how to use them, generality of 
relationships, and powers conferred to the authority, as in any part the law 
stated that ‘the tax inspector can do this and this, but not this’ (TPTA02). 
Although, during audits, the IRS followed OECD guidelines, these criteria were 
202 
not explicitly contained in the rule, causing uncertainty for both IRS and 
taxpayers (TPTA04). 
Despite the evident problems, no authority had the courage (TPTE02) to try to 
take the rule to the limit and propose a change until the arrival of a new national 
director of the IRS in 200676. Nobody previously had suggested that, knowing 
how ‘disastrous’ the law was, the tax inspectors should have to suffer it 
(TPTE01). His instructions to the audit team at that time were: 
build the case and don’t inhibit yourself because you have the idea 
that you are going to lose it, because that's the idea … you are here 
to lose the case (TPTE01). 
The idea was to leave a trace of why audits were not successful in terms of 
specific powers conferred to the IRS, methods, lack of clarity in the rule, etc. 
The causes of ‘failure’ were raised as problems to propose legal changes to the 
ministry of finance. The director’s initiative in going up against the wall, advised 
by a professional with substantial experience in Mexico, allowed the IRS to 
show that the rule should be changed, which was how the initiative to change 
the rule began. 
6.8 Summary 
This chapter has discussed the tax policy-making process for the 1997 transfer 
pricing rule in Chile. It has identified the powerful actors and shown how the 
policy reached the technical and political agenda. It has also shown the extent 
of parliamentary debate, as well as implementation practices by taxpayers, the 
IRS and tax advisors. Throughout the chapter, the concepts of field of power, 
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Chapter Seven: The New Transfer Pricing Rule 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings with respect to the three research sub-
questions presented in Chapter Four for the new transfer pricing rule enacted in 
2012. Section 7.2 presents the findings in relation to the design stage. Section 
7.3 presents the findings regarding the parliamentary debate. Section 7.4 
presents the findings for the implementation stage, and Section 7.5 provides a 
summary of the chapter. 
7.2 Design stage 
The design of the transfer pricing rule occurred in two separate phases: 
technical and political. The first phase was mainly a technical activity in 
response to the uncertainty faced by the IRS and taxpayers in the 
implementation of the 1997 rule, as discussed in Chapter Six (TPTA04). There 
was a wide consensus within the tax administration and the private sector about 
the need for legislative change (TA02), a change that took a long time (PM13).77 
The instigator of the tax law change was the IRS. Around 2004, a decision on 
‘what transfer pricing should be like’ (TPTA04) had been made and preliminary 
drafting had commenced. However, the technical agenda had not reached the 
political space. The authorities of the time argued that it was ‘not the time for a 
change; politically the [government] want something else’ (TPTA04). The efforts 
reached a higher institutional agenda with the arrival of the new IRS national 
director in 2006. 
As noted in Chapter 6, the national director was appointed on the basis of the 
confidence of the president and/or minister of finance. In the fieldwork, it was 
commented that personnel in the ministry of finance had suggested the 
director’s appointment. This social capital allowed him to enter the tax policy-
making field. This director had a mix of capitals that made him a powerful actor 
(Bourdieu, 1990). First, he held a law degree from the oldest university in the 
country and a master’s degree from the US, funded by a Fulbright scholarship 
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(Coddou, 2014), i.e. he had ‘institutionalised cultural capital’. Second, he had 
significant experience in tax practice in the professional services field, in a 
former Big Four firm and then at one of the most prestigious legal bars in the 
country (ibid.). And third, he possessed considerable social capital as nephew 
of an ex-president and with connections to a think tank connected with former 
ministers of finance (ibid.). These capitals influenced his habitus: being very 
critical of the former rule, and with a ‘public shirt on’, he was convinced that it 
should be amended and made more ‘useful’ (PM15). The director said on his 
arrival that ‘transfer pricing was a relevant issue’ (TA02) and, as shown in 
Chapter 6, he was able to persuade the ministry of finance that the problem was 
real (TPTE01). 
A tax lawyer specialising in international taxation who worked closely with the 
national director in the OECD accession process in 2006 also gained 
prominence. This actor entered the field through social capital when the director 
decided to restructure the functioning of the IRS, bringing in professionals from 
the professional services field. 
A third actor was the team of IRS drafters. Within the team, hierarchy was 
established in the process, perhaps naturally, based on the amount of tax 
knowledge and habitus. One drafter assumed a leading role based on his 
personal characteristics and connections with the issue. This individual 
possessed institutionalised cultural capital in the form of a law degree from a 
highly respected university in the country and a master’s degree in taxation. He 
also had experience of tax practice through a career developed within the IRS 
and as a delegate in OECD Working Group Six on transfer pricing and on the 
OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs. Moreover, this professional had been an 
agent in the academic field, teaching tax subjects for a number of years at 
postgraduate level. This experienced professional was recognised as having an 
interest in transfer pricing and a deeper theoretical knowledge than other 
members of the team. This experience was applied by working on the technical 
‘details’ of the transfer pricing rule (PM15). A second drafter assisted the leader. 
This junior member held a law degree and an LLM in taxation from the UK and 
also participated as a delegate on the OECD’s Working Group Six on transfer 
pricing. The third member was a senior member with substantial experience in 
legal drafting who had knowledge of the former transfer pricing rule process. 
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This senior drafter’s involvement shows that past experience helped to shape 
new legislation and overcome problems, as will be shown below. 
In March 2010, with the arrival of the first right-wing government since 1990, a 
new director coming from a Big Four firm arrived in the IRS. From then 
onwards, the ministry of finance through the tax policy coordination unit, along 
with the newly appointed director, started to intervene on a small scale as the 
text had by then almost been completed. As noted in Chapter Five, tax policy 
coordinators appointed in 2010 and 2011had institutionalised cultural capital 
and experience in the professional services and academic fields. 
This small number of participants and the types of decision they made may be 
interpreted as a site of struggle linked to the field of power. The involvement of 
these powerful actors shows that the legal perfection started within the IRS 
(TPTA02), breaking the linear trajectory of tax policy making and supporting 
claims made in the related literature (Sawyer, 2013b). Here, the 
‘technical/regulatory’ policy leading to the drafting stage occurred prior to the 
‘higher political’ tax policy agenda of reform. In TA02’s words: 
People from the ministry of finance participated very little because 
this [rule] became, instead, a bill from the tax administration towards 
the design of public policy … but the team within the ministry of 
finance was aware and also thought that the [transfer pricing] 
problem existed and that it was necessary to tackle it and that it was 
an improvement for both the tax administration and the income tax 
regime standards.78 
The central idea behind the new rule was that it had to ‘modify, update, 
supplement and perfect’ the former legislation in order to increase certainty for 
both taxpayers and the tax administration (TA02) through the adoption of 
international practices (PM11) and the application of the ‘full OECD standard’ 
(TA02). The new rule should also match domestic legislation and not just 
‘transplant’ or ‘copy-paste’ the OECD guidelines (TA02).79 This was achieved 
with the inclusion of aspects taken from comparative legislation and the 
introduction of Chilean innovations, as will be shown later in the chapter. 
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The second design phase involved economic and political considerations. This 
second phase overlapped with the drafting after 2010. The need for tax reform 
arose in 2011, when Chilean society manifested its dissatisfaction with the 
educational system.80 At this time the government coalition parties received 
signals that the right-wing government was preparing a tax reform aiming, at 
least, to increase the income tax rate for businesses (PM02). The government, 
‘pressured by these circumstances’ (PM03), decided to embrace this citizens’ 
demand, speeding up its effort to improve the quality and range of the education 
system at all levels (History of Law, No.20.630, p.5) through a tax reform 
oriented to funding the changes required in some way, but without ‘endangering 
the economic development of the country’ (History of Law, No.20.630, p.6).81 
The act, which included the transfer pricing rule, aimed to ‘perfect tax legislation 
and finance educational reform’ (History of Law, No.20.630, p.1).82 This bill had 
four central purposes: to raise revenue, to grant economic reliefs to the middle 
class, to create incentives for economic growth and to introduce mechanisms to 
improve the tax system, such as the elimination of unjustified exemptions and 
loopholes that allowed tax arbitrage (History of Law, No.20.630, pp.7-9 ). The 
first and fourth purposes matched the objective of the transfer pricing rule 
improvement (ibid.). Accordingly, this tax reform was seen as a ‘great 
opportunity to include other perfections’ (PM13) that aligned with the central 
ideas of the project. The transfer pricing rule would now increase revenues, 
justifying its inclusion in the reform. Secondly, the rule completed a couple of 
years previously (PM15, TA02) reached the political agenda for inclusion. On 
the latter, it was commented that part of the tax policy behind the reform was 
the inclusion of a ‘set of anti-avoidance and control rules’ (TA02), such as 
transfer pricing regulation. 
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7.2.1 Drafting 
In parallel with the drafting phase, Chile was negotiating membership of the 
OECD, which recognised that the former rule ‘was not contrary to the 
guidelines’ and that the arm’s length principle was there, but it was recognised 
that ‘it was not the best law either’ and that ‘it takes a while to understand it’ 
(TA02).83 This support from the OECD for the former rule gave a certain sense 
of legitimacy, removing pressure and haste from the compulsory legal change 
required to become a full OECD member (PM11).84 With this support, the 
drafting phase extended for years. Although the ‘social field’ should have 
‘clearly delineated boundaries’ in terms of time, purpose and a set of players 
(Mutch, 2006, p.156), the temporal boundary was not delineated in 
consequence of this OECD support. 
While the official drafting was ongoing, the senior professional working with the 
IRS director gave a list of technical points to the drafting team based on the 
OECD Guidelines. In principle, this shows a higher level of separation between 
policy design and drafting. These ‘bullet points’ (PM11) ratified that the policy 
was to move towards a complete OECD standard (Christians, 2010b). These 
points were taken by the team to capture those principles in written legislation. 
The drafting team comprised the three knowledgeable persons identified above. 
This team remained stable during the period 2006-2010. This high tax 
knowledge was a positive characteristic of the process commented on during 
the fieldwork. For example, PM15 saw this drafting process as stronger in terms 
of the number of people involved and the depth of the technical study carried 
out. The role of each member was fluid, with no clear delineation of participation 
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 The history of Chile’s accession to the OECD was as follows: November 2003, Chile applies 
to become an OECD member (Zúñiga, 2004); May 2007, OECD opens discussions with Chile 
on becoming a member (OECD, 2007a); November 2007, OECD issues ‘Roadmap for the 
accession of Chile to the OECD convention’ (OECD, 2007b); 15 December 2009, OECD invites 
Chile to become a full member (OECD, 2009); 11 January 2010, Chile accepts invitation to join 
OECD (OECD, 2010c). 
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 The OECD Secretariat informed Chile that four reforms/legal changes should be implemented 
in order for the Council to be able to approve Chile’s membership. These reforms related to 
companies’ legal responsibility in public officers’ bravery; information exchange of bank 
accounts with other OECD members’ tax administrations; amendment of the corporate 
governance of the Chilean stated-owned copper mining company, CODELCO; and private 
corporate governance reform (for a review, see Sáez, 2010). Regarding the information 
exchange clause, in December 2009, the Chilean government passed a law amending the Tax 
Code to meet the requirements stated in Article 26 of the OECD Model Convention to avoid 
double taxation (Sáez, 2010, p.106). 
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in the drafting. This interaction permitted the exchange of different forms of 
specific tax knowledge, as will be shown in Section 7.2.7. 
The national director was also directly involved in the drafting whilst in office 
until March 2010 (PM11). During his period in office, the rule was substantially 
drafted by the IRS. With the new government in 2010, the tax policy unit joined 
the IRS drafting team but did not play a significant drafting role. These high-
profile bureaucrats played a checking role (PM11, PM13), asking for the 
introduction/deletion of aspects from the rule (PM11). As noted by an 
interviewee, the tax policy unit strongly trusted the work carried out by the 
drafting team (PM11). 
Based on the evidence collected, it can be inferred that the IRS drafting team 
had a high level of autonomy. No tensions were evident or acknowledged 
between the drafting team and higher authorities within the IRS or ministry of 
finance in the process. There was a collaborative approach between these two 
groups, in which actors did not ‘vie for control’ over the content of the legislation 
(Mutch, 2006, p.157) because its purpose was shared by everyone, which was 
to follow the OECD transfer pricing guidelines. Members of the IRS and the tax 
policy unit remained cohesive and collaborative, as will be shown in Section 
7.2.7. 
In 2011, the IRS drafting team experienced a change. The junior drafter 
embarked on other transfer pricing professional endeavours within the IRS and 
a new member entered the field, who brought a different form of tax knowledge, 
given his possession of a public administration degree and ongoing study for a 
law degree. This new member’s participation was concerned with making 
comments and assessing the standard of the law rather than with drafting, as 
commented in the fieldwork. 
The drafting process was iterative. The first versions of the rule were short, 
containing around three to four paragraphs and leaving aspects untouched, 
such as APAs, fines and yearly affidavits, which were later included (TPTA04). 
However, the publication of updated OECD Guidelines (2010) with the 
international restructuring issue inspired further modifications to the bill. 
Decisions on how much to include in the rule about complexity/simplicity were 
not a formal process, but based on common sense (PM11). All these updates 
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and new requirements produced around six versions prior to the final bill 
(TPTA04). 
It may be inferred that the IRS drafting team positioned itself as the most 
powerful actor in the drafting stage. The drafters gained trust (a form of social 
capital) from other members of the IRS, which was later internalised and 
legitimised institutionally as a form of symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1977). This 
was mentioned by a professional member of an IRS tax inspectors’ association 
that acted as an interest group while the tax reform was under discussion. This 
association refrained from suggesting changes to the proposed transfer pricing 
rule as a consequence of this trust. The interviewee acknowledged that, since 
the drafting group was made up of professionals that had worked in the IRS for 
some time, the association ‘trusted that in any way, they [drafting team] were 
doing what was meant to be done’ (TA04). 
7.2.2 Consultation 
Although the IRS was now part of an expert bureaucratic holder of transfer 
pricing knowledge/expertise (Page, 2010), there is evidence that new 
knowledge and information was sought outside the drafting team from two 
sources. First, some technicalities of the rule were the fruit of internal 
consultation with other departments within the IRS and the ministry of finance. 
Second, knowledge and information was gathered from outside the bureaucratic 
field through consultation conducted by the IRS itself. It has been suggested 
that consultation should be conducted by a single agency, e.g. the IRS, in order 
to reduce problems of fragmentation and disorganisation (Burton, 2006). This 
transfer pricing policy process followed that suggestion. 
The extra time given by this ‘no pressure’ change to the law allowed the IRS to 
conduct external consultation as a novelty in tax policy making in Chile between 
2010 and 2012 (PM11). Unlike in other jurisdictions (e.g. Marriott, 2010), this 
consultation process was not formal or ‘institutionalised’ (PM11a). Although 
informal, this form of transparency improved the policy-making process in the 
terms delineated by the OECD guiding principles for regulatory quality and 
performance (2005), as will be shown later in the chapter. 
External consultation targeted the private sector, foreign and supranational 
institutions and academics in varous circumstances and forms. The people and 
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organisations consulted may be viewed as the ‘usual suspects’ (Bullock et al., 
2001, p.47). This focused consultation may be explained by the limitations 
imposed by the former pricing rule on the transfer pricing tax knowledge market 
(Hasseldine et al., 2011). As Chapter Six showed, transfer pricing knowledge 
was highly concentrated; therefore, open engagement with the public at large 
would be ineffective in making better legislation (Burton, 2006). The different 
fields consulted in the 2012 transfer pricing policy making are discussed next. 
7.2.3 Consultation with the private sector: Accounting and law 
consultancy firms 
A senior member within the IRS conducted external consultation with senior 
agents in the professional services field. This individual held institutionalised 
cultural capital in the form of an LLM degree from a European university and a 
Master’s in Law from a Chilean university, and had experience as a lawyer in a 
Big Four firm. Although it might have been expected that his power drawn from 
social connections with professionals in accounting and law firms would have 
granted enormous access to these professionals, enabling him to exert 
influence on the policy-making process, the way in which the consultation was 
conducted prevented that level of influence. 
The consultation format was through a sole official meeting/focus group with a 
few experts in transfer pricing from the Big Four firms and a specialist firm in 
Chile prior to submission to the Congress (PM13, TPTA02, TPTE02). The 
content of the bill was not disclosed as such; instead, bullet points with the 
essentials of the rule were shown (PM11, TPTE02). Therefore, these 
professionals knew of the scope and content of the rule at the same time as 
other citizens. In this respect PM11 commented: 
[The professionals] were not presented with the bill of law; it was not 
a white paper like Europeans do, but what was done was a 
presentation of the essential aspects contained in the bill [in order to] 
ask for the opinions of the most important actors in international 
taxation in Chile [on] aspects they thought were flaws, aspects they 
considered necessary for inclusion ... and based on these comments, 
some modifications were made. 
This quote shows that the senior members consulted were known to have high 
levels of tax knowledge or experience (TPTE03) and to be familiar with the 
details of their clients (PM13). As those consulted were rich in tax knowledge, 
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they held dominant positions in the professional services field. As the 
conceptual framework shows, in order to access this social space in which the 
most important decisions on transfer pricing were made, it was necessary to 
have social capital. Social capital was already present in this interaction. Very 
importantly, there was a conviction that these agents would not represent their 
clients at all (Shafer & Simmons, 2008). In this sense, their invitation was purely 
technically motivated. TPTE02 commented on this: 
What is going on here is that [invitees] operate as specialists. The 
Big Four don’t go to defend their clients’ interests because for them 
it’s more work as well. All this was very technical. 
The meeting revolved around the ‘premiere’ aspects of the rule in a general way 
(TPTE02), including methodologies, relationship clauses, powers conferred on 
the IRS, advance pricing agreements (TPTA02), transfer pricing adjustments, 
fines and the non-mandatory nature of transfer pricing studies (TPTE02). Those 
consulted seemed satisfied with the content of the rule, making only a few 
comments in response (PM13, TA02, TPTA02). 
In addition to this formal meeting, these professionals were asked to provide 
more detailed comments on the content of the bill once it had been made public 
in the Congress. In order to do so, these experts met to discuss and review the 
issues contained in the bill (TPTE03) and submitted a unique joint report with 
their opinions. The experts proposed several amendments to the bill, from minor 
to substantial, which were not fully considered by the authorities.85 They 
suggested the inclusion of interquartile price ranges and adjustment points in 
the legislation, but the authorities disagreed (TPTE02, TPTE03).86 Other 
suggestions were included during the parliamentary debate prior to discussion 
in the mixed committee. A minor change regarding the substitution of ‘profit 
margins’ for ‘operating profit margins’ in the methods sub-section was accepted 
by the executive (TPTE02). The concept of ‘inapplicability of the rule’ was also 
removed from the bill (TPTE02). Finally, a more favourable treatment of 
taxpayers regarding exemption from fines was accepted and included in the last 
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 For instance, the suggestion to amend the ‘resale of services’ wording (TPTE02) was not 
heeded. Other aspects were simply not analysed by anyone in this group. One was the 
enforcement date, arguing that they focused on technicalities of the rule, largely as a result of 
the ‘late’ invitation (TPTE02). 
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 On this point, the IRS said that this information would appear later in administrative guidance 
(TPTE03). The implementation stage shows that it was included in the circular. 
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stage of the mixed committee debate. This treatment favoured taxpayers who, 
although acting in ‘good faith’ and ‘proactive’ in providing information for an 
audit, were non-compliant with the arm’s length principle (TPTE03). 
The benefits of consulting with these ‘main critics’ of the former transfer pricing 
rule (TPTE03) were acknowledged by policy makers. For example, PM12 
revealed that this consultation led to a softening of the IRS approach in terms of 
information requirements, making the rule more practicable as a consequence. 
It was also commented that having these knowledgeable individuals involved in 
transfer pricing law making was positive. PM15 said that, as this rule was 
‘agreed with people that are supposed to understand much more than [other] 
people…, the outcome is more comparable to the standard of transfer pricing 
rules in developed countries’ (PM15). 
Despite these perceived benefits, the participation of professionals in tax policy 
making did not guarantee that their suggestions would be fully incorporated, as 
noted above. TPTE05 opined that the impact of consultation on the bill was very 
low if the first and second bill submitted to the Congress were compared. 
According to Burton (2006), a consultative model should include feedback to the 
participants as a way of assuring them that their views have been taken into 
account. Despite this novel consultation procedure, the participants were not 
entirely aware of the extent to which their views had been included in the bill 
because they were not informed directly. 
In addition to this ritual interaction with professional firms, the IRS and/or the 
ministry of finance also participated in several seminars to exchange ideas on 
aspects to be included in the rule (TA02). 
7.2.4 Consultation with foreign tax administrations and supranational 
institutions 
The conceptual framework shows the existence of an international bureaucratic 
field. In this case there is evidence that foreign tax administrations (PM13-01) 
and the OECD were consulted on the transfer pricing rule in informal ways 
(PM11). This consultation occurred more naturally through daily interactions, as 
TPTA04 notes: 
The IRS works with people from the OECD where the recurrent 
themes are transfer pricing, restructuring, aggressive tax planning, 
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etc. Then, you interact, there is no need to consult formally, and 
based on this, you adapt [this international practice] to domestic 
reality. You also interact with other tax administrations. The IRS has 
technical cooperation agreements … much information was gathered 
based on this relationship. 
These social connections allowed IRS members to access international tax 
knowledge and experience to bring into the drafting process. International tax 
practices were included in the legislation whenever the authorities deemed 
them to be appropriate (PM11). In general terms, decisions on what to include 
were made by senior IRS authorities that managed the consultation (TA02). 
7.2.5 Consultation with academics 
There is also evidence of consultation with the academic field. Academics from 
Chilean and European institutions had a say on the content of the transfer 
pricing rule (PM11, PM13, TPTE03). For example, a Chilean lecturer suggested 
applying transfer pricing to domestic transactions as well (PM11). In this way, 
the draft submitted to parliament in the first place included domestic valuation 
(PM11). However, that suggestion was later removed from the bill in order first 
to achieve a good implementation of the rule in international transactions, and 
then to move towards further domestic improvements (TPTE02). An academic 
working for a European university also participated in shaping the content of the 
rule, as will be shown later. 
In contrast to direct consultation with academics, eight academics raised their 
voices through a document called ‘Manifesto for tax reform’, the purpose of 
which was to contribute to the legal debate oriented to the improvement of the 
Chilean tax system.87 In their analysis, the importance given to international 
matters was reduced. The document simply called for ‘Review, order and 
simplification of domestic rules on tax credits paid abroad, transfer pricing and 
thin capitalisation and of the norms for audit in that area’, without addressing 
technical aspects of the rule. 
7.2.6 Consultation with taxpayers 
There is contradictory evidence on the inclusion of multinational companies in 
the debate. Whilst some stated that around ‘five or six’ MNCs were consulted, 
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 Available at http://www.ichdt.cl/userfiles/MANIFIESTO.pdf [accessed October 2012]. 
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being trusted by the IRS (PM13, TPTA02), other interviewees reported that 
companies were not part of the process, leading to dissatisfaction at their 
exclusion from the process (PM11, TPTE02).88. 
The specific effects of the knowledge and information gathered from internal 
and external consultation by the IRS and tax policy coordinator on the final 
legislation are illustrated in the next section. 
7.2.7 Technical specificities of the rule 
The new rule is contained in Article 41 E of the Income Tax Code, repealing the 
former Article 38. In the next sub-sections the technicalities of the rule and the 
reasons for their inclusion are presented. 
Burden of proof 
The decision on the burden of proof allocation was made by the IRS (TPTE02), 
with no intervention by the ministry of finance, as the rule was ‘mature’ when the 
latter took over the tax reform after 2010 (PM13-1). Interviewees recognised 
that, although the decision was difficult to make, the burden of proof remained 
with the IRS (PM11, TPTA04). 
Some private-sector professionals challenged this fact, arguing that the burden 
of proof was now on the taxpayers. A black letter law review suggests that the 
new article read ‘exactly the same as was contained in Article 38’ on the burden 
of proof, as was supported by one interviewee (TPTA02). These contradictory 
views may be explained by the new information requirements set out in the rule. 
As Chapter Six has shown in detail, the IRS faced several problems due to a 
lack of information; in response to these limitations, the new rule required 
taxpayers to submit an affidavit once a year. 
Documentation: Affidavit and transfer pricing studies 
The rule established mandatory submission of a yearly affidavit. In contrast to 
Article 38’s documentation requirement simply to keep records of transactions, 
the new rule’s affidavit required information on ‘the methods applied for the 
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resulting in its rejection in parliament. 
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determination of prices and values of those transactions’ (Article 41 E No. 6). 
This was perceived to be an ‘important change’ as taxpayers would have to 
prove the methods they had used (TPTA04). Accordingly, taxpayers’ 
transactions would be visible to the tax authority, losing the non-disclosure 
power held under the previous rule. Information asymmetries between the 
taxpayer and the IRS would then be attenuated. 
A fine for failure to submit and for wrong, incomplete and late affidavits was 
included in the bill, the amount of which would be as burdensome and ‘similar’ 
to other sanctions established in the tax code (TA02). In this way, the new rule 
would be better integrated with existing regulation (Thuronyi, 1996). The IRS 
decided to be flexible in the submission of the affidavit, granting a single 
extension of up to three months. This was conceived as a ‘trial run’ period, but 
was also based on acknowledgment that the preparation of the affidavit would 
be difficult and costly. TA02 commented on this: 
...but also the fact that the team had the conviction that preparing this 
information is quite complex, then companies, reasonably, especially 
in certain periods, find it quite difficult to arrange this information. 
When you've been involved in the issue of the audit and tax 
consultancy, you realise that teams within companies that work on 
these issues are smaller … sometimes these things are concentrated 
in the people from accounting [departments] who are not necessarily 
tax experts. There is a real problem … people from accounting have 
no idea of how prices are set by the commercial area …. they have 
to assume responsibilities about the information [and the team] knew 
that it was a major challenge and some flexibility was necessary. 
In contrast to the affidavit, the new rule made transfer pricing studies to support 
the methods of valuation optional (Article 41 E No 3; TPTA04). Instead, the rule 
only mandated the retention of records on the way the methods had been 
applied and reported in the affidavit or transfer pricing study. This meant that 
taxpayers would have to have ‘a policy, a handbook or transfer pricing report. 
Otherwise they will have no support for the affidavit’ (TPTA04). 
At first, it was thought that transfer pricing studies should be mandatory for the 
taxpayer (PM11); however, IRS internal debate led to a decision that only the 
affidavit should be so (TPTA05) in order to keep compliance costs as low as 
possible. The team also researched the costs of transfer pricing studies in order 
to establish a safe harbour for small and medium-sized companies. To avoid 
additional distinctions between taxpayers, it was thought that transfer pricing 
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studies should be voluntary for companies to avoid extra compliance costs 
(TA02). The compliance cost reason was interpreted differently by tax advisors. 
TPTE02 said that the IRS did not want advisors to earn money with the new 
rule. 
Senior staff checked the rule’s wording, raising doubts about its certainty. This 
related to ‘certainty’ for taxpayers about how to give credit to the information 
contained in these non-mandatory documents (PM15). Consequently, the 
drafting shifted from being ‘very simple and not very legal’, with words that 
looked as if they had been ‘let drop’ by non-lawyers, to a ‘legal and 
administratively procedural’ organised rule (PM15). This shows how the 
assessment of legislation, discussed in Chapter Five, operated for the transfer 
pricing rule, improving its standard and practicability. 
Relationships 
The OECD had commented that the relationships in the former rule were too 
broad (PM11). Although there was not total agreement as to whether these 
former relationships should have disappeared in the new draft, the attempt was 
to move towards a full OECD standard which would contain the presumptions of 
the former article (TA02). 
The rule included an innovative clause regarding ‘consanguinity’, based on 
marriage or kinship for consanguinity or relationship up to the fourth degree. 
This was a later development taken from the Spanish transfer pricing 
legislation, which was considered interesting during ‘conversations amongst 
OECD delegates’ (PM11). This shows how connections (social capital) with 
OECD delegates allowed the flow of tax knowledge to the drafting team, 
improving the standard of the rule (Christians, 2010a). With this relationship, the 
team ‘made the rule more complete ... for not massive or large cases … within 
family businesses’ (TA02). 
Regarding other relationships, there is evidence that internal consultation was 
conducted with the operational team at the Large Taxpayers Directorate. Audit 
experience showed that taxpayers were abusing the rule by using methods not 
contained in the OECD Guidelines or in any other legislation, and experience 
was brought into the drafting process (PM11). The audit team suggested a new 
relationship called ‘mirror’, in which a first party had transactions with a third 
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party carrying out ‘similar or identical operations’ to a party-related to the first 
party. 
Methods 
The former rule was known for its uncertainty over methods. The new rule 
attempted to solve that flaw by following the OECD Guidelines. Between 2010 
and 2011, the ministry of finance, through the tax policy coordinator, requested 
that the methods should be listed, defined and mathematically explained where 
appropriate. 
Coordination was not the only way in which the methods section developed. 
Individual agency was also predominant. The residual method was included 
owing to its prominence in the OECD Guidelines, but also as a result of 
knowledge gained through interaction with other OECD delegates. In OECD 
meetings, residual methods were recognised as important in the application of 
the rule (PM11). Similarly, it appears that social connections allowed the 
improvement of the new rule using internationally legitimised practices. 
Another area of discussion was about the hierarchical application of methods. 
Although it was initially decided to apply hierarchy, further analysis suggested 
that, since Chile was adopting the OECD standard, hierarchy should be 
dismissed (PM11). 
Regarding comparability, this analysis was not explicit in the rule as a result of 
its dynamic evolution in recent years. Given this constant change, its inclusion 
would have jeopardised the rule’s lifespan through ‘obsolescence’ (TA02). At 
the same time, the OECD Guidelines on comparability analysis were now more 
detailed, and inclusion in these terms would have increased the rule’s length 
and thus its complexity (TA02). For these reasons, a decision was made to 
regulate it in the near future through administrative guidance, because having 
no regulation at all would leave comparability in ‘limbo’ (TPTE02). The main 
benefit of ruling through administrative guidance was that changes could easily 
be incorporated, giving more flexibility in the application of the rule (TPTA05). 
The rule established the use of theoretically comparable prices, which were not 
defined in the rule. During the drafting process the team was aware of the 
possibility of finding no comparable prices for certain transactions, such as 
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intangibles and services, and based on comparative legislation, such as the 
German income tax law (PM11), the theoretically comparable concept was 
coined. The aim was that this comparable should be rebuilt ‘[f]rom the 
independent enterprises’ rational point of view of what they would have done in 
this situation’ (TA02). Its complexity was recognised, but through its inclusion 
the drafting team avoided the rule becoming inapplicable in the absence of a 
comparable price (TA02). 
In order to challenge prices, the IRS would have an obligation to arrange a 
meeting with the taxpayer to prove whether the transactions had followed the 
arm’s length principle. This request would be made internally by the operational 
audit unit within the Large Taxpayers Directorate. This would improve the audit 
process efficiency as the TPTA05 reflected: 
[The Large Taxpayers Unit] said that if they start to explain to the 
taxpayer who still does not understand what this is about, in the end 
[the taxpayer] will not understand what it means to say; however, if it 
is formally served a subpoena because [the IRS] is compelled to tell 
the taxpayer that differences were detected …  it is easier. Luckily 
the Large Taxpayers Unit was heard. 
This shows that internal consultation was effective in introducing changes that 
increased the practicability of the rule. Once the IRS had cited and challenged 
the prices set in transactions with related parties, the taxpayer would have to 
prove it had followed a traditional transaction method, transactional profit 
method or the residual method. 
Transfer pricing adjustments and taxation 
If the taxpayer was unsuccessful in proving it had followed the arm’s length 
principle, the IRS would determine the prices ‘with good reason’, using 
information provided by the taxpayer and third parties following the OECD 
methods. 
Interquartile ranges and adjustment points were unregulated issues and 
sources of uncertainty in the former rule. The drafting team considered solving 
this uncertainty by making these concepts explicit in the new rule; however, the 
OECD Guidelines, in which these concepts were not explicit, prevailed. 
Although this practice may be interpreted as a sign of ‘symbolic violence’ by 
retaining information (Gracia & Oats, 2012), the policy of full adoption of the 
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OECD standards took priority over any alternative decision. Interviewees 
constantly referred to the OECD Guidelines that allowed the possibility of 
constructing arm’s length ranges in order to improve the ‘quality of the 
comparability analysis’ (PM11), adjustments to which could be calculated using 
various statistical techniques. To follow the OECD Guidelines, the team kept 
that ‘broadness’ in the Chilean legislation (PM11), because interquartile ranges 
might not be ‘the best measure’ (TPTA02). In such a situation, it would be better 
not to regulate because ‘supposing all the possible cases, there is always one 
case that would be left out. It is impossible to suppose all cases’ (TPTA02). 
Consequently, inclusion of the interquartile ranges in the law was seen as a 
‘disadvantage’ because evidence suggested that countries that had followed 
that path had ended up with their ‘arms tied’ in solving certain cases (TPTA04). 
On this issue TPTA04 said: 
Transfer pricing is not the use of ranges; the use of ranges is one 
more technical instrument in transfer pricing. So, what was said is 
that the use of ranges is a technique that is based on a science that 
is commonly used and generally accepted, and from that point of 
view, the courts have always embraced the use of these techniques 
even when they are not stated in the law… 
Although adjustment to the median point was part of the transfer pricing field 
doxa (TPTA04), during drafting it was felt that it did not necessarily ‘respect the 
arm’s length’ principle because in certain cases the real price could be higher or 
lower than the median (TA02). Consequently, the median point was not 
included, and the IRS was asked to ‘make an extra effort’ in setting the prices to 
strictly respect the arm’s length principle (TA02), giving flexibility to taxpayers 
and the administration (PM11). 
If, as a result of an audit, price differences were detected, these would be taxed 
at 35 per cent plus a five per cent fine (Article 41 E No. 4). The 35 per cent tax 
rate was set to maintain harmony with other control rules contained in the 
income tax code (TA02). The five per cent fine was conceived as a way of 
increasing the cost of transfer pricing strategies (because the 35 per cent tax 
rate was equivalent to the withholding tax for dividends paid to entities situated 
abroad), without constituting an expropriation (TA02).89 As noted, these rate 
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result of a policy adopted abroad and this factor also influenced the five per cent rate (TA02). 
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decisions were consistent with the existing legal and constitutional framework 
within which the tax policy-making process developed, as the conceptual 
framework in Chapter Three showed. 
Advance Pricing Agreements 
The rule established a clause on APAs with foreign tax authorities. In these 
multilateral negotiations, the drafting team and the IRS thought that a larger 
number of databases and staff would be necessary in the national direction to 
implement the rule (TA02; Gould & Baker, 2002).90 
The new rule went beyond the basic framework given by the OECD Guidelines 
and included a significant innovation which encouraged taxpayers to disclose 
their ‘criteria, economic, financial, commercial reasons, among others, and 
methods’ (Article 41 E No. 6) in exchange for symbolic recognition from the 
state. This may illustrate the power that the state had to nominate. Bourdieu 
talks about the ‘mysterious power of … nomination’ to refer to the ‘capacity of 
state officials to exercise power through bestowing honours or titles, such as the 
titles of nobility in the Old regime’ (Swartz, 2013, p.138). This recognition was to 
be part of a list of ‘socially responsible taxpayers’. The rewards for accepting 
this disclosure and subsequent jurisprudence, described as a ‘social good, 
worth being rewarded or recognised’, were that companies would ‘be known by 
others who use that [information]’ and would receive a certificate from the tax 
collector (TA02). However, it was believed that very few taxpayers would be 
willing to disclose their strategic information (PM12), as such disclosure might 
make them vulnerable (see Section 7.4). In addition to this form of symbolic 
capital (potentially a source of symbolic violence), taxpayers would receive an 
‘economic’ exemption of any interest or fine relating to price differences 
detected by the authority during the period in which the agreement was in 
force.91 
This idea emerged from a social connection between the drafting team and a 
visionary academic from a European university (TPTE03). This very 
experienced academic (with a law degree and two LLM degrees and also a 
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 Unless there was a tax infraction punishable with a corporate penalty, in which case the 
taxpayer would be removed from the list. 
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teacher and active researcher) met some members of the IRS drafting team at 
a conference, where the idea was discussed, and was ultimately brought into 
the process by the lead drafter.92 This academic entered the tax policy-making 
field through his connections (social capital) with the bureaucrats, as the 
conceptual framework shows. This knowledge was exchanged for other forms 
of recognition, e.g. symbolic capital, which was not fully evident at this stage. 
However, this academic was described in the field as a good friend. This idea 
would meet two purposes. First, it would create jurisprudence in the matter 
(TA02), and second, it would feed a database helpful for other IRS processes 
(PM12). Interviewees commented that this innovation put the Chilean transfer 
pricing rule a step ahead of many other jurisdictions. 
Another APA change later included related to coordination between the IRS and 
Customs.93 A new paragraph showing an ‘embryonic state’ of integration 
between the IRS and Customs regarding transfer pricing was included in the 
bill. Whilst much more emphasis had been placed on the effects of transfer 
pricing on direct taxation, its impact on indirect taxation such as VAT had been 
neglected in the Chilean context. The IRS had attempted to follow the OECD 
guidelines, whereas Customs had resorted to the World Trade Organization’s 
rules on valuation. Time was a constraint in moving forward in the integration of 
the two institutions regarding transfer pricing. However, one of the first ‘bridges’ 
of connection94 between these institutions was on goods imports in the APA 
procedure, in which both would have to sign the agreement to reduce 
disagreements in terms of ‘methodologies, prices and profits’ (TA02). 
A final change in the APA procedure related to the ‘administrative silence’ 
concept. This clause established that, if the IRS did not inform the taxpayer 
about the outcome of an application within six months, this silence must be 
interpreted as a rejection. The rationale behind this clause was to protect the 
state financially (TA02). Considering the small number of staff and the ‘amateur’ 
profile of the IRS at that time (PM12), it was thought that this clause would 
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 During the interviews, it was commented that this idea did not result from a profound 
sociological study. 
93
 According to the interviewees, this additional amendment was apparently unrelated to the 
comments raised in Congress (see Section 7.3) on the inclusion of Customs in transfer pricing 
audits. 
94
 Further steps would include equal staff training for both institutions, and amendment of the 
rules to make them at least compatible and allow unobstructed information exchange (TA02). 
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prevent the state from signing a ‘not good agreement’ (PM12). PM15 
interpreted this as weighing the costs and benefits, where the core question 
was who would bear the burden of the problem. The response was that the 
taxpayer would. This may be interpreted as a sign of symbolic violence. 
Corresponding adjustments 
The IRS would recognise adjustments made in other states with which Chile 
had double taxation agreements in force. The underlying reason was that, if the 
Chilean rule was of the same standard as foreign legislation and the IRS agreed 
with the adjustment, double international taxation would be avoided, making the 
‘transfer pricing system healthy’ (TA02). The rule also stated that, if an amount 
of tax favouring the taxpayer was determined, it would be reimbursed. Although 
the global trend was to protect domestic revenue, the drafters pursued 
protection of the arm’s length principle (TA02). 
Other issues not included in the final drafting 
There were also other aspects originally considered but not included in the 
draft. One was cost sharing agreements, which were not included because ‘it 
was too specific’ and because they affected other rules in the income tax code 
(PM11) which were ‘very strict and very anti avoidance’ and ‘very protective of 
fiscal revenues’ (TA02). In this respect, the drafting team was flexible and 
considered that this issue might be included in the future, and that so far the 
new rule was very innovative (TA02). 
Similar analysis surrounded intra-group services and the treatment of 
intangibles. In these cases, the drafting team agreed that the arm’s length 
principle encompassed these situations, and also that this matter was changing 
and there was no consensus on comparative legislation in the OECD. These 
ideas led to exclusion of these subjects from the draft (TA02). 
The inclusion of safe harbours was also analysed, as this would benefit both the 
tax administration and companies; however, the drafting team preferred to 
respect the arm’s length principle, stating that everyone should comply with the 
rule in terms of the amount of transactions (TA02, PM11). 
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7.2.8 Budgeting 
Budgeting was the last phase of the design stage. Organisationally, DIPRES 
comprised three individuals to construct the economic estimates: the director of 
the institution and two professionals. This institution largely lacked tax experts 
and access to information protected by secrecy clauses. For this reason, 
DIPRES worked in close coordination with the ministry of finance. In estimates 
aspects of the tax reform, three professionals within the ministry of finance 
prepared/checked figures. In preparing transfer pricing estimates, DIPRES 
worked with the IRS’ department of studies. On transfer pricing, the IRS was 
recognised as an important holder of tax knowledge/expertise (PM09). In this 
scenario, DIPRES had to trust that the IRS’ personnel would perform their work 
well and that they knew the precise cost of each rule (PM14). During the 
interviews, no political aspects were commented on regarding this budgeting 
stage. 
Using macroeconomic information collected by a Big Four firm (KPMG) on how 
much other Latin American countries – Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela 
(History of Law, No.20.630, p.88) – had collected based on audits and/or stricter 
documentation requirements, the IRS extrapolated the findings to Chile using 
GDP percentages. The estimation procedure was as follows. The experiences 
of both Argentina and Venezuela were taken into account and, through the ‘rule 
of three’, the IRS reached an estimate for the first years of implementation 
(PM14). In other words, an average of foreign collection was made for Chile; 
and, for subsequent years, when there would be more experience in the 
domestic context with the rule in application and with the technical teams 
conducting audits (PM09), the Mexican situation was also weighted and 
included. This meant that, for the forthcoming years, the estimate included the 
average of these three countries. The point in time at which ‘maturity’ (History of 
Law, No.20.630, p.88) would be reached in the application of the rule was 
determined based on the IRS’ expert judgment about staff and audit efficiency 
(PM14). These estimates were included in a note or draft subsequently 
submitted to DIPRES for construction of the official financial report, for which 
the latter was ultimately responsible. 
In the preparation of the financial report, there was communication and 
coordination between DIPRES, the ministry of finance and the IRS. The main 
224 
aspect under discussion, and over which DIPRES had more competence, was 
on the suitability of the countries selected and their related estimates. Based on 
their ‘macroeconomic’ cultural capital, DIPRES argued that it would have 
chosen other countries for comparative purposes, such as Colombia or Peru, or 
more developed nations such as Australia, Canada or New Zealand as 
exporters of raw materials (PM14). However, the nature of transfer pricing as a 
tax concern prevailed over economic considerations, as the following quote 
reveals:  
One thinks of those countries when speaking in macro[economic] 
terms, but here what matters is the tax aspect, and that it is 
something to which one’s not used to. As I say, it is striking 
comparing [Chile] with Argentina and Venezuela, and that is the bias 
one could have, but it is a bias that did not bother [DIPRES] majorly 
(PM14). 
Recognising the limited information available, DIPRES ended up accepting and 
validating what had been done by the IRS, suggesting only minimal changes to 
the final report (PM14). Both the IRS and DIPRES adopted a conservative 
stance in the construction of the estimates because it was recognised that 
estimations on transfer pricing were difficult to make (PM11) and might be less 
‘robust’ (PM09) than other measures included in this tax reform, as revealed by 
PM09 and TPTA02. Accordingly, the institutions tried not to ‘inflate’ the tax 
reform revenue estimates (PM14). This conservatism was recognised by an 
experienced lawyer in the professional services field, who argued that transfer 
pricing revenue collection would be higher than all other measures included in 
the tax reform if these ‘new modern and very good rules are well applied’ 
(PL01). 
The official financial report included in the History of Law (No.20.630, pp. 83-92) 
is made up of two sections. The first section briefly presents the transfer pricing 
rule and the second presents the estimates of the bill. The estimates are shown 
in Table 7.1 
Table 7.1: Transfer pricing estimates 
Year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Million US$ 5 40 68 95 100 105 
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As noted, this social space was where the policy was created, the law drafted 
and economic figures budgeted. From interaction with other fields through 
consultation and daily contact, other agents also had a voice in the drafting of 
the rule. The second stage that occurred in parliament is discussed below. 
7.3 Legislative stage 
The documents reveal that the debate held in the committee of finance of the 
Chamber of Deputies was limited and superficial. The reports evidence 
discussion in four out of twelve sessions over the whole period of parliamentary 
debate. This limited debate was initially reflected in the first session: after the 
presentation of the transfer pricing rule by the ministry of finance and budget 
office, an opposition deputy member of the socialist party, A, asked whether the 
other mechanisms related to indebtedness and investment were part of the rule 
(Session No.175, p.12). 
There is evidence of dialogue between the executive and parliamentarians in 
the fourth session. Three different types of intervention may be distinguished 
from the documents examined: technical, implementation-based and policy 
framework-related. The technical concern was presented by Deputy A, who had 
an economics degree, had been in the Chamber of Deputies since the return to 
democracy in 1990 and had been a member of the committee of finance while 
the former transfer pricing rule was being debated. Deputy A referred to the 
transfer pricing rule as one of the most important aspects of the bill raising legal 
and economic concerns (Session No.179, p.3), arguing that, based on his 
knowledge, the IRS faced problems in getting to know the ‘real situation of 
companies’, and proposing that the ‘burden of proof’ should be on taxpayers 
(Session No.179, p.5). The IRS director responded that the new rule mandated 
the submission of an affidavit regarding transactions with related parties, and 
thereafter the IRS would conduct audits. 
The implementation concern was raised by government Deputy B, who held a 
business administration degree. Deputy B asked about the IRS’ organisational 
capacity to apply the rule, to which the IRS director responded that there would 
be coordination between existing departments within the IRS (in which there 
were experienced people that had participated for years in the OECD’s Working 
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Group 6), and that recruitment of experienced new staff had been difficult 
(Session No.179, p.5). 
The policy/framework concern was raised by another government deputy, C, 
who held a law degree and a master’s degree in tax management. Deputy C 
asked whether the new rule really matched the OECD standard, and the tax 
policy coordinator confirmed that this rule followed the international standard 
(Session No.179, p.6). 
From the extent and depth of the technical/legal discussion, it is possible to infer 
that tax knowledge on transfer pricing within the committee of finance was 
limited, as confirmed by PM02. However, there were asymmetries between 
committee members. For example, Deputy A displayed a higher amount of tax 
knowledge which became legitimate and was turned into symbolic capital 
(Bourdieu, 1977, 1990). This symbolic capital positioned Deputy A as a more 
powerful actor whose form of control was ‘accepted without question’ (Kraal, 
2013, p.92), as noted from the response given by the tax authority. Deputy A 
expected the IRS’ position to improve in the field, producing higher revenue 
collection. Additionally, it may be interpreted that Deputy A’s intervention sought 
to alter the field doxa (Bourdieu, 1977, 1990), which was characterised, on the 
one hand, by high administrative costs derived from the IRS’ burden of proof 
and inefficient audits, and, on the other hand, by the privileged position of 
companies in the field, leading to symbolic violence against the IRS (Bourdieu, 
1990). In contrast, the two other interventions were more general, concerning 
the need for extra resources and the match between the OECD guidelines and 
the Chilean rule. From these two interventions, it may be noted that 
‘institutionalised cultural capital’ in the form of a master’s degree (Everett, 2002) 
did not alter the habitus of its holder nor the depth of debate of this member. 
This highlights the specific nature and complexity of transfer pricing legislation. 
Tax knowledge asymmetry suggests that experience from previous positions in 
the congress and/or in practice was more effective than institutionalised cultural 
capital in increasing the levels of symbolic capital, as noted by PM01 and 
PM07, as well as in discussion of the tax bills. 
Two views may explain why the debate in the committee of finance was limited. 
The first related to the generally limited amount of tax knowledge. In PM07’s 
opinion, this low tax knowledge had its roots in the development of the tax 
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profession in the country. Being a tax expert was described as a ‘very odd’ 
(PM07) profession, in which only limited training was provided by academic 
institutions. This limited theoretical knowledge had led to knowledge 
concentration in the accounting/legal firms and the IRS. In contrast, very few 
people in the executive branch and in parliament had knowledge of tax issues. 
In PM07’s view, this limited knowledge was even more notorious in all 
regulation pertaining to transfer pricing, which led to a ‘very conceptual and very 
generic’ debate. An alternative explanation was provided by PM10, who justified 
this limited debate in terms of consensus about the need for a regulation based 
on the OECD guidelines. This second perspective may be interpreted as a sign 
of legitimacy of the rule, where further domestic analysis was deemed 
unnecessary. Nonetheless, the risk of this approach would place 
parliamentarians in the terrain of unaccountability for failing to regulate as their 
mandate required. 
Regarding economic estimates, the committee of finance and parliament in 
general had fewer possibilities to counterbalance the executive’s capitals. With 
additional time constraints in the tenth session, transfer pricing was presented 
again after its reinstatement. There is evidence that only Deputy A asked about 
the certainty of these tax estimates (Session No.202, p.10). The tax policy 
coordinator mentioned that these extra revenue figures would be collected in an 
advanced implementation of the rule. Regarding this type of information, the 
parliament had no capacity to make estimations and had to ‘trust’ the 
government (PM01). 
7.3.1 Invitations/hearings 
The committee of finance of the Chamber of Deputies engaged with other fields 
through consultation, as illustrated by the conceptual framework in Chapter 
Three. Those consulted or heard may be classified as ‘other government 
experts’ in the ‘private sector’ categories suggested by Gordon and Thuronyi 
(1996, pp.6-7).95 
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 Notably absent from the discussion on transfer pricing was another interest group, the 
Chilean Chartered Institute of Accountants (Colegio de Contadores de Chile A.G.). During the 
debate, its representatives did not refer to transfer pricing, arguing that its focus was on 
medium-sized and small companies that did not have this type of transaction, and that the few 
large companies could ‘defend themselves’ without any help (CA01). 
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The forms and amounts of tax knowledge brought into the discussion were 
varied, as the documents show, including economic, legal and 
political/procedural knowledge. Economic discussion surrounded the 
inadequacy of the underlying assumptions of the transfer pricing estimates 
(pp.11, 13-14) and the marginal contribution to revenue collection (pp.13, 18).96 
Legal discussion was present in a presentation made by a tax partner from a 
Big Four firm, who highlighted the modernising role of the transfer pricing rule in 
that it provided greater precision in its application (p.9).97 Finally, 
political/procedural discussion was about the need to strengthen the tax 
administration and Customs to conduct transfer pricing audits (p.6); the need for 
greater IRS political powers to conduct transfer pricing audits, for instance, in 
mining companies (p.15); and the lesser powers conferred on Customs vis-à-vis 
those conferred on the IRS in transfer pricing audits (pp.12-3).98 There was no 
evidence on the usefulness of this participatory process in educating the 
committee of finance members on transfer pricing specificities. 
The second stage in the Chamber of Deputies operated under the highest level 
of structural violence – ‘immediate discussion’ – exercised by the executive 
branch. Such discussion was very much about the size of the state required to 
fund it, rather than on the technicalities of tax rules (History of the Law, 
No.20.630, pp.162-234). On the one hand, the opposition deputies (centre-left 
and left politicians) argued that the government should have looked for greater 
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 As previously explained, Mexico was used to make the estimations and its adequacy was 
questioned. Mr Micco, an economist and academic at the University of Chile, attended the 
seventh session No.183 held on 5 June 2012. Mr Coeymans, an academic at the Pontifical 
Catholic University of Chile, attended the eighth session No.184 held on 6 June 2012. Mr 
Frigolet, a member of the economic committee of the Socialist political party, attended the 
seventh session No.183 held on 5 June 2012. Mr Leiva, a representative of the University of 
Chile’s student union, attended the seventh session No.183 held on 5 June 2012. 
97
 Mr Greiber, a tax partner at E&Y, attended the ninth session No.186 held on 13 June 2012. 
Although not referring in particular to the transfer pricing rule, he stated that some enforcement 
dates were unclear. As shown in the technical aspects of the rule, this was an issue at the first 
stage of its implementation. 
98
 Mr. Frigolet, a member of the economic committee of the Socialist political party, attended the 
seventh session No.183 held on 5 June 2012. Mr Insunza, president of the Internal Revenue 
Officials National Association (ANEIICH), attended the seventh session No.183 held on 5 June 
2012. Mr Thibaut, president of the Customs Officials National Association, attended the seventh 
session No.183 held on 5 June 2012. Mining companies might be avoiding taxes through 
transfer pricing schemes. In this respect, two policymakers referred to the avoidant mining 
companies’ behaviour in relation to transfer pricing. Similarly, a tax expert in the organisational 
field referred to transfer pricing schemes detected in due diligence on mining companies during 
his career. Transfer pricing practices in this particular industry were not studied in this research 
project. 
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consensus in implementing a tax reform (p.164); that the revenue collected was 
insufficient (p.169); that the opposition political parties had proposed a tax 
reform but the government had not listened to them (p.170); that they had not 
been able to vote against the proposal in the first stage, otherwise Chile would 
not have been able to collect revenue from the tax increases contained in the 
bill to finance the educational reform (p.183); that voting against the proposal 
equated to a vote against educational reform (p.187); that they would approve 
the tax increases but reject the tax reductions (p.200); and that the tax reform 
was customised to the wishes of a government political party (p.210). On the 
other hand, deputies supporting the bill argued that the bill needed to be 
approved because it would benefit many students from dispossessed 
backgrounds (p.167); that the executive had accepted the opposition’s ideas on 
introducing amendments to the current bill (pp.173-186); that it was not fair to 
say that the proposal did not include anti-avoidance measures, because the 
transfer pricing rule was included (p.178); that rejecting the bill entailed denying 
access to education by the poor (p.194); that rejecting the bill was ‘saying NO to 
Chile’ (p.206); and that the bill contained measures to perfect tax rules such as 
transfer pricing (p.229). 
Consistent with the findings discussed in Chapter Five, this shows that in some 
cases political debate eclipsed technical analysis. Only two short statements 
were made by supporters of the government. In essence, there was no real 
debate on the transfer pricing rule in the Chamber of Deputies. 
7.3.2 Consultation 
In addition to the invitations and hearings, professional advice, or professional 
capital (Gracia & Oats, 2012, p.313), was present throughout the debate in the 
committee of finance and during the debate in the whole Chamber as a result of 
consultation. Nonetheless, these advisors were unsuccessful in inculcating 
parliamentarians with the transfer pricing field doxa (Gracia & Oats, 2012; Xu & 
Xu, 2008). In this respect, PM01 commented that: 
To me, what is said, is that what is now included in the law is OECD 
standard. That was what was said, that this is the international 
standard, and is therefore an objective system from which the 
Internal Revenue Service will be able to act. This is what I liked the 
most about the bill because I had studied this from different 
[aspects]. Then I heard the opinion of some lawyers who told me that 
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this has an adverse effect on the procedure itself. I am unable to tell 
you if it is right or not. I have doubts, not about whether you have to 
regulate [transfer pricing] but on the procedure itself. I am unable to 
tell you whether [it is good or not] on the procedural issue. I do not 
know, frankly I do not know. I was not left with a strong concept 
[knowledge]. It [the process] was mediocre. I was told by other 
people, who know about it, that what was approved is almost 
irrelevant and that avoidance will happen in other ways. 
This limited knowledge was not restricted to a few parliamentarians, but was 
widespread in the Chamber of Deputies as a whole and apparently even 
amongst their advisors. Referring not to transfer pricing in particular, but to 
other aspects regarding this tax reform, a tax administrator commented that: 
[Parliamentarians] pay advisors to get notes prepared on [tax] 
aspects; but, clearly, we could see that even advisors are not well 
prepared and do not understand all the issues because this is not the 
only work they do (TA04). 
However, effective advice might have improved and influenced 
parliamentarians’ habitus. This limited consultation and scrutiny by transfer 
pricing experts was criticised by a tax advisor (TPTE02), who held that it was 
surprising that ‘the politician who does not understand’ transfer pricing had not 
sought extra advice to learn the ‘truth’ in ‘dry’ aspects such as this. It was in this 
scenario of absence of tax knowledge (TPTA05) that parliament voted and 
approved the rule (PM13). Parliamentarians’ weak position in the policy-making 
field was determined by the political constitution, limited institutionalised 
(transfer pricing) cultural capital (Everett, 2002) and ineffective ‘professional 
capital’ (Gracia & Oats, 2012, p.313). Therefore, debate and voting was 
influenced by political perspectives present in the habitus. The debate focused 
on other aspects that only represented ‘one … two or three per cent’ of the 
whole project (TA02). 
Regarding the process as such, absence of discussion of particular rules may 
be perceived as a non-transparent form of passing legislation, through which 
society as a whole might interpret the rule as technically adequate. 
Only three sessions were held (on 13, 14 and 27 August 2012) at the third 
stage in the committee of finance of the Senate. After presentation of the 
transfer pricing rule, the senators did not ask any questions relating to the rule. 
Despite the attendance of advisors to three senators, consultation seemed to 
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focus on other aspects of the tax reform, such as the effectiveness of revenue 
collection, rather than on transfer pricing (History of the Law, No.20.630, p.368). 
7.3.3 Invitations/hearings 
Other parliamentarians attended these three sessions (History of the Law, 
No.20.630, p.301), as well as several officers from the ministry of finance and 
budget office, other members of cabinet, researchers from think tanks, analysts 
from the National Congress Library, representatives of student unions, advisors 
to three senators of the committee of finance, advisors to two senators who 
were non-members of the committee of finance, one advisor to the president of 
the committee of finance from the Chamber of Deputies, representatives of an 
NGO related to education, academics from the two most prestigious universities 
in the country, and the former head of the studies unit of the IRS, amongst 
others.99 This shows the convergence of multiple fields at the legislative stage, 
as illustrated in Chapter Three. 
The forms and amounts of tax knowledge brought into the debate included 
economics and law. The economic information provided was about the 
effectiveness of the measure to reduce tax evasion, which no senator 
questioned at all (History of Law, No.20.630, pp.378, 381).100 Information on the 
underlying assumptions used to construct the revenue estimates, including the 
adequacy of Mexico as a comparable country, was also presented by the 
former head of studies of the IRS, who stated that the transfer pricing estimated 
revenue was zero (ibid., pp.425-6). In response to this assertion, a senator 
member of the committee of finance, A, asked about the methodology deployed 
to estimate it as zero, to which the expert responded that the estimate was 
calculated from data obtained from the IRS. 
Legal information was presented by two lawyers who were practitioners and 
academics (professional services and academic fields). The first held that the 
transfer pricing rule was a well-conceived piece of legislation considering its 
technicalities (ibid., p.395).101 The second presented a chart classifying the 
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 For the complete list see History of Law, No. 20.630, pp.301-3. 
100
 Economic information was provided by Vittorio Corbo and Jose Pablo Arellano, both 
economists, who made a joint presentation representing two think tanks, Centro de Estudios 
Públicos (CEP) and Corporación de Estudios para Latinoamerica (CIEPLAN). 
101
 Mr Selamé was principal tax partner at PwC and lecturer in tax law at the University of Chile. 
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transfer pricing rule as an urgent matter for regulation, and therefore its 
inclusion was a strength of the tax reform (ibid., p.405). This second lawyer’s 
scrutiny was technical, addressing the fact that the terminology adopted in the 
rule was not contained in the OECD guidelines (ibid., p.406). To neither 
intervention did any senator ask about the impact of the rule and its 
technicalities, either by themselves or through their advisors. 
As the evidence shows, there were no references to the technicalities of the 
transfer pricing rule in the discussion of the committee of finance. The 
lawyers/academics were more aware of the impact of the transfer pricing rule 
than other groups that attended. 
The lack of interaction between the committee and those invited or consulted is 
in line with Hoffmann and Zülch’s (2014) claim that parliament has less 
expertise than interest groups. This was evident in the absence of transfer 
pricing tax knowledge (PM07). As noted by PM16, parliamentarians were not 
expert in tax matters, and therefore a ‘team of experts on different aspects’ was 
required which would allow them to regulate in a more equitable way with the 
executive. Accordingly, it was possible to suggest that the Senate would 
improve its position in the field by receiving transfer pricing advice that would 
influence the senators’ habitus. In relation to this tax reform, as evidenced by 
the list of invitees, senators made use of tax advisors to evaluate the reform and 
the transfer pricing rule (PM03). However, the advisors’ effectiveness in 
inculcating senators with the transfer pricing field doxa is questionable. An 
interviewee dubiously said: 
Now, I do think that it is better than the previous rule; however, if it is 
the optimal rule, I don’t know. To be frank, I think it is better than the 
previous one (PM03). 
In this scenario, with no technical debate, rejection of the bill was purely political 
(History of Law, No.20.630, p.478). 
Once in the senate, a senator from the committee of finance, B, remarked that, 
while the Chamber of Deputies had had the bill for three and a half months, they 
‘only have four sessions in the Senate. There has not been time even to review 
each article because the document has more than fifty pages’ (ibid., p.500). 
This helps to explain how structural violence in terms of time prevented 
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parliamentarians from discussing tax bills. Note that the structural violence was 
part of the legal framework that affected the tax policy making. 
Similar to the type of discussion held in the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate 
was characterised by a political tone unable to reach consensus, focusing on 
revenue collection, tax decreases for high income individuals, and on one 
measure relating to a tax credit for education, which was considered to be 
regressive in strengthening the private education system.102 Since some 
opposing senators agreed to approve the tax increases and reject the tax 
reductions, one opposition senator, C, proposed rejecting the bill to resolve 
disagreements in the mixed committee (ibid., p.514).103 A second opposition 
senator, D, said that senators had reached an agreement with the government 
to reject the bill in order to start the third legislative step in the mixed committee 
(ibid., p.517).104 Despite this agreement, Senator A argued that opposition and 
government never appeared to have differences and highlighted that senators 
had not agreed to send the bill to the mixed committee for discussion and 
should have voted ‘yes’ or ‘no’ (ibid., p.519). This practice may be interpreted as 
an attempt to make the senators’ decision ‘procedurally’ transparent (Geraats, 
2001) to others, even though the discussion ended up going to the mixed 
committee anyway. In Senator A’s words, approval or rejection of the bill would 
allow differentiation between opposition and coalition, and he proposed to try to 
reach agreement in the mixed committee (History of Law, No.20.630, p.520). 
Finally, the discussion concluded with a decision to reject the bill – an ‘idea of 
legislating’. This agreement was sustained by a promise to introduce further 
changes, such as the creation of a fund for education. 
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 For example, one opposing senator, Mrs Rincon from the committee of finance, stated that in 
that instance, the technical analysis concluded that some measures were useless (History of 
Law, No.20.630, p.526). She argued that the bill was ‘absolutely insufficient, almost useless’ 
because education experts estimated that funds of around 4,500 million dollars were necessary 
for the education reform (ibid., p.527), in contrast to the estimated collection of the tax reform 
(ibid., p.538). 
103
 The tax increases were understood as an ideological practice by one government senator 
(History of Law, No.20.630, p.534). The opposition had a majority of members in the Senate 
(ibid., p.802); therefore, their interests were able to be objectified in the law through the 
approval of increases and rejection of decreases. 
104
 Rejection of the bill was interpreted as a non-transparent government practice in the sense 
that the executive possibly did not want a tax increase (History of Law, No.20.630, p.553). 
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Although the executive branch and the Senate tried to impose their views on the 
reform, neither became more powerful than the other. Consensus was sought 
(Gracia & Oats, 2012, p.317) rather than imposed to get the bill approved. A 
mixed committee had to be created to resolve the disagreement between the 
Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. 
The mixed committee sessions were attended by its ten members, five from the 
committee of finance of the Senate and five deputies (History of Law, 
No.20.630, p.568), nine senators and nine other deputies, senior officers from 
the executive branch with their advisors, and advisors to the deputies and 
senators. In other words, the bureaucratic, political and professional services 
fields concurred. At this point the executive introduced a change to the transfer 
pricing rule, adding a suggestion made by tax advisors regarding the removal of 
penalties for taxpayers who, if taxed due to a difference resulting from an audit 
outcome, had behaved in ‘good faith’ and were ‘proactive’ in providing the 
information required during the audit (TPTE03). Again, debate at this third 
legislative step focused on revenue collection and on the aforementioned tax 
credit for education. However, the bill was approved. 
This hot policy debate prevented discussion of tax matters. This deficiency in 
the process was remarked upon, although supported, by one opposition 
senator, E, who argued that: 
It's very funny, because today we are discussing an initiative which in 
theory improves the tax legislation. But as these greater resources 
are intended for education, as it was raised from the beginning, 
basically we ended up talking more about this than about tax 
legislation. And it is legitimate that this is so (History of Law, 
No.20.630, p.810). 
In accordance with the point raised by the preceding senator, and as shown 
throughout the whole legislative process, transfer pricing was not technically 
discussed in Congress. This confirms Cowley’s (1995, p.94) finding that 
parliament ‘is not a policy-making body’. Rather than discussing every point of 
the bill, it was perceived that parliamentarians attended the sessions with ‘clear 
and pre-conceived ideas… they had a clear idea of stamp tax, tax on persons. 
They knew about some measure and it was that that they were going to 
discuss’ (PM14). According to Wales and Wales (2012), the discussion was 
partisan. In addition, it had been announced that parliamentarians were going to 
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approve the tax increases and reject the decreases; therefore, parliamentarians 
would approve any measure that involved a tax increase, such as transfer 
pricing. It is unclear what caused the failure to discuss or approve transfer 
pricing. It is reasonable to suggest that the absence of tax knowledge on 
transfer pricing, along with the pursuit of higher revenue collections, led 
parliamentarians to discuss other regulations on which they had greater 
expertise and which would place them in a more advantageous political position 
in the field. Similarly to Boll’s (2014) findings, parliamentarians took an oligoptic 
view of the proposal, emphasising revenue estimates and other measures 
which would have a clearer political impact than the technicalities hidden in 
other measures such as the transfer pricing rule. This is consistent with the idea 
that: 
actors in the political field struggle for the legitimate manipulation of a 
comprehensive view of the social world… politicians perform the 
function of making visible their perceptions, their visions of the 
divisions of the social world, and they work to transform them into 
categories applicable for all (Swartz, 2013, p.77). 
It may be suggested that opposition parliamentarians (centre-left wing) 
approved the reform containing the transfer pricing rule because to do 
otherwise would have made them lose forms of capital for further elections. This 
is in line with Bourdieu’s (1990) argument that positions in the (political) field are 
‘positions of possibility’ because they are not static but in constant flux. As 
noted by Hoffmann and Zülch (2014, p.13), ‘parliamentarians generally prefer to 
use … arguments pointing to consequences for (potential) voters, which is 
particularly apparent when parliamentarians express their support for proposals’ 
(see also Levi, 1988; Profeta, 2007). Thus, the transfer pricing rule became law. 
7.4 Implementation stage 
Similarly to the findings of previous chapters, the implementation stage was 
where the bureaucratic, corporate-business and professional services 
intersected. 
7.4.1 Implementation by IRS 
Three components were identified in the IRS’ implementation strategy during 
the fieldwork: official guidance, organisational structure and audit procedures. 
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Official guidance 
Three official documents were issued in order to interpret and administratively 
rule on transfer pricing practices.105 
Resolution – affidavit 
The main problem with Article 38 was the difficulty in choosing cases to audit 
(TPTA05) owing to the absence or low quality (TPTA02) of information on 
transactions between related parties in multinational enterprises. Such was the 
case that, before the enactment of the new rule, the IRS thought about 
standardising the information requested from taxpayers through an affidavit 
(TPTA03). There were expectations that the affidavit would contribute 
information to the audits. TPTA said ‘at least [the IRS] is going to have a little bit 
more support’. 
A professional from the economic field, formerly in the professional services 
field and now at the sub-department of audit of the national direction of the IRS, 
led the process and made a decision on what to ask taxpayers. In order to 
make the affidavit more effective, knowledge about the layout was sourced from 
foreign affidavits, and also the lead professional mobilised social capital to 
access known professionals in the professional services field. The experts 
consulted came from Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Spain. Their input 
was believed to capture the best international practices for translation into the 
Chilean context. The questions asked of these foreign professionals included: 
What do you think about your affidavit? What do you not like about it? What is 
wrong with it? What do you think should be removed from it? What do you think 
should be included? 
Along with this template, a user’s manual was drafted explaining how to 
complete the affidavit form. During the fieldwork, the knowledge of the 
professionals in the IRS was highlighted. In contrast to other tax authorities, this 
manual was written by people with practical experience in the completion of 
transfer pricing affidavits; therefore, these individuals were able to foresee the 
types of question the taxpayer might have when filling it in, especially for the 
                                            
105
 The IRS’ website contains other resolutions linked to transfer pricing: Res. 114/29.10.2012 
on derivatives and Res. 115/29.10.2012 on the need to keep a technical report indicating that 
the derivative contracts were set under the arm’s length principle. 
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first year of application. According to TPTA03, the drafters were very careful in 
the process, and tried to make it simple for the taxpayer to understand and 
subsequently complete the affidavit himself, without the need for a tax advisor. 
This shows that the IRS was interested in keeping compliance costs low, as 
suggested in Chapter Two. 
Although the affidavit required a substantial amount of information (TPTA03), it 
was expected that both companies with few transactions and large companies 
with frequent cross-border transactions would be able to comply without 
professional advice. For these large entities, the main requirement for keeping 
compliance costs low was having their records in order. In TPTA03’s words, ‘the 
best support is the daily [practices]. If companies keep daily documents of all 
transactions with related parties for the authority to review them, then they will 
not have any problem. That’s the best [transfer pricing] study.’ In other words, a 
better connection was expected between accounting and tax records (Preston, 
1989). 
Once the drafting had been completed, both documents (affidavit and manual) 
were discussed with other areas within the IRS to incorporate relevant aspects. 
It was commented that the legal team, the transfer pricing team in the Large 
Taxpayers Directorate and the Medium and Large Companies Department had 
access to the documents and could make comments on them (TPTA02). In 
other words, knowledge and information was accessed through internal 
consultation. There is evidence that the transfer pricing group within the Large 
Taxpayers Directorate provided input on practical matters such as the currency 
in which to report transactions. The original form had asked for all transactions 
to be converted into and reported in Chilean currency, despite the fact that most 
MNCs kept accounting books in a foreign currency (TPTA05). However, as a 
result of these concerns, the format changed. The differing views of the two 
specialist transfer pricing units related to the fact that they were pursuing 
different objectives. Whilst the affidavit designers’ purpose was to ‘shed light on 
whether or not there is a transfer pricing issue’ (TPTA02) and assess risk 
(TPTA05), the operational unit had a focus on audits (TPTA05). 
Although the rule came legally into force on 27 September 2012, according to 
Article 38 the IRS was given power to challenge the value of transactions with 
related parties before this date, but was also given power to challenge the value 
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from the date referred to above. In this context, the IRS interpreted that the 
affidavit should be presented for transactions occurring during 2012 and ‘made 
a mix’ of both situations (TA02), even though the intention was to keep them 
separate. 
Circular 
The second guidance was issued by the transfer pricing department of the 
national direction along with the legal department (TPTA02). Similarly to the 
previous experience, it had the following purposes: 
 Clarification of issues in the formal rule in order to complement it 
In contrast to the formal act, the circular contained some definitions and 
other content not included in the former, such as transfer pricing taken from 
the OECD and cross-border transactions. It also explained in detail what the 
comparability analysis was about, with reference to the OECD guidelines. 
 Rules issues not contained in the formal act 
The circular made reference to the possibility of price or profit ranges and 
the allied concept of interquartile ranges with their benefits for improving 
accuracy of analysis. The circular read that, where a range existed, the IRS 
‘will be able to make the transfer pricing adjustment, and such adjustment 
will have to be made to the range point that best reflects the circumstances 
of the case in question’. 
Regarding this type of additional information and ruling through administrative 
guidance, the IRS adopted a lenient perspective, arguing that the flexibility that 
the circular allowed was beneficial for audits. TPTA05 said: 
No, in fact we thought that there were many things that could be 
mentioned through the circular and not necessarily written in the law. 
We often think that to say that the Internal Revenue Service could 
adjust to the median, mode, or some statistical tool could be 
mentioned in an [administrative] regulation or circular and not in the 
law, because if later the IRS will not adjust to the median and this is 
in the law, [the executive] has to make a legal change to get that out 
of there. Whereas, if [the IRS] rules through a circular, it can get it 
more easily removed. The more explicit it is, the more difficult for [the 
IRS]. 
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Other aspects were kept identical to the article, such as relationships and 
transfer pricing studies. 
Other concepts were explained in further detail. For instance, additional 
explanations were given on the suitability of particular methods for certain types 
of transaction. A second example related to adjustments, on which it added that 
the fine would not be applied by the IRS if the taxpayer provided the information 
requested on time, such as the affidavit and other information. This had been 
promised by the executive branch in passing the act. 
The circular also refreshed what had been stated in 2010, that the IRS had 
twelve months from when the tax inspector declared he had received all 
supporting documentation to conduct the audit. During that period, the IRS 
should also arrange a meeting with the taxpayer. 
In relation to APAs, the circular stated that this was an ‘alternative and in 
advance audit mechanism’ for transactions. The circular also made a link with a 
further resolution on APAs. 
Although the IRS had been working on drafting the rule for a long time, the 
circular and affidavit were not launched at the same time as the law was 
enacted. This may be explained mainly by limited resources, but also by the fact 
that other legislative changes gained more prominence in this scenario 
(TPTA04). TA02 added that this was because some bills had changed 
significantly in parliament in the past, and having the administrative guidance 
ready in advance could have meant a waste of man hours. 
Resolution – advance pricing agreements 
Similar to the affidavit, the APA procedure was also drafted by the same 
transfer pricing team within the national direction. The drafting was led by a 
lawyer with experience in transfer pricing and was assisted by the rest of the 
team. The same unit that drafted the resolution would be in charge of 
administering the procedure (TPTA03). 
Similarly to the circular, additional information was included in the resolution, 
such as the possibility that the IRS would offer an alternative transfer pricing 
study to the taxpayer for these purposes. 
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Organisational structure 
The two departments in charge of transfer pricing were still in operation. Both 
remained small until a second round of interviews was completed on 8 January 
2014. It was believed that these groups would remain small, which might affect 
revenue collection as the number of audits would be restricted (TPTA04, 
TPTA05). However, it was also believed that greater legal certainty in the 
improved law would improve the IRS’ work, with fewer disagreements with 
taxpayers in the interpretation of the law (TPTA05). 
As noted in Chapter Six, these two groups had worked closely since August 
2011 and their profiles were perceived to be complementary. Regarding the 
professional profile of professionals within the national direction, a policymaker 
commented: 
I think [the implementation] will never be full, precisely because the 
transfer pricing aspect is focused on a very specific and limited 
sector and taxpayers … I think that the IRS stills need to move 
forward to recruit more professional experts in economics [in the 
national direction], because tax inspectors make a secondary 
contribution. Those who can really contribute are economists, who 
have an in-depth knowledge of economic values, prices and transfer 
pricing studies, because at the end of the day it’s an economic 
matter. Tax inspectors might be assistants, providing analyses to 
support audit … not even a lawyer, he does not have much to say, 
except for the interpretation of how a method is implemented. And 
sure, we are thinking in about four or five years’ time it will be fully 
[implemented], it is a reasonable time. At that point the IRS will work 
fine (PM12). 
This may be interpreted as a form of distinction between the two groups, one 
subordinated to the other. On the other hand, the tax inspector, who conducted 
audits in the field on transfer pricing, must meet particular conditions to be 
successful in his work. Some features highlighted during the interviews were 
that operative tax inspectors must ‘like to study’ and must ‘be patient’ as these 
cases took a long time to complete. An inquisitive eye was also deemed to be 
desirable, as ‘sometimes there are things that superficially look very nice but on 
breaking them down to see the sense of the operation, they have nothing to do 
with what is on the paper’. In this respect, the tax inspector was expected not to 
trust and to be clever, features that are required where there is uncertainty 
(TPTA05).This resonates with Tuck’s (2010) finding that tax inspectors are no 
longer only specialists in tax but also need to meet other conditions. 
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Further training in several areas was deemed necessary to implement the new 
rule; nonetheless, the interviewees revealed variable recent training on the 
subject. While the group in the national direction had not received recent 
specific training in transfer pricing (PM11), the tax inspectors had recently 
participated in such training and also in English language courses to conduct 
audits more efficiently (TPTA05). 
In addition to human resources, technology is a powerful engine in transfer 
pricing audits (van den Noord & Heady, 2001). Both teams had access to 
common databases with companies’ information, contracts, etc., reducing the 
time taken to search these inputs to the process, but their purposes were 
different. Whilst the national direction team accessed databases for risk 
assessment processes, the operations group used this information to set 
comparable prices for specific audits (TPTA05). 
Audit processes and the first year of implementation 
There is evidence that interested parties not only tried to affect the content of 
the law, as noted in Chapters Five and Six, but also tried to influence its 
implementation. Soon after the rule’s enactment, some advisors made attempts 
to influence the enforcement date (Hellman et al., 2000). These attempts, a 
‘type of lobbying’, were based on connections such as ‘friendship’ and ‘personal 
trust’ previously established with the IRS (PM15). However, this mobilisation of 
social capital was unsuccessful and the affidavit requested information for the 
whole year 2012, rather than for a shorter period as requested by these 
lobbyists. 
Three interviewees agreed that there would be no substantial change in the 
‘concepts, procedures and conclusions’ (TPTA04) applied by the IRS with the 
new rule (TPTA02, TPTA05). This can be explained by the fact that audits using 
Article 38 had followed the principles contained in the OECD guidelines 
(TPTA04), as shown in Chapter 6. Therefore, the changes were more on the 
operational side of audits, such as in the way in which proof was constructed 
(TPTA04) and in the drafting of notifications/citations (TPTA02). The difference 
now lay in the fact that what the IRS said was written in the law, giving more 
certainty to taxpayers who ‘feel differently’ due to this (TPTA05). This 
perception of legal equivalence between the two articles was based on the fact 
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that the IRS read Article 38 through the lens of the OECD guidelines, going 
beyond wording to the policy or ‘spirit of the law’. This was sustained by 
TPTA05’s comment that the ‘IRS read Articles 38 and 41 E and for them they 
are the same’. In other words, for the IRS there was a ‘form of shadowy parallel 
[income] tax code to which only a privileged few have access while everyone 
else has to make do with the “letter” of the law’ (Hasseldine & Morris, 2013, 
pp.11-12). Despite Hasseldine and Morris’ argument about the ‘fruitless 
exercise’ (2013, p.12) of going beyond the literality of the law, the IRS 
succeeded in doing so, as reflected in revenue collection applying the former 
rule. Despite this knowledge and success, audits were recognised as a difficult 
‘art’: 
[Transfer pricing audits] are not something easy because there is no 
certainty. [The IRS] always says that this is art because they look at 
a transaction and set a criterion regarding it and try to convince the 
taxpayer who does the same. Then, in the end it is always about 
agreeing and hopefully that you think the same as the IRS about the 
transaction (TPTA05). 
Affidavits, APAs and further audits 
Taxpayers who had undertaken transactions with related parties under the 
terms set by the resolution had to submit an affidavit reporting these 
transactions and the methods deployed by 30 June 2013 for 2012 transactions. 
As noted in the technical aspects of the rule, it was possible to ask for an 
extension of up to three months, i.e. 30 September, for which most of taxpayers 
applied (TPTA05). Although the total number of taxpayers obliged to submit this 
document remains unknown, 2,365 affidavits were received by the IRS (Burr, 
2013). 
During the compliance process, both transfer pricing teams actively cooperated 
with taxpayers by answering telephone calls from them and their advisors 
(TPTA03, TPTA05). The IRS inculcated the taxpayers with the ‘new field doxa’ 
and then standardised the procedure for the future. This cooperative approach 
by the IRS was perceived to be rare but necessary for this first instance. Some 
questions were managed exclusively by the team in the national direction, 
especially those regarding IT problems. For these purposes, the transfer pricing 
team worked closely with the IT department. The team within the Large 
Taxpayer Department mainly managed operational questions such as ‘What do 
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you mean by analysed party? How do I make the calculation for this? What 
figure do I have to put in here?’ (TPTA05). 
The evaluation of the first submission was good, although it was recognised that 
there might be errors, as with any affidavit during the first year (TPTA03). Errors 
might have been unintentional, but some were caused by late submission of the 
document, and when taxpayers were unable to complete it, they would ‘fill in 
any figure or zero’ (TPTA05). 
Up to early January 2014, the affidavits had not been revised but had only 
superficially been examined, with no audits under this new rule. It was expected 
to start revisions in February or March 2014 (TPTA05). 
Regarding APA signings, few applications, including bilateral arrangements with 
foreign tax authorities, had been received so far and these were in the early 
review stages. Although the team was small and the APA workload was high, 
involving ‘many meetings and the review of lots of information’, the six-month 
term was perceived to have been adequate for making a decision for now. In 
this process, there was strong collaboration in the team within the national 
direction in reviewing this information. For example, two lawyers supported the 
work of the economists/engineers in the team who checked the figures. In 
general, there were Big Four firm advisors behind these APA applications; 
however, taxpayers were getting more involved, which was better for the 
process because they ‘know the details of transactions’ (TPTA03). 
7.4.2 Implementation by taxpayers 
This sub-section presents some findings following the enactment and after the 
first submission of the mandatory affidavit discussed above. Shortly after 
enactment, the analysis suggests that this first period was one of ‘passivity and 
expectations’ for some taxpayers. At one extreme of passivity, TPPT03 reported 
that, at the time of the interview, ‘there is no preparation … there is no interest’ 
in transfer pricing. 
Other interviewees reported their expectations of the application of the rule. 
Two companies referred to the probability of audits. For example, TPPT01’s 
non-intensive transfer pricing industry would not be the first target for the IRS 
audit, so it took a more relaxed approach to this first stage of implementation. In 
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contrast, TPPT02 believed that tax audits were more likely to happen from now 
onwards, given the information available to the IRS. In other words, these two 
taxpayers weighed up the probability of audits in their operations (Allingham & 
Sandmo, 1972). 
Another aspect of expectation was reported by TPPT04’s company, in which 
around ninety per cent of transactions were subject to transfer pricing 
regulation. This company was waiting for administrative guidance to be issued 
in order to prepare for implementation and submission of the affidavit. At a more 
general level, it was found that the affidavit was perceived as ‘just a form, 
without any added value’ by 42 per cent of surveyed companies in December 
2012 (EY Chile, 2013). 
Organisational structure and the role of external advisors 
Regardless of the intensity of transfer pricing transactions, implementation 
involved personnel and knowledge. All companies interviewed had small tax 
units, as shown in Chapter Six; therefore, their limited available personnel acted 
as a barrier to implementation. Recognising this limitation, companies had to 
decide between recruiting in-house tax professionals, which was very unlikely 
due to costs, as reported by TPPT04, or outsourcing tax compliance activities to 
professional firms (TPPT04). All interviewed firms except TPPT03 were 
considering or had already hired tax services from a Big Four firm. 
The decision to outsource depended on time and trust in technical knowledge. 
With regard to time, TPPT05 stated that the company’s corporate accounting 
manager had decided to outsource to a Big Four firm because these new 
compliance issues were ‘new, complex, and therefore need a one hundred per 
cent level of concentration’. These professional services firms had high 
symbolic capital derived from their tax knowledge and expertise; as 
acknowledged by TPPT02 and TPPT05, and that was the reason for 
outsourcing. 
The importance of these firms grew in the tax field to become, for example, the 
‘representatives’ or ‘visible face’ of the companies on transfer pricing matters 
(TPPT02). Despite the peace of mind that these firms gave to companies, 
TPPT02 recognised the disadvantages of low company involvement, which 
continued with this new legal development: 
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The negative aspect of this is that one is becoming outdated because 
you leave all the burden to them [advisors]. But in any case they 
come, especially now this is coming; I meet them once a month and 
we talk for hours about the new aspects [of the reform]… on what 
happened, what the IRS is doing and how to face the first [transfer 
pricing] audit. [Internally they were not doing anything else] …I am 
limited to practical issues. If you pay for an international advisor, that 
is very expensive and competent, then they take away your 
opportunity to train and learn and then you have to [learn], not as 
something you need to, but as something you personally have to. 
Because I don’t need to; I am paying the advisor very well. But how 
do I question them [if I don’t have the knowledge]? 
This suggests that the accounting and law firms continued to dominate in the 
tax policy field (Malsch & Gedron, 2013; Stringfellow et al., 2015). Some 
companies had responded to or resisted this domination by attempting to 
develop in-house knowledge through training. For example, TPPT01 provided a 
booklet of a course they had attended in October 2012 in South America. At a 
more general level, TPTE02 reported that some taxpayers had attended 
courses on the subject; however, their scope was very limited and with few 
participants. Consequently, knowledge remained low (TPTE02). In other cases, 
training had stopped for unknown reasons or because of limited interest in the 
matter (TPPT03), and in others, financial constraints acted as a barrier to 
embarking on further training (TPPT04). 
Compliance process: Submission of affidavit 
Two interviewees reported their experiences of their first affidavit submission. 
The affidavit format was evaluated as ‘very ambitious’ (TPPT01) as it collected 
a lot of information. As expected, companies relied on professional services 
firms. Both companies were advised by Big Four entities. The domestic 
headquarters made the decision internally (TPPT04), whilst the domestic entity 
(TPPT01) agreed with its headquarters to do so. 
The process was collaborative and responsibilities were delimited. Companies 
had to provide information to advisors to enable them to prepare the economic 
study and later complete the affidavit form. TPPT01 reported that the tax unit 
had to interview internal people directly involved with transfer pricing-related 
transactions for a two-month period. This ‘non-theoretical’ information on 
methods and comparable prices worked as an input into the compliance 
process. Similarly, TPPT04 had to collect practical information about its related 
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parties abroad that it did not previously have, such as the tax ID, full name, 
etc.106 For the latter company, the process was more costly given the volume of 
transactions with different parties. This highlights that the importance of the 
affidavit process was not just the form itself, but the ‘economic analysis that 
supports the affidavit’ (Loy, 2013). 
Opinions differed on the difficulty of the process. TPPT01 described the process 
as generally quiet and smooth, with only a few IT problems relating to the final 
submission of the affidavit. It was dealt with directly by the tax advisors and the 
IRS, confirming the cooperative approach mentioned earlier. In contrast, 
TPPT04 thought the process was complex, with unclear guidance. For the 
latter’s company, with intensive transfer pricing transactions, things became 
difficult and costly due to limited staff and advisors’ ‘high’ fees. The team 
worked long hours with the help of a member from another department highly 
skilled in IT. Although working long hours may be interpreted as a form of 
symbolic violence (Everett, 2002), the tone of this interview suggested that it 
was resistance rather than acceptance. In TPTA04’s view, a ‘regiment’ of 
people would have been required to perfectly prepare and file the affidavit. 
Changes of practice 
This process taught both companies several lessons, leading to the 
implementation of changes in internal practices which can be divided into three 
sub-groups. Firstly, there were lessons about ‘consciousness’. General 
administrative and commercial areas that executed transactions became fully 
aware of the importance of transfer pricing and that prices and procedures were 
not dependent on ‘one’s will’ (TPPT04). 
Secondly, the significant impact of the affidavit preparation on internal practices 
led to acknowledgement that ‘dedicated staff’ were required.107 TPPT04’s area 
was planning to recruit a non-area member to support the compliance process, 
                                            
106
 This indicates the passive approach to implementation of the previous rule. 
107
 The importance of dedicated people or in-house specialists was shared in the organisational 
field. Francisco Lyon, partner at KPMG, suggests that this preoccupation has led multinationals 
to creating specific in-house pricing departments (Lyon, 2013). Indeed, the results of a survey of 
350 enterprises conducted by E&Y between 22 May and 14 June 2013 revealed that 55 per 
cent of consulted enterprises considered that in the mid-term it would be necessary to have an 
exclusively dedicated internal team (Celedón, 2013). 
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and had also decided to put an internal member in charge of the review of all 
contracts relating to these transactions. 
Thirdly, daily changes had been implemented. TPPT01 stated that, for certain 
non-standardised transactions, the company had implemented better ways to 
generate ‘evidence’ documentation. The other company was now requesting 
basic third party details that had been difficult to obtain in the affidavit process 
as an integral part of their daily operations (TPPT04). TPPT04 also reported 
more profound changes to its operations. For example, the legal department 
was now also involved in transfer pricing and had to validate that contracts met 
the legal requirements of transfer pricing. Finally, a conceptual transfer pricing 
guide on contracts had been drafted with the help of tax advisors, delineating 
how to proceed under certain circumstances with worldwide impact. The latter 
measure was believed to give more importance to the tax unit. All these 
measures had involved much work, but at the expense of ‘rigour’ in the 
operations. This is consistent with previous studies of how tax responsibilities 
change accounting operations (Lamb, 2001; Plesner Rossing, 2013). 
The future 
These companies did not foresee any APA application in the near future. One 
was very reluctant to go first (‘there is no APA yet, and we are not going to go 
first’) because it would be like a voluntary tax audit, which was ‘senseless’ 
(TPPT01). Another aspect was that professional firms were likely to continue to 
provide this service to taxpayers (TPPT01). 
7.4.3 Implementation by tax practitioners 
Organisational structure 
In preparation for the new rule and in response to more frequent and intensive 
IRS audits, professional firms had recruited more people. In this respect, a tax 
expert stated that ‘in Chile there are no transfer pricing experts … nor in 
consulting firms; they are importing the workforce’ (TPTE05). For the first 
affidavit submission process, workload grew in an ‘exponential’ way (TPTE02), 
leading to an increase in team size. Although some firms had recruited few 
extra people, another stated that its personnel had grown by four hundred per 
cent (TPTE03). Despite these efforts, transfer pricing teams remained small in 
comparison with other Latin American countries (TPTE02). 
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In this process, the advisors’ profile grew in importance within MNCs. TPTE02 
reported that they ended up in the middle of a disagreement between the 
Chilean entity and its headquarters abroad: ‘the client … makes us argue with 
the headquarters and transfers the responsibility to us and we end up replying 
to England or the US … this goes beyond the service we provide … but in the 
end, they agree with us. It’s a technical matter’ (TPTE02). This may be 
interpreted as transfer pricing experts being able to ‘exert … a certain amount of 
cultural authority as shapers of opinion’ (Andon et al., 2014, p.78) which is 
accepted by their clients. This closeness – social capital (Andon et al., 2014) – 
along with technical knowledge were converted into symbolic capital, and then 
these experts were able to dominate the MNCs. 
Perceptions of the rule 
The importance of this rule had come to be seen as vital. A tax expert 
mentioned that ‘a country without a transfer pricing rule is nothing’ (TPTE01). In 
general, the rule was perceived to meet the requirements of a globalised world. 
Some lawyers opined that the rule was ‘very good and very modern’ (PL01), 
‘much more complete’ (TPTE05) and more understandable (TPTE02). TPTE03, 
an economist, remarked on its practicality, stating that it was ‘an excellent rule, 
very applicable. I do insist, I am not a lawyer and have a distinct view.’ 
A few aspects were referred to as flaws or linked to aspects not contained in the 
rule. Most interviewees mentioned the absence of regulation of interquartile 
ranges (TPTE03) and the adjustment point (TPTE02), which might cause legal 
problems based on the principle of legality of taxes (TPTE05). TPTE01 feared 
that the IRS’ discretion would result in a lack of certainty on how the adjustment 
would be made. Although contained in the rule, a feature that was negatively 
evaluated by advisors was the ‘administrative silence’ clause applying to APAs 
(PL01, TPTE05). 
Compliance process: Submission of affidavit 
During the affidavit submission process, IRS staff adopted a cooperative 
stance, and this was how practitioners perceived it. As most taxpayers needed 
to apply for the three-month extension provided in the rule, the IRS suggested 
that they ‘need the information you provide to be the best possible … then ask 
for the extension, we will approve it’ (TPTE03), leading to a high percentage of 
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taxpayers applying for this extension. Although, decisions on how to complete 
the affidavit were made internally by professional firms, the IRS’ cooperative 
approach made the process smoother, as the following quote suggests: 
...but also we had much communication with the authority, which was 
open to answer our calls, and had daily contact. They were always 
willing to answer. All the recognised advisors had the numbers of the 
international tax audit [unit] and we sent [our inquiries] to them 
because the general call centre did not have much clarity. It was 
easier and more direct to try the people really involved … the people 
from the international tax audit [department] (TPTE03). 
The affidavit template was considered to be ‘good … strong … it is evident that 
it has been discussed, that it was discussed abroad, it is a smart affidavit’ 
(TPTE02).108 
The first year of implementation was positively evaluated by professionals 
(TPTE03). One tax advisor enthusiastically described it as ‘chaotic’ in terms of 
workload, but also ‘extraordinary’ in terms of profits for professional firms 
(TPTE02). Some firms were hopeful that the second year would also be good, 
which would allow them to grow (TPTE02). Chaos was linked to the fact that 
advisors used information provided by companies as an input for preparing all 
the information for the affidavit, and the companies were usually ‘slow’ to do so 
(TPTE02, TPTE03). This was because the companies were unaware of the 
importance of transfer pricing, internal policies, contracts and supporting 
documentation but ‘wanted the solution straight away’ (TPTE02). The process 
was tough, characterised by ‘sleepless nights’, especially for auditors (TPTE02). 
Firms had to relocate professionals from other tax expertise into the transfer 
pricing teams to meet demand (TPTE02). 
In addition, tax experts had to educate their clients during the process 
(TPTE03). Consequently, the importance of having a transfer pricing study to 
support the affidavit was remarked on by tax advisors (TPTE02, TPTE03). 
However, there was a misconception about its role: 
There are companies that think that the transfer pricing study is a 
vaccine against the IRS, that you become immune, and that is not 
true, i.e. the transfer pricing study is a thing you use to communicate 
                                            
108
 Mauricio Loy of EY suggests that this new rule will allow the IRS to identify companies that 
manipulate their multinational transactions in order to obtain tax benefits (Loy, 2013). 
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with the IRS, you can refute … but later your study ends up in the 
bin. That’s one of the problems … that the study does not guarantee 
anything. The study is your argument not anyone else’s. Sure, up to 
now attempts have been made to try to sell the study, which is very 
difficult … consultants have the tendency to show you that the study 
is more than what it really is. The study takes your price policy and 
justifies it, but the IRS may not like that justification (TPTE01). 
In providing this service, professional firms preferred to be fully involved in 
preparing the figures, selecting the methods and then uploading the affidavit, 
rejecting services with limited scope that just checked what in-house 
professionals had prepared (TPTE03). 
In this first year, opportunistic professionals, referred to as ‘loudmouths’ (chanta 
in Chilean slang) entered the field and made profits, which was criticised by 
more established professionals This discrimination and categorisation of small 
advisors as bad advisors (Ramirez, 2009) may be interpreted as a ‘rite of 
institution’ (Bourdieu, 1991) which ‘tend to consecrate or legitimate an arbitrary 
boundary’ (Bourdieu, 1991, p.118). Rites of institution ‘assign, for instance, 
values or competences to individuals, and these serve as signifiers with 
symbolic power that transform individuals in terms of how they are perceived 
and how they perceive themselves’ (Stringfellow et al., 2015, p.89). This rite 
attributed ‘negative symbolic capital’ (Bourdieu et al., 1999, p.185) or a stigma 
(Swartz, 2013, p.106). This recognised predominant position of the more 
established professionals may be interpreted as a form of symbolic violence 
exercised through language (Bourdieu, 1991; Terdiman, 1987), as reflected in 
the following quotation: 
What’s the problem? It is that many loudmouths showed up. I think 
this is an important aspect … loudmouths that truly believed that 
because they had read the affidavit handbook they were prepared to 
advise companies. This was told to us by the tax authority. We were 
told that the IRS could not believe that these people asked 
everything and in the end said ‘it is because I am learning with you 
but I have sixty clients’ affidavits to submit’. Seriously. And they had 
no clue and were learning. I have seen very, very bad affidavits ... 
there are still companies that to save two coins risk more … [Transfer 
pricing] is not learned from one day to the next (TPTE03). 
Other services offered 
Regarding tax planning, advisors stated that it was a difficult service, as 
companies had to be entirely right in tax aspects and, when offered, the 
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technique was to plan within price ranges. Any other type of tax plan was 
difficult (TPTE02). 
Another feature contained in the rule was applications for APAs, on which there 
was no definite consensus regarding its success. Some agreed on its benefits, 
especially those derived from the social responsibility clause (TPTE03). 
However, it might not succeed because taxpayers might not want to make their 
practices transparent to the authority. TPTE05 said that nobody wanted to 
report themselves to the IRS and reveal their price policy. Others were 
persuading their clients to hold off for a while as ‘it is very brave being the first’ 
(TPTE02) and it was a voluntary ‘tax audit … in which you show everything to 
the IRS and it can tax you … you get naked [in front of the IRS]’ (TPTE01). 
TPTE01 suggested applying for an APA only when the foreign headquarters 
requested it or when tax audits became ‘brutal’, which was not yet the case in 
Chile because audit teams within the IRS remained small. Another reason for 
failure was the administrative silence clause, making the IRS-taxpayer 
relationship unequal: 
What is going on is that with this background, I do not know if I would 
recommend applying for an APA in the first place. The APA would 
not be one of my most urgent recommendations. If a client asks me, I 
would say ‘no’, not least because, being the first one … you better 
prepare a good [transfer pricing] study and plan …[because] I think 
the APA regulation contained in the law … does not have enough 
guarantees for taxpayers. It is asymmetric for the taxpayers 
(TPTE05). 
Although in some cases very few taxpayers were requesting this service 
(TPTE02), some advisors had received more requests and believed that 
demand for this service would increase, as Chile was a ‘very conservative 
country that likes to have certainty’, and also due to the benefits that the rule 
provided (TPTE03). Up to January 2014, none of the clients had been audited 
in relation to affidavits submitted in September 2013. 
7.5 Summary 
This chapter has discussed the tax policy-making process for the new 2012 
transfer pricing rule in Chile. It has shown who the powerful actors were and 
how the policy reached the technical and political agenda. It has also revealed 
the extent of parliamentary debate, and the implementation practices of 
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taxpayers, the IRS and tax advisors. Throughout the chapter, the concepts of 




Chapter Eight: Conclusions 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This study has been concerned with the under-researched practice of tax policy 
making, recognising both its procedural/structural and social, political, 
organisational and cultural dimensions (e.g. Boden et al., 2010; Roberts & 
Bobek, 2004; Steinmo, 1989, 1993). Empirically grounded in the academically 
under-researched jurisdiction of Chile, it has analysed the whole process 
through which tax legislation on corporate income tax and transfer pricing came 
into being. Related critical and interpretive literature has recognised that 
taxation is not just a technical exercise, but also an exercise of power. This 
study has departed from this assumption to examine how power relations shape 
the practices of tax law making, the resulting legislation and its implementation. 
In particular, it has posited the following main research question: 
How do power relations shape practices within the tax policy-making field? 
This question was broken down into three research sub-questions: 
How does the tax policy-making process relate to the field of power across its 
different stages? 
What is the role of tax knowledge and social capital in the tax policy-making 
field? 
How are violence and domination manifested in the tax policy-making field? 
The objectives of these research questions were explained in Chapter 4. In the 
remainder of this chapter, Section 8.2 summarises the key findings of this 
research project, Section 8.3 discusses the theoretical and empirical 
contributions of the study, and Section 8.4 posits some questions for further 
research. 
8.2 Findings 
A number of findings have come out of this investigation and are presented 
here. Although the under-researched phenomenon is that of the process 
through which tax legislation is created, the findings are presented separately 
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and recognised as constituent elements relating to why legislation and its 
implementation are the way they are. Although Bourdieu calls for structure and 
agency to be integrated (Bourdieu, 1990), promoting ‘constructivist 
structuralism’ or ‘structuralist constructivism’ (Alawattage, 2011, p.4), these 
elements are presented separately to illustrate their influence on the ‘quality of 
tax laws’ (Vording et al., 2007) in Chile. These elements are both structural, and 
social, political, organisational and cultural. 
8.2.1 Structural elements of the tax policy-making process 
The Chilean tax policy-making field is structured in ways that impact on the 
content and robustness of tax legislation. As Chapters Five, Six and Seven 
have illustrated, four elements shape the design and legislative stage: the 
exclusive initiative of the president of the republic, miscellaneous bills, the pace 
of discussions (‘urgencies’), and the committee system/bicameral parliament. 
In Chile, the exclusive initiative to propose a tax law change resides in the 
executive branch, a space where the bureaucratic and political fields intersect, 
especially in the period covered in this research between 1990 and 2012. 
During this period, all presidents were members of political parties and were 
supported by political coalitions. In legislative terms, this entailed that the 
executive was responsible for the agenda/policy and the legislation created, 
with the freedom not to disclose the content of tax bills prior to submission to 
parliament. This restriction prevented parliamentarians from promoting 
legislative changes that might benefit the geographical areas they represented, 
as commented on in Chapter Five (Perez Rodrigo, 2006). In other words, the 
executive exercised a kind of monopoly over the pace and content of tax law 
changes. This was a space which external agents aimed to access in order to 
negotiate on matters over which monopoly was exercised, turning this space 
into a site of struggle. In practical terms, parliament was prevented from 
introducing any tax law change without negotiation with the executive. 
The executive had at its disposal two other tools to control the tax policy-making 
field. The first was the power to decide the number of matters included in a tax 
bill. A bill treating a diversity of topics is known as ‘miscellaneous’. Although 
some proposals addressed a particular policy, others simultaneously addressed 
changes to income tax, value added tax and other tax concerns, which masked 
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the importance of each provision individually analysed, as evidenced in the 
general tax policy-making process described in Chapter Five. As noted in 
Chapter 6, this tool was used to obscure the role and impact of particular 
provisions, eventually impinging on the ‘quality of tax laws’, as found in the 
discourse of some senators in relation to the former transfer pricing rule. 
The second tool was the power to control the pace at which the congress would 
discuss tax bills through ‘urgencies’. This second element was used arbitrarily 
by the executive to get bills passed in parliament at will. In Bourdieusian terms, 
this tool redefined the temporal boundary of the tax policy-making field 
regarding discussion in parliament (Gracia & Oats, 2012; Mutch, 2006), limiting 
the extent to which bills proposed by the executive were reviewed, both in 
general and in relation to the former transfer pricing rule. As this tool could be 
used at any point in the parliamentary debate, it also generated asymmetries of 
time for discussion between the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate on the 
former transfer pricing rule. 
The configuration of the field in the legislative phase was another element 
impacting on the content and robustness of legislation. As commented above, 
the Chilean Congress does not have power to propose a tax law change. Its 
role is limited to approving or rejecting the content of a tax bill. If the executive 
wants to get legislation passed and enacted, it is forced to negotiate, and 
sometimes accede to, parliament’s demands in order to secure the necessary 
votes to accomplish its goal. 
Internal parliamentary legislation also impacted on how much debate was held. 
On the one hand, the Chilean congress is bicameral, which would appear to 
contribute positively to a more extensive and deeper scrutiny of tax legislation, 
leading to more robust legislation. On the other hand, the committee system 
reduces the number of participants, and hence the number of views brought into 
the discussion. From the fieldwork, it was noted that a large part of the overall 
debate was held within the committees of finance of both chambers but, for the 
rules studied, little or no debate was held in the whole chambers with all 
members. A reduced number of parliamentarians formed part of each 
committee of finance, implying that these members were more powerful than 
their peers regarding tax policy making. They had space in each committee 
session to approve, negotiate or reject tax proposals. This structure allowed no 
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discussion in the chambers if bills had been approved in the respective 
committees of finance unless a parliamentarian opposed further debate. This 
was the situation with the former transfer pricing rule, on which no extra debate 
and analysis was conducted in the Chamber of Deputies or Senate, exerting 
structural violence on other parliamentarians. 
These elements may be interpreted as causes of structural violence (Farmer, 
1997, 2004; Farmer et al., 2006; Galtung, 1969; Köhler & Alcock, 1976). 
Chapter Six has illustrated how parliamentarian members of the committee of 
finance blocked the discussion. Those dominated resisted but were defeated by 
the structure, influencing the debate on and possible robustness of transfer 
pricing legislation. 
Other elements that might be considered as part of the structure included 
consultation procedures, which were permitted but without guidance on how 
these should be conducted, access to parliamentary debates, which is part of 
the democratic institution, and the hierarchical levels of agents participating in 
the process. As these elements are deeply connected with social, political and 
cultural factors, they are discussed below. 
All these structural elements of the tax policy-making field intersect with a set of 
social, political, organisational and cultural elements to produce the type of tax 
legislation available in Chile. These other elements are discussed in the next 
section. 
8.2.2 Social, political and cultural findings 
Power, in a variety of forms, was a recurrent theme in the fieldwork, calling for 
greater reflection and conceptualisation in this thesis. In order to analyse this 
broad concept, the three Bourdieusian notions of power were deployed in the 
empirical chapters. To summarise briefly, in Chapter Three it was commented 
that power may operate in specific spheres over particular forms of capital, for 
example the field of power over resources (capital) and power over acceptance 
of social structures through the mechanisms of symbolic power and violence. 
The research questions and findings presented in Chapters Five, Six and Seven 
are explored in these terms. 
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Field of power 
The tax policy-making process has been identified as a site of struggle over the 
most important decisions that affect society. In this social space, there are 
agents who hold a significant amount of more than one form of capital, being 
able to decide on the course of tax policy. Chapter Five illustrated that this site 
of power is where the policy decisions are made; in other words, the design 
stage is closely connected to the field of power. The most powerful agents 
identified here were those actors in the executive branch, part of the 
bureaucratic field, including the president of the republic, senior members of the 
ministry of finance and other ministries, the budget office and tax authorities, 
and external consultants. As noted, in this phase a number of semi-autonomous 
fields intersected, including the bureaucratic, political, academic and 
professional services fields, as illustrated in the theoretical framework in 
Chapter Three. While these actors inhabited this social space following 
democratic elections, or as a result of appointments based on the trust of the 
president or promotion within the public apparatus, others tried to access it to 
persuade these agents to make decisions that would better serve their interests 
through requests for meetings, sending letters and reports, publishing news on 
the media, and even by requesting interventions from parliamentarians aligned 
with the government. The empirical data shows that these powerful actors were 
sometimes flexible and open to changes in policy direction when additional 
information was useful and improved the content and effects of the relevant 
policy. This élite group in the executive also had the ability and knowledge to 
stop attempts to influence policy. Although parliamentarians were generally 
powerful in other legislative matters, the structural component of the tax policy-
making field that grants the exclusive initiative to the president to initiate tax 
reforms (see Chapter Five) distanced the parliamentary debate from the general 
field of power. Nonetheless, it was also observed in practice that some 
government parliamentarians were successful ‘mobilisers of expertise’ (Page, 
2010) or carriers of habitus, and achieved a change in policy direction after 
convincing the executive that former ideas were inadequate. In practice, there is 
evidence of access to the process and negotiation in this site of struggle both in 
general tax reform and in the former transfer pricing rule. In 2012, for example, 
policymakers, with the help of tax advisors, were able to access this site, 
preventing changes to fundamental aspects of the tax system and maintaining 
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the status quo. In similar terms, Chapter Six illustrated how a right-wing senator, 
a member of the committee of finance, supported by another parliamentarian 
was able to affect the content of the transfer pricing rule regarding the IRS’ 
power to audit transfer pricing transactions. A similar situation took place in the 
reform of the transfer pricing rule in 2002, when parliamentarians opposed, 
negotiated with the executive and succeeded in limiting the scope of 
documentary requirements. It was been noted that the space connected with 
the field of power was in constant flux, allowing newcomers in after certain 
conditions had been met, such as technical knowledge and political 
compatibility in terms of ideology and ideas. 
In the 1997 transfer pricing policy process, the design phase was weakly 
connected with the field of power due to the composition of capitals present in 
the executive branch. Although the executive branch had the legitimacy and 
political capital to mobilise social support (Swartz, 2013) in order to conduct tax 
reform, it largely lacked one specific form of cultural capital, technical 
knowledge (Gracia & Oats, 2012), which is an essential requirement for 
producing good tax legislation. Specifically, the IRS staff involved in the drafting 
and implementation of tax rules were not technically competent in transfer 
pricing regulation, and members of the professional services and academic 
fields entered the policy-making field to craft this rule. This fact demonstrates 
that power was concentrated not in the state, but in the field of power connected 
with the design phase of the tax policy process (Swartz, 2013), as discussed in 
Chapter Three. These outsiders had reached high positions in their respective 
fields in terms of tax knowledge and were politically compatible with senior 
members in the bureaucratic/political field, which converted into symbolic 
capital, securing their entrance into the tax policy-making field (Burt, 1992, 
2000; Maclean et al., 2010; Stringfellow, 2010). However, this caused an 
imbalance of this form of power and tensions within the bureaucracy, which are 
examined below. 
The 2012 transfer pricing policy and drafting processes were different. This rule 
was produced entirely by members of the bureaucratic field. The IRS had 
accumulated substantial knowledge on the subject from theory, from practical 
experience through the failed implementation explained in Chapter Six, and 
through connections with the OECD, foreign tax authorities and academics. 
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This social capital allowed the IRS to connect with other realms and become an 
expert bureaucrat (Page, 2010), filling structural gaps. The role of social capital 
is discussed below. As noted from these findings, two elements are required for 
the production of tax legislation: cultural capital, in the form of technical tax 
knowledge and information, and social capital. These elements are discussed 
below. 
Tax knowledge and information 
The search for technical tax knowledge and information has been a constant 
struggle in the Chilean tax policy-making field. Diverse strategies have been 
deployed in the interacting fields that constitute the tax field. In the bureaucratic 
field, there is evidence of attempts to increase levels of expertise through the 
creation of new posts in the ministry of finance filled by professionals with 
experience in the private sector and in the IRS. Also, time has been devoted to 
understand theoretically the intricacies of the tax law in general and transfer 
pricing in particular by reading specialist material (OECD guidelines and 
papers) and foreign tax codes, consulting individuals, interacting with foreign tax 
authorities and supranational institutions, and through formal training in order to 
be the experts in designing, drafting and implementing tax regulation. In the 
IRS, knowledge has been accumulated through the long tenure of agents in key 
positions, such as those relating to drafting. These practices aimed to produce 
expert bureaucrats (Page, 2010). 
Whenever knowledge has not been internally available in the bureaucratic field, 
it has been sought outside from agents who have reached higher positions in 
their respective fields (Maclean et al., 2010), mainly the professional services 
field. This was noted in the general tax policy-making process in Chapter Five 
with the creation of the post of tax policy coordinator, which has generally been 
occupied by individuals who had reached senior positions in the private sector, 
providing legal tax knowledge to the policy processes. Their experience, 
described in Chapter Seven, was notable, as individuals in this unit were 
‘reform-minded’ legislators (Gould & Baker, 2002) who foresaw problems with 
APA subscriptions giving greater power and flexibility to the tax authority. In 
similar terms, the newly-created specialist unit for transfer pricing in charge of 
risk analysis and audits has been staffed with professionals coming from the 
‘worldwide’ professional services field, with substantial legal, accounting and 
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economic theoretical and practical knowledge on how to apply the 1997 and 
2012 rules. 
Following the previous point, the role of people with experience was crucial in 
the content and robustness of the former transfer pricing rule. Technical 
knowledge was not part of the bureaucratic field at all levels, so external experts 
were brought into the policy-making and drafting phases. These consultants 
became hyper-agents (Maclean et al., 2015) occupying at least three fields: 
bureaucratic, professional services and academic. 
In the parliamentary debate, the amount of technical tax knowledge was 
empirically examined in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. Parliamentarians tended 
to lack tax knowledge and information on the rules under discussion during the 
period examined in this study. This imbalanced situation, in comparison with the 
executive branch, was attributed to the parliamentarians’ inexperience of 
working with tax legislation in practice, the limited economic and time resources 
to study tax legislation and the way tax is taught in academic curricula. The last 
point suggests that the academic field is also responsible for the debate and 
quality of tax legislation. Absence of tax knowledge, or even its 
misunderstanding due to the levels of complexity in the current tax code, was 
pointed out in practice as a reason for the limited debate and standard of 
resulting legislation in incremental tax reforms (Jenkins, 1989). With these facts 
as starting points, technical debate was generic, superficial or non-existent, and 
obscured by ideological and partisan debate, as illustrated in the transfer pricing 
price policy processes examined in Chapters Six and Seven. Another point to 
highlight is that the acquisition of tax knowledge through consultation with 
advisors and through public hearings was ineffective in inculcating 
parliamentarians with the transfer pricing field doxa (Gracia & Oats, 2012; Xu & 
Xu, 2008), increasing the imbalance of knowledge between the executive 
branch and parliament. This shows that transfer pricing knowledge resided 
anywhere but in parliament. 
Tax knowledge was also required in the implementation phase. In the Chilean 
context, this thesis has demonstrated that the IRS was knowledgeable in tax 
matters, ably performing its role as a knowledge seller (Hasseldine et al., 2011). 
It was perceived by taxpayers that more competent personnel and technologies 
for audit were being used to enforce compliance. Regarding the 2012 transfer 
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pricing rule, the IRS was recognised in the market as an expert agent, equipped 
with the necessary information derived from affidavits and also from auditors 
and tax officials with a deep knowledge gained through practice to implement 
the rule successfully. However, this had not historically been the case for the 
IRS. Chapter Six illustrated that lack of knowledge at all levels prevented the 
creation of a rule that fully met the OECD guidelines regarding methods, and 
that this, combined with non-documentation requirements, caused long-
standing inefficiencies and lack of control over the implementation of the rule. 
The few taxpayers interviewed commented that they relied heavily on tax 
advisors and that they even asked for more than one opinion in order to 
manage risks. The complexity of general tax legislation was perceived to be a 
desirable feature of tax legislation as that allowed them to increase their 
economic capital and positions as necessary players in the field. In transfer 
pricing, the role of advisors was even more significant, showing the dominance 
of professional services firms. This finding is consistent with previous research 
regarding the dominance of the Big Four firms in the accounting discipline 
(Sikka & Willmott, 2009; Stringfellow et al., 2015). The perception of the IRS’ 
lack of control relaxed taxpayers into accumulating little or no knowledge on 
transfer pricing, whereas professional services firms were acquiring knowledge 
over the years through the increasing number of audits and the importation of 
knowledge from foreign staff. 
In general terms, it can be inferred that tax knowledge was related to 
transparency, becoming a tool for domination in the ‘battle’ between the 
executive and parliament to get legislation passed. It has been empirically 
proved that the executive used the structural elements discussed above, as well 
as withholding and non-disclosure strategies, to dominate the tax policy-making 
field. There was a perception that information was disclosed in a managerial 
and summarised way, that parliamentarians were not told the whole truth, that 
the economic estimates were subject to manipulation, and that full tax 
information was disclosed only to political allies. Information was also at stake 
at the implementation stage. With the legislation playing in the taxpayers’ 
favour, the IRS was in a very disadvantaged position to enforce the 1997 
transfer pricing rule. Taxpayers had the power not to disclose information 
compulsorily through an affidavit, but only after an audit had commenced and 
262 
based on the IRS’ general powers. The IRS requested information and the 
taxpayers provided minimal information, generally of poor quality, incomplete 
and erroneous, as shown in practice. 
Social capital 
Power derived from social connections proved to be an important factor in 
producing tax legislation during the design and legislative phases. Bourdieu 
refers to social capital in general and to its variant in the political sphere, 
political capital. In the context of general tax policy processes, it was noted that 
in practice external agents entered the tax policy field through connections, i.e. 
social capital, with official/structural members of the tax policy-making field. 
Both the executive branch and parliament consulted agents they knew (social 
capital) and trusted politically (political capital). 
These aspects were also present in the transfer pricing regulatory processes. In 
the formulation of the 1997 transfer pricing rule, external members were known 
to senior members in the bureaucratic field (social capital) through a think tank 
sharing political ideas (political capital) to access the field of power discussed 
above. Although it was expected that accessing knowledge in this way might fill 
the gap in the bureaucracy and hence improve the standard of the rule, the 
absence of trust, a form of social capital which has been studied in the 
literature, as well as a belief in the over-representation of the interests of the 
professional services field, blocked the impact of the input into the content of 
legislation regarding documentation requirements. The absence of 
documentation and information involved a big struggle between tax authorities 
and taxpayers in the implementation phase, as noted empirically in Chapter Six. 
In parliament, excessive trust reinforced by the structural violence commented 
on above limited the extent of debate, affecting the robustness of the rule. High 
levels of trust between members of the general chambers and members of the 
committees of finance diminished the extent of discussion in parliament, 
potentially affecting its robustness. Note that the content of tax legislation 
cannot be modified in the National Congress without a negotiation process 
between the latter and the executive branch, as discussed above. 
Effective mobilisation of social capital was positively linked with the standard of 
the 2012 transfer pricing rule. During the design and drafting phases, access to 
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trustable sources – individuals belonging to the professional services, 
international bureaucratic, political and academic fields – allowed the IRS to 
improve the content and standard of tax legislation in aspects such as more 
beneficial fines regimes, improved and innovative relationship assumptions, and 
innovative methods to encourage information disclosure in APA procedures, as 
illustrated in detail in Chapter Seven. However, social capital (including political 
capital) was insufficient to improve the robustness of the legislation, as noted in 
the parliamentary debate, in which those consulted were unsuccessful in 
inculcating parliamentarians with the field doxa, as discussed above. In 
summary, it can be inferred that technical knowledge (an aspect of cultural 
capital) and social capital were relevant elements in producing good legislation, 
as noted in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. 
Also important, but less evident, was the role of social capital in the 
implementation of tax regulation in Chile. A general aspect to highlight is the 
relationship between tax authorities and taxpayers. As noted in Chapters Five 
and Six, it was observed that tax authorities were well-perceived and trusted by 
taxpayers and tax advisors, which was relevant to tax compliance. The 
relationship between taxpayers and their advisors also deserves some space in 
these conclusions. Tax advisors protected their reputation (symbolic capital) 
through a strict adherence to legislation, avoiding unnecessary risks to become 
trustable sources of professional capital (Kurunmäki, 1999). In the transfer 
pricing implementation phase, it has been noted that this close relationship, 
sustained by trust (social capital) between taxpayers and tax advisors, was a 
constant over the years, granting dominance to specialist firms. 
Domination and symbolic violence 
Throughout the study it has been shown that some agents were able to 
dominate in each phase of the tax policy-making process, deriving their power 
from the amount and composition of capitals they had. The IRS, through its 
powers conferred by the Organic Law to draft, implement and interpret the 
legislation, as explained in Chapter Five, dominated in the tax policy-making 
field at more than one stage. The IRS had converted its capitals (e.g. economic, 
tax knowledge, information and trust) into symbolic capital, which legitimised its 
practices. An example of this symbolic power is that, in the 2012 drafting stage, 
interest groups did not challenge the IRS regarding the content of the law as it 
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was perceived that the course of action taken was correct. The IRS also 
attempted to dominate at the implementation phase through extensive 
interpretation of the law (Hasseldine & Morris, 2013), threatening taxpayers with 
shaming and international loss of prestige for non-compliance with the spirit of 
the law contained in the OECD guidelines. The IRS’ domination was also 
present in issuing the 1997 and 2012 transfer pricing administrative guidance, 
aiming to extend the content of the law in its favour and remaining silent on 
other unregulated areas, thus maintaining the level of uncertainty in the field 
and exercising a form of symbolic violence, as suggested by Gracia and Oats 
(2012). 
The role of specific individuals should not be neglected. Actors in the 
bureaucratic and political fields converted their cultural and social capital into 
symbolic capital, enabling them to dominate in their respective practices: the 
1997 transfer pricing policy design in the case of the deputy minister of finance; 
the 1997 transfer pricing debate in the case of the two opposition senators; and 
the 2012 drafting and implementation teams in the case of the IRS. The junior 
tax advisor was an actor who, although he had converted his tax knowledge 
and social capital into reputation to access the 1997 transfer pricing policy 
process, was unable to dominate due to political barriers within the 
bureaucracy, where there was a perceived over-representation of professional 
services firms. 
The findings also suggest the existence of rites of institution (Bourdieu, 1991), 
which attributed ‘values or competences to individuals ... that transform 
individuals in terms of how they are perceived and how they perceive 
themselves’ (Stringfellow et al., 2015), favouring government parliamentarians. 
The executive provided these parliamentarians with additional tax knowledge 
and information in order to approve tax bills and dominate opposing 
parliamentarians in the debate in the National Congress. This form of distinction 
between government and opposition parliamentarians and its acceptance as an 
intrinsic feature of the tax policy-making field may be interpreted as a form of 
symbolic violence. This masked the authority of the executive branch and a tacit 
form of supremacy of government parliamentarians throughout this process. 
There is also evidence to suggest that tax advisors were dominant actors in the 
transfer pricing field. This domination was exercised by not accepting any types 
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of professional service but only those over which they had full control from 
beginning to end of the process, denying their professional capital (Kurunmäki, 
1999) and exercising symbolic violence (Gracia & Oats, 2012), given that 
taxpayers had no other choice but to consent to such domination in order to 
report their transactions. Acts of symbolic violence by tax advisors were also 
exhibited in the use of language (Terdiman, 1987). Established professionals 
used derogatory language – ‘loudmouth/chanta’ – to distinguish themselves 
from newcomers or beginners and maintain their dominance in the transfer 
pricing field, creating the belief that others were unable to render a good service 
(Ramirez, 2009). 
8.3 Contributions 
Firstly, in response to particular calls made in this respect (e.g. Lamb, 2001; 
Oats, 2012), this study adds to the growing body of literature on tax practice in 
its operating context. Most critical tax research in practice has examined the 
effects of tax legislation on society once in place. Other scholars and 
researchers have examined the ‘behind the scenes’ of tax policy-making; 
however, they have either referred to legislation in general terms, disregarding 
its specific technical effects in practice (e.g. Heij, 2007; Steinmo, 1993; Wales & 
Wales, 2012), or, in examining particular tax policy processes (e.g. Marriott, 
2010), they have narrowed their analysis to a specific stage of policy-making. In 
contrast to the limitations of these studies, this research has examined both 
general income tax and particular transfer pricing legislation across all stages of 
tax policy making, providing additional insights into this practice (Gould & Baker, 
2002) and illustrating how specific policy processes produce legislation with 
certain characteristics. This analysis of transfer pricing is timely and contributes 
to current debate and policy, especially with increasing interest in the subject 
given the profit-shifting phenomenon addressed by the OECD through the Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project (OECD, 2013a, 2013b, 2014a, 
2014b). 
Secondly, the empirical contribution of this study is based on interviewing ‘good 
participants’ (Meadows and Morse, 2011, p.193), or ‘élites’ (Mulligan, 2008, 
p.323; Wacquant, 1993, p.19) with substantial experience of different stages of 
the process who were able to provide exceptional and first-hand insights. Some 
of these insights were captured shortly after a tax reform was promulgated in 
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Chile in September 2012, which allowed the researcher to obtain from these 
interviewees clear and detailed accounts of why certain courses of action had 
been taken. Similarly, a second round of interviews was conducted shortly after 
the first stage of implementation of the transfer pricing rule, which allowed the 
interviewees to provide recent views of their experience. This qualitative 
interpretive work overcomes the limitations of positivist qualitative research on 
the tax policy-making process (e.g. Freedman, 2013; Richardson, 1994; 
Sawyer, 2013b). 
Thirdly, this study has introduced Bourdieu’s theory of social practice as a 
novelty in tax policy-making literature. By combining structural elements of the 
tax policy-making process, such as the different stages and other specific 
elements of the Chilean context, discussed in Chapter Five and reinforced in 
Section 8.2.1, with Bourdieu’s three notions of power – power in specific 
spheres (field of power), power over resources (capitals), and power as 
acceptance and domination (symbolic power and violence) – a unique 
theoretical framework has been constructed and consistently applied to analyse 
and interpret the findings in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. Mobilisation of these 
theoretical constructs has allowed the researcher to answer the three 
theoretically-informed research questions. 
Finally, the tax policy-making phenomenon addressed in this research project is 
directly linked with the daily practices of various actors (bureaucrats, politicians, 
parliamentarians, professionals, etc.) and, as such, has the potential to have a 
direct influence on how practices are executed in reality when making and 
remaking tax legislation. 
8.4 Further research 
This study has some limitations that might be a motivation for other researchers 
to conduct research in the practice of tax policy making. Firstly, this thesis 
focuses only on direct taxation. Although the transfer pricing legislation enacted 
in 2012 cursorily referred to indirect taxation, the process failed to include a 
detailed regulation on it in the provision. Accordingly, useful insights might be 
gained by analysing processes in the introduction of value added tax and excise 
duties. This might enhance scholars’ and policymakers’ understanding of how to 
formulate and enact better regulation. 
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Secondly, this study has been concerned with the Chilean democratic 
experience of making tax regulation in the period 1990 to September 2012 and 
the subsequent implementation in June/September 2013, with a clear 
distribution of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial branches. 
An interesting alternative study might be a study of tax policy making under 
dictatorships in Chile or other countries in order to examine how different forms 
of power produce legislation with certain features. 
Thirdly, this study is limited to tax policy making in Chile, where the operation of 
institutions, broadly speaking, and culture may be different from interactions 
found in industrialised nations with the same holistic perspective adopted by this 
study. Further research in industrialised countries also adopting a critical-
interpretivist approach would enrich our understanding of tax policy-making 
practice. 
Fourthly, this study has examined the practices of a small number of MNCs. 
More diverse views might be obtained from a larger study on how these entities 
apply transfer pricing legislation or other provisions in Chile, using either face-
to-face interviews or surveys. 
Methodologically speaking, further research could be carried out through 
ethnographies as well as with reference to other data sources. Chile, for 
instance, has started to film and broadcast parliamentary sessions in order to 
legitimate its practices through greater claims to transparency. Video analysis 
might focus on other aspects neglected in the examination of words from 
documents and interviews. 
Theoretically, as noted above, this research has drawn on Bourdieu’s theory of 
social practice. Different insights might be drawn from mobilisation of other 
theoretical frameworks, such as new institutional sociology or historical 
institutionalism, or other social theorists, as some researchers have suggested 




Appendix 1: Regulatory Impact Assessment 
Regulatory impact assessment (RIA) is part of the smart regulation state 
(OECD, 2002) and, as such, is a coherent and mandatory type of administrative 
procedure used to evaluate how and to what extent proposed legislation 
(primary and/or secondary) affects stakeholders, economic sectors and the 
environment (Radaelli & De Francesco, 2010). This evaluation may take place 
before or after the implementation of regulation, although it is usually used 
before (Radaelli, 2010), and its scope of analysis is broad, including: the effects 
of administrative burdens, compliance costs or complex cost-benefit 
calculations; economic sectors ranging from type of firm competitiveness to the 
economic impact of regulations at large; and the effects of regulation on public 
administration (Radaelli & De Francesco, 2010). 
RIA is used in problem definition, in identifying the range of available options, in 
the process of consultation, in the classification of benefits and costs, in plans 
for monitoring and review, and in the choice of options on the basis of decision-
making criteria such as cost effectiveness, minimisation of administrative 
burdens, cost-benefit analysis ratios, and thresholds (Radaelli, 2010). RIA has 
been used in law-making processes in Europe (Radaelli, 2010) where, through 
independent evaluation, it has been found to be embedded in policy formulation 
processes (Radaelli, 2010). 
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Appendix 2: Fundamental Transfer Pricing Concepts 
Market behaviour (Plesner Rossing, 2013) is operationalised through the arm’s 
length principle contained in Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention 
(OECD, 1992) to avoid double taxation. 
 Arm’s length principle 
This principle states that when two divisions or business units within an MNE 
undertake internal transfers of goods, services and intangibles, the price 
charged should be that set if the transaction had been between independent 
parties. 
The OECD (2010a, p.131) argues that the complexity of some transfer 
pricing issues and particular situations under analysis may lead to 
differences in the application of the arm’s length principle and the 
subsequent determination of prices. Accordingly, these price differences 
raise uncertainty in the determination of the final tax liability for companies 
and authorities (Rogers & Oats, 2013). Other problems arise because a 
market price may not exist (Chan & Chow, 1997) or because transactions 
may share some common elements but are different (Eden et al., 2005). 
Although many countries have attempted to follow the OECD standard, 
regulation across countries may differ, increasing uncertainty in the 
application of the principle (Cools & Emmanuel, 2007). 
 Comparability analysis 
This is the core of the OECD methodologies (Adams & Coombs, 2007). It 
consists of comparison between a controlled transaction – within an MNE – 
with an uncontrolled transaction(s) – between independent parties. 
 Transfer pricing methods 
In the determination of prices, some methods are deemed to reflect the 
underlying arm’s length principle well. Two categories of method are 
distinguished: the traditional transaction method and the transactional profit 
method. The traditional transaction method has three sub-categories: the 
comparable uncontrolled price method (CUP), the resale price method and 
the cost plus method. 
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The CUP method ‘compares the price for property or services transferred in 
a controlled transaction to the price charged for property or services 
transferred in a comparable uncontrolled transaction in comparable 
circumstances’ (OECD, 2010a, p.24).  
The resale price method is ‘based on the price at which a product that has 
been purchased from an associated enterprise is resold to an independent 
enterprise. The resale price is reduced by the resale price margin. What is 
left after subtracting the resale price margin can be regarded, after 
adjustment for other costs associated with the purchase of the product (e.g. 
custom duties), as an arm’s length price of the original transfer of property 
between the associated enterprises’ (OECD, 2010a, pp.28-9). 
The cost plus method uses ‘the costs incurred by the supplier of property (or 
services) in a controlled transaction. An appropriate cost plus mark-up is 
added to this cost, to make an appropriate profit in light of the functions 
performed (taking into account assets used and risks assumed) and the 
market conditions. What is arrived at after adding the cost plus mark-up to 
the above costs may be regarded as an arm’s length price of the original 
controlled transaction’ (OECD, 2010a, p.26). 
Transactional profit methods include the transactional net margin and 
transactional profit split methods. The former ‘examines the net profit margin 
relative to an appropriate base (e.g. costs, sales, assets) that a taxpayer 
realises from a controlled transaction’ (OECD, 2010a, p.30). The latter 
‘identifies the combined profit to be split for the associated enterprises from 
a controlled transaction … and then splits those profits between the 
associated enterprises based upon an economically valid basis that 
approximates the division of profits that would have been anticipated and 
reflected in an agreement made at arm’s length’ (OECD, 2010a, p.28). 
 Burden of proof 
Burden of proof is a legal term used to denote the duty imposed on a party 
to prove or disprove an assertion. Regarding transfer pricing, the allocation 
of burden of proof differs amongst OECD countries. In most cases, the tax 
authority proves or disproves the validity of a transfer pricing argument. In 
other cases, taxpayers bear the burden of proof (OECD, 2013a, p.134). 
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 Documentation 
The guidelines provide some recommendations for tax administrations in 
designing rules and procedures on documentation to be requested from 
taxpayers. It also provides some guidance to taxpayers on identifying helpful 
documentation to show that their transactions have followed the arm’s length 
principle and to facilitate tax examinations. 
Although the tax administration has the burden of proof, it may oblige the 
taxpayer to submit some form of documentation (for example, an affidavit) to 
allow it to examine transactions adequately. It is suggested that the tax 
administration should not request documentation that is unrelated or costly 
to obtain or generate. 
 Transfer pricing compliance practices 
In the implementation of transfer pricing rules, the OECD (2010a) 
acknowledges that domestic practices dominate. However, all these 
practices tend to reduce non-compliance (e.g. withholding taxes and 
information reporting), provide positive assistance for compliance (e.g. 
education and published guidance) and discourage non-compliance with 
penalties which should be in accordance with the whole tax system as a 
percentage of the unpaid tax. 
Tax audits are more difficult than other audits. These audits are described 
as ‘fact-intensive’ and require difficult analysis of comparability, markets and 
financial or other information (OECD, 2013a, p.133). In such circumstances, 
the administration may require specialist staff, and the procedures may take 
longer (OECD, 2010a, p.133). 
The application of the arm’s length principle does not entail a certain unique 
price but a range of prices in certain circumstances. Judgments of the 
authority and taxpayers may differ and, as a result, different methods may 
be considered appropriate. Given these conditions, tax administrators are 
called to be flexible and not expect unrealistic precision from the taxpayer. 
Tax administrators should also take the business reality into account during 
the analysis (OECD, 2010a, p.34). 
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 Corresponding adjustment 
A corresponding adjustment is ‘an adjustment to the tax liability of the 
associated enterprise in a second tax jurisdiction made by the tax 
administration of that jurisdiction, corresponding to a primary adjustment 
made by the tax administration in a first tax jurisdiction, so that the allocation 
of profits by the two jurisdictions is consistent’ (OECD, 2010a, p.25). 
 Primary adjustment 
A primary adjustment is ‘an adjustment that a tax administration in a first 
jurisdiction makes to a company’s taxable profits as a result of applying the 
arm’s length principle to transactions involving an associated enterprise in a 
second tax jurisdiction’ (OECD, 2010a, p.28). 
 Secondary adjustment 
A secondary adjustment is ‘an adjustment that arises from imposing tax on a 
secondary transaction’ (OECD, 2010a, p.29). 
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Appendix 3: Codes Developed in NVivo 
Principal codes Sub-codes 









Tax policy design 
Budgeting 
Quality of law 
Tax knowledge 
Field of power 


















































Appendix 4: Interview Topics 
Design stage 
Tax policy design 
Who participates in this stage? 
What factors do you consider in tax policy design? 
Do you consult? Whom? How? 
How transparent is the process? 
What is the role of trust during this stage? 
Do you consider taxpayers’ behaviour at this stage? 
What coordination is there with other entities? 
Drafting 
Who participates in this stage? 
How is drafting carried out? 
What considerations are made during drafting? 
How is the quality of drafting assessed? 
How and why was transfer pricing drafted in this way? 
How was its quality assessed? 
Do you consult? Whom? How? 
What coordination is there with tax policy makers? 
Budgeting 
How is the budgeting process conducted? 
Who participates in budgeting? 
What consultation and coordination are there with other entities? 
How was transfer pricing budgeting conducted? 
Legislative stage 
What do you know is done when a tax bill is received? 
How do you know that the quality/purpose of the bill has been assessed? 
Who participates in this exercise? 
Do you know if consultation is carried out? How? Why? 
How is consensus reached with other policy makers? 
What is your perception of the transparency of the process? 
What is the role of trust in debating tax regulation? 




How is this unit organised? Number of people and roles? 
How is administrative guidance issued? 
What do you think about the quality of the law? 
What do you do when the law is uncertain? 
How are audits conducted? 
How is the relationship with taxpayers managed? 
How is the relationship with tax advisors managed? 
Taxpayers 
How is this unit organised? Number of people and roles? 
To what extent do you use administrative guidance? 
How do you comply with the rule? Compliance costs? 
How is the relationship with the tax administration managed? 
What do you think the transfer pricing rule is? 
How do you manage that quality? 
How was the first submission of an affidavit for you? 
What was the role of tax authorities and advisors in this first stage? 
Tax advisors 
How is this unit organised? Number of people and roles? 
To what extent do you use administrative guidance? 
How do you manage your relationship with taxpayers? 
How do you manage the relationship with the tax authorities? 
What is your opinion about the tax law-making process? 
What do you think about the transfer pricing rules? 
How do you manage that quality? 
How was the first submission of affidavit for you? 
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